

TRANSCRIPT WITH COMMENTARY

Tristan

Tristan Interview 4

Below in black is a word-for-word transcript of the January 27 interview with Tristan that is available on YouTube at <https://youtu.be/0T3rp2NhDVc>. In green are comments about and explanations of the Descriptive Experience Sampling process. If you have corrections, suggestions, or questions, please post them as YouTube comments.

RTH = Russ Hurlburt

AG = Amber Goto

Tristan = Tristan

- 0:00 RTH: Okay. And I can hear you also, I've got that, got that problem solved. Sorry about that. Too many, too many switches all have to be aligned in the right direction. So this is going to be Tristan's fourth day at this, is that right?
- 0:18 AG: Yes, day 4.
- 0:21 RTH: And anything we should be talking about before we launch into that?
- 0:27 Tristan: Um, no, I guess we could just get going.
- 0:32 RTH: I'm ready.
- 0:33 Tristan: Well, this, this, this day has a couple samples that I'm a little embarrassed about, but I'm still gonna talk about them, I think.
- 0:43 RTH: Okay.
- 0:43 Tristan: Y'know, [RTH: Well.] I mean, I thought of self, self-censoring, but I don't necessarily think it merits that, so just go ahead and do it.
- 0:54 RTH: Okay. Well, I would, what I would say is that we should do it and then when we're done doing it, then we can decide whether that was a good idea and we can decide whether to erase video or whatever about that. And, uh, but I think that's a, I prefer that to self-censoring, let's put it that way.
- 0:54 Russ comments: That Tristan would prefer to describe phenomena rather than self-censor is a sign that he values and is working toward high-fidelity description, which is good as far as I am concerned. It also puts us on notice that we will have to treat his descriptions with the respect that his willingness to reveal deserves.
- 1:11 Tristan: Yeah, right. It's, they're not that bad anyway, just still.
- 1:15 RTH: Alright, number 1. So it was number 1. One of those that are in the category of?

SAMPLE 4.1 DISCUSSION STARTS HERE

- 1:21 Tristan: Number 1 is fairly benign, so number 1. Um, so as a matter of fact, I was watching a movie, um, and I, um, it had been uttered in the film the phrase, “what do you mean wrong?” Um, and I had that entire phrase in my consciousness somehow. So almost as if I was picking out that particular phrase from the film. Um, and, and was sorta just registering it.
- 2:13 RTH: And does that mean I’m not just hearing that with comprehension, but I am somehow in my consciousness storing that or particularizing that or?
- 2:26 Tristan: Yes, I believe that there was some particularizing in my consciousness because at that moment in time, there may have been words uttered since that phrase on screen, but that was the phrase that my mind had picked out at that moment.
- 2:26 Russ comments: This particularizing seems similar to the “the last” words in sample 3.2. (It also may have been a feature of samples 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3, where the discussion suggested that a word was particularized, but the day-2 interview did not establish the degree of that particularization.) We are iteratively differentiating the experience / term “particularizing” as an idiographically significant feature of Tristan’s sampling—it connotes *not* that the beep happened to occur during that phrase, but that Tristan has actively latched onto that phrase in some conscious “particularizing” way.
- 2:42 RTH: Okay. And, and how does this, how does it particularize that, how does it pick that out?
- 2:47 Tristan: It was.
- 2:47 RTH: And, and I’m, and I’m not looking for a mechanism. I’m, I’m, I’m trying to ask about the experience. So what, how?
- 2:58 Tristan: Yeah. Which is, which is hard for me to say, almost as if the sound of it keeps ringing in my mind, somehow. This is a metaphor, but as if it sounded out, and then the sound is sort of like carries on in my mind.
- 2:58 Russ comments: Disentangling metaphors is a large part of the DES task. The upcoming minutes are devoted to that task.
- 3:16 RTH: Okay. And by “the sound carries on,” what, what, which of that is the metaphor? So does this seem like an *auditory* phenomenon? That they, I somehow continue to *hear* it? Or is that the metaphor, and it’s just somehow it *lingers* in the best way?
- 3:30 Tristan: Uh, it’s almost as if I continue to hear it.
- 3:34 RTH: And by “almost as if,” do you mean in my imagination I continue to hear it?

3:40 Tristan: Yes.

3:43 RTH: As, and I continue to hear it as it was said in the first place? Like the actor [Tristan: Yup.] said it this way.

3:51 Tristan: Yes.

3:51 RTH: So somehow I am continuing to hear that, even though the actor is no longer saying it?

3:57 Tristan: Yes.

3:58 RTH: Okay. And, and I'm interested in the "almost as if" portion of that. So does it seem, as far as my experience is concerned, does it still seem like I'm hearing it? Sorta straightforwardly I'm still hearing it? It in the real world I know it's, it's not there, but as far as my experiential world is I still hear it?

4:21 Tristan: Um, [tentatively] that could be yes.

4:30 RTH: But I'm not sure? [He responds to the tentativeness of Tristan's 4:21 reply.]

4:33 Tristan: I'm not entirely sure. But it's.... I would, I would say that I still hear it.

4:38 RTH: Okay.

4:38 Tristan: Yeah.

4:40 RTH: So it's not like I'm *speaking* it again? That's like, not like [Tristan: No.] I heard it, now I'm *speaking* i. And it's not like I'm have heard it and now I'm *seeing* it, seeing it *written out* or something, it's not like that?

4:53 Tristan: Yes, I'm still hearing it.

4:55 RTH: Okay. And it's not like I'm just, this isn't, I'm, I'm stating these as facts, but I really mean them as questions. Is, is it like, I guess I could say, is it like I have just stored away the understanding of it, and now the understanding of it is still present to me? Or is it that I continue to hear it even in my imagination?

5:18 Tristan: I continue to hear it.

5:18 Russ comments: Note that we have been disentangling this single metaphor for over two minutes. It's hard work, and it takes skill, time, effort, and attention. Viewers should (a) judge for themselves whether RTH has unfairly coerced this discussion; (b) whether Tristan is to be believed that the experience is of hearing; and (c) recognize that the whole effort is part of the iterative process that started on day 2 and will continue on day 5 or 6 or later.

The object is *not* to *eliminate* metaphor; metaphors are great, useful, tools. It is fair to say that all words are metaphors. The object is not to be confused by your own or others' metaphors.

- 5:21 RTH: Okay. And is there anything else in my experience, other than the continued hearing?
- 5:28 Tristan: Regarding this phrase or [RTH: Yeah.] regarding the rest of my sample?
- 5:33 RTH: Anything else in your experience?
- 5:36 Tristan: Um, so yes. So I'm thinking of a paper idea. Um, the fact that, I'm trying to think about this for an, for an essay, I'm gonna write for a specific class. And the fact that I'm trying to think about this paper idea was quite prominent, but the actual content of this idea is quite, um, it, it's hard to pin down what the actual content of this idea is. Um, but it has to do *something* with the idea of classifying types of *uncanny narratives*, um, or ways to classify what makes a narrative uncanny.
- 6:40 RTH: And are you saying that something about uncanny narratives are present in my experience at the moment of the beep? Or are you saying there's really *nothing* present in my experience at the moment of the beep, but I *know* what I'm thinking about because I've been thinking about it or whatever, [Tristan: Um.] but, but I have to tell Hurlburt and, and Amber what the [Tristan: Right.] what the deal is I'm gonna say it's about uncanny narratives.
- 7:05 Tristan: Something about uncanny narratives is present at the moment of the beep.
- 7:11 RTH: But not specifically what?
- 7:14 Tristan: Uh, some, something about that *is* present at the moment of the beep.
- 7:17 RTH: Okay.
- 7:18 Tristan: Um.
- 7:20 RTH: And is it possible to say more about what it is that's present? Or is it just that I understand myself to be thinking about uncanny narratives, but I don't know anything more about what that thought-process is?
- 7:33 Tristan: Um, well, um, there is an anxiety about wanting to find something, uh, something good to say about uncanny narratives and about not knowing what I'm going to say about uncanny narratives.
- 8:03 RTH: And is that anxiety present at the moment of the beep?
- 8:07 Tristan: Yes.
- 8:08 RTH: Experientially present?

- 8:10 Tristan: Yes.
- 8:10 RTH: It's not just, it's not just that I understand that I'm anxious in this, but somehow I *feel* anxious at this moment?
- 8:17 Tristan: Yes.
- 8:19 RTH: And how do, how does that present itself?
- 8:23 Tristan: Um, this anxiety is, is a cognitive anxiety, less, less than a bodily anxiety.
- 8:39 RTH: And by cognitive do you mean I'm, I'm thinking about this and the thinking is, I'm calling it anxiety? Or do you mean by cognitive something that's sort of in the mental realm, it's not bodily, but yet I **feel anxiety**. So the question is the, the question that I want to distinguishing or does, does this seem like a feeling or does it seem like a thinking?
- 9:03 Tristan: It's a, it, it's a feeling actually,
- 9:07 RTH: But mental?
- 9:08 Tristan: Mental, yeah.
- 9:11 RTH: And it's related to the not knowing what I'm gonna say. I wanna say, I gotta say something [Tristan: Yeah.] in that ballpark. And is there anything else in your experience at the moment of this beep?
- 9:25 Tristan: Yes, there's a visual component. Um, so well there are, there are actually *two* visual components because, uh, I am watching a film and I am seeing what's happening on the screen. Um, but there's also just an *equally* strong *imagined* visual component, which is that I'm innerly seeing, uh, a classroom and, um, uh, well, hmm, I'm seeing a classroom and I'm seeing myself, uh, and I'm seeing myself present a paper in it. Um, however, um, this is sort of a seeing without seeing as in, in this visual component. I know that what I'm seeing is myself presenting a paper in this classroom, but it's not like I'm seeing a specific image. It's like I'm seeing *something*. I know this something is me in this classroom presenting a paper, but the exact details of where I am, how I'm positioned, what's happening in the scene are harder to pick out.
- 9:25 Russ comments: RE "There's also just an equally strong imagined visual component"
 Here are some possible understandings that we will have to sort out: (1) Does he actually mean "I have a presupposition that when my eyes are open I must be experientially seeing what my eyeballs are aimed at, but I have this inner seeing, so I will say "equally" because it seems impossible that my visual experience is entirely imaginary here"?
- RE "this is sort of a seeing without seeing"
 (2) Does he mean that this is not really a visual phenomenon but is instead an understanding of something visual? Or (3) does he mean that he is experiencing

seeing without experiencing the thing seen? Or (4) is he seeing some details but not others, e.g., seeing classroom parts but not himself in the classroom? And if so, does it still make sense to say “I’m seeing myself present a paper in it.” There are probably some other options as well.

Much of the confusion, I think, comes from Tristan’s adopting the natural attitude (as do nearly all people), presuming that his experience must in some way reflect the real world. DES is largely about helping both participant and interviewer bracket the natural attitude.

11:06 RTH: So, so tell me about what you *see* without trying to explain why you might see it or what’s behind it or whatever. So what do you see?

11:18 Tristan: Um, well, it’s a pr, it’s a specific classroom that I know and have been in before. Um.

11:26 RTH: And do you see that more or less clearly in, in my imagination, I see this particular classroom more or less clearly?

11:38 Tristan: Um, less clearly.

11:38 Russ comments: RTH’s use (11:26) of “more or less” illustrates the difficulty of interviews in general, and specifically about interviews about experience. RTH intended his question to mean something like “Was this a clear seeing, with perhaps some not-so-clear features?” That is, RTH intended “more or less” as a potential underminer of “clear,” meaning something like “approximately” or “for the most part.” That is in accord with Webster: “**more or less**: 1: to a varying or undetermined extent or degree : SOMEWHAT (they were *more or less* willing to help); 2: with small variations : APPROXIMATELY (contains 16 acres *more or less*).”

But Tristan took “more or less” as if I had asked, “Do you see this *more* clearly or *less* clearly?” That is a perfectly reasonable understanding, but it is not what RTH intended.

The question then becomes, what to do about this misunderstanding. RTH elects to let it slide for the moment, and to leave sussing it out to the iterative process.

Merriam-Webster. (n.d.). More or less. In Merriam-Webster.com dictionary. Retrieved February 6, 2025, from <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/more%20or%20less>

11:44 RTH: And what do you see of, of that classroom?

11:48 Tristan: Um.

11:49 RTH: And I’m not interested in the real classroom, I’m interested in what you see. Do you see desks or tables or maps or blackboards or all of the above or none of the above?

12:16 Tristan: [long pause] Um.

12:24 RTH: And there’s a long pause here.

- 12:27 Tristan: Yeah, yeah. Maybe, maybe I can't say at this moment.
- 12:35 RTH: So should I, should I understand that as, *at the moment I was seeing a classroom clearly, but now I can't remember the details of it?* Or was it *at the moment I was somehow seeing a classroom, even though there were no classroom details present?* I had the experience of seeing a classroom, but I didn't actually see a classroom, even in my imagination.
- 13:04 Tristan: I think there's some, I think there's some details that I, that I, that I didn't properly note um.
- 13:15 RTH: They were there but somehow forgotten between then and now?
- 13:18 Tristan: Yeah.
- 13:18 RTH: Okay.
- 13:18 Tristan: Well, I wrote, I wrote "vague diffuse, not very visual, but slight visual component." Um, yeah, I need to, I need to dig into what this seeing was.
- 13:18 Russ comments: RE "I need to dig into what this seeing was"
The last few minutes illustrates the iterative process at work. Russ doesn't know the answer. Tristan doesn't know the answer. Together they might be able to engineer a situation where *next time* they can perhaps get clearer about this phenomenon. There is probably nothing to be gained by trying to dig into this particular experience—it is water over the dam. The iterative process is forward looking, not backward looking.
- 13:33 RTH: Okay.
- 13:33 Tristan: I'm not very good at getting these half formed, seeing without seeing.
- 13:41 RTH: Well, so what I would say about that is that nobody is, at least at the, at the beginning, and we might get better at that as we go. Maybe not, but we might, [Tristan: Mm hmm.] and that's part of the, part of the practice that we are engaged in, is trying to describe as careful as we can what was actually going on at the moment of the beep *without* speculating about it.
- 14:06 Tristan: Right.
- 14:07 RTH: So at some future beep, when you have this kind of an experience, well maybe you'll be able to capture it better, or maybe not. Maybe there's something about this kind of experience which just evades capturing altogether. That would be fine with me.
- 14:19 Tristan: Mm hmm.

14:19 RTH: That's what we're, that's what we're about. We're what we're trying to sort through. So what I'm gathering about this is as best you can say, there's something *visual* about it.

14:31 Tristan: Yeah.

14:34 RTH: But exactly what it is that's visual I'm not so sure about. It's a classroom, but how much of that classroom, how much of a classroom I actually *see*, or how much of it is sort of implied in the seeing—I see it, but I don't, the thing seen, the classroom scene doesn't actually appear to me [Tristan: Right.]—how much of that is, how much of that is present I'm not sure.

14:54 Tristan: Right.

14:56 RTH: Okay. [pause] And is there more, more about this experience?

15:09 Tristan: Um.

15:10 RTH: At any, any aspect of it at the moment of the beep?

15:16 Tristan: Mm, any aspect of it. Um.

15:22 RTH: So I think going forward it might be, it might be easier if in your opening salvo you describe sorta the whole deal—these are all the things that are present at the moment of the beep.

15:32 Tristan: Right.

15:32 RTH: That I, I was watching a movie and *seeing* it, but at the, uh, and the guy was saying something and I had it in my experience that was present. And, uh, I was also thinking, um, in sort of in general, in the direction of my, what I'm supposed to write about this paper and uh, uncanny narratives, what is an uncanny narrative and that's an anxiety arousing thing and I feel anxiety in a mental way. And at the *same time*, I am somehow seeing myself presenting this paper. That's what I've got as being sorta the *whole* experience at that was on, all those things were ongoing at the moment of this beep somehow simultaneously.

15:32 Russ comments: This is the fourth sampling day, and RTH is giving pretty basic instructions about how to do the DES procedure. Why is that?

Because RTH's view is that the development of the DES-with-Tristan procedure is every bit as iterative as the description of Tristan's phenomena—DES is iterative *all the way down*. We took a shot at a procedure, used it, refined it a bit, and now RTH is suggesting a further refinement. That suggestion arises out of the personal interactions between Tristan and Russ and Amber, *not* as the result of some supposed (one could say impersonal) best DES practice.

16:17 Tristan: Mm hmm. Yeah

16:18 RTH: Okay. Is that, is that right?

16:20 Tristan: Yeah.

16:21 RTH: And so what I was saying is I think it might be easier for all of us actually, if, if you were to give that as your sort of opening salvo, rather than to give one piece of it. And let us, let us break it apart and.

16:37 Tristan: Right. Okay. Yep. So should we do number 2?

16:42 RTH: Yes. Number 2. And this will be Amber's turn.

16:44 AG: Okay. Yup beep 2.

SAMPLE 4.2 DISCUSSION STARTS HERE

16:47 Tristan: Um, so my friend Emily has said the phrase, "I don't want someone to lick my crack." Now, she said this before the, before the, the beep or before the sample proceeding the beep, uh, but the *meaning* was still in my consciousness. Um, so I am speaking at this moment, um, I, as a matter of fact, I have said the words "Don't knock it till..." um, uh, and I'm hearing the words I was speaking. Um, at the same time, I am innerly seeing, um, uh, a butt crack being licked. Um, now it's, this is not attached to any particular person. Um, it's just an image I see. It has, um, a, it's vague and diffuse. It's not as if I'm actually seeing it in front of me, but I do see particular aspects of it. Um, like it, there, there is, there is a visual component that I can identify here. Um, and there's also an associated feeling with this image. There's an affective feeling of it being somehow kinda icky or clammy or something. Um, and as a matter of fact, I am seeing my friend, um, and I am, while I, I *am* seeing her, uh, I would say that it's about 50-50 between, uh, the image in my mind and the image of her in front of me, in terms of how present each one is in my experience. Um, yeah, that's what I got.

19:11 AG: Okay. So I heard quite a few things going on there. Um, but if I got it correctly, there's sort of three-ish, four things going on. And when I say three ish, four, it sounds like this innerly seeing or this imaginative seeing and this seeing of Emily I take it is, y'know, somehow equally present in a portion of my experience.

19:11 Russ comments: RE "in a portion of my experience"

AG seems to be saying that Tristan has one visual portion of experience that is divided into two parts (one inner, one outer). I don't think AG has any warrant for that. Tristan has said that there is an inner seeing *and* there is an outer seeing—he has *not* said that they are two aspects of a seeing experience. Thus, this "in a portion" is likely the result of some presupposition of AG's, perhaps that there is one visual processor.

19:44 Tristan: Right.

19:45 AG: So what I wanna get at is, is there anything of all of this that is the most prominent, the most salient to me?

- 20 Tristan: I would say that, um, the phrase uttered by Emily, um, actually, I would say that it's relatively, they're all relatively equal in salience.
- 20:15 AG: Okay. So is this like 33-33-33? And then that innerly seeing and seeing share half of that? Does that make sense?
- 20:15 Russ comments: I don't think that is right. I think he has said 25-25-25-25. See the comment at 19:11.
- 20:26 Tristan: Um, yeah, that sounds about right.
- 20:33 AG: Okay. So they're all about the same.
- 20:37 RTH: So I'm not sure that I understood which, what they all were yet.
- 20:42 Tristan: Right. So, [RTH: So which?] the way I understand it, Amber, is that there's the hearing or the, the, the phrase my friend had uttered, "I don't want someone to lick my crack." Um, and the fact that my comprehension and thinking about this phrase. Um, there's the me speaking. Um, and then there's the, uh, there's the dueling, uh, visual portion, which is my inner seeing and my actual seeing.
- 20:42 Russ comments: Re "the dueling, uh, visual portion"
Does "dueling" reflect AG's presupposition of one visual portion (see the comment at 19:11). Or does "dueling" reflect Tristan's presupposition of eyes-open-must-be-experience (see comment at 9:25). Or is there actually some experience that could be described as dueling?
I don't know. I am pretty sure that the presuppositions are each entrenched parts of the natural attitude for many people. The art of the DES interview is to convey that any of those would be fine with me, as long as it is a high-fidelity description of experience. So the interview has somehow enable the bracketing skill without pushing too hard in any direction. It is a challenge, but (I think) it is not impossible.
- 21:22 AG: Okay, so let's start with the see, the visual inner seeing, outer seeing portion.
- 21:22 Russ comments: I think using "portion" reifies/reflects AG's presupposition, when I would prefer that she undermine it. (See 19:11.)
- 21:30 Tristan: Right.
- 21:30 AG: So I heard in the inner seeing, right, I am innerly, I, I am seeing a butt crack being licked. And there's some components, details that are in, uh, with that. Can you tell me what, what it is that, that you see?
- 21:30 Russ comments: Amber does a good job here of conveying to Tristan that she is okay with talking about the sensitive material. That is, Tristan had put us on notice that he would not self-censor (0:33), and this is Amber's conveying that she also will not

censor. While unstated, this is an important contract that will underlie the interview: the parties are agreeing to be willing to talk about sensitive material.

21:48 Tristan: Right. So actually this would may mean that there's more than more than four cuz there was a, I attached a feeling to, to it to the image.

21:55 AG: Right, that icky, yes, the icky feeling.

21:59 Tristan: Yeah, okay. So the butt crack being licked. Um, it's, I'm seeing something that, uh, how do I describe it if it's not in metaphor? I am, it's almost like, maybe there's a, well, there's sort of like pale, white flesh perhaps, or, or, y'know, white-in-the-race flesh, maybe the pink line of the crack. Um, and that there's definitely a, a, that sort of line in the middle, um, that there's, that sorta crease that's actually formed. Um, and then there's, um, and the other stuff, it's, it's all a little diffuse. Um, so those are, [AG: So I.] those are those are components that I'm picking out.

21:59 Russ comments: RE "how do I describe it if it's not in metaphor?"

Being forthright about metaphor is a central piece of DES (and any experiential science, I think). I like metaphors; many if not all words are to some degree metaphorical; the object is *not* to eliminate metaphor completely. The aim of DES is to recognize the extent of the metaphor, and not to confuse metaphor with direct apprehension or direct description.

The aim of description is to characterize the phenomenon--what presents itself as itself. Here, it seems to me that what presents itself is the butt crack.

Tristan does not innerly see a line that presents itself as a line, a curve that presents itself as a curve, a crease that presents itself as a crease, and so on, and out of that collection of presenting-themselves-as-themselves phenomena he perceives a butt crack. That would be a natural-attitude explanation of inner seeing—that would be describing components as if inner seeing were a perceptual recognition task. That may well be how perception operates in the real world, but it is not (or at least not necessarily) how inner seeing operates.

The object of DES is to be descriptive as a way of avoiding being metaphorical. To describe here is to say "I see a butt crack." And if you ask me for the details of that seeing, I can say that it is not particular detailed—I see a curve, and some white-skin, and some pink, and a crease." But it is not the case that I see a curve, some pink, and a crease, and then somehow know that I am seeing a butt crack; it is the butt crack that immediately presents itself as innerly seen.

23:19 AG: Okay. So I take it that in this inner seeing the clearest piece or the clearest component is this butt crack. And [Tristan: Yeah.] this being licked is am I, see, I guess I hear that, that somehow that piece about this is not... Am I getting that right? That it's not *seen* directly, [Tristan: Um.] I just understand it to be being licked? Or is it that I see like a tongue or a person with a tongue?

23:50 Tristan: Um, the tongue, if there is tongue is less prominent. Um, and the other, I'm not seeing another person [AG: Okay] doing the licking.

24:01 AG: So do I, do I see the butt crack being licked? Or do I understand the butt, uh, do I see a butt crack and I understand that it's being licked?

24:01 Russ comments: That is a natural-attitude question, implying the clear separation between seeing and understanding. The presented-itself unit of Tristan's apprehension, it seems to me, is the butt crack being licked. It is entirely possible to innerly see a butt crack being licked without seeing any or all of the details. But AG's question suggests that *If I don't see the tongue, then I must be seeing a butt crack and knowing that it is being licked.* I don't think that is true.

24:13 Tristan: [pause] Um, the latter.

24:22 AG: Okay. And is that understanding directly apprehended at the moment of the beep? Or is it because, or is it that I, the moment of the beep, my friend had just said, y'know, "I don't want someone to lick my crack," and, and that's what's going on, but really I'm just seeing a butt?

24:22 Russ comments: RE "is that understanding directly apprehended at the moment of the beep?"

This is the penalty created by AG's natural attitude. She has (unwarrantedly) separated away the understanding from the seeing, and now asks about the features of that separated understanding.

24:46 Tristan: No, it's definitely, I'm seeing it being licked.

24:46 Russ comments: The good news is that Tristan is not sucked in by AG's natural-attitude queries.

24:51 RTH: So, so what's hard about this discussion is, it seems to me, that what I hear Tristan saying is that he's seeing a butt crack being licked, [AG: Mm hmm.] but the visual components that he is seeing are mostly of the butt crack rather than the licking.

25:09 AG: Mm hmm.

25:10 Tristan: Right.

25:10 RTH: But it's not like I'm just seeing a butt crack and somehow then on top of that, I know that I'm being, that it's being licked. [AG: Yeah.] It's that the, the topic that I am seeing, the content that I am seeing, just doesn't have all the details that match up with the description, I guess.

So let, lemme ask a few more questions. So do I, do I see just the butt of this person as opposed to the whole person, but focused on the butt?

25:42 Tristan: Yes. [RTH: And.] The previous, uh the first, yeah.

25:45 RTH: Okay. And does, and does the butt have any particular characteristics? Male, female, wahtever?

25:54 Tristan: Female.

25:55 RTH: Okay. So I'm seeing a female butt being licked?

26 Tristan: Mm hmm.

26:01 RTH: That right? Okay.

26:06 RTH: And by "a bit diffuse," you mean: I just don't, it's not like I see this perfectly clearly I see some aspects of it. My, my seeing articulates some aspects of it?

26:17 Tristan: That's, that's right. Yeah.

26:22 RTH: Okay. I'm good with that portion.

26:24 AG: Uh, me as well. Okay. So this innerly seeing carries this feeling, this icky, clammy feeling that I, I take it to be going on.

26:39 Tristan: Yeah.

26:40 AG: How is that present?

26:43 Tristan: Um, that is present... [long pause] Um, the fact that.... [pause] Um, uh, can you, can you cue me how I might describe its presentness? It's sorta just more like a general feeling. That is a general feeling that I have at the moment. And that is, I, I most closely associate it with this inner image rather than, uh, merely the words or what I'm saying or what, y'know.

27:41 AG: I guess what I'm trying to figure out is: is this right, I hear there's this associated feeling, [Tristan: Mm hmm.] kind of a icky feeling, but I'm wondering, is it like I am innerly seeing an icky clammy, I'm innerly seeing this butt crack, and there's this icky clamminess about the image? Or is it that, is the, is that feeling somehow separate? And if it is, and y'know, and given this feeling, is it bodily or mental or like, I understand that it's somehow associated with the, the innerly, the inner seeing.

27:41 Russ comments: RE "I hear there's this associated feeling.... I understand that it's somehow associated with the, the innerly, the inner seeing"

I think this over-specifies what Tristan had left indefinite. Tristan had said (26:43) "I most closely associate it with this inner image rather than, uh, merely the words or what I'm saying or what, y'know." That is, "I most closely associate it with" is (or at least might be) an expression of how he understands it *now* rather than how it was apprehended at the moment of the beep. That is, he did *not* say "That feeling was part of the image," or even "That feeling was associated with the image"; either of those would have been expressions about the moment of the beep.

In short, Tristan's original expression is indefinite or ambiguous, but AG's restatement loses that indefiniteness and ambiguity. That will make it difficult or impossible to help Tristan sort through the indefinite-ness or ambiguity.

The general principle is: it is not desirable for the interviewer to slide by indefinite-ness or ambiguity. Instead, it is desirable to inhabit that indefinite space and let Tristan remove or amplify the indefinite-ness.

- 28:18 Tristan: Right.
- 28:18 AG: But I'm trying to figure out if there's anything else to it.
- 28:23 RTH: So lemme ask one more, one more question that might help, help you out here.
- 28:26 AG: Okay.
- 28:27 RTH: Is the, is the icky clammy about the butt, or is the immy, clammy about Tristan? Tristan feels immy, clammy, icky?
- 28:38 Tristan: It's, it's about the fact that it's being, that the crack itself is being licked and not any other part of it. [pause] Um.
- 28:53 RTH: So I feel clammy, icky as I think about the butt crack? Or is it the butt crack being licked is an icky clammy thing?
- 29:03 Tristan: The latter.
- 29:15 RTH: Okay. [pause] I think I'm good with that portion.
- 29:17 AG: Okay. Me as well. And then I just wanted to make sure I understand. There's, I heard that there's also a outward seeing of Emily who's really there with me. Um, is it, is this somehow, I, um, is that directly present at the moment of the beep? It's not just that my eyeballs are aimed at Emily, we're having a conversation, but I, but my seeing of Emily visually seeing Emily is directly apprehended at the moment of the beep?
- 29:17 Russ comments: That is a good question, but I don't think it is heavy-handed enough for us to expect that Tristan will grasp the intent. So RTH will try to amplify.
- 29:49 RTH: And, and I would like to amplify that to which I, so I'm agreeing, agreeing entirely with what Amber said, but I wanna make sure that it gets transmitted.
- 29:57 AG: Mm hmm.
- 29:57 RTH: It's possible for your eyes to be open and aimed at Emily. But I'm not interested in what is coming in through my eyeballs. I'm more interested in the butt crack that I am seeing in my imagination. So the question is, do I still continue to see Emily experientially, or is it the case that Emily is being *processed* visually, but I don't really see her? Which is I think the same thing that Amber said, but I made it a little heavier handedly.
- 30:30 Tristan: Yeah. Um, I, I am still seeing Emily. But yeah, I'm, I, I am still seeing her.

- 30:45 AG: Okay. Okay, then I think I'm good with that portion. Um, alright, so then I'll move to this. I had, so I took it that you'd said, I had just said "don't knock it till." That's what was going ongoing in the world. But really my experience is hearing those words, like just, could you tell me a little bit more about that piece, as I understood it?
- 30:45 Russ comments: Tristan had indeed said that he is *hearing* what he is saying (16:47). But RTH knows that DES participants often use *hearing* in the natural attitude—if I am speaking I *must be* hearing it. So he will try to help Tristan bracket that, if necessary.
- 31:13 RTH: So I wanna, I, let me, let me qualify that because I, what I'm, what I'm in both of these qualifications, I'm trying to work against the natural attitude here. [AG: Yeah.][Tristan: Mmm.] So I understand that you are in fact saying "Don't knock it till," but what I wanna call the possibility. I wanna make, wanna make it clear that it's possible that those words could just be rolling out but I'm not really paying attention to them *at all*, in sort of the same sense as when you, most of the people, when they gesture, they don't actually feel a gesture. They don't see the gesture, the gesture is coming out of them, and mean it's meaningful. It's emphasizing this or that or whatever. But it's just, it's, it's, it's just a feature of a fact of the communication universe. But I'm not really paying attention to that. Once you accept *that*, then the *words* can be the same thing.
- 32:06 Words can be just be gestural in some way. They can be coming out in the real world, but I'm not really paying attention to them at all. And so that's one way of understanding what you're saying by, well, "I, I heard it." What I'm, what I really mean by heard it is I didn't really pay any attention to it *at all*. I was just that they were just happening, or it could be that I'm speaking and I'm more paying attention to the *sound* of it rather than the *doing* of it in which case I would say I was hearing it?
- 32:06 Russ comments: RTH leaves out of his options here a third important possibility: that Tristan uses "hears" as a generic word that actually experientially means something closer to "speaks."
- 32:36 Tristan: Um, [pause] I'm speaking it and I'm paying, uh, I'm paying more attention to the sound of it than the mechanism of moving my mouth.
- 32:36 Russ comments: This is the penalty paid by the omission described in comment 32:06. Had RTH described adequately the experiential phenomenon of speaking as being the sense of creating, or "driving," the utterance. The experience of speaking does *not* typically involve noticing mouth, throat, tongue, and so on mechanisms. RTH didn't discuss this, so Tristan was left to assume (incorrectly) that the mouth mechanism experience is important.
We shall see that RTH elects not to try to repair this issue, preferring to leave it to the iterative process.
- 32:55 RTH: And that paying attention is present to me experientially at the moment of the beep?
- 33:01 Tristan: Yes.
- 33:01 RTH: Okay.

33:01 Tristan: Yeah.

33:06 AG: And I understand that you're paying attention to the *sound*. Like, is this the sound, I guess, is this a sound of my voice? Or is this the sound of a phrase, a particular word, something else?

33:22 Tristan: Um.

33:23 AG: I think I'm not understanding that yet.

33:26 Tristan: The sound of, of my voice saying these words.

33:30 AG: Okay. And is there, is there anything more to say about, about how the sound of my voice is in my experience? Is it, is it just the sound of my voice and that's, that's really it? Or is there something about like, how I am, I dunno, inflecting on a, on this sentence or my voice is really low or, or anything like that? But if not, that's also an option.

34:05 Tristan: It's just the sound.

34:06 AG: Okay. Okay. And is there I anything more to be said about that part of your experience?

34:21 Tristan: I think I'm.... No, I don't think anything more about that particular part.

34:27 AG: Okay. Okay. Um, Dr. Hurlburt, are you okay with that?

34:30 RTH: I'm good.

34:31 AG: Okay. Me too. Okay. So now let's go to the last part that I hear this is something about the, what Emily had said. Could you tell me a little bit more about that?

34:31 Russ comments: DES is the attempt to describe concrete instances, but AG's question makes it seem like an abstraction. That is, it would have been better had AG said something like "Emily had said 'I don't want someone to lick my crack,' and you said you are somehow keeping that in mind. Could you tell me a little bit more about that?" That is, Tristan is *not* keeping *something Emily said* (an unspecified utterance) in mind; he is keeping "I don't want someone to lick my crack" (a specific phrase) in mind. The first is a generalization about some unknown and unspecifiable universe; the second is a specification about one particular event.

That is a huge difference from the standpoint of DES. DES wants to get the specifics right, accumulate a set of them, and then generalize about the actual specifics we have observed. DES does *not* want to talk about things in general.

34:47 Tristan: Um, [pause] uh, [pause] this was a, well, she, she had said this thing and this phrase that she had uttered was still [pause] in my consciousness. Um, and it wasn't *as if* I was hearing it, but I was still sort of remembering her speaking it, [pause] or I was remembering, or I was remembering these words.

- 34:47 Russ comments: Tristan's response here is very labored. It is likely that he would have had a much easier time had AG been more specific in her 34:31 query (see the comment at 34:31).
- 35:40 AG: Okay. So just to make sure I fully understand, I take it that Emily had said this before the beep, Emily had said, "I don't want someone to lick my crack." And at the moment of the beep, I'm somehow still on these words. And I, and I'm wondering, is this, am I on the meaning of it? Like I'm, like I am stuck with the meaning of it, something like that? Or is it there, or is it that, um, there's some that I am still, these words are there. So I guess my question is, are the words there or not, but I'm still somehow stuck with that?
- 35:40 Russ comments: Good! AG makes it clear what specifically is being considered. (See the comments at 34:31 and :34:47.)
- 36:22 Tristan: Um, the words are still there.
- 36:29 AG: Okay. And the word quote, the words quote or the statement quote, "I don't want someone to lick my crack?"
- 36:35 Tristan: Yeah.
- 36:37 AG: Or is it just one of, so that whole statement, not just one of the words? Or the word "crack" or something?
- 36:44 Tristan: It was the whole statement.
- 36:46 AG: Okay. And I, and I take it that there's some kind of something about Tristan's under thinking, understanding of the phrase in the experience. Am I getting that right? It's not just that the words are there, it's, there's a little bit more to it, like, there's something about me, Tristan, and my understanding of the words?
- 36:46 Russ comments: That is not how I understood it. For sure it is Tristan who is holding the words in mind, but there is no Tristan-ness in the experience; the experience is of the held words.
- 37:20 Tristan: I, maybe there's not, maybe there's not something about my understanding [AG: Okay.] of it. Maybe there's just the words where there.
- 37:20 Russ comments: Good. Tristan does not get misled by AG's question.
- 37:27 AG: Okay. And how are the words there?
- 37:36 Tristan: Um, [pause] um, [long pause] almost like a memory of the sound or, or like the sound is still carried through. And I did say before that it *wasn't* sonic, but....
- 38:36 RTH: You did say before that it wasn't the same as the first beep, but...

38:40 Tristan: Yeah, but.

38:42 RTH: ...but that's, but, but it can still be sonic, but at a different level or different kind or what, whatever. I'm not trying to talk you into being, it, it's being sonic.

38:54 So lemme, so lemme say what I think the options are. I think it's possible to have the meaning without the words (which you have said No, the words are present). And it's possible to have the words present without *any* sonic characteristics at all. Somehow these *words* are present to me. *And* it's possible to have the words present, including some sort of recognition or re, recollection of the sonic nature of that, even though I don't hear it. And option 4, I guess, here, is it could be that I could *hear* Emily's voice saying those, and there's probably all sorts of other possibilities or gradations within, within that.

38:54 Russ comments: This is RTH's attempt to help Tristan (and AG) bracket the natural attitude. In the natural attitude, the words, the sounds, and the meaning all come together, as if they were one thing. RTH wants Tristan to bracket (put out of play) the natural attitude by accepting that in the experiential world, it is not necessary that those aspects come together, or even all be present. He will elaborate this in the upcoming, particularly at 40:30 and 41:05.

39:43 Tristan: Yeah. It's not, it's not as if I can... Uh, there, there is, there is is, um, there is, it's almost as if like the, the sound of, of her saying this has carried through in a, in a way. Um, as in that there's a.... Yeah, what was the third option again? That you said you were going through the list of ways it could be presented to myself. There was like, um.

40:20 RTH: I don't think I remember what the third option was. So, no, the third option was the words are present and I know something and present to me are, is some knowledge about the sonic characteristics.

40:30 Tristan: Uh huh.

40:30 RTH: Like I can say, I know how a trumpet sounds. I'm not hearing a trumpet, but I, I know what the trumpet sounds like that could, that could be present to me.

40:41 Tristan: No, it's, it's more like I am, I'm *hearing* this phrase, um.

40:47 RTH: And, and there's yet another possibility that I didn't list in the first possibility. And that is that I somehow hear Emily's sound, and I don't actually hear the words, but the sound somehow carries the words.

41:04 Tristan: Right.

41:05 RTH: So that, so what what I'm trying to say here is: Experientially I think that it's possible for the sound and the meaning and the words all to be present together. And it's possible for those to be separated apart in all possible manners. I can hear the sound without the words, I can hear the words without the sound, I can hear the sound with

the meaning without the words, I can hear the meaning without the words, I can hear the words without the meaning [speaks in a rapid sing-song to indicate the non-essentiality of the words he is uttering]. I can hear s, some of, some of each. There, there's no necessity that all those things are experientially tied together.

41:40 Tristan: Hmm. Um.

41:47 RTH: And I would say one more thing about all about all this and that is that I think it's probably not possible for us to go back to this particular beep and get it right.

41:59 Tristan: Right.

42:00 RTH: Going forwards, I think if we have this kind of experience (now that we've had these, this conversation and we've split apart all these possibilities), then it might be easier for you to be able to *say* about some *future* beep well, this one was definitely the sound and not the words! Or whatever.

42:00 Russ comments: It may have seem that this whole line of questioning has been an attempt to clarify what occurred in Tristan's experience last night at the moment of beep 4.2. That is not really true. RTH recognized many minutes ago that we would not ever get to a high-fidelity understanding of sample 4.2. The questioning was primarily aimed at *next week's* samples. *Then*, as the result of today's interview, Tristan may be better able to make important distinctions, better able to apprehend experience when it occurs, better able to bracket natural-attitude presuppositions, better able to describe his experience. This, of course, describes the heart of the iterative process.

I think it is a fool's errand to try to clarify Tristan's experience when at the moment that experience occurred, Tristan was not competent to make the important discriminations. The iterative process can establish those discriminations, but those discriminations will apply *only* to future samples, *not* to past samples, including the presently under discussion sample.

42:13 Tristan: Right.

42:13 RTH: But that's, that is why I think that the process that we're engaged in is what I call iterative. We have to, we have to *discover* what *might* be interesting from Tristan. And one of the things that might be interesting from Tristan is *possibly* this separating out of words and sounds and, and whatever. And so we're gonna have to figure out how to, how to deal with that.

42:39 Tristan: Right, right.

42:40 RTH: Some *other*, some other person who engaged in this task might not have, might not have any interest at all in separating those things. It might not be important for him *at all*. And then in which case we wouldn't do that. So that's why we, that's why I couldn't have given a lecture at the outset. Well, Tristan... we could have said at the outset: *Well, Tristan, we're gonna have to pay attention to this*. Well, I didn't know

- we were gonna have to pay attention to this. We have to, we have to discover that as we go.
- 43:08 And one more thing about that *iterative* procedure is that now we have made this distinction, we also have to recognize, well, maybe we just had a wild hair about this distinction today. And maybe that isn't important. We should set that aside.
- 43:22 Tristan: Mm hmm.
- 43:22 RTH: It's not that we, we should make that distinction. We should, it is *not* that we *should* make that distinction going forwards. It's that we are capable of making that distinction going forwards *if it's necessary* to make it. But if it's not necessary to make it, well then we talked about this stuff and that was a one-shot deal.
- 43:44 And that is, that's just the way it is. This is not a failing of Tristan's and it's not a failing of Amber's or mine. It's the, we just, we don't know what we *don't* know, and we don't know what we *have to* know. And until we discover that, and then we try to do the best we can about it.
- 44:09 So I would say we probably oughtta go forward. I think, I think we have complicit, we have accomplished quite a lot in this discussion, and we should say, well, that's good enough we oughtta go on to beep number 3.
- 44:23 Tristan: Alright. Number 3.
- 44:24 RTH: And, *and* I, and I'm guessing that this, this is one of the beeps that you said, well, sort of mildly embarrassing, we should, should I censor. Is that right?
- 44:33 Tristan: Right, right.
- 44:36 RTH: Okay. And, and I would say we, we still have all the options of what to do about the *recording* of that. We obviously can't forget that we have had this conversation, but we *could*, now that we, now that you know what that conversation was actually gonna actually *was*, then we can decide what to do about any recording or transcript or whatever about that.
- 44:55 Tristan: Right.
- 44:55 RTH: And we don't have to decide that right now. We can, we can decide that whenever.
- 45:02 Tristan: Right, right. Um.
- 45:05 RTH: So: number 3.

SAMPLE 4.3 DISCUSSION STARTS HERE

- 45:07 Tristan: So number 3. So as a matter of fact, I'm trying to write up my sample. Um, and I have two mental images in my mind at the same time. Um, I have the image of the crack being licked (as described in the previous, well, I, y'know, will determine. Yeah as described in the previous sample). Um, but, um, and then I'm comparing that with,

and I also have the mental image of Emily's genitalia. Um, so I have both those mental images in my mind.

46:11 RTH: Um, and then I have a bodily feeling of a stomachache. Uh, and this bodily feeling of the stomach ache is tied in with sort of like a pit in my, the fe, a feeling of anxiety. Like there's a, yeah a feeling of anxiety. Um, and there's also, uh, an anxiety over whether I should share this sample the next day. Um, yeah, I think that's everything.

47:01 RTH: So do I understand that there are, experientially, there are, there's an image of the crack, an image of Emily's genitalia, a stomach-achy pit feeling of anxiety *and*, [Tristan: Yeah.] and also an anxiety over whether I should share this, so sorta four separable?

47:25 Tristan: No, I would say that the, oh, yeah, actually that's, that's true. That that is, yeah, that, that's how I would describe it.

47:39 RTH: So *two separate* anxieties, or at least separable anxieties, maybe they're related to each other, but...

47:44 Tristan: No, actually no, actually it's the same anxiety. Um, it's the same anxiety. Um, but there's also a, um, a physical component that is beyond just the anxiety, which is the pain, but the pain and anxiety are, um, li, linked somehow.

48:13 RTH: So it would be fair to say I have a pain pit, pain, stomachache pit in my stomach, and I feel anxiety about whether I should share this. And those are not entirely separate.

48:28 Tristan: Right.

48:29 RTH: Okay. And, and is there anything about trying to write, write about the sample, or is that just sort of context and, and what's actually experiential to me, me are these two seeings and the?

48:47 Tristan: That's, that's just context.

48:51 RTH: Okay. And is your experience more about the visual seeing, the inner two, two seeings or more about the feeling anxiety, bodily feeling, bodily sensation anxiety is, Which is more salient to you?

49:09 Tristan: Um.

49:10 RTH: If that question makes sense.

49:14 Tristan: Um, hard to say they're about equal.

49:19 RTH: Okay. And are the two, [coughs] two images about equal?

49:29 Tristan: Um, yeah.

49:31 RTH: Okay. Alright. Well let's start with the, let's start with the images. So there's the image of the crack being licked. And is that, does as far, is the visual aspect of that, is that the same as in the previous sample? Or is this more detailed, less detailed, different, same angle, different angle? [said in a bland indifferent monotone to suggest alternatives but not specifics]

49:57 Tristan: It's the same.

49:58 RTH: So as far as you can tell, I'm seeing the same image that I had seen before.

50:03 Tristan: Yeah.

50:05 RTH: Okay. And then at the same time I see Emily's genitalia?

50:11 Tristan: Yeah.

50:11 RTH: And what do I see?

50:14 Tristan: Um, it's more of a butt hole quality to it, or I'm, that's maybe that's what I'm seeing.

50:25 RTH: So I see Emily's genitalia from the backside, basically, is that right?

50:31 Tristan: Yeah.

50:34 RTH: Mostly the butt hole? Or mostly, or that's just part of it?

50:41 Tristan: I would say that's the strongest part of it?

50:44 RTH: But I see the rest of the genitalia?

50:49 Tristan: Yeah.

50:50 RTH: And the rest of Emily? Or just?

50:54 Tristan: No, I mean, no, not particularly.

51:07 RTH: So I, I understand that I'm seeing *Emily's* genitalia, not just genitalia.

51:12 Tristan: Yeah.

51:13 RTH: Okay. And it's *mostly* Emily's butt hole, or is it butt hole and genitalia in general?

51:24 Tristan: Uh, mostly the butt hole.

51:28 RTH: Okay. And in color?

51:33 Tristan: Yeah, there's like a pinkish quality to it.

51:36 RTH: Okay. And any other characteristics of this that we should be talking about?

51:36 Russ comments: These discussions illustrate what is often a dilemma for the interviewer. RTH wants to grasp the experience, but he does *not* want to satisfy his prurient interests in so doing. So the question becomes, how much should he ask? How many details are enough? There is no easy answer to that question except to work at separating out one's prurient interests from one's genuine interest in the other's experience.

51:45 Tristan: No.

51:46 RTH: Okay. And Amber, you wanna ask anything else about the visual stuff?

51:54 AG: No, I think I'm good.

51:56 RTH: Okay. Then there is the bodily pit in my stomach, stomachache?

52:06 Tristan: Yeah.

52:07 RTH: And the anxiety over whether I should talk about this.

52:13 Tristan: Yeah.

52:14 RTH: And are those equal or, [Tristan: Um.] or inextricable, or?

52:19 Tristan: Inextricable.

52:21 RTH: Okay. So they seem related to each other.

52:24 Tristan: Yeah.

52:26 RTH: But, but, but related to each other, but separable, is that true?

52:36 Tristan: Yes.

52:37 RTH: Okay. So it's not, it is, so what I, what I understand from that is: that it's not the case that the stomachache is just a part of anxiety. It's that I have a stomachache, which is both a physical feeling of a stomachache and a component of anxiety.

52:37 Russ comments: It is dubious whether RTH is being adequately clear about the distinctions he is trying to make. There are at least three possibilities: (1) Feelings (the experience of emotion) sometimes involves experienced bodily aspects. So a person may say "I was feeling sorrowful," and when asked to describe that feeling might say (among other aspects) "my heart felt heavy and I was crying." Such a locution generally means that the heart-heaviness and watery eyes are immediately understood as being aspects of the sorrow, *not* as being separable bodily sensations that are subsequently integrated/recognized as being sorrow.

(2) But there are others (less frequently, in my studies) who say “My heart felt heavy and I felt watery eyes,” and when asked to elaborate might say “I felt those bodily sensations, and I guess you could say that I was feeling sorrowful, but the presented-to-me-as-themselves phenomena of my experience were the bodily sensations, not primarily a feeling.”

(3) And there are yet others (roughly as frequent as type 1) who would say “I was feeling sorrowful, a heavy-hearted feeling” and when we clarified, we would discover that there were no bodily sensations at all—“heavy-hearted” was used as a metaphorical linguistic token, not a direct description of sensation.

52:58 Tristan: Yes.

52:59 RTH: Okay. And so let’s focus on the physical aspect. What, what do we mean by a pit, pit, stomachache, whatever?

53:14 Tristan: Um, pain that I feel in my stomach that, um... [pause] Yeah, pain, pain, pain that I feel in my stomach area that’s not, that I would characterize as a, as more dull than sharp.

53:52 RTH: And strong? Or weak? Or?

53:55 Tristan: Um, fairly, fairly moderate, I would say.

54:07 RTH: Okay. So I feel a dull, moderate pain more, more-or-less in my stomach. And does it, does it feel, are we talking about by stomach, the organ, the stomach? Or do we mean the, my midsection, my thorax, I guess you might say?

54:27 Tristan: Um, my, my midsection.

54:34 RTH: Okay.

54:34 Tristan: But doesn’t necessarily feel like it’s right on the surface either.

54:45 RTH: So it’s deep, deeply-er, or in my body, but not necessarily attached to the organ, an organ?

54:52 Tristan: Yeah.

54:52 RTH: Okay. And anything else can be said about that?

55:01 Tristan: No.

55:03 RTH: And then somehow that is connected to or part of a feeling of anxiety?

55:12 Tristan: Yeah.

55:13 RTH: And, and I’m understanding that that anxiety is about whether it’d be a good idea to talk about this, whether I *should* talk about it. That makes it seem sort of at the cognitive end of anxiety? Specific, *should I, should I not*, whatever.

55:33 Tristan: Um.

55:33 RTH: Or it's possible that, that that's more just a way to tell us about the experience. I, I experienced anxiety and if I gotta tell you guys about what the anxiety is, like well, this is the content of it.

55:48 Tristan: Um, you know what? I think, I think it was, I think it was more just I'm feeling anxiety.

56:15 RTH: And that anxiety involves a pain or pit or midsection sensation, but goes beyond just that. Is that right?

56:29 Tristan: Yeah.

56:35 RTH: And when I try to understand where that an, what that anxiety is about, I can say, well, it's probably about, I gotta, should I talk about this or not? But it doesn't seem like I am experientially trying to decide whether I should talk about this or... Is that right?

56:52 Tristan: Well actually the, um, [pause] Yeah, it's just, it's just anxiety.

57:31 RTH: Okay. Then I think I'm good unless Amber has other questions about that.

57:31 Russ comments: This sample illustrates the fact that DES conversations about feelings are often quite difficult. Perhaps the iterative process will help us out in the long run.

57:34 AG: No, I'm good as well.

57:36 RTH: So it is now 10:15, which means we're at, been at this for an hour. Do we want to call that enough? Do we wanna do another one?

57:47 Tristan: I think with the, at the end of the last session, you, you said you wanted to call it and that, y'know, that'd be fine by me I guess.

57:53 RTH: I think there's some logic to sticking to an hour for, for a variety of reasons. One is it makes it easier for everybody to plan. Another is that I think these conversations are *hard*, I think they're.

58:08 Tristan: Yeah,

58:08 RTH: I, I think they're, you know, we have, it's always a matter of, well, should we, shouldn't we talk about this? To what level should we talk about it? How do we talk about it? How do we try to be accurate about it?

58:20 Tristan: Um, I think we've done enough.

58:23 RTH: And, and so that's the second. And the third is I, the more we allow for the iterative procedure to work, the better. And that re, that requires accepting that what we have

said today was as good as we can do today, but maybe we'll be able to do better *next time* because we will have profited from the experience that we got this time.

58:47 Tristan: Yeah. And my, my next one has a ton of different components, [laughs] so it would take way too long. Um, so yeah, let's, let's plan for the next one, I guess.

[They compare calendars]

59:50 RTH: Anything else that we should be saying about *today* before we sign off for today?

59:57 Tristan: Uh, it's [inaudible]. I'm good. I'm good.

1:00:01 RTH: Okay. So I guess I would say I, I appreciate the candor. I recognize the, [inaudible] that it's, it's often difficult to determine where, where, what, how to deal with these boundaries, and boundaries or whatever. And I think, I think it seems to be like we've done a pretty good job.

1:00:23 Tristan: Um yeah, I'm set. I'm, I'm, I'm satisfied. Fine by me.

1:00:27 RTH: Okay.

1:00:27 Tristan: Except for, except for wanting to be clear next time that, the little details, but we'll get there, we'll get there.

1:00:35 RTH: Right. I think I, the pro, the, the process, the, the process is an interesting process and, and it's a difficult process *and* it requires, I think, going up against what the edges of what we would self-censor. So I'm guessing that you probably have profited, or *we* have profited, maybe I should say we have profited from *your* willingness to, to look the self-censor-y items in the eyeball, so to speak, in the butt crack, so to speak.

1:01:14 Tristan: [laughs] Perfect, perfect note to end this one.

1:01:19 RTH: One. All right, well thank you all very much.

1:01:21 AG: Thank you.

1:01:22 RTH: Appreciate it.