

TRANSCRIPT WITH COMMENTARY

Tristan

Tristan Interview 3

Below in black is a word-for-word transcript of the January 24 interview with Tristan that is available on YouTube at <https://youtu.be/45eISq96uI4>. In green are comments about and explanations of the Descriptive Experience Sampling process. If you have corrections, suggestions, or questions, please post them as YouTube comments.

RTH = Russ Hurlburt

AG = Amber Goto

Tristan = Tristan

- 01:21 RTH: Good morning, Amber.
- 01:23 AG: Hello.
- 01:23 RTH: Good morning.
- 01:26 RTH: Can you hear me?
- 01:28 AG: Yes.
- 01:28 RTH: Alright. Then I think, I don't know that I have any administrative things to be talking about before we launch in to the beeps.
- 01:42 Tristan: Uh, I don't.
- 01:42 RTH: Anybody else got comments, whatever?
- 01:45 Tristan: Okay. Yeah, let's go into the first one in that case.
- 01:48 RTH: Alright.
- 01:48 Tristan: Oh, I just, just say I got the, I got the new earpiece.
- 01:51 RTH: Okay.
- 01:51 Tristan: So thanks for sending that over.
- 01:54 RTH: You're, you're welcome. And, uh, this is gonna be day 3, is that right? Day 3, sampling day 3. Alright, let's do it.

SAMPLE 3.1 DISCUSSION STARTS HERE

02:05 Tristan: Okay. So in this first sample, um, I am listening to somebody who's talking, um, I feel some degree of anxiety over being overwhelmed by how many words she's saying. Um. And so that's one component of it. Um, and I am comprehending the word she's saying, but, um, but the content of those words themselves is not the strongest element in my, uh, in my consciousness. Um. Another component is I'm thinking of, uh, someone else I know a, a dancer. Um, and I have a vague mental picture of her wearing a white gown and dancing.

03:23 RTH: [pause] Is that the end of the opening salvo here and uh?

03:26 Tristan: That's it.

03:28 RTH: Okay. The, and so the is the most prominent... Well, you tell me, what is the most prominent portion of this experience?

03:36 Tristan: Probably the anxiety over what I'm going to say next. Or what, how I'm gonna respond to her. My friend who's speaking.

03:48 RTH: And can we give her name? Doesn't have to be her actual name, but just makes it easier to talk, talk to her.

03:53 Tristan: Sure. Uh, Danielle,

03:55 RTH: Call her, let's call her Danielle, whether her name is Danielle or not. So we're not gonna commit ourselves to whether this is really Danielle, but we're gonna call her Danielle. And so the anxiety is the more, more, more prominent portion. By a lot more? So, so it seems to me that there's sort of three things going on here. There's the anxiety, there's the comprehension, and there's the image of the dancer?

04:22 Tristan: Mm-hmm.

04:23 RTH: And, [Tristan: Um.] and if we were to, if it's this like 60-20-20? or 90-5-5 or [Tristan: Um.] 35-34-33 or whatever?

04:37 Tristan: A little closer to evenly split, with maybe the anxiety a little more, more prominent.

04:43 RTH: So 40-30-30, something like that?

04:44 Tristan: Yeah.

04:44 RTH: Okay. And I'm not, I'm not big on the numbers, I just think the numbers are a way to keep us focused about what we mean by "a little bit more," or "evenly split."

04:54 Tristan: Yeah.

04:54 RTH: So let's start, let's start with the anxiety, which I have heard sort of two versions about. One was just the, about the number of words—I'm anxious about the number of words; and the other is I'm anxious about how to respond.

05:11 Tristan: Right.

05:12 RTH: Are those the same? Is that two ways of saying the same thing?

05:16 Tristan: Um, actually, now that you put it that way, I think there may be a little bit of a distinction between them, because not all of my content about the, the rapidity of the words is, has to do with the anxiety. So maybe I would split them up a little, but I am, uh, to some degree trying to keep track of, of everything she's saying and how much she's saying, and I am thinking of what my next response is gonna be. Um, I'm slightly anxious that I hope I will have the *right* response or be able to respond properly. Um, so it's not entirely an, an, anxious content, but, but I would say that the anxiety is the primary affect.

06:02 RTH: Okay. And, and let, so let's talk about the number of words here. So are, are we talking is, are you saying: I am in some way noticing the number of words? Like this is the, the, the aim of this portion of my experience is at the number of words? *Or* is it that I'm trying to keep track of what she's saying? *And* when I have to tell these guys about that, it's gonna say, "well, there's a lot of words there."

06:32 Tristan: Um, well first of all, more as a, a statement of fact that she's a very quick talker.

06:39 RTH: Okay.

06:39 Tristan: Um, so my, um, so yeah, I would say that I am keeping track of her speaking and that there is some sort of more diffuse content to my thought about that I'm noticing that her speaking is very fast.

07:02 RTH: Okay. So it's both about the quickness of her speech *and* the keeping up. Those are sorta two separate but related tracks, is that right?

07:14 Tristan: Yes. Yes.

07:16 RTH: Okay. And is one of those more, more prominent than the other? Or are these just all tangled up together and...?

07:24 Tristan: I, all tangled up together, especially since this was, I sent, I did the sample yesterday, so a little bit of distance there.

07:34 RTH: Okay. So lemme, uh, lemme see whether I understand this portion of, my friend Danielle is talking.

07:40 Tristan: Mm-hmm.

07:40 RTH: She is as, as a fact of the universe talking fast. And, and my experience is that I'm somehow *noticing* that she's talking fast *and* I am trying to keep up and figure out what I'm going to say. *And* I am anxious, this is an anxious....

08:06 Tristan: Yes. Yes. [RTH: Okay.] I, I like that. I like that.

08:10 RTH: Okay. And, and about the, and, and about the trying to keep up: Is the, trying to keep up more about what I'm going to say, or is it just I am trying to keep my com, my comprehension, trying to keep my comprehension going in this barrage of words or this speed, of speeding words?

08:37 Tristan: Um, hmm. That's, that's a little harder to say for me right now.

08:40 RTH: Okay.

08:40 Tristan: Uh, it's sort of, um, uh, and it, it may be that sort of, I have something to say now, but like, if she keeps talking, I'll have to say something else later or there'll be more things to respond to and keep track of and. Yeah, so I, it's, it's hard for me to say exactly what that, that is.

09:04 RTH: And, and is that somehow present to me? Like somehow I have a present something to say and, and I might have to say, I might have to have something different to say is that?

09:15 Tristan: Um, I, I, I can't say at this moment.

09:19 RTH: Okay. Fair enough. And then, and I would say sort of as a, as a meta or an aside or whatever, that, that's why we do this more than once.

09:27 Tristan: Mm-hmm.

09:27 RTH: And, uh, and maybe we'll get better at teasing those things apart or, or maybe those things are inextricably woven and *can't* be teased apart. I don't have a preference in, in that regard. It's not like I'm trying to tease things apart. What I'm trying to understand is the degree which they are apart...

09:44 Tristan: Right.

09:45 RTH: ...in your, in your experience. And about the anxiety, what, [Tristan: Yeah.] what, what, how does that this present itself to you in this particular moment?

10:01 Tristan: Mm, I wrote down diffuse. Um, so it's a diffuse anxiety, and it's neither all bodily or all mental.

10:11 RTH: And does that mean it's *somewhat* bodily and *somewhat* mental?

10:15 Tristan: Yes.

10:16 RTH: And in the bodily portion, any particular portion of your body?

10:20 Tristan: No particular portion.

10:24 RTH: But it, so what I gather from that is it's not purely mental. Doesn't seem like it's purely mental, but it somehow seems physical. And what I want us, what I want us to make sure is that we're *not* doing is: I have a theory of anxiety; and my theory of anxiety is that it's in the body; therefore [Tristan: Okay.] this must have been in the body. I *don't* want us to do that. But I am, I'm also happy to have us say, or have us, have us *recognize* that there's something that's seeming, seems bodily, even though I can't pin it down as to where in my body it is.

11:01 Tristan: Yeah. I, I, I would, I would veer towards the later.

11:10 RTH: Amber, you have any more questions about *that* aspect of...?

11:14 AG: Uh, nope, I think I've got it.

11:15 RTH: Okay. And then there is a visual something, of a dancer.

11:29 Tristan: Right, so.

11:30 RTH: This, this is a different person. Let's give her an it, was it her, a female person?

11:34 Tristan: Yeah. Let's give her the name. Eiko. E-I-K-O.

11:41 RTH: And so how does Eiko, is that how we're pronouncing it, Eiko?

11:47 Tristan: Yes.

11:48 RTH: Prono, how does, how does she present herself to you at this particular moment?

11:54 Tristan: Well, uh, we could say that as a matter of fact, she is someone I know personally.

11:59 RTH: Okay, okay.

12:01 Tristan: Um.

12:03 RTH: So I, my, my question was rather badly crafted. So what I really wanna know is you said, I think something like, [Tristan: Right.] I have a vague pic of her?

12:13 Tristan: Yeah, I was, uh, that was next. Okay. So the yes va, it is, I think I said "vague mental picture." Um, so I have a mental image of her. Um, and it's like I am innerly seeing her. And there, and I see especially a, a white gown. Um, is, is, y'know, sort of, if I were to say what the contents of this mental image was, I would say that, that this white gown and perhaps black hair would be present. Um, but it's not as if I am, it's not as if it's a particularly clear mental image. It's, um, yeah, there's a visual component to it, but it's not like I'm seeing her right there. Um, and if there's a visual component, it says, oh, also, oh, it's also a visual component. Um, that is, um, happening at the same time as that I also have other visual content of the scene in front of me, of, of the table in front of me and, um, and of my conversation partner.

13:36 RTH: [pause] So lemme see whether I can understand this. So at the moment of the beep is Eiko do I see Eiko in my imagination, is that...?

13:48 Tristan: Yes.

13:49 RTH: And so it's not just, I'm thinking about Eiko and, and in some way recalling that she has a white dress when she dances or something. Um, it's more than that. [Tristan: Mm-hmm.] It's that I am somehow *seeing* Eiko in a white dress?

14:05 Tristan: Yes.

14:07 RTH: Okay. And that, and that word *seeing*, I would like to know whether that is the, seems like sorta the same kind of seeing as like right now, I think you could look at the Zoom screen and you could see that would, we would call that seeing you, you, you're seeing Hurlburt in a blue and white shirt and whatever. And uh, and if we call that *seeing*, is it the more or less the same kind of seeing of Eiko that what we mean by seeing (it's innerly, she's not there), but?

14:34 Tristan: No, it's a, a much vaguer and more inner and less, um, it's, and, and it's a more partial seeing.

14:50 RTH: Okay. And, but, but so you, you're, you're a second question ahead of me. So the, but it, but I wanna make sure that I understand that this is a *seeing* in the *visual* sense as opposed to seeing in the sort of the *cognitive* sense, like you could say, oh, I see as in I understand.

15:12 Tristan: Um. Yeah, this is, um, sorta like in the, in the mental image seeing, but it's not a figurative seeing as in your second example, there's, there's a visual component to it. Um, yeah, so there's the beginning of a mental image, but it's not espe, it's sort of fuzzy.

15:35 RTH: Okay.

15:35 Tristan: It's not literally fuzzy. It's, y'know.

15:41 RTH: So in the, in this *seeing*, I see a predominantly a white dress. Is that correct?

15:52 Tristan: Um, yes.

15:53 RTH: In motion?

15:57 Tristan: Um, I don't know whether it's in motion or not. Her dances are very, they're not quick, so, um.

16:11 RTH: So it could be in motion of a slow moving scene or something like that?

16:14 Tristan: Yeah.

16:16 RTH: Okay. And do you see this dress and the person in it, I guess from the front or the side or?

16:24 Tristan: Um, [RTH: The back?] it's not even as clear cut as that. It's sort of like a, somehow I am seeing prob, probably from the front, but.

16:35 RTH: But not ob, but, but not visually, obviously from the front. Is that right?

16:40 Tristan: Yeah.

16:40 RTH: Okay.

16:41 RTH: And then there was something about black hair?

16:45 Tristan: Mm-hmm.

16:46 RTH: And do I see that? Or do I somehow vaguely see it? Or do I just know that Eiko has black hair and I'm confused about whether that's there or whatever?

17:00 Tristan: I think we can get rid of the black hair.

17:02 RTH: Okay.

17:02 Tristan: Just keep going with the white gown.

17:06 RTH: So I see, of, in a visual sense, I see, but not clearly, uh, Eiko in a white dress, but mostly what I see is the white dress, and the, the rest of the Eiko and her hair or whatever is, is sorta implied by the white dress or [Tristan: Yeah.] incorporated into the white dress or something like that. But I don't see the detail, I don't see the details of that. I don't see her face, I don't see her, whatever. Is that right?

17:06 Russ comments: The task is to grasp Tristan's experience, and not to conflate that experience with what would have to take place in the natural world. Here, for example, Tristan clearly sees Eiko—there is no doubt about the fact that this is Eiko that appears before the footlights of his consciousness—but he does not see Eiko clearly. And he sees Eiko's dress clearly, even though it is not clearly enough seen to be obviously front the front or the side. In the natural world, for example, if Tristan were seeing a photograph of Eiko, then the parts that are not seen clearly would have to be seen blurrily, but that is not the case in the experiential world. In the experiential world, there is no necessity that Eiko's face or arms or whatever have to be seen *at all* for Tristan to understand that he is seeing Eiko. And Tristan's not seeing the face or arms or whatever does *not* necessarily imply that Tristan is seeing a faceless or armless Eiko, or a blurry-face and blurry-arm Eiko. It is that his seeing does not articulate or create a face and arm, nor care that it does not do so.

Or, alternatively, it may be that Tristan is not capable of making those distinctions. The epoché (the bracketing of the natural attitude) is not a natural skill. Tristan may (or may not) become more skillful at that as sampling progresses.

- 17:38 Tristan: Yeah.
- 17:44 RTH: And at the same time I see Danielle.
- 17:51 Tristan: Mm-hmm.
- 17:52 RTH: And what I would like us to do is to distinguish as, if we can between, as a fact of the universe, my eyeballs are aimed at Danielle and my retina and LGN and visual cortex and whatever are no doubt processing Danielle,...
- 18:07 Tristan: Right.
- 18:07 RTH: ...but that doesn't mean that I'm *experiencing* Danielle *visually* at this particular time. Maybe I am, maybe I'm not. But what I don't want us to do is to *presume* that just because my eyes are open and aim in, aimed in Danielle's direction, that I am experiencing, visually experiencing Danielle in a, [shrugs shoulders]. But I'm not trying to talk you out of that, either.
- 18:33 Tristan: Mm-hmm.
- 18:33 RTH: I'm trying to make a distinction here.
- 18:36 Tristan: I, I, I am visually seeing Danielle, but it's maybe, um, uh, yeah, but it's slightly less. Um, I, I am visually seeing Danielle.
- 18:36 Russ comments: On display here is the art of DES. Viewers may judge for themselves the adequacy of RTH's art, but here's what's at stake.
Tristan has said (in his opening salvo at 12:13) "I also have other visual content of the scene in front of me, of, of the table in front of me and, um, and of my conversation partner," and RTH restates that at 17:44. But RTH also knows (from lots of DES interviews) that many people presume that if their eyes are open, they must be directly apprehending what their eyeballs are aimed at. Does Tristan make that presumption? RTH doesn't know, so his art is to undermine the presumption while at the same time supporting the possibility that Tristan's experience really does include a seeing of Danielle.
One key to that attempt is fully to accept that it is *not* possible to make that distinction today. Tristan and RTH had not had this conversation at the time of beep 3.1, so Tristan was not prepared to judge, *at the only time that such a judgment might be made* (that is, immediately after the beep), whether he was simultaneously innerly seeing and externally seeing. RTH will be skeptical regardless of what Tristan says about the seeing in sample 3.1 The conversation RTH is having is aimed at *day 4* and beyond, so that Tristan will have at hand the distinctions that might be necessary for fidelity.
That is, this is the iterative process at work.
- 18:54 RTH: And by the slightly less, you mean more of my visual seeing is of Eiko even though it's not crisp or, or implied or whatever we're, whatever we're calling that. But, but that's

still more present to me visually than Danielle is present visually, even though my eyeballs are aimed directly at Danielle.

19:17 Tristan: Um.

19:17 RTH: And I don't, and I don't mean to be saying that I, I sound to myself like I'm saying that in sort of an incredulous tone, which I don't mean to be at all.

19:24 Tristan: Yeah.

19:24 RTH: What I mean to what, what I really, most of what we're talking about here from my point of view is something like a *lecture* on, well, *let's suspend what I call a natural attitude*. It *makes sense* to say, "well, if my eyeballs are open, and aimed at Danielle, I must be seeing Danielle." I don't think that's necessarily true. And I want us, I want us not to, not to pretend that it is true and not to pretend that it isn't true. So I call that *bracketing*. I want us to, I want us to *set aside what seems natural* about seeing Danielle and then say, well, yeah, I actually was seeing her experientially or not. Either way that's.

20:07 Tristan: Yeah, I, I would say that the vision of both are, not to attach a number to it, but they're about equal or, or the, the prominence, the prominence of each component is about equal in my mind.

20:38 RTH: Okay. So I think I'm, I think I'm pretty good about the sample. I think, I think what we have done this is, this is a fairly complicated sample.

20:44 Tristan: Mm-hmm.

20:44 RTH: And, and from my point of view, our conversation, which is now 15 or 20 minutes in, is more about *next* sampling time than it is about *this particular* sample.

21:00 Tristan: Mm.

21:00 RTH: Cuz I think we're, I think there's a lot of skills involved in keeping track of what's actually experienced and what my theories tell me that should be and what my customs have been about, about that. And I, and I think it takes practice to what I call bracket, all of those things so that then we can focus just on what was actually experienced.

21:22 Tristan: Yeah.

21:26 RTH: And so, and so in this particular beep, we have distinguished between the actual rate of speed of Danielle's speech as a fact of the universe *and* the noticing of the *speed* as a construct in Tristan's experience, *and* the trying to, trying to comprehend, which is a different thing from just noticing the speed, *and* the preparing to say something and then having to replace it with something else. All those things are sort of experientially separable.

- 22:04 Tristan: Mm.
- 22:04 RTH: *And* I don't think, well, I, I think our conversation about *this* beep is going to make it easier to *separate those* in future days.
- 22:17 Tristan: Mm.
- 22:17 RTH: And that is an essential part of the method. I call that the *iterative* portion of the method we have to learn.... I use *iterative* in the same way a mathematician would use iterative, which if you wanna iteratively solve a problem, you make a guess at a, at it, and then you incorporate that guess into the equation and see how you did. And if it, then you make another guess, which is gonna be a little bit better because it's now informed by the application of, of that. It's a well-known process in numerical analysis, which I, in my previous lifetime I was one of them. And, uh, so it's the, sorta the same kind of a make a guess, get better at it, make a guess, get better at it, make another guess, get better at it until eventually you either converge on the solution (which sometimes happens in numerical analysis), or sometimes you don't (and that sometimes happens in numerical analysis as well). So, it's a process. Amber, you got any additional questions or should we move on to number 2?
- 23:23 AG: Um, I think I've got it all. So we can go on to number 2.
- 23:28 RTH: Okay.
- 23:28 Tristan: Okay.
- 23:28 RTH: Let's do number 2.
- 23:35 Tristan: Um, okay, so you're doing this one, right, Amber?
- 23:46 AG: Mm-hmm. So whenever you're ready.

SAMPLE 3.2 DISCUSSION STARTS HERE

- 23:48 Tristan: Okay. So, um, I am listening to my friend who is speaking (that's a matter of fact), um, and I am focusing in on the words, uh, quote, "the last" unquote. Um, I am hearing and understanding what she's speaking, but those specific words are what I am sort of latching on to in my consciousness. And so that's, that's one component. The next component is I am, uh, fixating on the, uh, the fries in gravy I see in front of me. Um, or you could say "poutine" if you wanna be specific, but I am visually fixating on those fries and almost seeing, um, almost as if they're, they're really emerging outta the rest of the scene as what's most prominent in it is those fries and gravy. Um, so that's another component. And then the third component is a diffuse thinking of what to say next.
- 25:14 AG: Okay. And, um, of these three (again, for salience, prominence, clearness, whatever word we wanna use), what would you say, is there any one that's like way more, um,

salient in your experience, like 95-5, or, y'know, the numbers don't much matter, but just trying to get a sense.

- 25:40 Tristan: Um, I would say that they're fairly comparable, but the, the fries and gravy, the visual, probably edges it out here.
- 25:49 AG: Okay. So is it similar to like the last time we had 40-30-30, you'd say, like kind of, or would you say the fries are *more* than that?
- 25:58 Tristan: 40, 30, 30 sounds fine.
- 25:59 AG: Okay.
- 25:59 Tristan: If that, yeah, that adds up.
- 26:03 AG: Yeah. Yeah, it doesn't have to add up, it's just, just I hear like a little bit more versus a lot, but that's helpful. Okay.
- 26:09 Tristan: Yeah.
- 26:09 AG: Okay. So I hear I'm seeing these fries and the gravy, and I take it that these fries and gra, the poutine are, they're actually, they're in, y'know, in my environment?
- 26:22 Tristan: Yes.
- 26:22 AG: Okay.
- 26:22 Tristan: They're there.
- 26:23 AG: And, and I somehow these are sticking out to me or, or more prominent to me. Could you, could you tell me a little bit more about that?
- 26:34 Tristan: Um, well, I guess in biophysical terms, they could say that, y'know, you're in the core of my foveal vision, but we're not speaking like that. So they are the, um, it's almost, but it's, yeah, I would, if, if I was speaking metaphorically, I would say it's, it's almost like I'm zooming in on them, but I don't wanna get as confused with metaphors here. So it's, it's just like, I'm very *focused* on what they look like. [AG: Okay. And is there any,] and I'm not noticing much else in my [AG: Oh, I'm sorry.] I I, I guess I would say that I'm not noticing much else in the surrounding environment,...
- 27:30 AG: Okay.
- 27:30 Tristan: ...I guess.
- 27:31 AG: And am I just focused on, I'm really just into these fries, or is there any particular part of the fries that I mentioned, or the gravy? Is it like the shape of the fries, the color of the gravy, something like that? Even the smell? Or is there any kind of sensory

component? Or is it just, I'm just seeing the fries in front of me and that's just kind of where my focus is at, at this moment?

27:56 Tristan: Um, good question, cuz when I wrote this note, I was focusing on the visual. Now looking back, I'm like, well, I must've been, I, I know I was thinking they were delicious, but, um, but.

28:10 AG: And if you, if we can't get that now, then [Tristan: Yeah.] that's okay, right.

28:10 Russ comments: AG's comment implies that the smelling/deliciousness was experientially present at the moment of the beep, but somehow lost in the reporting. That is not true, or at least not necessarily true. As a fact of the *universe*, the fries were delicious and smelly; as a fact of *experience* at the moment of the beep, Tristan may well have experienced the visual and experienced not at all the deliciousness or smell. That is, AG here has not adequately bracketed the natural attitude.

28:12 Tristan: But, but, but I'm just gonna say it's just the, they look visually appealing.

28:12 Russ comments: The good news is that Tristan has not been influenced by AG's suggestion.

28:17 AG: Okay.

28:21 RTH: So before we leave the topic of very focused or whatever, can I ask a few more about that? So the, I, I would like to, I would like to understand whether by visually focusing, I mean, I'm just more interested in them. So all, most perception, maybe all perception, has some kind of a figure ground phenomenon to it. And I'm, I'm occupied with the figure and what's ground is in the background. And I would like to know whether that's what you're saying, or whether you're saying there's something that's more dramatic or more gripping or more something than that. Like that the, it's like the figure, the fries and gravy, are basically all there is, and there, there really isn't any experiential ground.

29:09 Tristan: Mm. I would say that there's still, um, that it's not as if the ground has completely fallen away. It's not as if I have ceased to know that there's a world or, or have some element of the world around the fries in my visual component. It's just that the fries are the most prominent part. Um, and they are, yeah. Does that make sense?

29:34 RTH: Well, it makes sense, but I'm not sure that I understand it yet. So when you, when you look at me on the screen,...

29:39 Tristan: Right.

29:41 RTH: ...you could say probably, well, I know there's a refrigerator back there and a filing cabinet or whatever, but mostly I'm paying attention to Hurlburt's face, whatever.

29:50 Tristan: Hmm.

- 29:51 RTH: So it's... *Or* you could say, I'm really zoomed in on Hurlburt's face and it doesn't matter what else there might be on that screen. All, all there is to me. So what I, what I wanna, what I wanna know is, is the, are the fries and the gravy more or less the same as Hurlburt's face on the zoom screen? Or?
- 30:15 Tristan: I would say they were, it was somewhat to your first example where it's, I'm really focused on this particular element. Um, yeah. I'm *especially* focused on this particular element.
- 30:26 RTH: So it's more than just your everyday figure-ground phenomenon. It's a sort of an especially figural, figure ground phenomenon. Is that right?
- 30:36 Tristan: Y, Yes.
- 30:38 RTH: Okay. So it's not like the ground goes away *altogether*, [Tristan: Mm.] but goes farther away than, than some of other everyday kind of perception.
- 30:47 Tristan: Yeah.
- 30:50 RTH: Okay. And, and here, here, here again, this is as much conversation about tomorrow or next week or whatever than it is about today because I, I think it's, uh, we have to learn how to talk to each other about these kinds of things and, and, and in the learning how to talk to each other, that's part of that is you have to learn how to, how to be ready to talk about it at the moment that it happens. And, and, and we didn't have this kind of a conversation when the, when you wore the beep yesterday, and therefore you, you couldn't possibly have been ready for the line of questionings at the level of specificity that I'm asking or whatever.
- 31:26 Tristan: Right, right.
- 31:27 RTH: And, and that's just the way this process is. This is not a criticism of Tristan or of me or Amber or anybody. I think Amber's questions have been great. The, it's, uh, it's just the way this process has to go. And turn it back over to you, Amber.
- 31:48 AG: Okay. Um, so I think we're good on the seeing portion, or as far as we can get today. I dunno, Dr. Hurlburt, what do you think, we're good on that? Okay. So the next piece. So I would like to, okay, so I have this, I'm hearing, I'm listening with comprehension, but I am hearing and focused in on quote "the last." Okay. And I guess what I wanna get a sense of, right, I hear then this, I'm focused on "the last."
- 32:25 Tristan: Mm-hmm.
- 32:26 AG: Can you, can you tell me a little bit more about that now, that piece?
- 32:32 Tristan: Um, is that these words, uh, what is, what does it mean to be focused on specifically these words? Um, well, it's, I'm paying attention to everything my friend is saying, and it's more that this is what she has just been saying in, in the, this is what's immediately

proceeding the beep. So if we had moved on, I would've maybe latched on to something else that was not these specific words.

33:06 AG: Okay. So I hear that right, she's, maybe she's telling a story, saying in this sentence, that sentence, y'know, this string of words, flow of words, and she's actually saying this, I'm actually hearing it, it's happening out in front of me.

33:17 Tristan: Mm-hmm.

33:17 AG: But the beep happens. The la, she's speaking words, words, words, words, words, "the last," <beep>. And that's just what's, what's there.

33:27 Tristan: Hmm. Yeah.

33:27 AG: And it is there and there's nothing I'm, I'm almost hearing that makes it seem to me as if there's nothing particularly interesting to me or special about those words, is just that's what she happened to be saying.

33:27 Russ comments: It seems to me that AG's questioning has normalized Tristan's experience, making it seem like the beep simply occurred somewhere in a sentence. However, I think Tristan has been saying that he has somehow particularized those words, pulled them out of the flow in some way, giving them more specificity than merely the words that happened to be ongoing at the beep.

33:41 Tristan: Yes.

33:41 AG: Okay.

33:46 RTH: So I, I, I need to clear, clear this up because, just because... I need to clear it up.

33:51 AG: Mm-hmm.

33:51 RTH: So the sentence is something like, "well, the last time I did this, I..." whatever. And in that, in that, in that sentence, are the words "the last." Is that correct?

34:05 Tristan: Mm-hmm.

34:06 RTH: Like some, something about, uh, "I've been sailing a couple of times, and the last time I went sailing..." and the beep comes on "the last."

34:14 Tristan: Mm-hmm.

34:14 RTH: That's the, that's, that's what's happening. But I, what I, what I would like to know is about the, what you have called the "latching on to." So one, one way to be happening is that these words, that there are words that are going by, well, "I, I, I've been sailing, and the last time I went sailing," whatever, and those words that are going by and the beep happened to come on "the last," and that's it. That's one possibility. *Another* possibility is that I have somehow latched on to a word, and then I

latch on to another word, and then I, or set of words, and then I latch on to another set of words. And the words, the set of words that I happen to have latched on to this time is “the last.”

34:54 Tristan: Mm-hmm.

34:55 RTH: So what I wanna know is whether, whether there is some kind of a *sense* of latching on to words, as opposed to, well, the sentence was going by and the beep happened here, and the words that happened when the beep happened, happened to be “the last.”

35:13 Tristan: Mm-hmm. Um, well, um, I am latching on to, huh.

35:30 RTH: Shall I ask that question in a, in a slightly different way?

35:33 Tristan: It no, it makes sense. It makes sense. Um, whether I am attaching more weight to different parts of the sentence and, and latching on to specific words in particular, or whether it’s just a matter of whether all words are given equal weight, um, uh.

35:52 RTH: It’s slightly more than that, from my point of view.

35:54 Tristan: Mm-hmm. Yeah.

35:54 RTH: And the slightly more than that is, is does the *latching*. Does, we’re, we’re talking about *latching*. I’m trying to understand what you mean by latching. So does the latching seem to come because I, cuz the beep happened and the beep happened here. [Tristan: Mm-hmm.] Well, and I gotta go back and figure out what it, what it was that was going on, and therefore I’m gonna latch on to these words “the last,” that’s one possibility. And another possibility is: even if there weren’t a beep and Danielle had been saying the sentence, I would’ve latched on to those words, and then I would’ve latched on to these words, and then I would’ve latched on to those words, and then I would’ve latched on to these words. And one of those was gonna be “the last.”

36:28 Tristan: Mm-hmm.

36:29 Tristan: Okay. I, I understand it now. Yeah. It’s, it’s the second option. It’s specifically that I have, and and, real, really latched on to those words in particular.

36:37 RTH: Okay.

36:37 Tristan: Um, at that, at that moment in time.

36:42 RTH: Okay. And that, that latching was independent of the beep, as best we can figure out. [Tristan: Yes.] If, if we had a, if we had a universe, if parallel universe, without the beep time locked in this universe, I would’ve been latched on to those words.

36:56 Tristan: Yes.

- 36:57 RTH: Okay. And can you, is, is it possible to say, and well, lemme have a side conversation with Amber, or I want you to note, Amber, that that, that this phenomenon seems to be a little bit different, more, more latch-y than you hadn't, hadn't note, noted it to be.
- 37:14 AG: Mm-hmm.
- 37:16 RTH: Okay. So what, so is there more to say about what the, what this phenomenon of latching, what the, what the characteristics of the latching are? That's to Tristan.
- 37:31 Tristan: Oh, to me. [RTH: Yeah.] No, that's, that's accurate.
- 37:35 RTH: Okay. So somehow I am singularly out singular-ling, if you can say that singular-ling out these words, I'm, I'm presenting these words to myself or I'm, I'm, I am particularizing I guess that would be a better word. I'm particularizing these words, "the la," "the last," and before that I was probably particularizing some other words and particularizing some other words before that. At the moment of the beep, I'm particularizing "the last."
- 38:01 Tristan: Mm-hmm.
- 38:02 RTH: Okay. And, and I think I'm good about that, unless there's anything more to be said about how this, how you experienced this particularizing.
- 38:24 AG: I think I've got it too. I don't know, unless Tristan has anything.
- 38:27 RTH: Oh, I was, I was gonna give Tristan a little [AG: Yeah.] bit of time to think about that.
- 38:29 AG: Yeah.
- 38:30 Tristan: That, that's all I have to say for this sample.

38:30 Russ comments: This interchange (from 33:46 on, or going back to the beginning of the sample) illustrates how careful the DES questioning must be to allow the participant to describe the phenomenon with fidelity. (And the questioning will actually continue beyond here.) Tristan now seems confident that his experience is actively particularizing each word (or short phrase). It is *not* merely that he is hearing with comprehension, and the beep happens to occur in the midst of that comprehension (at "the last"). Instead, he is actively latching on to a word, and then actively latching on to another word, and then actively latching on to the next word (that happens to be "the last").

For most people, comprehension is experienced as a passively received process—words that are being spoken to me seem naturally to arrive with their semantics already present. Tristan, by contrast, experiences himself as going out to meet each word (or short phrase). This is a phenomenon I have found in participants for whom anxiety is an issue. Here's what I wrote in 2011:

In 1993 I wrote about the phenomenon of the ‘doing of understanding,’ suggesting that when some of my anxious subjects were engaged in conversation when another was speaking, they experienced a powerful direct-in-experience *necessity* to work hard at, actively reach out for, purposefully assemble their understandings of the other’s speech. That is in distinct contrast with non-anxious subjects, for whom understanding is experienced as occurring with no sense of agency, work, or effort whatever — as if understanding happens automatically. Since 1993 I’ve corroborated that view, although I have not written about it since. (Hurlburt & Schwitzgebel, 2011, pp. 215-216)

Tristan’s experience at this beep (and others as well) seems to be very similar to what I have earlier described about the doing of understanding in anxiety.

Hurlburt, R. T. (1993). *Sampling inner experience in disturbed affect*. New York: Plenum Press.

Hurlburt, R. T., & Schwitzgebel, E. (2011). Presuppositions and background assumptions. *Journal of Consciousness Studies*, 18(1), 206–233.

38:35 RTH: Okay. So, so let me, I guess I would wanna say something and, and this what this,

38:39 AG: We have one more piece of the sample? Or is this?

38:42 RTH: Yeah, but I’m not ready to go there.

38:43 AG: Okay. Okay.

38:44 RTH: The.

38:45 Tristan: Oh, right, right, right. You’re right.

38:48 RTH: But before, but, but before, before we leave the latching, what I, I’m gonna prime the pump a little bit, and by this I’m gonna say, well, y’know, I wanna give us a way of a way of talking, which I would like you to reject [Tristan: Mm-hmm.] everything that I’m gonna say. But, but “latching on” to could mean something like, I am saying those words along with her. So I’m innerly speaking those words, that that could be said to be latching, or somehow I visualize this sentence and the words stand out in bold face or whatever. Or somehow I am auditorily more, more focused on these words than on other words. Or whatever. I don’t, I don’t know. And I’m not trying to put words into your mouth. What I’m just, what I’m trying to say is basically: I’m, I’m interested in this latching phenomenon, and next time, if there is such a latching phenomenon, I’m gonna, I’ll, I’m gonna be asking some more questions about it then. And, and I would like us to, I would like us to be able to describe this phenomenon with as much fidelity as we can. I don’t want us to *pretend* that the, the *risk* of doing what I just said, we’re giving you some options. Uh, the *risk* of that is to, well, Hur, Hurlburt’s interested in inner speech or seeing words on the page or whatever. That’s *not* true. I don’t want us to make us a multiple-choice thing. What I, what I’m trying to convey is that I’m interested in, well, all the phenomenon, but I’m interested in the latching phenomenon. And if it occurs again, I’d like to know, I’d like to know how, how that comes to you.

40:26 Tristan: Right, right.

40:29 RTH: Alright, Amber, now I'm ready to go forward.

40:31 AG: Okay. So the last piece I got was diffuse thinking of what to say next.

40:38 Tristan: Mm-hmm.

40:38 AG: Um, so I guess, yeah, we'll start by, tell me a little bit more about what, how that's present to you.

40:50 Tristan: Um, well, there's not quite an anxious quality to it, but there's a feeling to me that I will need to respond to what, to the words being spoken.

41:13 AG: Okay.

41:13 Tristan: Um, and there's a need, an, uh, yeah.

41:24 AG: So this need to respond. Is this more, I guess like a cognitively process, an analytical thing? Like I, and I, cuz I heard this is somehow less anxious? So I, I dunno I take that to sound more that way. But I also wanna leave space for it being some kind of affective, emotional, um, process.

41:24 Russ comments: AG's question about emotional process is from the natural attitude. DES is not about process, it is not about emotion as a process, it is about experience at the moment of the beep. The task is to help Tristan describe his experience, *not* to help him speculate about any underlying process.

41:58 Tristan: There's, there's definitely an affective component, but, um. Yeah, there's, there, there is an affective component to it, but it's not, it's more cognitive. It's much more on the cognitive end.

41:58 Russ comments: So when Tristan says "there's definitely an affective component," he is doing what AG has (unwisely) asked him to do—speculate about process. The good news is that Tristan pushes the conversation back to the cognitive experience.

42:19 AG: Okay. So I wanna make sure I, I got what you're saying. So I hear more cognitive, not entirely cognitive, and, but there's like a touch of, um, emotional type thing going on.

42:19 Russ comments: AG's "but there's like a touch of, um, emotional type thing" still does not adequately separate the experiential from the conjectural. That is, *of course* there is an emotional type thing—many people think there is *always* an emotional type thing ongoing. The question is whether Tristan *feels anxious at the moment of the beep*; the question is *not* whether there is an anxious process somehow occurring. That is, AG's question is from the natural attitude, a habit that is hard to break.

42:34 Tristan: Yeah.

42:35 AG: Okay. And is this need to respond, thinking of what to say, is this happening in words? Or is this just, I need to respond, I have this urge, desire to respond, but really that's all that's happening, it's?

42:57 Tristan: It's, it's a, trying to find words, but there are no words yet.

43:01 AG: Okay.

43:03 RTH: So can I, can I ask like Amber's question a little bit more broadly? Is, is the content present to you? [Tristan: No.] The, the, the what you're gonna say, even though, even though the words might not be?

43:15 Tristan: No.

43:17 RTH: So I gotta say something, but I don't know what it is.

43:19 Tristan: Yeah.

43:19 RTH: Okay.

43:19 AG: Okay.

43:27 RTH: And, and is it, *I gotta say something?* Or is it, *this is what I might say.*

43:36 Tristan: It's a *what should I say? How should I reply?*

43:53 RTH: Okay.

44:01 AG: And is, um, anything about, what, is this Danielle, the person we're referring to? Danielle, um, whatever.

44:11 Tristan: Uh, no, this is, this is another, this is a different person. [AG: Okay.] This is Emily.

44:14 AG: Okay. Okay. It does, it doesn't much matter. But just for the sake of our conversation. Does it, um, is there anything about what Emily's saying as part of this? How should I reply? Or is it just, Emily's spoken and I'm like, how should, uh, y'know, it's more, this is more about *me* than it is about what Emily has is talking about or has said?

44:36 Tristan: It's a *what should I say to Emily?*, so.

44:37 AG: Okay.

44:37 Tristan: Yeah.

44:45 AG: Okay. Um, Dr. Hurlburt, do you have any more questions about that?

44:49 RTH: Nope. I'm good.

44:50 AG: I think I'm good as well.

44:53 RTH: Number 3.

44:53 AG: Number 3.

SAMPLE 3.3 DISCUSSION STARTS HERE

44:57 Tristan: Okay. Number 3. Now this one, this one I wish.... This might be a, a slightly more difficult one. So as a matter of fact, my friend is telling me about a chlorine-gas leak that killed a bunch of furies. (Um, this was this, this was a recent news story.) Um, and there is a def, there's a vague mental image I am seeing of a bunch of dead furies, um, lying on the ground. And this is, um, in the same way as my first sample. It's, I'm innerly seeing it. It's not especially clear. I can't especially make out how many figures are in this image. Um, but I, it is a, it is a mental image I'm seeing. Um, so that's one component.

46:32 And the next component is, uh, I am seeing a stoplight in front of me, and I am undergoing the bodily process of putting on the brakes on my car. And I am reg, I'm cognitively registering that there's a stoplight in front of me and that I need to stop the car. Um, but it's less, that's more automatic than that. Like the, the cognitive thought *I need to stop the car* is not especially prominent at all. It's mostly sorta like a thing that's happening. I think most prominent in this, in this sample is the, um, I is the combined, um, uh, comprehension of my friend telling me about this chlorine gas killing furies and my, um, and my visual imagination of this.

47:57 RTH: Okay. So let's start with the, the, what do you, the visual image. Tell me exactly what you're seeing.

48:10 Tristan: I'm seeing, um, I'm seeing figures in, uh, animal-like suits on the ground, uh, killed by chlorine gas. And I, there's a, possibly a, a pipe in this image, but I don't know where it is. There's possibly pipes carrying gas.

48:45 RTH: And, and by "possibly" do you mean that I see it, but it, but it's not specified exactly where it is that I see it? Or is it that my friend's story includes a pipe, and so I know it has to be there somewhere.

49:03 Tristan: It's the former.

49:05 RTH: So there's something visually present about the pipe, even though it's in inconclusive or indistinct or whatever.

49:12 Tristan: Yes.

49:14 RTH: And then I didn't, I didn't quite understand it that there was something wearing animal suits?

49:21 Tristan: Well, do you know what furies are?

49:23 RTH: No.

49:24 Tristan: Oh. So that, that might be to specify that this might be necessary. So a, a furry is a, a human who puts on these animal suits. They look like cartoon animals, and then they attend conventions.

49:45 RTH: Okay.

49:46 Tristan: Um, so that's what a furry is. [RTH: Okay.] So in my image, I see, in my mental image, I see figures on the ground in these, y'know, who have the shapes of these cartoon animal figures, but an unspecified number. And like unspecified animals, it's not like I'm seeing particular animals.

50:11 RTH: And, and there's more than one of these furies, I understand.

50:16 Tristan: Yeah. More than.

50:17 RTH: And are we talking, [Tristan: More than, more than.] we talking 2 or 20 or 200 or?

50:20 Tristan: More than, more than 2.

50:23 RTH: Okay. More than 20?

50:26 Tristan: Can't say. Probably not.

50:28 RTH: Okay. And, and is this, it seemed like in motion or a still, still seeing?

50:39 Tristan: Uh, oh, whether it's in motion?

50:41 RTH: Yeah.

50:41 Tristan: Um, I didn't at the time of the sample, uh, see any motion. So no motion.

50:51 RTH: And, and I would like to know whether there are any characteristics... Like the, the phrase "seeing an image" is a little bit ambiguous for me. So *sometimes* an *image*... Like in the real world, an image has a border to it [holds up his hands to indicate a square or rectangle], [Tristan: Mm.] and I can say I'm seeing an image, I can, I would say I'm seeing a, like I'm seeing a photograph [gestures a rectangle], this photograph has a border to it, and whatever. Or "seeing an image" can mean I'm just innerly seeing, I'm seeing furies, and I don't see an *image* of furies, really. I'm just seeing furies.

51:26 Tristan: I would say innerly seeing.

51:29 RTH: Okay. Then and that, that's an important distinction for me. And, and for some people, because for some people would say, I'm seeing, I'm seeing an image of furies. And the reason I know that this image, that this is an *image* of furies is that the image itself seems to curl up and float away. [Tristan: Mm, right, right.] Then you could, then

you could say, *for sure*, I'm seeing an image of furries and I can see that image curl up and float away.

51:51 Tristan: Mm-hmm.

51:51 RTH: But otherwise, I'm guess, so in this *particular* case, it's more like, I'm just innerly, I'm *seeing* furries.

52 Tristan: Mm-hmm.

52:01 RTH: Okay. And, and I'm seeing somehow an indeterminate chlorine pipe?

52:12 Tristan: Mm-hmm.

52:15 RTH: And, and is there a way to describe that more?

52:21 Tristan: No.

52:22 RTH: So it's, it's not like I see, um, sort of a mist, and the mist is around the furries and that mist is a, is a pipe. It's not *that*. It's just that somehow I am seeing without seeing a chlorine pipe.

52:38 Tristan: Yes.

52:39 RTH: But that's a *seeing* without seeing, not a *knowing* without seeing. It's not like I just *know* there's a pipe there. It's somehow I *see* a pipe [Tristan: Mm-hmm.] even though I don't see a pipe.

52:51 Tristan: Right.

52:52 RTH: Okay. And that of course would be impossible in the real world. This is part of what makes the world of imagination different from the world of reality. And why I think we have to suspend the natural attitude, what I call *bracket the natural attitude*, that the, uh, the re, the rules that apply in, in, in real seeing don't apply in the, in the world of imagination.

53:17 Tristan: Mm-hmm.

53:19 RTH: So.

53:27 Tristan: Very Husserl-ian, but not [laughs].

53:35 RTH: I have paid some attention to Husserl, let's put it that way. But the, the, so I, I think I'm good as far as the inner seeing is concerned. I guess I would like to establish one more thing, and that is, so in my experience, I'm seeing furries. I'm not seeing people wearing furry costumes that, that look like cartoon characters. Is that right? [Tristan: Um.] That was, that was what he had to explain to Russ so that he could understand

what a furry was. But in my, as far as my experience, I'm seeing a bunch of dead furries.

53:35 Russ comments: This is a reference to what Tristan had said at 48:10: "I'm seeing, um, I'm seeing figures in, uh, animal-like suits." The experiential question is whether Tristan is seeing furries (and then he describes some attributes of those furries—figures, animal suits); *or* is Tristan seeing figures in animal suits (and from which he can infer that they are furries). Here, the fundamental experiential bit seems to be the furry.

We made a similar distinction in sample 3.1: Was Tristan seeing Eiko dancing (and he could describe a white dress), or was Tristan seeing a white dress (which he could infer or interpret to be Eiko dancing). There, Tristan's experience seemed to be of Eiko dancing.

54:10 Tristan: That's correct. Yes.

54:14 RTH: Okay got it. And, and *then* I am seeing a stoplight and putting on the brakes and I recognizing that I need to stop. And now I would like to know whether that is in your directly apprehended experience or whether that is something which is automatically processing?

54:39 Tristan: It's directly apprehended.

54:42 RTH: Okay. And by "directly apprehended" that, that means "before the footlights of my consciousness." So for example, right now, I'm guessing you are, I'm gonna call your attention to your backside. [Tristan: Mm-hmm.] You, you are sitting on a chair or something, [Tristan: Right.] and now when I'm calling your attention to it, you can feel the pressure on this part of your cheek and that part of your back and whatever, now that I'm calling your attention to that.

55:09 Tristan: Right, right.

55:09 RTH: My guess is that five minutes ago you weren't paying attention to that. It was those corpuscles were sending signals and whatever, and you were, and you were responding skillfully. You weren't falling off the chair or whatever [mimes falling over], but not directly in the footlights of your consciousness. That's the distinction I would like to make between what I mean by *in* the footlights of your consciousness, and not.

55:33 Tristan: Mm-hmm. This was *in* the footlights of my consciousness. [RTH: Okay.] but we can go 60-40 to everything, everything furry and, and 40 to the stoplight.

55:48 RTH: The 40 is still a lot, but it's not quite as much as the furry?

55:52 Tristan: Mm-hmm.

55:52 RTH: Okay. And, and in the, so in the 40 portion, I'm seeing the stop sign and putting on the brakes and somehow?

56:04 Tristan: Oh, oh, red, red light. Sorry, red light.

56:06 RTH: Stop light. And I did you, you,

56:09 Tristan: Oh, oh, sorry, sorry, sorry.

56:10 RTH: You did say that and I misquoted myself. So the, so we see the stoplight and, and I need to stop. And the need to stop is before the footlights of my consciousness as we're, as we're defining that phrase, now? That's a, this is a question. [Tristan: Eh.] So it's not like I'm just automatically stopping it's.

56:32 Tristan: Right. The, the need to stop is not..., the need to stop is, is automatic.

56:42 RTH: Okay.

56:42 Tristan: Or, or it's so it's, or it's so, or the, the before the footlights component to the need to stop is so slight that it may as well be automatic.

56:58 RTH: And, and so that's, in, in my world, I think it's not possible to make a distinction between "absolutely no} and a little bit. The philosophers take me to task to, "don't you know the difference between *a little* and *no*?!?" And the answer is, and the answer is no. I don't know that, [laughs] I don't know the difference between that or experientially I think it's not possible to, to distinguish that sometimes, [Tristan: Yeah.] so I, I'm, I'm not, I'm not particularly concerned about that. Philosophers say, well, "there's a huge difference, y'know, if you got 1 cent, then you can't say, I got *no* money!" so. [shakes his head in frustration]

57:38 Tristan: I'm with you, now.

57:39 RTH: I don't begrudge them their logic. But it, in the, in the world of experience, I think it's not possible to make [Tristan: Mm.] some distinctions more finely than, than you can. So about *this* portion of your experience, what I understand that we're saying is the *seeing* of the red light is directly apprehended. [Tristan: Mm-hmm.] And maybe the response to what I have to do with it—I gotta, I gotta stop—if that's directly apprehended, that's much less than the seeing of it.

58:10 Tristan: Yes, that's correct.

58:13 RTH: Okay. And, and the seeing of it, the seeing of the stoplight, is less prominent, 40 to 60, than the seeing of the furries.

58:23 Tristan: Yes.

58:24 RTH: Okay. And then my friend is telling me about the furries?

58:36 Tristan: Mm-hmm.

58:37 RTH: And who, who, who is my friend? You wanna give this person a name?

58:41 Tristan: Sure, Emily.

58:42 RTH: This is Emily.

58:44 Tristan: Mm-hmm.

58:45 RTH: And, and so Emily is telling me about the furies, and I am innerly seeing, I'm sorta illustrating what she's telling me.

58:55 Tristan: Yes.

58:55 RTH: And uh, and then the question you said, I think (if I'm recalling correctly), that you were somehow some, somehow paying attention to what she was saying.

59:14 Tristan: Uh.

59:14 RTH: And the, this, the distinction that I wanna make here is: it's clear to me that you were paying attention to, to what she was saying, because she's talking about furies—in the real world, she's talking about furies. And *you*, in your imaginary world, are seeing furies. So there's, there's no question that your gray matter and your, you're processing and whatever are processing what she's saying. The question is whether that's directly before the footlights of your consciousness.

59:42 Tristan: Right. Um, yes, it's before the footlights of my consciousness, but it's not the specific, there's not the sort of, um, oral component to it as say in the last sample. It's what the entirety of what she's saying is in the footlights of my consciousness. Um, and that she's talking about dead furies, but I'm not picking out a specific words that she's saying.

1:00:17 RTH: So just to make sure that I'm understanding correctly. It's my understanding, as in Tristan's understanding, is I am directly apprehending bef, before the footlights of my consciousness. Unlike in this, in this situation, for example, you were sitting in the car, no doubt you're driving the car [Tristan: Mm-hmm.] but your butt doesn't, your butt doesn't figure in this [Tristan: Right.] before the footlights consciousness. You were, it was, it was intelligently processing what needed to be processed, as butts do. But that is not before the footlights of my consciousness.

1:00:59 Tristan: Mm-hmm.

1:01:01 RTH: So the Emily's talking is more than just skillfully being processed. It is [Tristan: Mm-hmm.] somehow being experientially heard.

1:01:14 Tristan: Right.

1:01:17 RTH: Okay. But *not* heard in a latch on to this word, latch on to this word, latch on to this word as we were talking about in the previous beep.

1:01:24 Tristan: Right.

1:01:27 RTH: Okay. So in, in *this* sample, I am *hearing* what she's saying. I'm *understanding* what she's saying as evidenced by the fact that I'm illustrating it with my im, imagery, but I don't, I'm not, latch on one word at a time.

1:01:44 Tristan: Mm-hmm.

1:01:50 RTH: I'm good about that. And, and in my timekeeping mode, I'm noticing that we are now at an hour.

1:01:59 Tristan: Mm-hmm.

1:02:01 RTH: Do we wanna say this is good?

1:02:02 RTH: Might, uh.

1:02:06 Tristan: Yeah, this is good for me. I do have more samples and I could continue, but I could also stop.

1:02:15 RTH: I, I think it'd probably be just as good if we stopped.

1:02:17 Tristan: Yeah because I'm getting better this anyway so.

1:02:20 RTH: Yeah. I think, I think that's the, the, the... The risk of going on is that, that we've fall into the trap of thinking that what we're doing is good enough, which actually I would like us to, I would like us to do the opposite of that. I would like us to always *think*, well what, what we're doing is *not* good enough, [Tristan: Mm-hmm.] because in a way it's never good enough. And I would like us to be *happy* with that. I, it, it's not good enough, like what a, what a dummy you are. It's, it's not good enough because this is the way the world is.

1:02:47 Tristan: Mm-hmm.

1:02:47 RTH: And, and the, and what we do is al, we always falls short of, [Tristan: Mm-hmm.] of what we would like to be able to do. And we can maybe get better at it, but that doesn't mean that we have arrived at some adequate ability or... So I'd say, and I've got another meeting coming up anyway, so I don't, not too long. So, so I would say we should call this a day. We should figure out when we're gonna do this again.

1:03:11 Tristan: Mm-hmm.

1:03:11 RTH: If, I guess first if we're gonna do it again, and then if someone.

1:03:15 Tristan: I, I would like to.

1:03:17 RTH: Okay. Let's do it again.

[They compare calendars]