

TRANSCRIPT WITH COMMENTARY

Tristan

Tristan Interview 11

Below in black is a word-for-word transcript of the April 4th interview with Tristan that is available on YouTube at <https://youtu.be/PqrndmQnPMc>. In green are comments about and explanations of the Descriptive Experience Sampling process. If you have corrections, suggestions, or questions, please post them as YouTube comments.

RTH = Russ Hurlburt

AG = Amber Goto

Tristan = Tristan

- 0:00 RTH: And this is going to be Tristan's 11th day, maybe? Is that right? 10th?
- 0:14 Tristan: Uh, I feel like it might have been 10 last time, but.
- 0:16 AG: Today is, uh, day 11, yeah.
- 0:19 RTH: Tristan 11. Anything we should be talking about before, before we look at beeps?
- 0:25 Tristan: Um, no.
- 0:32 RTH: I would warn us that I have, uh, repair, house, house people coming sometime today. Don't know when, whether it's gonna be in the next hour. I don't know. Probably not, but I might have to delay for a minute to say hello to them, I guess.
- 0:49 Tristan: That's fine.
- 0:52 RTH: Number 1.

SAMPLE 11.1 DISCUSSION STARTS HERE

- 0:55 Tristan: Number 1. Um So I am reading the words "after the hunt." Um, and I believe these are the last words I've read, but there's also some degree of latching on, so that's component one.
- 1:23 Um, component two, I am thinking about an advertisement that has appeared on the page, that internet page right above, right above what I'm reading. Um, and it's made some type of visual impression on me that's sort of waning, but I'm still thinking about it.
- 1:54 Um, three, I, I have the physical sensation of shaking myself after peeing. Always catching me at the right time here.
- 2:16 RTH: And is three it? Or is there another?
- 2:19 Tristan: That's it.

2:20 RTH: And are all those things present caught in flight by the beep?

2:26 Tristan: Um, yes.

2:28 RTH: Okay. So the distinction there that I wanna make sure that we're clear about, which I think we are, but have to have to check it out, is: I don't, I, what I don't want us to do is to sort of take stock afterwards and say, well, I could be doing this, I could have been doing that, I could have been doing that. But rather to try to grasp what is actually ongoing before the beep, right one microsecond before the beep gets us.

2:50 Tristan: That's what we got.

2:51 RTH: Okay, excellent. And any, and any one of those more prominent than the others?

3:02 Tristan: Mm probably the words, the words.

3:05 RTH: Okay. And the words were "after the hunt"?

3:08 Tristan: Yes.

3:08 RTH: Okay. And how are those present to you?

3:11 Tristan: So there's that slight quality of, of them being spoken of, sort of, but it's not as if I am speaking. It's just that they have a slight speechiness to them.

3:31 RTH: And by a "slight speechiness, but not spoken," it's like they have characteristics of speech, but I don't feel myself, even innerly, speaking them?

3:40 Tristan: Right.

3:42 RTH: So I wanna make sure that I'm, I'm clear about that. That it's, when we're saying it has a speediness to it, clearly they're not coming outta my mouth. But we've had examples. I think where it is, it has seemed like you were speaking even though the words weren't coming outta your mouth, the inner speaking kind of a deal.

4:00 Tristan: Yeah.

4:01 RTH: This is *not* that?

4:02 Tristan: This is not that.

4:04 RTH: Okay. And it's not that I hear these words, and *yet* somehow they have a as-if-spoken quality to them?

4:14 Tristan: Yeah.

- 4:15 RTH: Okay. And does it seem like I'm, as if speaking, does the whole sentence have this speechiness quality? Or is it that I have speechified "after the hunt"?
- 4:28 Tristan: Just these words.
- 4:30 RTH: Okay. And then in previous beeps, we've talked about *latching onto*. Does this seem like the same kind of a thing or different?
- 4:40 Tristan: Um, I think this is, this is the same thing. Like I've latched on to these words in,
- 4:54 RTH: And in the past when we've talked about *latching onto*, in my recollection (which might be totally imperfect, I grant you that), but in my recollection, the *latching onto* has not involved a speechiness to it. So is this a latching onto *plus* a speechiness, or is it, well, *I'm refining what I'm saying about latching onto, and it has, probably those other ones had a speechiness to it, but I wasn't ready to say that.*
- 5:20 Tristan: I feel I've had some from my memory in the past where they have, there's the latching onto and there's a speechiness and some where they aren't. I'd say those are two separate components to, for me. This time it's a latching onto and a slight speechiness.
- 5:20 Russ comments: We should be able to determine whether Tristan's recollection is correct when we get to the green meeting.
- 5:42 RTH: Okay. And that was exactly the distinction I was trying to get us to make, so I'm happy about that. And so I'm happy about number, part one, I think, unless we have anything else to say about that.
- 5:54 Tristan: Mm hmm.
- 5:55 RTH: Then number two was, uh, waning visual impression.
- 6:01 Tristan: Right, it's sort of, um, I was thinking about this, this Megan robot film, and so it's sort of, it's both sort of maybe a mental, mental thought process about it that's waning and a visual impression that's waning. Um, sort of remembering her dance from the first movie.
- 6:28 RTH: And, and *thinking about* and a *visual impression*. Are those two separable components? Or is that one way of talking about the same thing?
- 6:46 Tristan: I dunno if they're separable at this point in time in the beep.
- 6:52 RTH: *Inseparable* is a problematic word for me. I haven't figured out a better word to say it. But, so sometimes when people say, "I'm thinking about something" they mean in, in that something like this, they would say, "well, I've got a visual impression of it." That's what *thinking about* means.
- 7:06 Tristan: Mm.

- 7:06 RTH: But sometimes “thinking about” means “I have some kind of a cognizing or analytical thing or mentalizing that would be (and this is the word that I don’t know how to say better) *separable* from a visualizing.”
- 7:21 Tristan: Yeah why I say at this time in the beep is because I think if you had done earlier, I would’ve been seeing the ad and I would have the visual in front of me, and I would’ve had a simultaneous visual of the movie and her dancing, and I would’ve been thinking about the ad. So those may have been separable components at the beginning. And now this just sort of like, I have a vague cognizing / visual, something about this movie that’s not especially, that’s being sort of, that’s not the most prominent thing in my thought.
- 7:56 RTH: Okay. And, and a *cognizing visualizing*, does that mean that there, by visualizing does that mean that there, there is something about this that I am *seeing* even though it’s vague or inchoate or something?
- 8:11 Tristan: Yeah.
- 8:13 RTH: And at the same time, I’m somehow *thinking about* it, not just having this vague visual thing, but somehow analyzing / considering . mentalizing.
- 8:28 Tristan: Yeah.
- 8:28 RTH: Is that true?
- 8:31 Tristan: Yes.
- 8:33 RTH: And is there anything more to say about that?
- 8:35 Tristan: No.
- 8:36 RTH: So I’m bringing to mind this movie somehow, not a specific portion of it, and not a analytical in the sense *that that was a good movie* or *that was a bad movie* or whatever. But somehow reflecting, don’t know, the don’t, I don’t think there’s a perfectly good word there, but somehow cognizing about this *while I also* somehow see it. But most of all of that stuff is not explicit enough to be able to say, well, this is exactly what I’m seeing, or this is exactly what I’m thinking about?
- 9:14 Tristan: Right.
- 9:15 RTH: Okay. And then there’s a physical sensation of shaking myself after peeing. And is that, uh, happening at the moment of the beep, the shaking actually happening? Or is this a recollected feeling?
- 9:29 Tristan: It, it’s happening at the moment and it’s, it’s largely physical sensation, but it’s sort of, I mean, there may be, it’s hard to say if there’s a cognitive component to the this as well, but it’s possible that there is.

9:51 RTH: Okay. And, and is this shaking of my hand doing the shaking? Or my penis being shaken? Or the wetness? Or can't say? Not that specific?

10:08 Tristan: All together, yeah.

10:08 RTH: Okay.

10:08 Tristan: Penis, hand, maybe, maybe. Yeah, I, I, I maybe could have gone in a little more detail about this one, but.

10:19 RTH: Okay. But it wasn't, it wasn't the primary aspect of my experience.

10:26 Tristan: It was stronger than thinking about Megan, but not as strong as the words.

10:30 Tristan: Okay. Or at least it, yeah.

10:35 RTH: And, and this is *mostly* a physical thing, *might be* we're allowing, there's, there's a possibility that there's some cognitively analytically thing about it. But that's a minor aspect if it's there. Is that right?

10:51 Tristan: Yeah.

10:53 RTH: Not trying to talk you into it, but just trying to tell you how I understand what you're saying.

10:59 Tristan: Well, I think, I think there is some sort of, well, there's some way it's sort of more present to me in consciousness than some, some other times where I'm hap, I'm not just happened to be doing this at the moment. I'm, y'know, somewhat en, engaged in this process, but maybe I'm just confusing things. So we'll go with the first thing. It's mostly physical, although there may be some cognitive component.

11:25 RTH: So I think it's, I think it's totally possible to be engaged with some physical activity and have it be *entirely* a physical activity, I'm totally engaged with it.

11:34 Tristan: Right.

11:35 RTH: *And* it's also possible to be in some way cognizing about that physical activity while I engage in it. Both, both of those things are possible.

11:44 Tristan: Right.

11:44 RTH: And I don't have a preference for one over the other.

11:49 Tristan: Right.

11:50 RTH: But I think I am good. In to number 2?

11:57 AG: Yep. Sounds good. Beep 2.

SAMPLE 11.2 DISCUSSION STARTS HERE

11:59 Tristan: Beep 2. Um, um, so I have heard the phrase “spine-tingling moment” on a podcast. Those are *not* the last words, but I’ve latched onto them— in some way or they’ve stuck with me. Um, component number one.

12:30 Component number two, I’m scrubbing away a piece of carrot with a sponge. Um, and this piece of carrot or whatever food matter has made some visual impression on me. And there’s sort of some affective component of this, maybe the sort of satisfaction of removing this, this piece and cleaning.

13:03 Um, and then there’s some degree of anxiety, which has a diffuse bodily component, um, which is sort of involved in this thought process. I’m sort of thinking about, well, I’m not thinking in words, but these are maybe if you put words to it, what it they’d be. I’m thinking about if I watched the documentary that they’re describing on the podcast, if it would be worth writing about. Um, and I’m thinking about, I’m sort of going back and forth thinking sort of the fact that just cuz you’d like something or it moves you in some way doesn’t necessarily make it worth writing about.

13:55 AG: Okay. Is there anything else in your experience?

14:00 Tristan: No, just those ones.

14:02 AG: Okay. And which of these is the most salient, prominent?

14:11 Tristan: Um, the most salient is, um, I’d say they’re about equal.

14:23 AG: About equal, okay. So let’s start with the “spine-tingling moment.”

14:28 Tristan: Mm hmm.

14:28 AG: Um, I hear that that’s, well, I guess how is that, how is that in your experience?

14:39 Tristan: Um, well, there’s sort of a continuous chain of thought, and I’m sort of latched onto this specific phrase and sort of innerly presenting that to myself. It doesn’t have much speech quality. It maybe has, uh, some residual heard quality.

15:01 AG: And by residual heard quality. Does that mean that this is something no doubt coming from the podcast, but is this, like, when you say “residual heard quality,” is that like an inner thing or is like residual heard like?

15:16 Tristan: It that’s like an inner thing that I’m trying to use to [inaudible]. It’s not as if I’m hearing it again at this moment, but it has some, just like my, the former one had some speechiness, maybe this one has some, some heardness.

15:31 AG: Okay. Um, okay. And I’ve also somehow latched, I’m latched onto the phrase or the words “spine-tingling moment.”

15:48 Tristan: Mm hmm.

15:48 AG: Okay. And I think, I wanna make sure I heard you earlier. You said that there is some type of, is that, or sorry, is that, is that it to that or is there anything more to be said about that?

16:01 Tristan: Um, I think that's it for this component, yeah.

16:06 AG: Okay. Dr. Hurlburt, do you have anything about...?

16:12 RTH: So I guess I do have a question about by comparison to the first beep. So there's, there's latched, so on in the first two beeps so far in the wordy portion, we've got latched onto speechiness and heardiness. And does the first beep seem like latched onto and speechiness, and then the second beep is sorta the same thing except it's latched on to and heardiness. So the heardiness and the speechiness are sorta the same and the latched onto is sorta the same or is one of them more or less, or?

16:46 Tristan: Well, there's slight differences because sometimes I latch onto something and it's the last word I've read, and sometimes I latched on to something and I've maybe read a few more words after that, but I'm still remembering the former thing. Um, the first one I was a little unsure if it was the last thing I read or not, but I think it might've been the last, this one, I'm definitely sure that there have been words after, um, that I just haven't latched onto as strongly. Y'know what I'm saying.

17:20 RTH: So is the latching, latching onto seem like the same thing from beep one and two?

17:20 Russ comments: The discussion beginning here illustrates a fundamental characteristic of DES: DES accepts that B.F. Skinner was right that language about inner experience is not adequately differentiated (see my discussion in Hurlburt, R. T., & Heavey, C. L. (2001). Telling what we know: describing inner experience. *Trends in Cognitive Sciences*, 5, 400-403.)—that it is *not* fair to assume that people use dictionary definitions of words when applied to their inner experiences.

Here, the issue is what Tristan means by *latching onto*. RTH is going to spend the next 13 minutes (13 minutes spent on one phrase! And that on top of the conversations we have had about this phrase on previous sampling days!) helping us to differentiate the usage of that phrase, to remove the phrase's ambiguities. We won't eliminate *all* the ambiguity, but we will take the potential for ambiguity seriously. That makes DES different from most (maybe all) other methods of exploring inner experience.

17:28 Tristan: Fairly similar yeah. Fairly similar, although, yeah.

17:33 RTH: And in, and in terms of the speechiness and heardiness: do they seem like of the same intensity, the same mental investment, whatever that is? The, the first one I can say is speechy, and the second one I can say is heardy. And it's sort of the same extent in both situations.

17:50 Tristan: Sure. Yeah.

17:54 RTH: Okay. Then I'm good now.

17:58 AG: Okay. Um, so the second component was the carrot. Um, how is that in your experience?

18:08 Tristan: Um, well, like I said, there's that visual component, which is sort of just like the, what is, what is it? I am sort of describing in, in around the fact, cuz I can't get it exactly, but it's like, y'know how when you have a task and you sort of see the visual component and that something needs to be done with it, and you sort of latch onto, there's sort of a similar visual latching onto it. *This is the thing* that needs to have something be removed, I guess, and say, and you remove it.

18:46 AG: Is there a, so to my ear, if I'm getting that right, it sounds like there's a, I'm not.. The visual impression is not of the carrot, but of something *on* the carrot or something?

19:02 Tristan: No, it's a, it's a little piece of matter of food that I believe is a carrot.

19:06 AG: Oh, okay. So this is on,

19:08 Tristan: It's a small piece of carrot.

19:09 AG: Okay.

19:09 Tristan: But it's just like a tiny little piece that I'm sorta clearing. As a matter of fact, I'm scrubbing my counter kitchen countertop of debris.

19:17 AG: Okay. So I am somehow into this carrot on the kitchen counter. Is that... What I'm wondering is by *visual impression*, does that mean that somehow, is that a way of saying, right, there is a affective satisfaction? Is that, is that visual impression a way of saying, well, now I feel satisfied, I've gotten rid of it? Or is the visual impression to say I'm somehow seeing it or into it, experientially?

19:54 Tristan: Well, uh, the, the visual component, you could just say, I see this carrot and I'm scraping it off. But it, but maybe this is me overcomplicating it, but I think there's some way that I'm sort of like maybe a little kind of honed in on this, this piece. Y'know, I'm just sort of thinking of the way I pick out this piece from the surrounding environment, y' know, [AG: Okay.] as, as a part of it that interests me and that sort of, my actions are engaged with just my orientation towards this carrot.

20:25 RTH: So the.. Much perception, maybe most perception, has a figure ground phenomenon to it, so that [Tristan: Mm.] whatever it is that we're interested in, we make clearer and more present to us. And everything else seems [Tristan: Right.] sort of faded away. So are we talking about figure-ground here? Or does it seem like it's more extremely figurely then and the, like, the ground has disappeared altogether?

20:52 Tristan: Um, no, the ground is still there. So, so I guess this is figure-ground carrot, carrot's figure and ground or I think I, Jakob von Uexküll has this article about effect space and sort of the tick is latching onto, y'know, the, the things that it needs to do is it senses this blood, so it, y'know, or the butyric acid. So it sort of like latches on to this thing as it's driving its action. So I dunno I, I sort of think of it in a, I don't, I don't know if that's what value this has, but that's sort of how you see it. And sort of, this is,

20:52 Russ comments: Notice that RTH has not followed up on Tristan's theoretical reference to von Uexküll's effect space. DES tries to bracket such theoretical references. That doesn't mean that RTH didn't hear it—he will guide the conversation back to this issue when the opportunity presents itself (see the comment at 39:16).

21:30 RTH: So I am aimed at the carrot piece,

21:35 Tristan: Right.

21:38 RTH: And I am focused on the carrot piece, but I am not, I don't obliterate entirely the surrounding.

21:48 Tristan: Right.

21:49 RTH: So that makes it sound to me like pretty much standard figure-ground phenomenon.

21:54 Tristan: Sure.

21:54 RTH: Right now when I'm looking at you, I'm seeing your face and Amber's pretty much *gone* and the rest of my computer's screen's pretty much gone, cuz I'm looking at Tristan, they're still there somehow, but for the most part, I've destroyed Amber in favor of Tristan at *this* moment.

22:10 Tristan: Right.

22:12 RTH: And is that, is that what we're talking about in terms of the carrot?

22:17 Tristan: Yeah, yeah, yeah.

22:17 RTH: Okay.

22:17 Tristan: Sounds good.

22:22 RTH: And, and then is, is that what we mean by "latched onto"? That I've latched onto the carrot means I've made it figure? Or does it also seem like I've somehow grasped it?

22:41 Tristan: Yeah, I think if that's the, the the words that you want to use, we can, we can just go with figure-ground, if that makes things easy.

22:51 RTH: Well,

22:52 Tristan: Or, or, or both. But yeah.

23:01 RTH: The difference, so, so the, I don't care about the words *at all*. [Tristan: Right.] What I, what I would like to do is to just to grasp your experience as best I can, as best I can. And since I can't get inside you and experience it, we gotta do it with, with using words. But in my lexicon, it seems to me, that the figure-ground phenomenon is something that happens sort of automatically when I shift my gaze from my window to Tristan's window, I, Tristan just sort of becomes the present, becomes the figure, and, and my, my own face gets obliterated. [Tristan: Hmm.] *Latching onto* seems somewhat more premeditated or more, more actively grasping, more, less, less automatic and more, more...

23:55 Tristan: I think maybe that, maybe why I picked the word *latched onto* is because figure-ground, y'know, I, I don't quite know the intricacies of of, of how it's employed, but it, it seems to me I have these, maybe I might have an experience where I'm reading where I focus on, on the, there definitely seems to be a bodily element here that's quite strong, as sort of like my, my actions are and vision are oriented towards this thing at the same time in a very intentional way. Um, so just, y'know, maybe it's a figure-ground thing where it's sort of en, engaging my bodily towards pursuing this, this end, end goal, but this, and maybe there's a bodily component and there's a goal oriented component that are quite strong in this.

24:49 RTH: So what I mean by figure-ground, I, I dunno whether we can do this here, but [Tristan: Mm.] when I show you a figure that looks like this [sketches and holds up the figure shown at right]



24:57 Tristan: Right.

24:58 RTH: What do you see?

25:00 Tristan: Well, y'know, figure candelabra, ground, ground, y'know, uh, just a plane behind it. Or, y'know, you have the figures as both heads and the ground behind it, and you sorta shift between the two, um, depending on when you're seeing it so.

25:18 RTH: And does, so does it, does it happen for you that as I'm watching this, sometimes I see the candlestick and sometimes I see the profiles?

25:25 Tristan: Yeah, yeah.

25:26 RTH: And, and I switch back and forth between those?

25:29 Tristan: Right.

25:29 Russ comments: I think RTH's exploration of *latching onto* is pretty good (I'd give it

an A-) with the – coming from his not giving Tristan a chance here to describe his own experience of the candlestick / faces alternation. There might have been profit from beginning with Tristan's experience rather than assuming that Tristan's experience was similar to that of other folks. That is, RTH here exhibits a failure to bracket some presuppositions about Tristan's experience.

- 25:30 RTH: That, and, and that's what the, what I would call the *figure-ground switching*. So I can make the candlestick the figure and I can make the faces the figure. And when I do that, I feel the candlestick sort of emerges and then the faces emerge and then, and, and it seems to come from the, it seems to come from *out there*, I guess it seems like the, the candlestick grabs my attention and then the profiles grab my attention. And then the, [Tristan: Mm.] whereas *latching onto* seems like I'm directing myself to *let's look at* the candlestick or *let's look at* the profiles or something. But I'm, I don't, I don't care about the words, I care about whether this is, seems like an automatic, the candlestick grabs me, the profiles grab me, and we can call that *latching onto* or we can call that something else, I don't care. The question is what does it feel like for you?
- 26:23 Tristan: Maybe in your words, I think there is a component of maybe of latching onto it, um, as, as, as sort of directing myself towards it [RTH: Okay.] and sort of grasping it.
- 26:36 RTH: So, so there's something *Tristan-aiming* rather than the *candlestick-drawing*.
- 26:43 Tristan: Right and.
- 26:44 RTH: And that's what we mean by latching on?
- 26:46 Tristan: Of course it's hard to say that there's not an aiming component when you're looking at the candlestick as well. So, but, but, but it turns it. But if we're laying out those two poles, then I would say that it's definitely more towards the, the aiming component of it.
- 27:01 RTH: So, so, good point. So I'm, I'm, so, I'm I'm, I *absolutely agree* that even in the candle, even in the candlestick thing here, there is a component and it's Tristan's bag of bones and neurons, which somehow makes it a candlestick and then makes it a profiles that [Tristan: Right.] there's no question those questions about that. The question is about what the *experience* is, not, [Tristan: Mm.] not what Tristan's, Tristan's neurons are doing, not, not his cognitive processing or whatever. What his experience is. And, and so my question is, is the experience of latching onto sort of like, I feel myself to be directing it. [Tristan: Yeah.] And the figure ground is I feel myself having been directed by the candlestick.
- 27:48 Tristan: Uh, then definitely, definitely the former latching on.
- 27:53 RTH: Latching, *latching onto*, not *figure-ground*?
- 27:56 Tristan: Yeah.

27:57 RTH: And is, is the latching onto here the same kind of latching onto, as we've been talking about many times with, with *words*? So this, the latching onto that we're talking about here is a,

28:13 Tristan: It's different cuz it has that bodily component.

28:19 RTH: So which is, which is which? What, uh,

28:22 Tristan: Oh, the, uh, my, my action with the carrot has that bodily component that makes it, I think a, a more forceful latching onto.

28:32 RTH: So this is a, a sort of a whole of Tristan's body latching onto?

28:36 Tristan: Yeah.

28:37 RTH: Whereas "after the hunt," ...

28:42 Tristan: Yeah.

28:44 RTH: ...that was a verbal aspect of Tristan latching?

28:49 Tristan: Yeah.

28:51 RTH: But both of them are latching onto in the sense of, I feel myself as doing the latching rather than I feel a figure-ground coming from the environment? Is that right?

29:07 Tristan: Yeah.

29:07 RTH: Okay.

29:07 Tristan: Yeah.

29:11 RTH: Okay. So I think, I think those are totally interesting conversations. This conversation we've had, we've spent the last 10 minutes probably talking about *latching onto* versus figure-ground. And that to my way to, to in, in my world, I guess I would say, that's sort of like the fundamentally interesting-est conversation cuz it, it is really trying to make sure that we don't, *infect* the conversation with, with word connotations, which might be different from you and from me. So we're trying to refine [Tristan: Right.] the word so that the, so that they rest easily on the phenomenon and yet mean something for, to Russ and to Amber and to Tristan and mean sort of the same, at least we, we can get to sort of a shared definition of. And it's hard work and it is to my way of thinking, sort of the ultimately interesting-est work.

30:16 Tristan: Mm hmm.

30:20 RTH: Alright.

30:21 Tristan: I found it fruitful. Um,

30:24 AG: So the satisfaction piece of this: I don't think we've touched on that too much.
[Tristan: Yeah.] Um, how is that present?

30:33 Tristan: Um, there's some affective quality that comes with the action that I am. Um, it's not a happy, but it, there's just a degree of satisfaction of having cleared the item away.

30:50 AG: And is that, uh, how is that a, a like purely mental feeling or a purely bodily feeling or somehow both?

31:00 Tristan: I'd say it's [pause] maybe, maybe a little more mental...

31:10 AG: More mental. Okay.

31:11 Tristan: But I can't exclude bodily.

31:14 AG: Okay. So not *mental*, but *more mental*, then?

31:19 Tristan: Yeah.

31:19 AG: Okay. Okay. Um, so let me see if I got this part right. I am latching onto by latching onto, we mean there's, I'm kind of directing my body physicalness toward this carrot, this piece of carrot. Um, and I am mentally satisfied by having, I guess, cleaned it off.
[Tristan: Mm hmm.] Is the anything about the clean, and I take it that the cleaning-off is context, that's just what's happening. But I'm not really into that in my, as far as my experience goes?

32:07 Tristan: Um, not so sure, because, because, I mean, all the, all the, the, the directing myself towards the carrot is in the action of cleaning it, y'know. So, and the, the affect is sort of like from, from the cleaning it. So I, what was the question, again?

32:39 AG: Yeah. The question is, I am in the act of cleaning the carrot, [Tristan: Right.] but is any part of that in my experience, directly apprehended in my experience at the moment of the beep? Or is that just something that I'm ongoing, no doubt skillfully, it's coming outta my body, but I'm not really paying attention to it. Like the same way a gesture would happen or, y'know, the way you're sitting on the chair, we don't feel the chair, or something like that.

33:06 Tristan: Hmm. No, I'm, I think, I think it's part of it because it's already part, it's already component of the, of both the things we've talked about already so,

33:19 AG: Um, okay. I just, I wanna be careful that we're not, uh, just kind of going with why I was cleaning the carrots and to be looking at it and feeling satisfied, I would've *had to have* been experiencing myself cleaning it. It's, y'know, it's totally possible that really I'm just feeling satisfied about. I'm looking at it and I'm feeling satisfied about it. But the cleaning part of it, the action of, it's not really.

- 33:47 Tristan: No, I think it's essential that I feel satisfied *because of* the act of cleaning it. So it's the act of, of clearing the surface of stuff that's dirty and needs to be removed that is giving me that sort of small satisfaction.
- 34:01 AG: The act, okay. And, and by the act, is that, is there some type of physical action involved? Or is there some type of visual comparison? Or how is that present?
- 34:13 Tristan: Now I'm unsure when, at the moment of the beep, what exactly, I'm a little unsure of the chronology because it's also part of this ongoing thing. So, but I've certainly just cleaned crumbs and maybe I'm getting to the carrot or maybe, maybe I've, in the process of sweeping the carrot or maybe, so I can't tell you exactly what physically is going on at that moment.
- 34:40 AG: Okay.
- 34:40 Tristan: Um, I just know that the latching onto the carrot is a latching of something that needs to be cleaned. Um, and the satisfaction is of having been cleaning. So I'm unsure if I've just cleared the carrot and I'm satisfied that I've cleared the carrot or if I've just cleared something else before that, I'm satisfied with that. But, uh, there's satisfaction that's coming from the act of doing the clearing, and there's a visual latching on of the carrot that needs to be of something to, to clear.
- 35:18 AG: Okay. I think that does make sense there. Is this, there, it sounds like the satisfaction is an ongoing feeling. What, what, whether that [Tristan: Right.] be from crumbs or carrot, whatever, doesn't much matter. But it sounds like the satisfaction was, y'know, our timeline has been going on for, for a little bit of time.
- 35:37 Tristan: Right.
- 35:39 AG: Okay. Dr. Hurlburt, do you have anything about that?
- 35:44 RTH: I'm, I'm good about that, but I have one, I have one more thing to, to say about the, about what I found interesting about the previous [AG: Yeah.] when I, when I said something was interesting, it was interesting what I said, I'm, I'm agreeing with what I said was interesting. I still think it was interesting.
- 35:58 But one of the things that was interesting about that was the, the task of separating out the difference between directly apprehending something and having some theory about it. And it seemed like it made it sort of easier for Tristan when we could clearly separate those things out between the, the neuron process of, of whatever to what was, what, what the, the way things work behind the scenes, so to speak, to what was actually experienced. And when we made that distinction clearly, Tristan could say, well, yeah, this was different. That was, this was a latching onto, and that was something else.
- 36:39 So the part of the task, and I would say a, a *huge* part of the descriptive experience sampling task, is what I call bracketing the theoretical..., setting, setting aside, trying to get ourselves unconfused about the diff, unconfused about what is theorized, *well, I must have been doing this because the theorists say that, y'know, my, even my figure-ground phenomenon is something which driven by Tristan.* Well,

yes, that's true. But, but that's a theoretical thing. And that's com, pretty much entirely different from whether from what I, from what I experienced in the moment, I guess.

37:19 Tristan: Mm hmm. Yeah. Interesting trying to tease that apart. Although I don't, I'll, I'll have to go back and play the tapes and see how it unfolded and see how my,

37:29 RTH: Yeah. I'm it, I, I would say the conversation, this conversation, like many of the conversations, maybe even most of the conversations that I have are more about our next sampling [Tristan: Mm.] than, than this, than our last sampling. They're more forward looking, the backward looking.

37:47 Tristan: Yeah.

37:47 RTH: And, and so what I, what I'm, what I would say the reason I don't have, it's not like I have a premeditated reason and then I'm saying it, but if I had to guess what my reasoning is, why, why I'm talking like this, it's because I want to help Tristan and Russ and Amber keep separate theories about perception from directly apprehended experience. I got nothing against theories of perception. They're all, they're all fine and well, but, uh,

38:16 Tristan: I'm, I'm curious, Russ, which, which theories do you think I should've changed as I, as we, as I teased out the experience?

38:26 RTH: Well, I would, to answer that question well, I would've to go back and look, but, but for example, you talked something about the tick and the

38:35 Tristan: Right.

38:36 RTH: Orienting towards the, towards the blood or whatever. *That* to my way of thinking is *entirely theoretical*. We have [Tristan: Mm.] no experience of whatever the fuck that *tick* is doing.

38:47 Tristan: [laughs]

38:48 RTH: And, and whether that is at all similar to what Tristan or, or Amber or Russ does, don't have any idea.

38:56 Tristan: Now see, in, in my experience, that's sort of like more like a poetic allusion to something that colors something that I'm not quite sure I got down in words in the DES. So, we'll, we'll have, we'll have to see as we go forwards, y'know.

39:16 RTH: So I, I, I totally accept that. And, and so the, so the metaphorical or the co, colorizer, coloring or whatever, I love that kind of stuff. I'm totally, totally into it. But what I want us to do is to, is to know the difference of what is a metaphorical characterization and what is a direct, direct description and, and not be confused about that stuff.

39:16 Russ comments: The last several turns have been RTH's attempt to help the process bracket the theoretical / metaphorical. Note that RTH does *not* say *don't use metaphor* or *do not mention theory*—bracketing does *not* involve a prohibition. Bracketing is a putting-out-of-play, a not-getting-caught-up-in, a not-confusing-something-for-description skill.

39:49 Tristan: Right, right.

39:50 RTH: That, that's the, that's the skill. So I'm, I'm, I'm, I'm entirely in favor of as colorful languages as, as we can use, as long as we know what we're talking about.

40:02 Tristan: I think we're, we're getting good at sorting out our, our plain-speak here, yeah.

40:06 RTH: That's right. And it, and y'know, this is our 11th day at this. We, we've spent quite a bit of time with each other trying to sort the, sort these things out. And, and that is a necessary pi, piece of the descriptive experience sampling deal. We don't do descriptive experience sampling on one day or even, or even three days. It takes us, y'know, we're 11 days in and, and we're making important distinctions about what words mean, and what Tristan's experiences, how, how, how in what, *in what manner* do these words lay on Tristan's experience.

40:45 Tristan: Right.

40:46 RTH: And, uh,

40:47 Tristan: We're getting there.

40:50 RTH: And I, I, and the whole thing is that, from my point of view, as I said before, it's, and I'm, now I'm gonna say it again, I guess it's, it's, it is like the fundamentally most interesting thing to do.

41:03 Tristan: Mm hmm.

41:03 RTH: Because it's, it's in a way, like a three-dimensional crossword puzzle or something, because there are word, there are words with clues in, in *my* direction, and then there's words and clues in *Tristan's* direction, and then there's words and clues in *Amber's* direction. And they're not all necessarily the same, but they're aimed at something that's the same. And the object is to make these things all align. Should we go on to number 3?

41:37 Tristan: Well,

41:38 AG: We have a diffuse bodily anxiety. [RTH: Oh.] Do, do we wanna?

41:41 RTH: Sorry about that.

41:43 Tristan: We had, we had third component of number 2, so.

41:47 AG: Yeah, okay. So we had this,

41:49 Tristan: I guess that is a number three.

41:50 AG: This diffuse bodily anxiety, um, and back and forth deal. Um, how is that, how is that?

42:00 Tristan: Yeah, so this, there's a thinking component, the cognitive component, um, so which is, as I described it before, I'm thinking of, oh, *they've just described this documentary, I should watch it, I guess. And maybe it'd be worth writing about. Why would it be worth writing about?* Y'know, it's kind of this, it has this diffuse anxiety that has a bodily component. Um, definitely, but maybe in this particular instance, it's a very, a strong mental component, these anxious thoughts about.

42:39 AG: Okay, so if I, I took you to be saying that there's, this whole thing is like this kind of anxiety with a, I have these anxiety analytical part, so the thinking about writing about it, is it any good, um, can I write about it, something like that, that kind of has like an anxious analytical piece. [Tristan: Mm hmm.] At the same time, wrapped in this, there's a diffuse bodily anxiety as well. And that's all.. Are those, I think, I think we used the word separable. Are those separable things or does it seem like one big thing with a analytical and bodily component?

43:24 Tristan: It seems to be one thing in this instance. Um, maybe because the bodily component is less strong than in some other samples, but that's sort of more theorization. But I feel like you could say it's, it's one thing here.

43:38 AG: Okay. And by the bodily thing being less prominent, is it that this is bodily and mental, but I'm really into the analytical thing. Bodily thing is still there, but it's like, I dunno, like a 90-10 type of deal? Or is it that I'm just, I'm not really paying it, I don't, or yeah.

43:58 Tristan: Hard to put numbers. Maybe it's, maybe it's the fact that I may be distracted by other things, uh, that are happening with my body at the moment, like the scrubbing the carrot. But, um, yeah.

44:15 AG: Mm, okay. So I think, so the, so if I'm understanding this correctly, there's this anxiety, has a bodily component, a ana, *and* an analytical component, and that's pretty much it.

44:41 Tristan: Well, an analytical or, or cognitive?

44:45 AG: Okay. Cognitive.

44:46 Tristan: And what's, what's the difference? In, in your,

44:50 AG: It's, it's, I think it's like the same thing. I think it, I just have a favor, I favor the word analytical a little more cuz cognitive could mean a million things.

44:58 Tristan: Oh, okay yeah that.

44:58 AG: Analytical could also mean a million things, but I think it's easier to separate analytical [Tristan: Right.] versus affective versus cognitive,

45:06 Tristan: Right, Yeah. I, I guess that, I guess that's true. Yeah. Um, so yeah, an analytical component. Yeah.

45:15 AG: Okay. Dr. Hurlburt, do, do you have any more questions about that?

45:19 RTH: Well, I would, I would comment on that because I, I don't know that we've got any, any single best word for it. But, uh, the, what the *cognitive analytical, mental* consideration or the stuff that is, if you put into words, would be something like, "well, is it A, or is it B?" Or, or "this is 47 meters long and that's 29 meters long." Or, or, or, uh, "the ingredients in a cake are flour and eggs and sugar." That if you put a cognitive analytical thing into words, it'd be like that. That's sort of by *distinction*, if you put into words something, something about the affective, it would be something like, well, "I'm pissed off," or "I'm worried," or "I'm anxious," or "I'm...." So the question is, well, what, what, what is the concept for the experience that if you put into words would be, y'know, "it takes four cups of sugar and two cups of flour" or whatever. What do you call that stuff? And, and we, and the way we try to deal with that is because we can't, we haven't figured out what a best word is. It's to say, well, it's cognitive or analytical or contemplative or thought, thoughtful or whatever.

46:58 Tristan: Yeah.

46:59 RTH: And, but, but the, the, the reason that *cognitive* is problematic is that cognitive ends up being sort of theoretical-sounding. Cognitive, we have the cognitive psychologists act, actually for, to a large degree, is not *at all* about experience. They think there's cognitive processes that go on and do these analytical shit. And, and probably there are (I'm, I'm not, I, I don't really care to argue that one way or the other), but it's *not experienced*.

47:30 Tristan: Yeah.

47:32 RTH: So the question is, what would be the best word to describe the *experience of: somehow considering that I need four more cups of sugar* or whatever, by contrast to *I'm worried about this*. [JBK: Hmm.] And it's hard, it's hard because the language, (A) because the language is difficult; (B) because inner experience is private, and (C) because, because the people who oughtta be thinking about this stuff, like psychologists, don't think about it. [JBK: Hmm!] There's, there's very little conversation about what *really* happens as far as inner experience is concerned.

47:32 Russ comments: We have spent that last 4ish (!) minutes trying to clarify the distinction between cognition and affect. This is the eleventh sampling day (!), and we are wrestling with basic word meanings. Is that really necessary?

Yes! Skinner was right—there is no reason to believe that language about inner experience is been adequately differentiated by the verbal community (see Hurlburt, R. T., & Heavey, C. L. (2001). Telling what we know: describing inner experience. *Trends in Cognitive Sciences*, 5, 400-403.). So we have to do the linguistic differential reinforcement by ourselves, which is part

of the iterative process. Tristan asked (at 44:46) “And what’s, what’s the difference?” If we credit that as being a serious question, then we have to answer it in a serious way; otherwise we convey to Tristan that we do not care about is concerns. But answering it in a serious way takes time and effort, as the conversation since 44:46 shows. It’s *not* a matter of referring to Webster—Skinner was right about that.

In short, this is what you have to do if you want to apprehend experience with fidelity.

48:18 Tristan: Yeah.

48:19 RTH: Almost no, almost nobody is, is doing like, like the kind of thing that I said was the interesting-est thing, trying to, trying to help Tristan and Russ and Amber talk to each other about what the difference between *latched onto* and... Nobody’s doing that other than

48:37 Tristan: You’re, you’re, you’re fighting the good fight! [laughs]

48:40 RTH: Yeah, but it, it is, it *is* the fundamentally interesting-est thing, it seems to me! And sooner or later psychology’s gotta wake up to that, and figure out, well, yeah, we, we gotta figure out what this inner experience of, we gotta figure out how to do, how to do about it. And get some people out there who are better at it than Russ and Amber and, and Tristan [pause] maybe.

49:07 Tristan: One of your disciples, maybe.

49:11 RTH: Or somebody’s got a, somebody’s got a better way to, and, and, and I’m, I’d be, I’d be delighted to have somebody better, way better at it than I. But the, but *somehow* we’ve gotta know the difference between what Tristan *experiences* and what Tristan *theorizes about* and what Tristan *directly apprehends* and what Tristan *puts into colorful language*. We’ve *got* to learn how to distinguish between those things, [Tristan: Yeah.] I think. And that’s, that’s why I’m here, and that’s why you’re here, probably (and or you got your own reasons probably), but the, but that’s why, that’s why this, that, that’s why this *effort* exists, I would say.

50:02 Tristan: Mm hmm.

50:07 RTH: So it’s now 10:07 here, which means we’re almost, we’re fifteen in into this for 47 minutes or something. Should we go one more beep?

50:17 Tristan: Yeah This next beep is, is quite, is quite a complicated one. Maybe. So depends if you want to stay a little over or not.

50:25 RTH: I’m good.

50:28 Tristan: Okay.

50:28 RTH: Let’s do it.

50:28 Tristan: Good, Amber?

50:30 RTH: She said she was good, but she was mute, muted.

50:33 Tristan: Yeah.

50:33 AG: Yeah, sorry. Yeah, it's good.

SAMPLE 11.3 DISCUSSION STARTS HERE

50:36 Tristan: Okay, then let's do it. Um, so I'm, as a matter of fact, I'm still listening to this podcast. Um, I've sort of, the last word is that I've heard is "happened" and I'm sort of just heard that word. Um, I'm thinking about the content. Uh, so maybe that's component one.

51:04 Component number two is I'm thinking about the content of what they've just said on the podcast, which is they're, they've described how the entire Beatles career took place over four years, or maybe it was four years from this point to that point, or maybe it was from like, the *Hard, Hard Days Night* to end of, end of *Let It Be* or something. Um, and so I'm sort of thinking about how, how quick that was, like they said. Uh, maybe this, this, this might be a thought that's waning a little.

51:41 Um, so component three is I'm thinking about, uh, whether I should put the lunchbox.... So maybe, as a matter of fact, I'm trying to put this block of Parmesan back in the fridge. I don't want it to get that crusty thing it gets when like the air like, y'know, covers, covers the Parmesan, but I don't have Saran wrap and I don't have anything else to wrap it with. I sorta have the, maybe the leftover cheese wrapper. So, but it's kind of shredded, so I'm gonna put it in this like, sort of lunchbox thing I have and either close that all the way or, um, and maybe put that inside one of the vegetable drawers as well. Or y'know, or maybe there's sort of like, maybe there's a dairy drawer. So I have vegetable drawers down lower, and then I have this other drawer up higher that still allows some airflow. And I dunno what you call that. Maybe that's the dairy drawer. Anyway, so that's just background. So I'm thinking about whether I should put the lunchbox with the cheese in it, in the refrigerator cheese drawer and vegetable drawers. And there's some, uh, there's sort of some vague visual... There's a visual component of this as sort of like, I'm vaguely imagining, um, the lunchbox with the cheese in it, in the drawers.

53:20 Um, and so concurrently this is maybe another component or not, I'm also thinking about the airflow and I'm thinking about whether the cheese will mold if it's completely sealed in the lunchbox with no airflow, um, or, and whether I should keep the lunchbox slightly cracked or whether it will dry out if there's any amount of airflow in there. Um, so yeah.

53:53 RTH: So is any of that more salient, more present, whatever, than the rest in your experience?

54:01 Tristan: Well, the, the cheese stuff over the, um, the,

54:07 RTH: Podcast stuff.

- 54:08 Tristan: Podcast stuff, and I think you could even submit the, probably the cognizing or the analyzing of the cheese over the visual component of the cheese. Although I think the def, the visual component is, is difficult, because I'm definitely imagining the lunchbox placed with the cheese in the drawers as visual. But there's also a possibility that, that there's a visual component towards imagining the moldy cheese without airflow. Or there might be, there might be several visual components to it. So, but if there are several visual components, then the most prominent visual component, I think, is sort of imagining the lunchbox with cheese in, in one of the vegetable drawers.
- 55:07 RTH: Well, let's start there. When you say "I'm visualizing this," do you mean I *see* it? In it's imaginary, I, I understand it's an imaginary thing—we're not *in* your refrigerator. The question is, is this a *seeing* kind of visualization or a, I guess a *knowing* kind of visualization?
- 55:34 Tristan: Um, there may be some knowing visualization there, there's also a component of seeing visualization, but it's not particularly strong.
- 55:46 RTH: It's what?
- 55:47 Tristan: I wouldn't say it's not particularly strong. It's not particularly clear, perhaps.
- 55:53 RTH: So what is it that in the, in what, what if... To the extent that you see something, what is it that you see?
- 56:02 Tristan: Uh, the a, a brown and tan lunchbox in the vegetable drawer, uh, in, in the refrigerator drawer. [RTH: Okay.] And I see the, see the drawer.
- 56:18 RTH: Okay, lemme, lemme, lemme interrupt that to, to make an important distinction here. So I'm not interested in the lunchbox itself. You said "a brown and tan lunchbox," or whatever. I don't care about the lunchbox itself. I care about what you *see in your experience at this particular moment*.
- 56:36 Tristan: Right.
- 56:36 RTH: So do I see brown and tan lunchbox? Or do I see...
- 56:42 Tristan: Um, it's actually brown and gray, yeah. The, the, the brown and grayness of the lunchbox, the lunchbox itself is present in the visual imagining, um.
- 56:51 RTH: So I, so in my visual imagining at the moment of this beep, I do *see*, in my imagination, brown and gray, the brown and gray colors. That's not just a fact of the fact of the universe. This lunchbox in, in reality over there in its drawer, wherever it is, is brown and gray. But in my imagination, *I see it*, [Tristan: Yes.] in, in its brown and grayness.
- 56:51 Russ comments: Here again, it is noteworthy that this is the 11th sampling day and we are working hard to be careful about what it means to *see*.
- 57:12 Tristan: Yes.

- 57:13 RTH: Okay. And, and as am I seeing, this is another set of distinctions here. Am I seeing more the brown and grayness, which happens to be of the lunchbox? Or am I seeing the lunchbox, which I could say it happens to be brown and gray, but mostly my intention is, my imaginary attention is on the lunchbox?
- 57:35 Tristan: Um, I'd say that the brown and grayness is the most salient features that I know to be there when I picture that lunchbox in the drawer. Um, so, um, I'd say those are particularly salient features of the imagining. Um.
- 58:07 RTH: So at the moment of this beep, I am seeing in my imagination, innerly seeing, brown and gray of the lunchbox.
- 58:25 Tristan: Yeah.
- 58:29 RTH: Okay. And it's in the drawer. Do I see the drawer or do I just know that the drawer is present?
- 58:47 Tristan: Um, I know I see drawer, but I'm trying to figure out which drawer I see, cuz I know there are three right now, and I can't remember which drawer I see at that moment.
- 59:03 RTH: So this is, this is gonna give us some, some good practice. I don't care which drawer that you're actually seeing. What I care about is *what you see*. Do I see a whole drawer? Do I see an open drawer? Do I see a left hand side of a drawer? Do I see blue plastic? Or?
- 59:19 Tristan: Yeah, I'm not sure I can, I am, I'm not sure if I have made, I'm not sure I can answer that right now.
- 59:27 RTH: Okay. So this, so this comes back to the, to the kinda conversation that we were having a little bit ago about, about trying to learn how to bracket what, I call bracket the theoretical from the, from the experiential. Cuz it's, it's more than bracketing just the theoretical. It's, it's bracketing *everything* [Tristan: Right.] away from just so that we can just talk about the experiential. And, and, and it's difficult because I, in the, in the experiential world, the experiential world *does not necessarily* match up with the real world. So the real refrigerator's got three drawers in it or whatever. And what, what I want us to do in DES is to, is to forget about whether the real, I don't really care about whether it has three drawers and I'm looking at the second one or whatever, that's not the issue. The issue is what I, what I see in my experience, regardless of whether that conforms with reality or not.
- 59:27 Russ comments: This is a pretty good discussion of the act of bracketing. The object of DES is to suspend the natural attitude. In the natural attitude, in the real world, there are three drawers and the lunchbox has to be in a particular one of them. But that is not at all necessary in the experiential world. I can see the drawer without it being specified which drawer it is. I can see inside the drawer without it being specified whether the drawer is open or closed. And so on. The question is *what do I see?* The question is *not* what is the thing that is being seen.

The interview is going to devote the next 10 (!) minutes to clarifying bracketing the natural attitude.

1:00:34 Tristan: Mm hmm.

1:00:38 RTH: And that's sort of the same conversation as, as we had about *theory*. I don't really care whether what you say conforms or, y'know, when we were talking about the, the oscillation of the faces in the vase, I, I don't care whether that conforms with some gestalt theory or whatever, cognitive theory or whatever. I don't care about that. The question is what happens in your experience.

1:00:59 Tristan: Yeah. So yeah, I think these, um, these visual imaginings have always been a challenge for me and remain, remain a challenge to do it. And maybe, maybe I have less sa, maybe I have fewer samples with them, so they're a little harder. So you'll get better at it but yeah.

1:01:22 RTH: And the, and the, the color issue, the blue, gray and brown, was it gray and brown?

1:01:30 Tristan: Gray and brown, yeah.

1:01:30 RTH: Gray and brown. That and that, that gives us the opportunity of making this kind of a distinction between reality and experience.

1:01:47 Tristan: Yeah.

1:01:47 RTH: Because in *reality*, the, the lunchbox is the way the lunchbox is, and it's got colors and edges and corners and latches and whatever. But in *experience*, I don't have to see any of that to understand that I am seeing a lunchbox.

1:02:06 Tristan: Right.

1:02:06 RTH: So I can, I can, I can visualize a lunchbox without seeing *anything* in, in my imagination or otherwise.

1:02:16 Tristan: Yeah.

1:02:16 RTH: But I can also imagine a lunchbox where I see brown and gray and I don't see any of the latches or the edges or whatever, but somehow I see a pattern of lunch of gray and brown that I understand to be the lunchbox because I'm doing the imagination. I, I know what I'm looking at obviously, cuz I'm doing it.

1:02:37 Tristan: Yeah.

1:02:37 RTH: But the, but what I actually see is brown and gray in my imagination.

1:02:45 Tristan: Yeah.

1:02:48 RTH: Or I could be saying, I see a lunchbox and the lunchbox is brown and gray, but what I see is actually a lunchbox and the brown and gray are sort of the constitutive factors of the features of the [Tristan: Yeah.] lunchbox itself.

1:03:10 And the same, the same is true in, in the Zoom in, in the real, real life. So right now we're having a, we're having a Zoom window and in the, in the Zoom window on my screen (probably on yours too), when I'm speaking the, the border of the, the border of my square lights up with, with green. And when you speak the border of your square lights up with green.

1:03:32 Tristan: Yeah.

1:03:35 RTH: *And* there might be a time when I would be interested in just the greenness. I don't give a shit about whether it's a square that's, that's indicates that Russ is speaking. But for whatever reason the green draws me.

1:03:48 Tristan: Mm.

1:03:48 RTH: And at some *other* time I see the square and I, and I am, I recognize that that, that, that indicates that Russ is talking.

1:04:03 Tristan: Mm.

1:04:03 RTH: The physical world is exactly the same thing. The experiential world is entirely different because at one time I'm interested in the green, and the other time I'm interested in the speaker.

1:04:10 Tristan: Mm.

1:04:10 RTH: And the task is to try to not be, it's the, the DES task is to try to describe experience without, without regard really for what, what it is. The fact that it's a, if my, if my interest is in the, the chartr, chartreusey green, it doesn't matter to me that the, the chartreusey green happens to be of the rectangle on the Zoom screen. It's that I'm interested in the chartreusey green, chartreusey green line, maybe I'm interested in. That's it. And the rest of that stuff, y'know, how Zoom works and the electrons that choose how to, how to determine whether Russ is speaking or whether Tristan is speaking or whatever, how it zooms out, how it filters out the airplanes in the background or whatever. That doesn't matter if my experience happens to be of the gr, chartreusey green.

1:05:26 Tristan: Mm hmm. I think I've determined that I can say that I see differ, I see the different drawers in my fridge.

1:05:48 RTH: In my imagination at the moment of this beep, I see....

1:05:52 Tristan: Yeah.

1:05:53 RTH: What do I see?

1:05:55 Tristan: Um, it's, I'm seeing, I can, I know that I'm seeing them. I am unsure of what exactly I am seeing, but I know that I see, I see the lunchbox going into these three drawers. So it's sort of like, um, there's a, this, the, the brown grayness of the lunchbox is a salient feature that I know I *definitely* see. So perhaps the other ones are sort of seeing without, without as clear a seeing. Um, but I, I see, um, for example, I see the, there's the air, I see the space in the top drawer where the airflow gets in. Um.

1:06:54 RTH: And do you see that at the moment of the beep as opposed to knowing from what y'know about the, the way the refrigerator refrigerator works, there's airflows notches up there?

1:07:05 Tristan: Yeah.

1:07:14 RTH: Okay. So lemme say what I've heard you to say about this beep.

1:07:21 Tristan: Mm hmm.

1:07:21 RTH: I see, in one manner of speaking, brown and gray, that I know to be the lunchbox. And in another manner of speaking, I see the lunchbox going into one of three drawers. And what I see, I think is the airflow spaces of the top drawer.

1:07:47 Tristan: Mm hmm.

1:07:47 RTH: And in the real world, of course, the lunchbox has to go in one drawer or the other.

1:07:50 Tristan: Mm hmm.

1:07:50 RTH: But in my imagination, it doesn't, I can't say that I see it going into the top drawer or the second drawer, but nonetheless, I see it going into a drawer.

1:08:03 Tristan: Mm hmm.

1:08:03 RTH: That would be impossible in the natural world.

1:08:06 Tristan: Mm hmm.

1:08:09 RTH: I would have to see it going into the second drawer, or whatever.

1:08:11 Tristan: Yeah.

1:08:11 RTH: But in the world of, of imagination, I can, I can see what I, what I see and not see what I don't see. So it could be that all I see is brown and gray of the lunchbox and rectangular holes for the airflow. That's all I really need to see for whatever reason. That's all, that's all I see at this particular moment. I *know* this be, this is the lunchbox and the drawers because that's what I'm thinking about. But what I see is brown and gray and holes.

1:08:55 Tristan: Mm hmm. That's good. Yeah, that sounds about right.

1:08:58 RTH: And, and the conversation that we're having right now from my point of view is more about tomorrow than about yesterday.

1:09:04 Tristan: Mm hmm.

1:09:04 RTH: Because I think we had to have this conversation before you could, maybe, distinct, make the distinctions that, that, that I like to make, I guess.

1:09:25 RTH: (continues) So what I went about this beep, I would like to ask about the first portion of it.

1:09:30 Tristan: Mm hmm.

1:09:31 RTH: I'm watching the podcast. Then you said that the word that had just occurred was "happened."

1:09:37 Tristan: Yeah.

1:09:38 RTH: You did not say "I latched onto" happened. You said it was the last word, but you didn't say that I latched on to it. Does that mean that I didn't latch onto it?

1:09:47 Tristan: Yeah. There's not that especially strong quality of latching on.

1:09:50 RTH: Okay. So this was the, it, so this is the last word, but it's not a latched onto word?

1:09:57 Tristan: Yeah. I would say I heard it and I registered it, but I'm not sure I latched onto it.

1:10:08 RTH: Okay. And then there was a portion about four years, which I, I don't think I actually heard enough to know what we were talking about there. There was something about four and it was quick, but I, but I don't think I really understood the,

1:10:24 Tristan: Okay. So, um, so on the podcast they were talking about, as a matter of fact, they were talking about how, um, from the moment of the recording of the Beatles film, *A Hard Day's Night* to the recording of the rooftop concert, at the end of *Let it Be*, that all took place within the span of four years and how fast that was. Um, so I am thinking about that and the fact and about the, the fact that that is surprising.

1:11:05 RTH: That it's surprising how fast it was.

1:11:09 Tristan: Yeah.

1:11:13 RTH: And does that mean that I feel surprised? Or does it mean that I am considering how surprising that is, that it was that fast?

1:11:26 Tristan: I dunno if surprise is the word. More like, huh. Yeah, that is, that is kind of fast.

1:11:32 RTH: Okay. Alright. Then I think I'm good.

1:11:43 Tristan: Excellent.

1:11:43 AG: Me as well.

1:11:43 RTH: And I think, I think, I think today's conversations were totally interesting.

1:11:47 Tristan: Awesome.

1:11:47 RTH: So can we do this again?

1:11:53 Tristan: Yes.