

## **Michael Dickson**

### **Summary of Michael's Inner Experience**

Michael Dickson is a 57-year-old professor of philosophy who was diagnosed with schizophrenia at about age 25. We used descriptive experience sampling (DES) to explore 49 random samples of his inner experience (45 if we exclude sampling day 1, as is usual in DES). All DES interviews were conducted by two interviewers (Russ Hurlburt and Agnes Bolinska, a professor of philosophy colleague of Michael). Unredacted videos and word-for-word transcripts (with commentary) are available.

The aim of DES is to describe Michael's inner experience with fidelity, which is to say, to describe his experience as uncontaminated by extraneous distractions as we can make it. For example, Michael is a philosophy professor, but our task is to describe his experience without regard for his philosophical interests (unless those interests are directly salient at the moment of some beep); Michael has been diagnosed as schizophrenic, but our task is to describe his experience without regard for his diagnosis (unless that is salient at the moment of the beep).

We (Russ, Michael, and Agnes) are describing here the salient characteristics of Michael's sampled experiences. By "salient" we mean, with Webster, "standing out conspicuously : **prominent**; *especially* : of notable significance." Salience is not an objective attribute of Michael's experiences—it is what seems notable to Russ, Michael, and Agnes. We affirm that the characteristics we will describe are faithful characterizations or descriptions of Michael's sampled experiences, but we accept that someone else might have different sensitivities and therefore might characterize a different set of salient characteristics. In that sense, we are something like curators; curators of a Picasso exhibition, for example, would certify that the displayed works are by Picasso and would try to lead the viewer toward an understanding/appreciation of some aspects of Picasso (and not toward an understanding of van Gogh or Monet). Curation also reflects in some way our interests, sensitivities, and availabilities.

We are *not* attempting to describe any complete characterization of Michael as a person, or his essence or soul; we bracket away any theories or beliefs we might have about the existence of complete persons, essences, souls, etc.

We are *not* attempting to describe characteristics of people with schizophrenia, nor do we suppose that such a thing is necessarily even possible--indeed, we bracket away any theories or beliefs we might have about the existence of schizophrenia as an entity or group of syndromes or whatever.

So what follows is what we found salient / noteworthy about the 45 samples we observed.

**Speaking, aloud vs. silent vs. inner?:** There were many samples in which Michael was speaking, sometimes aloud, sometimes silently. In most of those cases, it was irrelevant to Michael whether the speaking was aloud or silent and he therefore did not register whether speaking was aloud or silent. Furthermore, there was *no* immediately obvious characteristic of a speaking that would indicate whether it was silent or aloud. [Russ says it

is highly unusual for DES participants to be unsure about whether speaking is inner or aloud.]

In situations where he believed he was alone (or, in general, where there are no social consequences for being noticed to be speaking aloud), he was unlikely to attempt to discern whether any occurrent speaking was silent or aloud.

In situations where there did seem to be social consequences, he was more likely to determine whether speaking was aloud, and such determination was the result of a process separate from the speaking itself. For example, he might monitor his throat for vibration or lips for movement; or he might observe the eyes of people around him to ascertain whether they were looking at him-as-speaker.

In one sample (9.1), Michael was purposefully speaking silently (so as not to disturb people who were sleeping nearby), and he easily accomplished that.

In one sample (9.4, see below in the “Creative seeing” section), Michael was purposefully (and successfully) speaking aloud (commenting on eduroam to his friend Chris). Furthermore, Michael reported that once he specifically spoke aloud, and verified that he was in fact doing so, he could confidently continue to speak aloud if he wished. For example, in a classroom-lecture situation, he would check at the beginning of class to ensure that he was speaking aloud; once he ascertained that aloud-ness, he could continue through the class without needing to monitor aloud-ness continuously.

Throughout sampling, until sample 11.4, Michael understood himself to be distinguishing (or not) between aloud and *silent* speaking. In sample 11.4, Michael understood himself to be *innerly* saying “They’re moving to UVA” as if to his friend Chris to tell him about some mutual friends who are moving to Virginia. This was rather clearly recognized to be an instance of *innerly* speaking, not merely *silently* speaking, and this was perhaps the first time ever that the concept of inner speaking made sense to Michael. (Simultaneously he was hearing the rattle of the HVAC.)

Michael’s silent speaking could be surprising to him. In one instance of silent speaking (sample 6.3, described below in the section called “Worried about losing his grip on reality”), Michael said to himself “You should take an Ativan.” (He had said this perhaps 20 times already, separated by perhaps a minute. Michael did not know whether this was said aloud or innerly.) On retrospection, Michael found it weird to have said “Ativan” because he never calls it by its Ativan brand name, instead referring to it as “Lorazepam.” This sample was at a time of some distress, which may be relevant here.

**Figure with no ground:** Most of Michael’s experiences involved some sort of perception, and that perception was experienced on its own, with no penumbra or background of experience. [Russ says that most people’s perception has a figure / ground characteristic where the figure is clearer and more coherent, but the ground is apprehended perceptually with less detail, clarity, puissance than the figure.]

For example, at sample 3.1, Michael was stirring oatmeal. He saw just the oatmeal; he did not at all see the pot, the spoon, or the surrounding stove. Simultaneously, he proprioceptively felt the resistance of the oatmeal to the spoon, but this was *not* understood to be related to the seen oatmeal. That is, he saw oatmeal; he simultaneously but separately felt resistance; neither of those were immediately apprehended as being in

relationship to each other. [Michael could have, and in fact did when jotting down notes about the sample, correctly recognize the relationship between the two experiences, but that was *not* part of the immediately apprehended experiences at the moment of the beep.]

**Objects can have a sense of agency:** Michael sometimes experienced objects as having their own agency, and interacted with them in that manner. This happened naturally and without any intention or probably, often, even noticing. For example:

5.3 [Michael had just sent an email to Agnes; he had used a group email as the starting point, and was now worried whether he had replied just to Agnes or had inadvertently hit Reply All.] There are three simultaneous aspects.

(1) Michael feels a slight panic located in a demarcated region inside his left upper chest; the region is roughly spherical, beneath the skin and bone, and extends into the interior of his body but not to the back. The slight panic is *not* a bodily feeling, but it *is* a feeling that resides in that region of his body; (2) He is watching the arrow (the mouse pointer) look for the Sent folder; [he is in reality controlling the motion of the arrow with the mouse, which he operates with his left hand, but he has no experience of that. Instead] he sees the arrow (as an agent) looking for the Sent folder (but not yet finding it); and

(3) he is mid-gesture with his right hand, pointer finger moving toward the screen, gesturally pointing at where that Sent folder is. That is, these are three separate consciousnesses: the demarcated panic, the seeing of the (agentic) arrow, and the *look there* gesture with the right hand.

Here, the arrow is understood to have its own agency; and his right hand has its own agency, so that the hand is understood to be communicating with the arrow, neither of which is felt to be being controlled by Michael. Michael did understand, in some intellectual manner, that these do not have agency, but that was not apprehended at the moment of the beep.

Another example is sample 6.3 (described below in the section called “Worried about losing his grip on reality”), where Michael is reclined in his recliner and feels the recliner to be actively holding him up, supporting him in space.

**Multiple separate simultaneous strands of experience:** Michael usually had multiple simultaneous but separate strands of experience. Sometimes the strands were objectively related but experientially separate; an example was sample 3.1, where the seeing of the oatmeal was experientially separate from the kinesthetic feeling of the spoon’s resistance, even though they arose from the same objective oatmeal.

Sometimes these simultaneous strands had separate agentic impressions. For example, in sample 5.3, just discussed in the “Objects can have a sense of agency” section, there were three strands of experience: (1) he felt panic in a demarcated region in his upper left chest (see the Feelings section below); (2) he was watching the arrow (the mouse pointer) look for the *Sent* folder; and (3) he is mid-gesture with his right hand, pointer finger moving toward the screen, gesturally pointing at where that *Sent* folder is.

Usually it made sense to Michael to say at least approximately how much attention he was investing in each of the separate strands, and sometimes the multiple strands did not occupy his entire experiential capacity. For example, in sample 3.1, seeing the oatmeal and feeling the resistance were each about 25% of Michael's experience, while the remaining 50% was unoccupied. [That characterization should be taken as metaphorically descriptive, not objectively definite.]

**Noticing of proprioceptive or kinesthetic sensations:** Michael often noticed his body position in space or its movement through space. Sometimes this was a bare noticing, as in sample 7.3 (which also contains many of the characteristics already described):

7.3 [Michael is in the grocery store self-checkout line; the checkout-computer has just said "Please use PINpad to complete transaction."] Michael says [aloud] to the checkout computer "You need to learn the rest of the words," (said with resignation [this is an old complaint of Michael's]). [Michael knows this is aloud because the store employee laughs at Michael's statement.] [By the rest of the words, Michael means "Please use *the* PINpad to complete *the* transaction."] Simultaneously, [Michael is reaching for his phone/wallet] (and sees it [as the target he is reaching for]). Simultaneously but separately he feels the kinesthetic motion of this arm through space [as he reaches]. [The kinesthetic sensations are part of the reaching, but] they are experienced as their own kinesthetic / bodily experience.

Sample 7.3 has multiple simultaneous strands; Michael is speaking, and knows it is aloud only because of his observations of someone's reaction. He feels his arm moving, not as a feature of the reaching for his phone but as its own kinesthetic sensation.

Sometimes Michael experienced bodily motions as manifestations of rhythm, or regulated his bodily motions in a rhythmic way (either by reference to some external source of rhythm, or by reference to some internally produced rhythm). For example:

6.5 [Michael was walking across campus, and as he walked] he was clicking his (right hand) thumb and middle finger together, making a specific Da da da Da da da Da da [the underlining/capitalization indicating accent; that is, this is a rapid 8/8 (3 + 3 + 2) lilting rhythm] repeating rhythm with his thumbnail as it moved back and forth across his fingernail. (He was especially feeling the accenting pressure *upwards* on his fingernail [even though it was his thumb that was doing the pressing].)

Simultaneously, Michael was synchronizing his steps to the rhythm, matching his steps particularly to the rhythm of the sensation in his fingernail. [Retrospectively, he thinks this lilting gait might have looked weird to a passerby, but that potential weirdness was not present at the moment of the beep.]

Sample 7.1 (discussed below in the "Left, right, or backwards" section) also included an instance of Michael's synchronizing his walking to a tune he was softly singing.

**Creative seeing:** Michael frequently saw objects that he would have correctly said were not present (or at least not present *that way*) in reality if he had been asked (or if the reality

was called into question in some other way). However, not having been asked and not considering the issue himself, he did not ponder whether the seeing was real or not. Russ calls this “creative seeing.” [Russ thinks that *all* seeing is creative, but some seeings are more or less common across people, whereas others are more idiosyncratic. For better or worse, Russ has referred to this second kind as “creative.”]

Some examples:

9.4 [Michael was sitting in his colleague Chris’s office helping him fix his laptop. Michael said to Chris (aloud) “I could never connect to eduroam” (the beep happened immediately after those words. [Eduroam is a roaming access service for the international research and education community.]

Simultaneously, Michael saw the word “eduroam” in a dropdown menu on the laptop (printed in white on a black background).

Simultaneously, he saw “eduroam” suspended an inch or so in front of the screen. (He saw just the letters [no background, including no blackness in the interior of the “o” of eduroam]. [The seen letters were thin (or two-dimensional), but his experience was not of seeing thin or two-dimensional letters—rather, his experience was of seeing a copy of what was displayed on the screen.]

Michael was seeing both eduroams (the two seeing experiences were the same), but he could have told Chris (for example), if Chris had asked, that the front eduroam was not real. However, that distinction was not present at the moment of the beep.

5.4 [Michael was creating a makeup quiz for a student who missed a quiz in his logic class, considering how to alter a question to be similar but different from the original. He was looking at the screen, which displays “~Bd → Ja”.]

There are two experiential aspects (within one experiential organization / consciousness). (1) Michael says to himself “let him try the bonus,” said matter of factly [as the answer to the question of whether Michael should include the bonus question on the make-up quiz]. (It is experientially irrelevant whether this is aloud or silent speaking.) (2) Michael sees the tilde in “~Bd → Ja” move quickly in an arc up and over the Bd and the →, and come down to rest before the Ja. [The ~ does not move in reality, but Michael sees the ~ make the arc-shaped motion. This seeing is experienced as a real seeing, but at the same time Michael could say (and could have said at the time, if asked) that the ~ did not really move. The seen ~ is experienced as agentic in the sense that it is as if the ~ is showing Michael where it could go to accomplish the aim of creating a similar but different question.]

Michael saw the ~ move, and that seeing was the same as the seeing of the remaining characters, but he could have told someone, if they had asked, that the moving ~ was not real. However, that distinction was not present at the moment of the beep. [The ~ here is similar to the mouse pointer in 5.3 in that Michael experiences them as being agentially independent of Michael—that is, Michael does not experience himself as controlling them

or creating their movement. The two are different in that the ~ is aiming at a specific location, whereas the pointer does not (yet) have a specific aimed location.]

9.3 [A bit before the beep Michael had seen the cover of a book which included the word “stratification” in the title. [He had understood the entire title as he read it, but he quickly forgot what it was.] Now, at the moment of the beep, he sees a random collection of letters [which somehow then or a bit later he understood to be the letters of “stratification,” but at the moment of the beep he experienced them as a bunch of nonsensical letters with no semantic significance].

He also sees the cover of the book that included a group of graduating students wearing mortarboards; the mortarboards were seen as ridiculous [this is *not* a separate thought, but is a seen experience, as ridiculous as if they had been wearing bananas on their heads].

DES typically does not consider day-1 samples, but we include one here because it is illustrative of the creative-seeing phenomenon.

1.4 [Michael was looking out his window.] He sees the white house across the lawn.

Simultaneously he sees the same house overlaid on the original; this second house moves slightly toward Michael and then floats upward and rotates backward (so that it faces toward the sky). He says (perhaps aloud, perhaps silently) “The house is doing yoga” [a reference to the Sun Salutation yoga sequence, which the motion of the house resembles]. [As the house moves and rotates, Michael sees that it is a flat façade, as if it had been painted on canvas and then the canvas was rotated revealing that it is thin.

**No direct apprehension of “reality”:** In all these examples, notice that Michael has *no directly apprehended at the moment of the beep* sense of reality or unreality; there are seeings that are apprehended in the same way. Michael can, if required, perform some kind of analysis and determine whether a seeing is “of something real” or “of something unreal”. By “something real,” Michael means nothing more nor less than his belief that if he were to inquire of others in a similar position as to whether they saw (for example) the white house across the lawn, they would say Yes. By “something unreal,” Michael believes that if asked whether they saw the house façade float away, people would say No. Michael has sufficient skill and practice to be mostly right about such judgments, but the judgments are post hoc analyses, not immediate perceptions.

**Creative hearing (including hearing voices):** Michael had frequent hearings that he could determine (as in the previous section) were “unreal.” In our samples, those hearings were mostly of voices.

Two of the voices were familiar, with their own characteristics. One of those was of his friend/colleague Chris. For example:

3.4 [Michael is driving skillfully, but he does not experience the driving.] Slightly before the beep, and repeatedly, he has heard Chris say “That’s really nice.” “That’s so great.” “That’s so great.” “That’s really nice.” in a repetitive manner. At the moment of the beep, Michael says to Chris, “Yes, Chris, that’s really nice” (with the intention of slowing down or stopping Chris’s speaking). [This intention is not explicitized; it doubtless *is* the intention but there is no direct apprehension of the intention.] (Michael does not know whether he spoke silently or aloud.)

This description of Michael’s speaking may read as patronizing, but Michael’s tone is actually friend-to friend—Michael has a very similar relationship to this voice as he has to his actual friend Chris.

Michael knows the other single voice that appeared in our samples to be always nasty. For example:

6.2 [Michael was concerned about losing his ability to maintain a grip on reality, to keep reality from melting away or disappearing. He had reclined  $\frac{3}{4}$  of the way in his office reclining chair trying to relax and to keep himself focused by looking at his favorite guitar which was on a guitar stand in front of him.] There were two experiential strands. First, he saw the guitar surrounded by directly apprehended blackness (that is, this was *not* merely ignoring the stuff in his peripheral vision—the peripheral things were not at all seen or otherwise present). [Michael referred to this as the “guitar was at the end of the tunnel,” but this “tunnel” had no 3-D extension into the distance.] This seeing felt like at any moment it could “melt” (by “melt” he meant somehow lose its reality—dissolve, reveal itself as merely a façade that could peel away). [That is, Michael was trying (not very successfully) to relax, focusing on the guitar with the specific intention of trying to make the guitar (and Michael himself) feel stable.]

Second, Michael heard the typically nasty person saying “People just pretend to like you.... People just pretend to like you.” This voice came from directly above Michael (perhaps three feet above him) and was spoken (as it always is) in a very flat affective tone [“like reading a phone book”—that’s part of what makes him particularly nasty].

These single voices on occasion could be heard speaking clearly (as in 3.4 and 6.2), but on other occasions could be heard speaking, but Michael did not know what they were saying.

Michael frequently heard multiple voices speaking simultaneously. Sometimes (as at sample 10.3) those voices were loud and frustrating/annoying. Sometimes they were not so loud or frustrating (as at samples 10.1 and 10.4). The perceived number of heard voices was to some degree conflated with their loudness/frustratingness; Michael concluded that if one were to count the number of voices, one would count something like: “1, 2, 3, students in a small class before class starts, busy cocktail party, Victoria Station” (see the discussion at sample 10.3).

On one sampling day, Michael creatively heard a cello playing (unknown) melodic music.

In all creative seeings and hearings, it made no sense to Michael to inquire about whether something was heard “in imagination”; that “in imagination” concept made no experiential sense to him. He could analyze and decide that that the cello was not real (in the sense described above), but it did not make sense to say it was “in imagination” or “imaginary.”

**Creative sensation:** One sample referred to a creative sensation—see part 2 of sample 11.6:

11.6 [Michael was on campus, and was hungry and wanted to get something to eat before class. He was in line in the coffee shop, which was getting busier and noisier as he waited; part of that is noticing a bunch of online-orders waiting to be picked up, and thereby avoiding the line.] At the moment of the beep there were four simultaneous related but separate experiences:

1. Experientially most prominently he said “It’s too much.”

(Experientially, it was irrelevant whether the speaking was aloud or silent, [but from the reaction of the girl behind him, he could infer it was aloud]).

2. [Two-ish minutes before the beep, Michael had felt someone tap-tap-tap on his back to get his attention. He had turned to respond and found that there was no one there. In the intervening minutes, the tap-tap-tapping had happened two more times (but now, knowing that there was no one there, he had not turned around).] Now, at the moment of the beep, Michael is [less prominently than the speaking) anticipating / awaiting expectantly that someone might tap him again. He is mentally aimed at the specific region of his back (below his right shoulder blade); (this is much more a mental expectancy than a bodily or proprioceptive focus); [he of course knows that it is not really someone, but his experience is of expecting someone to poke him].

3. [less prominently] He feels hungry as a pit in his stomach.

4. [less prominently] He is vigilantly scanning the shop looking for danger [that is, the experience is of looking for danger even though he knows there is no danger present].

**Creative perception:** One sample referred to a creative perception; see part (2):

7.4 [Michael is at his home computer, and has turned it on to see if it would work—there have been issues with his cloud data server.] There are three simultaneous tracks:

(1) He sees [at the right of the screen] the blue cloud logo (that signifies he has successfully connected to the server) and is experientially aimed mostly at its blueness [the blue signifies the successful connection—he is *not* appreciating it for its blueness qua blueness].

(2) Simultaneously [but separately from the cloud-logo seeing—these are two separate visual experiences], he sees [on the left of the screen] the

cloud file directory window—sees that it contains file names [whereas before it had been blank]. He apprehends those files as entities that have somehow been traveling through space, entered the back of his computer monitor, and then into the screen’s window. (This is the direct apprehension of a physical trajectory—a straight-line path from *over there* to *here* in the computer.) [That is, this is *not* merely the analytical understanding that the cloud server is in Charleston (or wherever) and that the files have been electronically transferred from there, although he certainly knows that that is the case.]

(3) Simultaneously he says “Ta da!” (expressing the satisfaction / relief [that the server is working and the files have arrived]).

The trajectory in part (2) is somehow perceived as being a straight line from Charleston through the back of his computer into the screen window. This is *not* a metaphorical description but rather the description of a perceptual reality (even though he knows it is not real in the sense discussed above).

**Feelings as occupying hyper-clear locations:** Two of Michael’s experiences involved feelings that were in hyper-clear locations in his body. [*Feelings* in DES refers to the (directly apprehended) experience of emotion; emotion itself refers to a process that may or may not be experienced. Russ says that feelings, if they are experienced as bodily, are generally relatively diffuse, such as “in my chest” or “throughout my body.”]

3.3 [Michael is shopping at Whole Foods, and has just entered a freezer aisle. Something happens ahead of him in the aisle [one person being quite rude to another, blaming the other for what he had in fact clearly done] that made him angry; we did not discuss what that event was.] Michael (~25%) sees the (real) freezer doors (converging in perspective); and as part of this visual experience but not experientially seen, “sees” that the doors converge, blocking his way. That is, he has the visual experience of being blocked. This is *not* a cognitive knowing *you can’t get out this way!* It is experienced as being part of the seen convergence—the blocking convergence is visually experienced but not experientially (even in imagination) seen.

At the same time, Michael (~75%) feels anger and is vigorously brushing / scrubbing / swatting it away with his left hand. The anger is felt spider-like with sharp feet scuttling across the top left of his head. This scuttling sharpness is directly apprehended as anger (that is, it is *not* a metaphorical representation of anger; it *is* anger). (Michael is in fact vigorously brushing, but he doesn’t really feel himself to be doing that. He does) feel the vigorous brushing as a sensation on his head/scalp.

A second example of feelings in demarcated regions is sample 5.3, discussed above in the “Multiple separate simultaneous strands of experience” section. There, a feeling of slight panic was described as located “in a demarcated region in his upper left chest.” That region was roughly spherical, beneath the skin and bone, and extended into the interior of

his body but not to the back. The slight panic was *not* a bodily feeling, but it *was* a feeling that resides in that region of his body.

**Left, right, or backwards:**

7.1 [Michael was walking back from class] softly singing (and experiencing) a tune “ba ba baaaa, da bum baa, da-ba-da bum bum baaaa.” At the same time he was [fingering with his right hand French-horn fingerings that were relevant to but not the same as the tune he was singing and] was experiencing / enjoying the kinesthetics of the motion.

Simultaneously Michael was actively coordinating his walking to the cadence of the sung rhythm [but this did not take much effort because the rhythm was close to the cadence].

[Michael had been reflecting on a conversation with a student after class, and had, a few seconds before the beep, produced the words “she gets it,” without those words having been spoken or heard.] Now, at the moment of the beep, there is some unworded sense of the student’s having understood [perhaps something like a residual of the previous thought process and worded expression of it].

In the conversation about sample 7.1, we noted that the French horn is fingered with the *left* hand but Michael was producing the fingerings with his *right* hand, and to Michael that seemed just as natural as fingering with his left hand. RTH found that remarkable. In explanation, Michael also reported that he writes equally with either hand (which RTH also found remarkable), and that in graduate school while taking notes, and still occasionally, he would write simultaneously with both hands, the right hand taking notes about what the professor said and the left hand writing his own thoughts about it (which RTH, AB, and Michael’s fellow students found remarkable).

8.3 [Michael is watching disc golf on his computer, and three things are experienced simultaneously.

(1) He is watching player Simon collect his disc out of the basket.

(2) He hears Simon say “Thank you” to the watching, appreciative crowd (he had just made a good shot and they were cheering).

(3) [Just before the beep, the announcer had said “It happens quick,” more or less matter-of-fact-ly. There’s a second-or-so pause and then] Michael hears the announcer continue to say “quick kciuk quick kciuk quick kciuk quick kciuk” (where Michael understands that “kciuk” is “quick” spelled backward) [and pronounced like the first syllable in *cucumber*]. (This is heard as a real hearing [even though part of Michael, perhaps retrospectively and analytically, understands that it is probably not real].

Russ says that such word reversals are very rare in DES sapling. The hearing in (3) is an instance of creative hearing (see above).

**Worried about losing his grip on reality:** On sampling day 6, Michael felt himself to be losing his ability to maintain a grip on reality. The first of two samples, sample 6.2, was

described above in the section called “Creative hearing.” There, he was reclining, trying to relax and to keep himself focused by looking at his favorite guitar. He felt like the guitar was at the end of a tunnel and could melt away or dissolve.

Here is the next sample:

6.3 [Michael is now fully reclined in the recliner, having closed his eyes, still trying to relax and to maintain the existence of reality.] At the moment of the beep the person who typically says nasty things is still talking (at sample 6.2 he had been saying “People just pretend to like you.... People just pretend to like you.”), but now it’s more like background noise (Michael is not attending to the words or their meaning). Mostly Michael feels the chair holding him up. This is a bodily (across the entire back parts of his body) sense of being supported by the chair. (That is, this is *not* merely a felt pressure of chair against body, but rather of being supported in space.) Along with this bodily-supported sense is an unnerving, precarious worry that the chair could itself disappear—this is an am-I-gonna-fall? sense.

Also, Michael is saying to himself “You should take an Ativan.” (He has said this perhaps 20 times already, separated by perhaps a minute. (Michael does not know whether this was said aloud or innerly.)

The lack of confidence that the chair will remain real is very similar if not identical to the (sample 6.2) lack of confidence that the guitar will remain real.

**A note from Russ:** I give substantial credit and thanks to Michael for allowing us these glimpses into his inner experience.