

Kerry
Rectification Meeting Part 2 (excerpts)

Below in black is a word-for-word transcript of the January 30 second rectification meeting with Kerry that is available on YouTube at <https://youtu.be/0Mn5sWOeUEM>. Video of the entire meeting is at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tvhRESdjZnI>. In brown are conversations about the Descriptive Experience Sampling process that took place during the interview. In green are Russ's comments, and in blue are Julian's comments about and explanations of the Descriptive Experience Sampling process inserted after the interview. If you have corrections, suggestions, or questions, please post them as YouTube comments.

RTH = Russ Hurlburt

JBK = Julian Bass-Krueger

MM = Mel May

0:00 RTH: Now I think we're recording.

0:00 RTH: That should, you should now be able to see my screen. Is that true?

0:07 JBK: Yeah. Yeah, yeah.

0:09 MM: Yep.

0:10 JBK: Okay.

SNIP

Focusing on sample 4.5

4:00 RTH: And now we're gonna go to 4.5 and we're gonna wonder whether this was clear or not.

4:10 JBK: I do think it's clear. I don't know if I said it was or not, but...

4:15 MM: I think you did. I think I'm the only one that did it. Yeah. It seems pretty clear to me.

4:20 RTH: It seems pretty clear to me there, there might have been some unclarity. She, she, she said she was seeing some of the things more clear than others. [JBK: Yeah.] But I think that's clear. [MM: Of what's clear here.] Alright, then we're on to number 5.1. And...

Focusing on sample 5.1

4:44 MM: God, it's, it's me! Did I just not, did I have a sleep for this one? [laughs]

4:51 RTH: Well, it's not you. You and I agreed on that.

4:55 MM: Oh, okay.

- 4:55 RTH: Whether there's skillful, whether there was not *skillful clarity*, 5.1, *skillful clarity*.
- 5:06 JBK: Oh, the logo is not detailed. I think it's *skillful clarity*, like she sees it enough to that it's recognizably the brand, but it, she can't clearly see the letters *Fage* or whatever.
- 5:25 RTH: So this is one of those which I think it's a matter of interpretation. If she was just, if, if she just, this was about yogurt, but, but it wa, it wasn't about the brand of yogurt, I guess that would con count as *skillful clarity*. She was hiding from herself the... So I'm willing to go for *skillful clarity*.
- 5:49 JBK: Think, I think it was clearly this brand, but like, just enough, just recognizably enough to be that brand with the elements of the logo. But she didn't need, she didn't so much need to spell out all the letters. Actually, I don't know why.
- 5:49 Russ comments: RE "Actually, I don't know why."
For us to understand it as *skillful clarity*, we don't need to know why. For example, it is quite possible that Kerry's blurring of the spelled-out *Fage* is because the pronunciation ("fah-yeh") conflicts with the spelling, or because she doesn't know how (or isn't confident how) to spell *Fage*. Furthermore, even Kerry doesn't need to know why she blurs or otherwise doesn't elaborate a part of her seeing.
- 6:04 RTH: So the, so the question is, um, is what's at stake here? If we call it *skillful clarity*, if we call *this* skillful clarity, then, then we could say about, just about anything that isn't clear, "this is skillful clarity."
- 6:18 JBK: Yeah.
- 6:20 RTH: And I think that's a mistake, because skillful clarity, uh, and you know, like my example last time of the girl with the bra and the boy with no, no face. [MM: Yeah.] that, that was *clearly* skillful. And this is not clearly skillful like that.
- 6:38 MM: Okay. Yeah, I, I hear what you're saying Julian. I think it's that, but I think it's so low on the scale. Like I agree with you. I think, yeah, she has hidden the yogurt brand, so there's some aspect, but like on the scale of 1 to 10 of her skillful clarity there, I reckon it's so minor.
- 6:54 JBK: Okay. I'm not wedded to it. I just feel like by the criteria we've been using so far, it does flow into that. But I'm not,
- 7:03 RTH: So the part of this exercise, a *major* part of this exercise, is refining the criteria that we've been using. And so what we are, what it looks like we are saying here is that this is not just any, any un any partial unclarity. There has to be some...
- 7:24 JBK: For me, it's like when she talked about it, she was like, it clearly was this brand of yogurt. It was the *Fage* brand and she put in enough visual elements that it clearly was like it was the blue and red diamond whatever. But like, I guess she didn't need, like it was superfluous to spell out, to really see the letters or whatever. Right.

7:48 RTH: And that's what, that's what makes it not skillful to me.

7:48 Russ comments: RTH comes to change his mind about this. The day after this conversation, Russ emails Julian and Mel: "I have reflected on what Julian said about skill in the Fage yogurt sample, and I think I have come around to his view on this. We should put a revisit of sample 5.1 on the agenda" for the third part of the rectification process. See that discussion in the first nine minutes of **Rectification Meeting 3**.

7:52 MM: Yeah, I agree. I think then it's clear. But the skillful clarity aspect for me is more if there's that great meaning attached to leaving something out. So like, yeah, she has technically left something out, 'cuz it's not necessarily relevant, but I don't think that's enough for skillful clarity definition.

8:10 JBK: Okay. Well I'm fine keeping it as a zero or five or whatever.

8:18 RTH: So I said this was clear.

8:23 MM: Yeah, I'm I'll, I'm, I think this is quite clear. At the very least. I think it's a 0.5, which I haven't,

8:31 JBK: But not every part is clear.

8:37 RTH: So I, I think it, it seems to me that maybe what we should refine, and we have been refining but haven't really spelled it out, is what *clear* means is there's *part* of this image that's clear; *part* of this image that's clear. That's what clear means, I think. Everybody agree with that?

8:56 JBK: Okay, well, so...

8:58 RTH: We can change this to clear. [Changes heading of column *N* to read "Clear—at least in part"] So it's not, it is not just the a vague inner, it's not just a vague thing. [JBK: Yeah.] You buy that? [MM: Yeah.]

8:58 Russ comments: Note that this exemplifies how the rectification process is aimed at refining our understanding of the characteristic, *not* merely correcting the rating to match the characteristic.

9:17 JBK: Then I'm, yeah, then I would call it clear

9:19 RTH: And if that's the case, we're gonna call this clear.

9:21 MM: Yeah.

9:25 RTH: Cuz there are some, there are some inner seeings where, where just *nothing* is articulated and that's different from this, it seems to me. So now we get to the inner speaking. Is there any inner speaking, any kind of speaking this category is speaking that's not inner of any kind.

9:47 JBK: To me, the fact that she couldn't even say who was saying it shows that it was probably outside of experience.

9:54 MM: I agree. The fact that it started with a "perhaps," I'm not into it,

10:00 JBK: But I feel like we've been doing it, like we'll still label this as *speaking*, but then we'll also label it as *speaking outside of awareness*. I think that's what we decided on.

10:15 MM: But I don't, I don't, I don't like that either though. Because it says *perhaps* Kerry was saying it or *perhaps* it was her brother. Like there's no,

10:24 JBK: But I feel like we agree it was probably outside of awareness, but last time we decided any speaking was just like, if it was inside or outside of awareness, we would put it there. But then we also made that other category *speaking outside of awareness*.

10:38 MM: Yeah, I remember that. But I'm not even sold on that because the description says *perhaps* it was Kerry, *perhaps* it was her brother. So I think that's even beyond outside of awareness. She's not even sold on *if* someone was talking or who it was.

10:52 RTH: Well, I got a couple of comments about that. One is, our job is *not* to descri, *not* to describe the, the description. We're not to *rate* the description. We're trying to remember what actually happened in the, in the *sample*. So the fact that we *wrote* "perhaps"—that is, that is designed to be a tool that takes us back to the sample as best we can do it. But I'm agreement with your sentiment. I think what's happened is that she was not sure whether she was talking aloud or whether her brother was talking aloud. Somebody was saying "yogurt," but who it was, she wasn't sure. [MM: Hmm.] So now the question is, does that count as *speaking*? In my head, I would say perhaps, but give it a 0.5. But this is one of those where if you give it a *zero*, then you then you forget that you, that there was a sample where *she's not even sure whether, whether she herself is speaking*, [MM: Yeah, okay.] which seems sort of interesting.

11:57 MM: Yeah. On, on that count I'll award a 0.5.

12:05 RTH: [to JBK] Does that convince you?

12:09 JBK: Um, I, I'm fine with 0.5, but then I think if it was, I think it was outside of awareness.

12:19 MM: It's definitely outside of awareness then.

12:21 JBK: Yeah. But then for that category, do we do it a one or 0.5? Then I get a little confused.

12:26 MM: Yeah, that's true. Well I think, didn't we discuss that that category is only a 1 or a 0?

12:33 RTH: Or not this, this category here? Is that what we're talking about?

12:37 MM: No, uh, no. The *outside of awareness* one. Not that one. The green one. [Column V] I don't know. Um,

12:48 JBK: Uh, [pause]

12:51 MM: Because it's, it's sort of either in your awareness or it's not.

12:51 Russ comments: RE "it's sort of either in your awareness or it's not"
Thinking that awareness is an either/or proposition reflects the natural-attitude.
The experiential world is not necessarily either/or, as the Fage example illustrates.
Kerry both sees and does not see Fage yogurt in some important way.

12:56 JBK: Yeah.

12:57 RTH: Except that we're not sure about it here.

12:59 MM: Yeah, I know. All right. Well

13:01 RTH: So, so from my, from my point of view, this exercise that we're engaged in now is more about understanding Kerry than it is about getting the right numbers into blocks. [MM: Mm. [JBK: MM.] And it seems to me that we're probably pretty much in agreement about Kerry in this sample. [JBK: Yeah.] There was some, somebody was saying yogurt or maybe it was Kerry, maybe it was somebody else—we're not sure. But I think we *agree* about that. And the numbers that we're putting into the blocks are trying to get us to be able to say that when, if and when the time comes for us to say it. So...

13:45 MM: Wait, so what's that *speaking other than semantic*, why have you got a 0.5 on that?

13:50 JBK: Oh, *speaking other than semantic*, that's Russ's .5.

13:56 MM: That's Russ.

13:56 RTH: So what's the difference between...

14:00 MM: In that category you've got *speaking other than semantic*, but this is semantic, isn't it? Because she knows someone saying "yogurt," but she can't work out who it was.

14:10 RTH: Yeah, I agree. This should be a blank.

14:13 MM: Yeah. The question is in our green category, [column V] that, that's gotta have something. Do we think that the yogurt was inside or outside the awareness?

14:23 JBK: I think it was outside. Maybe just a 1, even if the speaking is 0.5 to say that if it was there, it was outside?

14:32 MM: [laughs]. Yeah, I sort of agree.

14:34 JBK: [laughs].

14:36 RTH: I don't, and I don't care. So...

14:36 Russ comments: RE "I don't care."

By that he means that he doesn't care about *the rating*; he *does* care about apprehending the phenomenon with fidelity.

14:37 MM: [laughs] Yeah, I'm with you. I'm with you.

Focusing on sample 5.2

14:40 JBK: Okay. I feel like we agree on the experience, brother, mom saying "caramel."

14:48 MM: Sensory awareness [inaudible]

14:54 RTH: So I think this is sensory awareness.

14:57 MM: Yeah, I agree.

14:57 JBK: Yeah, I agree with that.

15:01 RTH: So this should be a 1.

15:03 MM: Yep. It didn't work.

15:10 RTH: And

15:11 JBK: [inaudible]

15:12 RTH: We're all over the, as far as *skillful clarity* is involved. So I think we're talking about *this*. [Highlights "She also saw some bit of the chair and some other stuff that might be found in a salon but disproportionately sized." In the purple document.]

15:22 JBK: Yeah, I can see that.

15:25 MM: Well I was also, I was also interested, yeah. Okay. Maybe this comes back to the definition of *skillful clarity*, but with the um, the close-upness and the, and the detailed texture of the hair and stuff to me felt like some aspect of *skillful clarity*. But I hear what we're talking about of um, that's not in line with what we were saying before about meaning associated with blurring certain aspects out and stuff. She, um, disproportionate. Yeah. I mean regardless that bit definitely is skillful clarity.

15:59 RTH: So it's, it is pretty clear to me that this is not *skillful clarity* in the, in the center-of-the target definition of that. But there's something that's sort of skillful about putting some salon stuff in there but not arranging it. And there's something that's skillful about that. That's what, that's what we tried to convey by this. [MM: Hmm.] [JBK: I can see that.] And whether we should call that skillful clarity or whether we should make up another category

16:33 JBK: Elements but not a whole scene. Yeah. Um, I mean I'm fine with *skillful clarity*.

16:43 RTH: Call it 0.5.

16:45 MM: Yeah, sure. That's, but I would say 0.5. Yep.

16:52 JBK: Clear. And then *clear*. It is clear by our new definition.

16:56 RTH: It's definitely clear by our definition, [MM: Yeah.] new definition of *clear*.

17:01 MM: What's that one?

17:02 RTH: *Any speaking?*

17:03 MM: What was she speaking?

17:04 JBK: Yeah.

17:05 MM: Oh yeah, the "caramel."

17:06 RTH: She's saying "caramel."

17:08 MM: Yep.

17:09 JBK: Yeah. And that is an awareness.

17:12 MM: Yep.

17:13 JBK: Okay.

17:15 RTH: So we're done with this one.

17:18 JBK: Yep. Yeah. Okay.

SNIP

Focusing on sample 6.3

27:38 MM: Oh wow! That's a lot of disagreement on this one. Oh yeah. I remember this.

27:52 RTH: Um, we had, we had a quite a bit of,

27:55 JBK: Uh, this one was wild. This

27:56 MM: This was just a, a messy example.

28:09 RTH: So is she inner speaking?

28:12 JBK: To me? This is inner hearing. Like she's imagining herself inner speaking, but her experience is of hearing this imagined self speaking, which makes it more hearing.

28:12 Russ comments: RE "her experience is of hearing this imagined self speaking, which makes it more hearing"

To my ear, that is natural-attitude thinking. In the real world (in the natural attitude), if you apprehend words that *someone over there* is speaking, then your apprehension is naturally of hearing those words. But that natural attitude needs to be bracketed. The question is *not* whether it would be natural for Kerry to be hearing in this imaginary situation, but rather whether Kerry's *experience is of* hearing, or of speaking, or of something else. We must not allow ourselves to favor the natural-attitude hearing option. See the discussion in the comment at 18:46 in **Kerry interview 6 transcript with commentary**.

28:31 MM: I start to get really lost on that, on these distinctions for this. [JBK laughs] They feel really fine. [reads] "Saying not as speaking it, but also simply not as hearing herself." I don't know. It sounds confusing.

28:48 JBK: To me this, this was written confusingly when you said, "but there's no experience hearing by either the imaginer or the imagined Kerry," because to me the imaginer is hearing like the imagined Kerry speaking.

28:48 Russ comments: The confusion (both for MM and JBK) comes from the natural attitude.

29:03 RTH: So as a, as a general rule, which, which I feel pretty strongly about keeping with unless we, unless unless we change our mind, is, and that is the, the general rule has been in my work, if there is hearing that is part of an inner seeing, [JBK: Um hmm.] it does not count as separable inner hearing. We had, we in my lab had a, have had long debates about that and recognized that it's sort of arbitrary. And, and, and so arbitrarily we have said so, you know, let's, let's say I'm, I'm, I'm, I'm innerly seeing the Philadelphia orchestra play Beethoven's fifth. And I can hear the Beethoven's fifth along with it. But I don't say "this is inner hearing." I say "this is inner seeing." And I imag then I, I *embellish* that by saying, "well, I, I was also hearing what I was seeing."

29:03 Russ comments: This conversation is difficult because there are two difficult issues that are operating simultaneously: (a) bracketing the natural attitude (see the comments at 28:12, 28:48, 31:48, and 33:36); and (b) whether an imagined scene that is richly seen and heard should be counted as both inner seeing and inner hearing or just as inner seeing. We are now discussing (b); we will return to (a) at 31:48 and 33:36.

30:01 JBK: So what's, what's your main rationale for that?

30:09 RTH: Because if you mark it as inner hearing, then it makes, it puts it into the same category as, *as I was walking down the street, I heard Beethoven's fifth playing in my head. And I've been hearing that all day. I don't see anything, but I'm, I'm hearing it.* And that it seemed to us was a longer way away... The, the, the hearing, the hearing as a detail of

the seeing seems sort of close to the seeing to us. Whereas the hearing *as its own thing* seemed like a long way of having some hearing be part of a seeing. [MM: Hmm.] [JBK: Okay.] And, and I'm, and I accept that there's something that's very arbitrary about that. But I would be loath to, [JBK laughs] for *me* to change that *now*, given that that's how I've counted it (to the extent that I think counting is important), that's how I've counted it for quite a long, quite a long time.

31:11 JBK: That's how you do it. That's how you do it. If you had long discussions, like I don't feel like we need to have those. But I think we should somehow mark so we can at least remember this was something different, somehow.

31:27 RTH: So what's different is that she sees herself saying. [MM: Mm.] So this one, this one, this one is even, even stronger than my Beethoven's fifth example because she,

31:48 JBK: But to me it's, it's stronger than like she sees a camping scene and also hears birds chirping. That one I could really see, see why you wouldn't count that as inner hearing. But this one it seems quite close cuz she's hearing words, she's hearing like herself speak them and they are clear and ambiguous.

31:48 Russ comments: RE "she's hearing words, she's hearing like herself speak them"
The understanding that Kerry heard the words illustrates the pervasiveness of the natural attitude. It was *not* (to my ear) clear that Kerry was hearing her imagined self. She definitely understood herself as saying "30 is not so bad, it's 29 that sucked!" but whether that saying was *heard* is not at all clear.

32:22 MM: Gosh, it's a tricky one. Cuz I sort of understand in Russ's definition now of the seeing this, I sort of understand looking at it from that angle.

32:37 RTH: This one, this one is difficult from the, from the, from the perspective that I talked about it a little bit ago with the Beethoven, but it's, it's also, I'm not, I'm not convinced that there is *any hearing at all* in this sample whether or not,

32:56 JBK: Really! So that's a different thing, then!

32:58 RTH: That *is* a different thing. That's right. And, and I'm not sure that she was capable of making that distinction, but... So she was imagining herself, she's imagining herself *saying* "30 is not so bad." [JBK: Yeah.] But I'm not sure that she *hears* herself saying that. I think it's quite possible that she is somehow recognizing herself as saying that. But it's not a heard thing and it's not a spoken thing.

33:23 MM: Mm-hmm.

33:23 JBK: It could be like a unsymbolized kind of thing. Or, or.. I guess it *is* symbolized cuz she's seeing herself, but like...

33:32 MM: Yeah, there's just no [inaudible due to crosstalk]

33:33 JBK: [crosstalk] It's there conceptually, but not heard. [MM: Yeah.]

33:36 RTH: In, in a way it's sort of like, I imagine myself seeing Mickey Mantle swinging the bat. [JBK: Yeah.] But there's no swinging involved. I see Mickey Mantle with a bat. [JBK: Yeah.] And the swinging is implied. It's understood. I understand him, but I don't see it. [MM: Mm.] And this one, I think I, I think we, I was, I was never sure that we under... (we as in Kerry and the rest of us probably) understood that distinction.

33:36 Russ comments: RE (33:23) "unsymbolized" / "symbolized"; (33:33) "conceptually"
Suppose I'm a Yankee fan, and in the past I have often thought about, talked about, wondered about the Mick's 565-foot home run. At the moment of the beep I innerly see something like the photo here; I see no motion. In describing my experience it is fair to say "I innerly see Mickey Mantle hitting his 565-foot home run." It is *not* fair to say "I innerly see a still pic of Mickey Mantle hitting his 565-foot home run." It is *not* fair to say "I innerly see Mickey Mantle and even though the pic is still, I know that he is in motion swinging." It is *not* fair to say "I innerly see a Mickey Mantle and I know that he is hitting his 565-foot home run." The first of those describes my experience. The rest of them confuse my experience with some natural-attitude theorizing about my experience.



34:17 JBK: What if we just make it a 0.5 [laughs]?

34:17 Russ comments: I would be happy to call it .5 if we all understood that the interview did not adequately bracket the natural attitude, and therefore we are not confident about Kerry's experience.

34:23 MM: So, which are, what are we talking about specifically whether we,

34:27 RTH: Whether in

34:28 MM: Hearing, well I said 0.5, but Russ is just very convincing. [laughs]

34:34 JBK: So convincing. But, um, I still, I still think it's, it's still *possible* that she was like, there's room for uncertainty, but still room for

34:51 RTH: Possible. This is, this is the kind of thing where you, where a 0.6 or a 0.4 [JBK laughs] would be better than 0.5 because it calls your attention to this sample.

35:03 MM: Yeah.

35:03 RTH: So I'm happy to call this a 0.5.

35:06 MM: Yeah. Okay.

35:07 JBK: Would you ever do .4s or .6s or something?

35:10 RTH: I don't usually, but, but I, but I'm tempted to a lot!

35:15 JBK: [laughs]

35:16 RTH: And this, this is a sample. I think that, I think the purple, the length of the purple discussion indicates to us we need to describe this better.

35:29 RTH: Or, or this is an interesting sample, put it that way. We can't, we haven't figured it out.

35:36 MM: Well I think it's a good, you know, demonstration of we can all do our best and get, and get very clear on certain experiences, both Kerry and us. And then sometimes there are still phenomenon which are bloody tricky to understand.

35:49 RTH: Right. So we gave this a 0.5. Do we want to give inner speaking a zero or a 0.5?

36:00 JBK: I'd say,

36:01 MM: Yeah, I'm okay with zero, I think.

36:03 JBK: Yeah.

36:07 RTH: And then sensory awareness. Julian didn't see sensory awareness.

36:12 JBK: Made the rug.

36:14 JBK: I'm fine with 0.5 actually. Yeah, I think I might have just overlooked it.

36:25 RTH: And then I gave this some *skillful clarity*. I wonder why I did that.

36:35 MM: The people off to the sides, but they're indistinct maybe.

36:40 RTH: Yeah, probably. But this is, this is more or less close to the Fage...

36:54 MM: Yeah, the yogurt, I guess

36:55 RTH: ...yogurt thing.

36:56 MM: Correct. Yogurt.

36:58 RTH: So I'm happy to leave this as not *skillful clarity* or...

37:06 JBK: Up to you.

37:07 RTH: The mo, the most interesting thing about this, oh, there's a lot of interesting things about this. If, if we, if we really understood this sample, we would know a lot about how inner experience actually works. Like what's, what, what's the deal with, *I experienced this as a recollection*. [JBK: Oh yeah.] I thought she was pretty clear about that. [MM: Hmm.] This is like, I'm remembering an event that's in the future.

37:36 MM: Accept it.

37:36 RTH: I feel, I feel myself to be remembering.

37:39 MM: Yeah. That's crazy.

37:40 JBK: Yeah. But I, I also wondered if it was more of just a comparison or a metaphor. Just that, did she mean that it's a clear scene and she, she, she sees a scene and she sees herself? Or did she mean that there's a special memory kind jjujjj that makes it feel more memory-ish? Like, I don't know. [laughs]. [MM: That memory jjujjj.]

38:06 RTH: My, my impression was that she experiences this in the same way as she experienced is a experiences a memory. [MM: Yeah.] So if I, if I'm remembering 9/11, I, I experienced that as remembering 9/11. And she's experienced, I, I understood her to be saying I experienced this as if it had already happened, [MM: Mm.] even though it hadn't already happened. And we don't have a category for that.

38:39 MM: It's very interesting there.

38:39 Russ comments: What makes this (37:39) "crazy" or (37:40) a "metaphor" is, I think, the failure of bracketing the natural attitude. In the natural attitude, if I am thinking about an event that is (in the real world) in the past, I say "I am remembering," and I have an experience that is consonant with remembering. But in the experiential world, I can have an experience that is consonant with remembering even for an event that is not past (is in the future or does not exist at all). Being open to those possibilities requires bracketing the natural attitude.

38:41 RTH: But it's interesting. And so by our new definition of *clearly*, this is clear.

38:45 JBK: Yeah,

38:46 MM: Yeah, sure.

38:49 RTH: And sensory awareness of color. If we gave this a sensory awareness, we should have given this a sensory awareness of color.

38:55 JBK: Yeah. Why did I put something other than color.

39:00 RTH: [laughs]? Well, it could have been the pattern.

39:03 JBK: Oh yeah. I was thinking pattern. I think that's what I was

39:10 RTH: Well, I, I'd be happy to go with that. Call this a 0.5.

39:15 JBK: Yeah.

39:18 RTH: And this a 0.5.

39:19 JBK: I think it's such a detailed scene with like, it's not just the rug, it's also the friends and the chain and this and that. [RTH: Right.] I think that's what made me kind of hesitate too,

39:30 RTH: If we ever, if we ever wanna describe Kerry, we're gonna have to describe her visual imagery. And this is going to be one of the examples that we would want to describe about the, about the complexity, [MM: Mm.] or the variability or interesting aspects or however you want to phrase it, of her [JBK: Yeah.] visual imagery

SNIP

Focusing on sample 8.2

1:04:32 RTH: We're at 8.2. Oh, this is the one where we're pushing the door. We're, we're never gonna agree about that.

1:04:40 JBK: So we thought maybe sensory awareness, but we weren't sure.

1:04:43 MM: 8.2. Maybe sensory awareness.

1:04:53 JBK: In the notes. My note here was that it could also be *doing*, like she's pushing the bike. Maybe it's more about pushing, not driving hands than the coldness of the handlebars.

1:05:07 RTH: That's where all these question marks came from, I think, because I couldn't figure out, I couldn't figure out during the, during the meeting whether [MM: Yeah.] her experience at the beep was *I'm pushing it*, but when I look back at it, those handlebars were cold and therefore they must have, I must have been experiencing the coldness of it. And I never figured that out, as I recall it.

1:05:32 MM: Yeah, I agree. I never felt like super confident about all of that. So [RTH: 0.5?] despite when I put this number in, apparently I felt confident. But I'll get, I'll meet you at 0.5 for this. [JBK laughs]

1:05:45 JBK: Skillful clarity.

1:05:54 MM: Seeing,

1:05:58 RTH: So this is the same... From my point of view, this is the same deal as the, was it a, a beauty shop with things arranged?

1:06:09 MM: Yeah.

1:06:11 JBK: From my perspective. Like how do we know that this isn't just in a minute she might have seen more things or might have been adding, filling in the scene.

1:06:24 MM: Well, yeah, we *never* know that, though. I think this is *skillful clarity*. I agree with Russ. I've missed this, but I think, I think it's the same as that.

1:06:37 JBK: Okay.

1:06:38 RTH: So maybe we need to call it something other than *clarity*. It's skillful *indeterminacy*. How does that grab you?

1:06:49 JBK: Sure.

1:06:51 RTH: You buying that Mel?

1:06:52 MM: Um, I'd like another word! [laughs]

1:06:59 JBK: Ambiguity.

1:07:01 MM: I don't mind that, actually, even though it feels like an oxymoron, but *skillful ambiguity* is kind of cool.

1:07:08 JBK: [laughs].

1:07:10 RTH: So the examples that we've got are, it's not ambigu, it's not ambiguous. It's not ambiguous. Sometimes it's ambiguous.

1:07:21 MM: Yeah. But it's not always, uh,

1:07:24 RTH: Like the, the arrangement of pieces. I got some pieces from the, from the beauty shop and I've got stuck them in there.

1:07:32 MM: Yeah. That's not ambiguous. It's um,

1:07:37 JBK: Actually don't feel like we'll come up with better than *clarity*. We could try.

1:07:44 RTH: Well, why don't we just, why don't we leave it as *clarity* to remind us and then if somebody comes up with a better word, we can figure it out.

1:07:44 Russ comments: As I edit this transcript, *skillful indeterminacy* seems pretty good.

1:07:58 JBK: Okay.

1:07:59 MM: Yeah.

1:08:01 RTH: And then we're gonna give that a 1.

1:08:03 JBK: Yeah.

1:08:04 MM: Yeah.

1:08:07 JBK: *Unusual perspective*.

1:08:12 RTH: So we, we built the *unusual perspective* category to deal with the yurt. I'm seeing the yurt from behind me.

1:08:21 MM: Yeah. I don't know where I've, I, I feel like there's a mistake. I'm not sure where I'm getting that from.

1:08:26 JBK: Okay. I guess maybe that was capturing that it's different elements, but it doesn't put them in perspective as a full scene.

1:08:33 MM: Yeah. I don't, I've, I honestly just think that's a mistake that does,

1:08:39 RTH: It's easy to make mistakes in this

1:08:42 MM: *Clear.*

1:08:44 JBK: At least partially clear by our definition.

1:08:46 MM: Yeah, yeah, yeah.

1:08:48 RTH: Aaghh!! [He has screwed up a cell in the Excel sheet, exposing its formula instead of simply replacing it.]

1:08:50 MM: You done it again! [JBK laughs].

1:08:54 RTH: So when, how, how did I do that? [refers to the Excel issue] I, I went like that, that went away. And then I did ctrl-Z to put it back, which it still is blank. Alright. And then we got *sensory awareness other than color*. All that was, whether it, the coldness was the sensory awareness thing.

1:09:16 MM: Oh yeah.

1:09:18 RTH: .5?. Yeah.

1:09:19 MM: Point five is fine. Yeah.

1:09:24 RTH: And then *multiple*?

1:09:28 JBK: I could buy a multiple.

1:09:31 MM: This, this has gotta be multiple. Come on Russ! [RTH: Okay.] These things are *not* related. [RTH: I'm buying it.]

1:09:42 JBK: Would, would you think of, um, the code *doing* for this? Cuz even if not, even if she's not sensing the coolness of the handlebars, she's definitely experiencing, she's definitely like pushing the bike, experiencing that.

1:10:00 RTH: Well, I would be happy to make a category about that, but I wouldn't be happy to call it *doing*, because *doing* for me is a technical term. That means I'm doing something

that is not otherwise usually being done. So for example, if I am, if I am particularly zeroed in on the blue of my computer screen, [JBK: Mm-hmm.] And it's not just that I'm captured by the blue of the computer screen, but I am, I am specifically looking at the blue *in order to see it* as being blue. [JBK: Okay.] That's the *doing of* sensory awareness. That's *not* just sensory awareness. That's the *doing of* sensory awareness. [JBK: I see what you mean.] So for me, that's a tech, *doing* is a technical term where I'm, I'm diddling in the, I'm interfering with the natural sensory awareness. I'm trying to create

1:10:58 JBK: Sometimes use a code, like *just doing*, like, just

1:11:02 RTH: *Just doing...*

1:11:04 JBK: I know you have like *just watching TV* or something. [RTH: Mm-hmm.] Just doing. But how would you describe like you're performing action?

1:11:12 RTH: An action. I would probably use *action*.

1:11:14 JBK: Action.

1:11:16 RTH: But then, but for *action* in almost every, that's a really slippery-slope category for me. [MM: Mm.] There's almost *always* an action. You can always, y'know....

1:11:27 JBK: You know, but like, we had a lot where she was running, but she didn't think the running was so [MM: Was part of the... Yeah, that's, to me (inaudible)] this is like, it's pretty clear that like pushing, angling the bike, whatever, try not to take the hands is experienced.

1:11:47 RTH: So we're gonna make an action category or we have to go back and re no refine on.

1:11:54 JBK: Do you think that's worth? Um, I don't know if we need a category in the spreadsheet or..

1:12:01 RTH: I agree that she's doing an action. Whether it, whether it's ever an interesting category. [JBK laughs] [MM: Yeah.] People in my lab, for example, in a relative thing, people in my lab want to have a category called *perceptual awareness* where there're, which means I'm seeing something. And I've argued, you know, almost always there's some kind of perceptual awareness going on. If you rate it here, you gotta rate it just about everywhere. [MM: Yeah.] And it hasn't convinced my students, mostly, but that's what I put my foot down there and say, you know, we're just not gonna do that.

1:12:01 Russ comments: Day 2 of the rectification meeting proceeds for another half hour, which, because transcription is hard work, we do not transcribe. The audio / video is available at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tvhRESdjZnI>. Then there is a third rectification meetings after that.