

Gualtiero 3
Gualtiero Sampling Interview 3

Below in black is a word-for-word transcript of the May 26 sampling interview 3 with Gualtiero that is available on YouTube at <https://youtu.be/32Ii1zxJQQ4>. In green are Russ's comments, and in blue are Gualtiero's comments about and explanations of the Descriptive Experience Sampling process inserted after the interview. If you have corrections, suggestions, or questions, please post them as YouTube comments.

RTH = Russ Hurlburt

GP = Gualtiero Piccinini

LG= Lauren Graf

- 0:00 RTH: So we had started to say something about the transcripts, and I had said that you had sent me a comment and I had just started to respond to it or whatever, and go out, and Lauren and I were having a little bit of a conversation about that before you logged in.
- 0:24 GP: And, um, I was just gonna say that this whole descriptive experience sampling, um, episode is making me want to, is making me *think* more about consciousness and making me wanna *write* more about consciousness. And you, at some point, I think you hinted that you're open to potentially write something together. So if it comes to that, I would be, um...
- 0:54 RTH: So I, I, I, I, if I didn't *hint* it, I would've said it *explicitly* one way or the other. I'm, so I'd be happy to think about that. And I would, and I would also say the, the backs and forths that we are having, [GP: Mm-hmm.] in my view, are something like a step in that direction.
- 1:12 GP: Yes.
- 1:12 RTH: And, uh, whether, whether they would ever be quoted verbatim or imported verbatim or something, I have sometimes done that in some of my books. I've, I have put, put them in verbatim, and sometimes not. So, for example, the Schwitzgebel book, we had backs and forths, which we, to some degree edited to make them a little bit more streamlined. But in my book with Marco, uh, Caracciolo, the, the, they were just straightforward, verbatim what's in there. And, and I think there's advantages and disadvantages either way. [GP: Yes.]
- 1:51 And, and also what I, what I was saying to Lauren just before you logged in was, and, and the about and about which, which is about our procedure, which maybe we should make explicit amongst all of us. What I was saying is that I used in, in the, in the comment that I made yesterday and you responded to today, I used the word *extraneous*, and you objected to that word or didn't like that word or reacted to that word or whatever. And, and actually the word *extraneous* is probably *not* the best

word. It's probably, um, I, I admitted that, I admit that I wrote that word, but it's probably not exactly what I mean. And, but, but that leaves us with, as far as the *transcript* is concerned, or as far as the *commentary* is concerned, it leaves us with sort of two options. I could go back and *fix that word* and then see whether you have the same reaction to whatever I fixed it with. And, and if, if it made it better, then we could delete the part of the comment where you said, I didn't like that word. Or we could leave that stand. And part of the, part of the conversation would be about, well, why did he say that, and,

- 2:56 GP: Yeah, I would leave it and keep going. [RTH: Okay.] If you have more to say, then.
- 3:01 RTH: Yeah, I, I do have a, I do have a reaction to that, but I didn't have time to finish writing and I started it, but....
- 3:07 GP: Of course.
- 3:09 RTH: But we're, and the, the part of, part of our process here is that it is interleaved in the sense that we're having these conversations in the light of *part* of that, **part** of the previous conversations, but not all of 'em. And...
- 3:25 GP: Yes.
- 3:26 RTH: And, and then that's just the way it is. I don't, I'm not saying that's good or bad, I'm just saying that that is the way it is.
- 3:36 So I'm delighted that, that the conversations that we're having are inciting you to have more to say about consciousness or whatever. And, uh, because I think our conversations will refine for each other what we think about it. And that I think will be useful, not only to you and me and Lauren, but to anybody else who [pause] is interested in that topic, which I think there's a lot of people.
- 4:02 GP: Yes.
- 4:06 RTH: So, anything else we should be talking about before we press on here to beep number 1?
- 4:15 GP: Uh, I'm happy to start with the beeps.
- 4:20 RTH: And this is day 3, if I'm not mistaken.
- 4:23 GP: Yes.
- 4:24 RTH: So, sample number 3.1. I'm ready.

SAMPLE 3.1 DISCUSSION STARTS HERE

- 4:30 GP: Okay. So one thing I was really curious to try was a beep while I'm asleep, but instead of doing a nap after going to sleep for the night to see if it would make a difference, um, and if I could catch myself with not nothing in my experience. And you even

mentioned I think last time, that sometimes if people fall asleep when they are woken up by a beep, they do say “there was nothing there. It was all blank.” Um, but in my case, um, last night, about an hour after I went to sleep, the beeper beeped, and I remember very clearly and vividly that I *was* thinking something, or that there was a thought in my experience. Um, but once again, [laughs] nothing of the content of the thought was available by the time I was ready to write it down, uh, other than it was not a dream, it was not visual or sensory. It was a unsymbolized thought. Um, but I, and it was part of a train of thought, but it was not, I do not, I could not remember any of the content, unfortunately. So that’s all I have.

5:58 RTH: So I experience myself to have, have been asleep and to have been thinking about something. But I don’t have any direct apprehension of what that something was.

5:58 Russ comments: RE “So I experience myself to have, have been asleep”
This is not a well-crafted query: it incorrectly implies a meta-experience (an observation of himself) that does not reflect what GP has said so far. It would have been better had RTH asked something like: “So I was asleep, and at the moment of the beep I was thinking about something....”

6:11 GP: Yeah. I wouldn’t say I was, I was experiencing myself to be asleep, because that was not part of the experience. [RTH: Okay.] But I was asleep. I, I went to sleep for the night around 10:15, and the beep woke me up around 11:15. Um, so I was asleep for the night. So that’s like not even a nap type of sleep. It’s like about as sleepy sleep as it gets [RTH: Okay.] for me.

6:11 Russ comments: RE “ I wouldn’t say I was, I was experiencing myself to be asleep, because that was not part of the experience.”
Good. Gualtierio is not trapped by RTH’s infelicitous question (see the comment at 5:58).

6:39 RTH: Okay. And, and, and there was, as I heard you correctly, there was what you thought, what you characterize as an unsymbolized thought.

6:49 GP: Yes.

6:50 RTH: And I would like us to bracket *that* concept (just like I would like us to bracket just about every other concept), on a, on a number of possibilities. One is that what you think of as *unsymbolized thinking* and I think of, of as *unsymbolized thinking* are *not* necessarily the same thing. Maybe they are, maybe they’re not. I, I don’t wanna debate *that*, but what I would— *and*, and so that’s one thing. And then another thing is I think it’s possible for someone, maybe Gualtierio in this situation to say, I had an unsymbolized thought. And what that really means in this situation is *I had a thought and there were no words or other symbols*, but I don’t know what that thought was.

7:32 GP: Yes.

7:34 RTH: Okay.

7:35 GP: That's what I mean.

7:37 RTH: Okay. Which is, and now I'm gonna violate the rule that I just said, which is I, *unsymbolized thinking* in, in my center-of-the-target parlance is I'm thinking about a thought and I know exactly what that thought was, and I know *in detail* what that thought was. And I can confidently say that there weren't any words or symbol or, or pictures or any other kinda symbols that, that carry that. [GP: Yes.] And so what you're, what you are labeling as *unsymbolized thinking* here is not what I would call the center-of-the-target *unsymbolized thinking*. It is the recognition of a thought as being ongoing, but I don't have the access to any of the content.

7:37 Russ comments: RE "now I'm gonna violate the rule that I just said"

RTH didn't explicitly just say it, but the rule he has in mind is: *do not inject your own technical terms (e.g., unsymbolized thinking) into the interview*. That is indeed a good general rule—it is much better that I should learn how to use the participant's (perhaps idiosyncratic) terminology than for *the participant* to have learn how to use my (perhaps neologic) terminology. The language-interpretation burden should be on *me*, not on *the participant*. The participant's task is hard enough—learn how to apprehend his own experience—without overlaying that with a new terminology.

Here, with respect to *unsymbolized thinking*, RTH violates that rule because GP has used the term on several occasions. There seems to be no choice but to try to clarify what *unsymbolized thinking* means.

RE "*unsymbolized thinking* in, in my center-of-the-target parlance is I'm thinking about a thought and I know exactly what that thought was"

In my view (and I am the coiner of the term), *unsymbolized thinking* is an interesting topic *only* if it is confined to experiences where the content is very specific. That is, *unsymbolized thinking* as I use the term does *not* refer to a gist, or to a hunch, or to a general impression, or to an unconscious or preconscious or pre-reflective concept. *Unsymbolized thinking* refers to a directly apprehended thought that is every bit as specific as *I directly apprehended myself as deciding whether to put on my hamburger both ketchup and pickles or just pickles* (but with no words hamburger, ketchup, pickles, just, etc., and no visualization).

Unsymbolized thinking does *not* refer to a situation where I was somehow merely deciding what to put on my hamburger.

8:22 GP: But I did have it at the time that it was happening. So when I was happening, I could tell what it, what the content was, but by the time I was ready with the notebook and the pencil, I couldn't remember it.

8:41 RTH: Okay.... So that would indicate that I had enough access to my experience of thinking [GP: Mm-hmm.] that I can say with confidence that I was thinking something specific.

9:03 GP: Yes.

9:04 RTH: And the *way* that I was thinking that something specific was without words or pictures or any other kind of symbols, but the *what* that I was thinking, the specific, what I was

thinking was gone by the time I wrote it down, which was like some number of *seconds* later, I gather.

9:24 GP: Yes. [RTH: Okay.] Yes.

9:29 RTH: Okay.

9:33 GP: That's it. Uh, I wrote another word on my notes, but I cannot read it anymore. So I don't know what it says [RTH laughs], because I was, y'know, I was in the dark, y'know, it was, [RTH: Right.] it was night. And I, um, unfortunately, I don't know what it says.

9:56 RTH: [pause] So the good, the good news about the descriptive experience sampling, from my point of view, is that we get a chance to start over afresh with every beep. And so if we lose a detail on a particular beep, like a word that's missing or whatever, then well, that's a, it's a tragedy, but it's a *minor* tragedy. [GP: Yes.] Because if this kinda thing is going to be a frequent thing for Gualtiero—something that we would be interested in—then it's going to appear later on in some other beep. And if it's a one, a one-off deal, well then we missed it. And, uh, that's just the way it is.

10:38 So the skeptic would say, "I wonder how it is that Gualtiero would be able to remember the *form* of his thinking without being able to remember the *content*! And I would bracket that reaction as well. I would note it going by, well, y'know, that the fly on the wall would want to know the answer to that question. And we don't know the answer to that question. It's an interesting question. And that would, that's one of those things where if we are so motivated and we do more sampling while, while Gualtiero's asleep, maybe we'll maybe we'll figure that out. Or maybe we'll even be, even be able to figure that out from samples that we get while he's awake. Because we may, we may discover something on day 4 or fi5ve or whatever that would cause us to think back, "well, that, remember that back in day 3.1, beep 3.1? He said this!" And that's part of the, what I consider the fair game of, of the process. [GP: Yeah.]

11:43 So the process is, from my point of view, I, I'm gonna record— and I guess I haven't been sending these to you, I probably should—but I will, I have been recording contemp-what I call *contemporaneous* notes about what you have said, which are not really contemporaneous, but they're pretty close, they're in, in the same day. And, and I have the, I I don't accept those notes as being perfectly perfect characterizations of Gualtiero's experience, I I treat them as constraints on my wild speculations. I, I can't go off on a wild tangent and leave those notes entirely behind. I have to, I, it's one of, one of what I guess I called the handrails of the DES method. So when I write this down, I I, I will say he, he said there's some reason for skepticism of it what he, his his understanding was that he remembered the *manner* of thinking without remembering the *content*.

12:47 GP: Yes. You said the first one, the first day.

12:52 RTH: Right. We good about number 1?

12:57 GP: Okay. So shall we move to second beep?

12:59 RTH: Yeah, let's do it. Unless Lauren, Lauren has a question. [she nods negatively]

SAMPLE 3.2 DISCUSSION STARTS HERE

13:03 GP: I was, okay. So I, at that point, I was, this morning I was looking at a 0% balance-transfer offer on my Bank of America phone app. I had just thought I *should* try to do a balance transfer and navigate it away from that offer page to a page that just showed my HELOC balance, (HELOC being home equity line of credit), and some other generic banking app information.

13:37 Um, and the, my experience was a visual experience of that bank, bank app page on my phone. Um, it was somewhat diffuse without my attention being focused on any particular detail. Um, I have a vague sense that perhaps there was an echo of the previous thought, the thought that I should do a, I should try to do a balance transfer using one of these deals. Um, but the thought had already, like the, the main part of the thought or the main, I don't know, activation of the thought had already passed. So in, so far as there was, um, there was anything like, it, it was sort of just, I'm calling it an echo meaning like a sensation that I had just thought that, but the thought was already passed. Um, and that's, that's, uh, that's the end of my notes.

14:48 RTH: So let me see whether one part that I didn't quite understand fully, and that is, so my eyeballs are aimed at this new page.

14:56 GP: Yes. My, the phone screen. Yes.

14:58 RTH: The phone screen. And is that what I'm seeing when, when you said I'm seeing the phone happen, it's diffuse and not detailed or whatever, is—

15:05 GP: Yeah, so the, you, what's showing on the phone screen is the, the banking app page on a screen that shows the HELOC balance. And then there's a bunch of other little things. I took a screenshot, so

15:20 RTH: I, I don't need to see that. [GP: Yeah.] But what I, what, what I, what I wanna make sure of is that, that what your experiences is of that page. It's not like I'm remembering the previous app. It's the previous page. So it's of *that* page. [GP: Yeah.] But I don't see it with clarity. Is that right?

15:40 GP: Um, I don't, I'm not focusing on any specific detail on it. It's more of a diffuse experience of the whole thing. Does that make sense? So, y'know, you can, y'know, visually you can focus on just this, y'know—

15:58 RTH: the HELOC balance, or whatever.

15:59 GP: —Or, yes. Like the HELOC balance, *or* you can just sort of take in something bigger. And I was, at that moment, I felt like I was just visually experiencing the whole thing, not, not specifically the HELOC balance or some other detail on the page.

16:19 RTH: And, and is, is this more a *visual experience* or more like a *cognitive recognition*? I'm, I'm understanding this as a display of my balances.

- 16:31 GP: It was a visual experience. Maybe there might have, there was probably at least the awareness that the figure on the page is my HELOC balance, like probably because it says HELOC on that page. Um, so that might have been at least something that I recognized, um, e-even maybe faintly, but not, but I, I wasn't *focusing* on it actively because it wasn't, I was sort of, I was just moving away from the previous page and I had been on that previous page for a purpose, but now I was sort of navigating away. So I didn't really have a purpose to be on that one page. Um, there was nothing specific that I wanted to do there that I wanted to learn from there. So it was... [RTH: So, the—] additional.
- 17:24 RTH: So what I understand is that this, this experience is more a visual-taking-in [GP: mm-hmm.] a seeing of the, of the whole page. [GP: Yes.] without any of its specifics, but without denying any of its specifics. [GP: Yes.] But, uh, visual taking in of the whole page [GP: Yes.] without a particular cognitive consideration of it. Which is not to deny that there, that, that this is, that there's no cognition going on. But, but what I understand you to be saying is this is primarily a visual apprehension rather than a amount-of-my-balance apprehension, say.
- 18:04 GP: Yes, yes.
- 18:07 RTH: Okay. And does that adequately describe that portion of the experience? We haven't yet gotten to the echo, but the,
- 18:19 GP: Yes.
- 18:21 RTH: So I'm, what I've got so far is: I'm seeing this page, it's a *seeing* experience, not, not a meta experience (it's not like I'm experiencing myself to be seeing), but, but I *am* seeing, and it's more the visual characteristics than the financial or cognitive characteristics. And at the same time, there *may be* an echo of I should do the re... Take advantage of the, this deal or whatever.
- 18:55 GP: Yes.
- 18:55 RTH: And how, how does that present itself to you?
- 19:02 GP: Um, I-It's, so this is one of those situations where it's hard to, it's hard to, for me to know whether I really was perceiving or sensing or experiencing that echo of a thought at the moment, or whether the beep made me ask myself, what am I experiencing? And in my kinda momentary attempt to review what might've been in my experience since I realized that right, y'know, right *before* the time, right *before* the beep, I was thinking about taking advantage of this offer. I probably still had some echo of that in my mind. y'know what I'm saying? It's, it's that, it's that question that we've run into before. To what extent can I really directly apprehend what was in that moment, in that, in my *experience* at the moment versus, y'know, what I might have *inferred* in the process of gathering information to write down in my notes. So that being said, though, I would consider it entirely possible that at that moment, in a faint

way, there was a sense of a, of a cognitive thought, unsymbolized I would say, of wanting to use one of these 0% interest, uh, balance-transfer offers.

- 20:57 RTH: So is that to say that, [pause] that the, that as far as your total experiential package, whatever that is, which I would leave like, to leave somewhat vague, is that there's part of it that is visually apprehending, non-specifically visually apprehending the, the app on the screen, *and* possibly cognitively thinking, well, I should really make this balance transfer?
- 21:35 GP: Or at least like the echo of that, like some kinda residue, after having thought that.
- 21:45 RTH: And does it make sense to, to try to put a number on, how much of your experience is this visual apprehension and how much is this echo?
- 21:55 GP: Yeah. Um, if the echo was real at the moment and not inferred, I would put it at maybe 15, 20% maximum [RTH: Okay.] of my experience.
- 22:10 RTH: So I understand that to be saying, my experience is pretty much by far dominantly 80, 90%-ish [GP: Mm-hmm] at, at this visual stuff. [GP: Yes.] And I'm allowing for the possibility that there's some cognitive stuff too. And maybe it's zero and maybe it's 10 or 15, 20, something like that.
- 22:28 GP: Yeah. Mm-hmm. Yes.
- 22:32 RTH: Okay. So that's fine with me. I'm, I'm totally happy with, with, with, with that kind of difficulty because I think, I think descriptive experience sampling (and all other introspection short of nirvana) is going to, is going to have the, this kind of what I would call *in the weeds* [GP: Mm-hmm.] characteristics that, that we can't discriminate. And I've written, actually, I wrote a paper out there with, with, uh, Eric about little or nothing in experience. And I, I don't think you can make a distinction. There are those who would like to make a distinction between having a little and having none. And, and just as you are struggling with it right now, I think that's not possible to make in many, maybe even most, situations. And so I say, well, if we can't make it, well, we'll do the best we can. We'll allow—it's little or nothing—whether it's, and we can't really discriminate between little or nothing. That's, that's how I understand what we're taking, what we're saying here. Is that right?
- 22:32 Russ comments: My general strategy: Let's get the big picture with as high fidelity as we can get, while accepting that there is, or at least may be, some portion that we overlook. In short: let's not let the perfect be an enemy of the good. Perhaps if experiential science could get good at grasping the big picture, it might be able to extend itself into the smaller portions. But so far, in my opinion, experiential science has been preoccupied with the problematics of the details and has confused them with the big picture.
- 23:36 GP: Yes.

- 23:39 RTH: And, and I think that's just the way it is, and so that doesn't disturb me in the slightest. And, uh, and I think it's, and, and from a, from an iterative point of view, I think my acceptance of that (which I'm hoping will be your acceptance and Lauren's acceptance of that too) will make it perhaps easier to discriminate between little or no, to the extent that we can, we can discriminate that as we go forward. Because I'm accepting that maybe it's not possible. And so there's no, this wouldn't, it would not be a high-stakes, this is not a high-stakes consideration for me. Let's do the best we can like we do for everything else, but... [GP: Mm-hmm. Yes.] The, the, the philosophical, I guess, position of between little or nothing is, y'know, like if a, if a, if a guy's got one penny, then you would say, you can't say "he has no money," but if he's got all, all, he's got is one penny, he's pretty much in the, I-got-no-money ca, camp. And, uh, and so I, I think we just can't... There's limits to what we can do.
- 24:59 RTH: Mm-hmm .
- 25:01 RTH: Lauren, you good with this? Number 3.
- 25:06 GP: Okay. So, um, there's the, there's a one beep that I really wanna get to, just so y'know, and it's the last one of the day.
- 25:22 RTH: You wanna do it now?
- 25:24 GP: Yeah, we could do it now.
- 25:25 RTH: And that's, so let's go to number 6. Is it number 6?
- 25:28 GP: No, I think, yeah, it's number 6. And I, I think it's the most interesting of the, of the remaining five, besides the one from last night.
- 25:35 RTH: Let's do it.
- 25:35 GP: Um, so I, uh, wait a minute. Oh, maybe that's not the one. Maybe that was one before. Hold on a second. [laughs]. Oh yeah. Okay. Yeah, it's the one before. So it's not number 6, it's number 6. Oops, [RTH: Okay. Okay.] my bad. [RTH: No problem.]

SAMPLE 3.5 DISCUSSION STARTS HERE (sample 3.5 is discussed before samples 3.3 and 3.4)

- 25:55 GP: Um, I had my eyes closed and I was relaxing and almost asleep, maybe kinda in between, in the twilight zone between wakefulness and sleep. And I was imagining a friend of mine (whose name is Dean, but I don't think that was in the experience), but I knew who she was, and she's a radiologist and she was taking an x-ray of a patient. And it was a vivid dream-like visual image, which usually I cannot form, y'know, when I'm fully awake because I have, I have aphantasia, but I do dream sometimes, and I *can have* visual images like that, that are like vivid, like those that normal people report, if I am in the twilight zone, like if, if I'm like kinda half asleep. Um, so it was like that. So, important thing is that it was visual, it was vivid. Um, I knew what it was about. It was dynamic, like things were moving happening in it. Um, and so it's, it's a good contrast to all those other times when I said, oh, that's not symbolized. There's

no sensory content, y'know, there's no symbols. This time there was, and there was visual imagery.

27:31 RTH: So, what did you see exactly?

27:34 GP: Um, I saw there was machinery, y'know, like x-ray machinery and there was Dean, um, moving around the machine, maybe turning it on to take the x-ray, something like that. I don't think I could see the patient, at least at the time of the beep. Maybe I, maybe the patient had been in the, in the imagery before, but not at the time of the beep. By the time of the beep, all that I remember is the radiologist, the machine, the x-ray machine, and the maybe the operation, operating the machine. Y'know how like you, y'know, you have to go behind in like a, some kinda little cabin to press buttons and turn it on to protect yourself from the x-ray? Something like that. Maybe it was something like that.

28:22 RTH: And, and so you see Dean moving around this x-ray apparatus?

28:30 GP: Yes.

28:31 RTH: And she disappears p-p-part of this. Is that true or do, do you not actually see that?

28:35 GP: No, no, because she was in the, uh, in the front.

28:39 RTH: Okay.

28:40 GP: Yeah.

28:41 RTH: And, and do you see her from the front or from the back?

28:44 GP: From the side, I would say.

28:46 RTH: Which side? Do you see her the left side of her face, or do you see the right side of her face? [turns his head from side to side]

28:52 GP: Well, it was the whole body. I could see her whole body.

28:54 RTH: Head to toe?

28:57 GP: Yeah, I think so.

28:58 RTH: Okay.

28:59 GP: Um, I don't, I don't, I can't swear that I saw the toes or the even the feet, but certainly I had this feel, y'know, this sensation of all, all human body including head, torso, arms, legs. [RTH: Okay.] Um, I, I—

29:19 RTH: That's, that's what I was looking for by asking about whether it's the head, [GP: Yeah.] head to toe. It could have been like just a headshot and uh.

29:25 GP: Right. No, no, no, no. It wasn't just a headshot, it was a whole body, y'know, with hair, like long dark hair, um, some kinda clothes on her body. But that's vague. Um, and I don't know if I can tell which side I was looking at. That's a little too specific at this point. Like, I'm not, that's not to say that I couldn't, it was not in my experience at the moment. It's just that I wouldn't be able to remember now.

29:58 RTH: Okay. So at the moment of the beep, I, I see Dean clearly from the side moving back and forth around this x-ray stuff.

30:08 GP: Yeah. And she might have turned to, y'know, like maybe she came one way, then she turned and like pressed some button on the machine to take the x-ray and then she came out or something like that. And now this is reconstructive, y'know, I cannot swear that this is exactly how it went, but it was something along these lines. There was movement, there was action, there was, y'know, the whole body of the radiologist in, in interaction with the x-ray system.

30:40 RTH: And do I see Dean clearly?

30:46 GP: Um, yeah.

30:47 RTH: So this is not just some radiologist that I happen to know to be Dean. I see Dean.

30:52 GP: I think so. Okay. Yeah. Yeah. Yes, I would say so. I mean, not super, super precisely, but I, I, I had the feeling that I could see her clearly *enough* that I, that I knew who she was based on her appearance, not that, y'know, so yeah, sometimes in dreams, like somebody doesn't even look like they look in real life, but somehow you know it's them. That's not how it was.

31:20 RTH: Okay. And in color?

31:27 GP: I don't know if it was color.

31:32 RTH: Okay. But definitely in motion.

31:34 GP: Yes, definitely motion, definitely visual.

31:41 RTH: And, and was anything else in your experience at this moment?

31:47 GP: No.

31:51 RTH: Including, there's no affective or analytical or whatever? [GP: No.] I'm not by any means suggesting that there *should* be. I just wanna make sure I'm asking sort of a, for the complete picture here. So for whatever reason, which I don't actually know what that reason is, but for whatever reason, I am seeing Dean who is a radiologist doing her radiology thing.

32:26 GP: Yeah. And it's not something I've ever seen. And it was not an intentional effort. It was not due to a decision or an intention to imagine her. It was a spontaneous imagery that just happened on its own because I was in the twilight zone and I wasn't fully awake.

32:45 RTH: Mm-hmm. Alright, so I'm good about that. I got a couple of comments. One, one, one is whether it was intentional or not, I don't think we know. I don't think I know. I'm pretty sure I don't know, and probably you don't know either, because where intentions come from, I don't really know. But I don't really care the, unless the intention is directly experienced, I don't, that's one of the many things that I would bracket away. And I would also like to know how to spell *Dean*.

32:45 Russ comments: RE "where intentions come from, I don't really know"

Intentions are mentalisms, in my view (and, I think, in Skinner's view; see the discussion in Interview 0 from about 8:00 to 11:00), so I would bracket any understanding of intentions. If I had to bet, I would bet that we should understand human intentions much the same way as we understand flock intentions, when many birds move suddenly from this tree to that telephone wire. That is, I would bet in both cases that intention is a multi-determined, multi-processing kind of thing that gives the misleading appearance of being unitary. But I don't have to bet, and I am not at all committed to that understanding, and, most of all, (as I said) I don't really care one way or the other—that is, I would bracket any consideration of intentionality unless intention is directly apprehended (which it sometimes, but fairly rarely, is).

Gualtiero comments: it's a good point that we often don't experience our intentions and, I would add, we are often wildly mistaken about why we do what we do (there is plenty of empirical evidence about that). That said, in this case it seems relevant to me to point out that the imagery I experienced was NOT the result of an intentional decision to imagine something. I have a high degree of aphantasia, so I can't imagine anything vividly on command. At best I can experience a vague sense of how something is visually, without actually experiencing any imagery beyond a very faint outline of the target. But sometimes, if I'm in the twilight zone between wakefulness and sleep, I do experience spontaneous dreamlike visual images similar to faint, partial, fleeting dreams. And sometimes they are a bit more robust, similar to short dreams, like the one I described about Dean operating radiology equipment. It seems legitimate and relevant for me to point out that it was not the result of a decision to imagine something (which decision I was not in a position to make, since I was not fully awake).

Russ comments: RE "It seems legitimate and relevant for me to point out that it was not the result of a decision to imagine something"

In folks who do experience waking visual imagery, it is *very* rare for them to experience the intention to create that imagery (it does sometimes happen, but that is by far the exception). In those (highly frequent) cases of visual imagery where there is no experience of intention, is there some behind-the-scenes intention to innerly see? I have no idea, and (like Skinner) I can see no profit in speculating about it.

Here are two descriptions of sample 3.5:

(A) *At the beep of sample 3.4, Gualtiero [was in the twilight zone between wakefulness and sleep and] innerly saw Dean interacting with some x-ray equipment.*

(B) *At the beep of sample 3.4, Gualtiero was in the twilight zone between wakefulness and sleep, a state where his decision-making was suspended or impaired, and because of that suspension/impairment was able to innerly see Dean interacting with some x-ray equipment, the kind of inner seeing he would not be able to do if his decision making were intact.*

Statement (A) seems pretty darn true. Statement (B) seems highly speculative. I (like Skinner) think it is a mistake to trade a pretty darn true statement for a highly speculative statement. I accept that it might be a good thing to make highly speculative statements (knowing whether something is good is above my pay grade). But at the very least, I do think (rightly or wrongly) it is good to distinguish between pretty darn true statements and highly speculative statements.

Gualtiero comments: I take your point and in fact I don't think the most basic difference maker is the impairment of decision making, because when I'm awake even my spontaneous imagery is so impoverished as to be barely apprehensible. Now that I think about it, it could be labeled "unsymbolized imagery" or "unsigned imagery" by analogy with unsymbolized/unsigned thought (see my comment about this terminology in the second transcript), where an unsymbolized/unsigned image is an experience in which I know at least some of what the image should represent but without experiencing the image itself. Maybe this is a useful category for describing inner experience? In any case, I think the difference maker is the global brain state I was in. So, I'd suggest something more like the following:

(C) *At the beep of sample 3.4, Gualtiero was in the twilight zone between wakefulness and sleep, a brain state that, unlike wakefulness, allows him to have vivid visual imagery. He innerly saw Dean interacting with some x-ray equipment, the kind of inner seeing he would not be able to do if he were fully awake.*

Russ comments: RE "I think the difference maker is the global brain state I was in":

I take it as an axiom that whenever a philosopher or consciousness scientist refers to a "brain state," they are admitting that they don't know what they are talking about. To specify a brain state would require specifying the action of however many billions of neurons, and synapses, and glial cells, and blood chemistry, and so on. I do not think that is possible. (This comment is a corollary of *eschew mentalisms*.)

RE (C):

To be what I would consider defensible, I would revise (C) to become:

(D) *[At the beep of sample 3.4, Gualtiero was in the twilight zone between wakefulness and sleep. He holds a theory that maintains that this is a brain state that, unlike wakefulness, allows him to have vivid visual imagery. This theory is perhaps correct, or perhaps partially correct, or perhaps substantially*

distorted; Russ recommends that we bracket that theory and collect data that is as free from that theory as we can keep it.] Gualtiero innerly saw Dean interacting with some x-ray equipment. [This is the kind of inner seeing his theory holds that he would not be able to do if he were fully awake.]

As a methodological aside, when I write the description of a sample, I generally put in square brackets any context, consideration, or commentary that is not a direct description of the phenomenon at the moment of the beep. So it should always be possible to read a description of the phenomenon by eliminating entirely the bracketed material. Here, for example, the only words that are description of phenomenon are "*Gualtiero innerly saw Dean interacting with some x-ray equipment.*"

33:11 GP: Oh, uh, D-E-A-N.

33:15 RTH: Okay. It seems pretty straightforward. [GP: Yes.] And then I think I'm good about that. So shall we go back to number 3?

33:29 GP: Yeah, I would just add that if I had been awake and you had asked me, *imagine Dean and the radiology machine and Dean is operating that*, I would not have been able to do that with the vividness that I experienced in this case. Um, and so that's also a clue for me that that was not an intentional act of imagining something, but that it was a dreamlike image that formed in my mind in a sort of spontaneous way at that moment.

33:29 Russ comments: You asked (in your Interview 2 at 1:07:03 comment) for a bit of detail about our fMRI DES study. Here is one main takeaway.

Each of our participants had ten fMRI sessions. In one fMRI session, we gave the participant some tasks to perform, including some inner speech tasks (e.g., "Silently say 'lamp'"; "silently say 'pencil'"). Then in nine half-hour fMRI sessions, we had the participant relax in the scanner and beeped them at four quasi-random times in the usual DES way. At the end of each of those nine sessions, we interviewed them (in the usual DES way) about their beeped samples.

Sometimes, according to our DES interviews, participants resting-state experience happened to include inner speaking. That allowed us to compare brain regions the light up during on-demand inner speech (saying 'lamp' or 'pencil') to those that light up during naturally occurring DES-identified inner speaking. We found that, for our participants, the neurophysiology of on-demand inner speaking was very different from the neurophysiology of naturally occurring inner speaking.

Ours was a small study with lots of limitations. But I think the main takeaway (which comes not only from that study but from lots of other DES experiences) is that on-demand experience is *not the same as* naturally occurring experience. And I think that applies not only to inner speech but to all other forms of inner experience (such as imagery). If that is true (or even partially true), it has far-reaching implications for experiential science: most psychological studies are on-demand studies. Most armchair introspections are on-demand inspections. Most of psychological science's conclusions about inner experience are based on on-demand inner experience.

“But,” people complain, “naturally occurring studies are hard to do! You have to wait around for the phenomenon to occur!” Yes they are, and yes you do.

Hurlburt, R. T., Alderson-Day, B., Kühn, S., & Fernyhough, C. (2016). Exploring the ecological validity of thinking on demand: Neural correlates of elicited vs. spontaneously occurring inner speech. *PLoS-ONE*, 11(2): e0147932. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0147932.

Gualtiero comments: thanks for explaining that. Your result is very interesting and it makes sense because, at the very least, in on-demand inner speech, introspection, or any other on-demand task, a subject has to process the prompt/instruction and exercise inner control over their processes to execute the instruction (and perhaps inhibit other processes that might occur spontaneously and interfere with the task), and presumably all of that requires its own neural processes, whereas in the resting state none of that needs to happen. Besides this, is there evidence of any other differences between the on-demand and the spontaneous cases?

Russ comments: Except for that one study, I have never directly compared or contrasted naturally occurring and on-demand experience, and I’m pretty sure no one else has, either, because naturally occurring experience is a lot of work to discover. But here are occasional characteristics of naturally occurring inner speaking that I suspect would never occur in on-demand inner speaking: simultaneous inner speaking of two or more different contents; partially unworded inner speaking; unworded inner speaking; inner speaking in a voice other than your own; inner speaking that has no understandable meaning.

- 34:04 RTH: Well, as, as I suppose is not going to be a surprise, I would, I would say I, I’m gonna bracket that away and uh, cuz I’ve sampled with a lot of people who say I never have visual imagery, and then come a beep where they had visual imagery and they’re wide awake. So I don’t, [GP laughs] and, and, and I’m, and, and I’m not suggesting that, that we’re gonna find a beep with visual imagery. What I’m just gonna say is, for me, there is a big distinction between experience that is *directly apprehended*, such as at this particular moment I was seeing this woman Dean, my friend Dean, who’s a radiologist, whatever, and then some other moment I was seeing the visual display of my, my app. Tho, those I think we can describe with, with substantial confidence and, and say, well, this is, this is pretty, pretty darn likely what Gualtiero was experiencing at that, at that particular beep. [GP: Mm-hmm.] And everything else is in, in my world, sort of questionable.
- 35:09 GP: Okay.
- 35:11 RTH: And that, that’s not to say I don’t believe anybody, and I believe everybody just like everybody else does. But, but it’s a, it’s a different kind of level for me.
- 35:21 GP: Yeah.
- 35:21 RTH: That I, I refer to as the difference between diamonds and glass. The individual samples are, are diamonds in the sense that we’re, we can be pretty, pretty confidently clear about the edges of these diamonds. Y’know, I can, I, I could, I was having a visual

experience of my, my app and maybe out beyond this facet of the diamond, there was some cognitive or echoey of thought, thought process. Maybe, maybe not. So I think we can be pretty good about that. Not perfect, but pretty good. Whereas about generalities, which is what I refer to as *glass*, it's pretty hard to say, hard to be that confident. It's not to say they're not true or pretty or whatever, but, uh.

36:15 GP: Okay.

36:17 RTH: Number 3.

SAMPLE 3.3 DISCUSSION STARTS HERE

36:19 GP: Number 3. I was reading Russ's response to my comments. I was having a diffuse experience of red line text on my computer screen. I wasn't focusing on it, focusing on any particular word. So it was just the visual experience of word statements on, on the screen. Um, and I, I guess I was probably aware that they were your red line comments, but not, but I wasn't reading anything in particular at that moment.

36:54 RTH: So at the moment of this beep, I am actively reading. Is that true?

36:59 GP: No, I was reading, but at the moment of the beep, I wasn't reading anything. I was just—

37:09 RTH: So let me, lemme define what I, lemme define what I mean by reading, cuz I was pretty sloppy about that. I should have said something like, "at the moment of the be my eyeballs are aimed at the screen." [GP: Mm-hmm.] And are they tracking across the screen in the way that a, like, like if I were sitting there, I would say, well, he is reading, not of course knowing anything cuz I'm not a mind reader knowing your experience, but... Or from your, from your, have you seemed to sort of withdrawn from the reading?

37:37 GP: Yeah, I think at that moment I had withdrawn from the reading and I was just, y'know, visually aware of the, of the words on the page without out, y'know, processing any specific word or any specific sequence of words.

37:59 RTH: And you've mentioned a couple of times that it's the red lines, the red lines on the page. Is it, is it more about the I'm seeing the redness of these words or seeing the words that happen to be red?

38:10 GP: Yeah, the latter. I've seen the words that happen to be red.

38:14 RTH: Okay. But we have—

38:15 GP: I don't even, they might not even have been red. They were, y'know, the text that is red lined or I, y'know, has the vertical line on the side and it maybe they didn't appear red at yet, and they appeared yet right after I accepted the change.

38:33 RTH: Uh-huh, okay. And, and so far we haven't said anything at all about the *content* of this.

38:41 GP: Yeah. Because there's nothing more.

38:43 RTH: So there's no content present to you at the moment of the beep?

38:47 GP: No. Besides the visual presence of the words on the screen. [RTH: So the—] And maybe the aware, like the vague sense that they were *your* response to my, to my comments that you wrote tho-those. Like, I, somehow I knew that, and I wrote that as a comment in my note. Um, but it, it might not even be, have been part of the experience. It might just have been something that I knew because I was reading your response.

39:20 RTH: So at least the content, the content, excuse me, at least the *context* [GP: Mm-hmm.] was you're reading what I had written.

39:27 GP: Yes.

39:29 RTH: Whether that is experientially directly apprehendable at the particular moment, maybe, maybe not. [GP: Yeah.] probably not. If it was, it was in this little-or-no category.

39:40 GP: Yeah.

39:42 RTH: Yes. But what is, what is in my experience is a visual apprehension of the page. And is it of the words on the page or the, just the, the visual, visual of the page themselves?

39:57 GP: Yeah. The, the words, the text on the page. Um, yes.

40:08 RTH: So is this experience the same or different from the I see the, in maybe beep number 2, where I've seen the app balance, HELOC balance, whatever, I'm taking in that app, we said.

40:20 GP: Yeah. Yeah. I would say it's like that.

40:23 RTH: It's like that?

40:24 GP: I'm taking it in, but it's not actively processing anything on the page.

40:31 RTH: And no more nor less worded? The words are equally present in both of these experiences? My eyeballs, there are obviously words falling on my retina.

40:43 GP: Yeah, yeah.

40:43 RTH: And I know them, I know them to be words. Whether that's context or experience is hard to say.

- 40:49 GP: Yeah. The difference is that in the first case, there were relatively few words on the screen and there was some, y'know, there was some, I don't know, graphics. Um, whereas in the second case it was all words.
- 41:09 RTH: And is it, is it *words* that you see or is it the, the *lexicography* (I guess you might say) of the words they're, they're lines and spaces and indentations and?
- 41:22 GP: Yeah, it is more like the latter. It's, it's, it's, it, it it's text. It's, uh, an experience of linguistic text. But that, but that's, y'know, it's written text, it's not... Of course the, the text itself is clustered into words. Um, but it, that's not really a [inaudible].
- 41:49 RTH: And is is that to say that if the, if if what I had written had been in Italian, say, your experience would've been sort of the same about it? It would've been in both cases there?
- 41:59 GP: Yeah, mm-hmm. I'd say so.
- 42:01 RTH: So it's the apprehension of text? [GP: Yeah.] Not of particular words.
- 42:07 GP: Yes.
- 42:19 RTH: Okay. [pause] Then I think I'm good about that. You happy with that Lauren? [LG nods] Number 4.

SAMPLE 3.4 DISCUSSION STARTS HERE

- 42:28 GP: I was looking at a, at the thermostat while singing, um, to turn on the heat and the word "Heat" spelled with a capital H um, on the light brown plastic cover of the thermostat was in my visual experience. I was about to push the switch, so maybe I was aware of my motor intention to push the switch, and I was probably faintly aware of my singing. Um, I did become aware of the singing after I heard the beep. So that's another one of those cases where, y'know, by the time the beep comes and I'm trying to do an inventory of what I was experiencing, I know I knew I had been singing. So I also thought, oh, I might have been at least a little bit like say 20 to 10, 20% aware of the singing. But I certainly was aware of the word *Heat* on the thermostat against the background of the whole thermostat, um, and of my intention to push the button so that it would start heating the house.
- 43:48 RTH: So is that to say that the primary aspect of your experience is the word *Heat* or the seeing of the word heat or the intention of turning up the heat or seeing the thermostat?
- 44:03 GP: Would, I'd say at least, y'know, 50, 60 at least, maybe 60%, 60, I would say, say about 50, 60% of the content, of the experience was the, the word *Heat* on the background of the whole thermostat. So that's, y'know, I had some awareness of the whole thermostat, which is gray and plastic and the, but the word *Heat* was the focus because that's where the button is, and that's where I have to push the button. I have to push it towards the word Heat. y'know, there's like word heat, the word *Cool* and

the word *Off* or something, I don't remember exactly, but, y'know, the goal was to turn it on, turn on the heat, so push it towards heat. So where's the word heat? I have to push it there that way, y'know.

44:52 RTH: So is it more about... I don't know how to ask this, ask this question, more about the semantics of the word *Heat* that I know that heat has to do with heating, heating my house? Or is it more about this is the target that I need to push and I, I have set myself a task of pushing this target and that's, and that's the center of my, my target. Does that distinction make sense to you?

45:20 GP: It's a good question. I'd say as best I can remember, the, the main aspect of the experience was the visual appearance of the word *Heat* itself. But the reason that was salient is that I wanted to turn on the heat and therefore I needed to push the button towards that word. So the meaning of the word was salient, and presumably at least something I understood and was relevant in the context. Um, so I think it would be fair to say that the meaning of the word was also an aspect of the experience.

46:15 RTH: So is that to say that the experience is sort of, at least this aspect of the experience, this is more about the way this word looks, but not entirely. [GP: Yeah.] And, and what, and by more we could leave that as 51-- 49 or 60 -- 40 or whatever, and, but it, but it, it is at least to, at least to a large degree, maybe the primary degree, [GP: Yeah.] about the, the visual impression of the word rather than the semantic meaning.

46:54 GP: Yeah. Yeah. So yeah, y'know, in so far as I can try to just remember what I was experiencing as opposed to inferring what I must have been experiencing, I would say it was primarily just a visual experience of the shape of the word. But I, I think it's at least plausible that there was awareness of its meaning as well.

47:30 RTH: Okay. So as, as sort of an aside, but I would, I would say this kinda thing, and if, if, if I were not speaking with a philosopher or whatever, but the, what, what, what I would say is that the conversation that we're having today, [GP: Mm-hmm.] maybe all of the conversation we're having today is at least as much about tomorrow, next or next week, as it is about this particular sample. And, and what I mean by that is we are refining the distinction. There's a couple of places where we've had a distinction between words as semantic tokens and words as visual presentations. And we have come down on the side of visual presentations.

48:15 GP: Yes.

48:17 RTH: But what I would, what I would say about that is what, and this is relevant to one of the comments that you made, and I, and my reply to it, [\[see the comment at 29:31 in Gualtieri interview 2\]](#), co, is, I would like us *next time* to recognize, well, we've made this kinda a distinction, and of course we're gonna remember that we made a distinction in that particular way. But I don't want us to presume that we made it *correctly* today. I want us next time to, to recognize, well, there is a distinction between seeing a word as a visual display and seeing a word as a semantic token. And that seems to be sort of relevant, but maybe not. [GP: Yeah.] For sure, let's, let's not fall into the trap of saying, well, I wanna be consistent than I said. What I, y'know, last

time I said it was more about visual and less, less about semantics. What I would prefer us to do is to say, well, we've made that distinction, let's even keep that distinction as a, what I would call a bracketed deal, which is, which is to say maybe, maybe we should determine that even trying to make that distinction was probably a, um, a wrong turn that we took on day 3. And we should probably try to correct on, on day 4, whatever.

49:29 GP: Yeah.

49:30 RTH: Yeah. That's what I call the iterative procedure, where we are trying to get better at describing the phenomenon as the phenomenon occurred. And, and a lot of that is, is about determining what counts as a phenomenon, what, what is or is not.

49:51 GP: Yeah. And part of the challenge is that when you're looking at a word and you're reading a word, and you're understanding a word, the, uh, at least, at least for me, you, you don't really experience the visual appearance of the word separately from the meaning of the word. It's, it's kinda unified. Um, I mean, the many aspects of experience are unified in this kinda way. You see a person and you see their, the distance they're at and the, the, the, the texture, the color, the shape, they're all unified. You don't experience them separately, even though they might be different parts of the brain. They represent them to some degree, but they're all together.

50:42 RTH: So, so what I would say about that is on retrospection, or on armchair introspection, it is almost impossible and probably may, and maybe even *absolutely* impossible to separate out the visual aspects from the semantic aspects of a word. [GP: Mm-hmm.] At the moment of the beep today, *you seem to say at a moment of beep, I can separate those things out. They were most more visual than they were semantic.* And, and, and I would say, well, let's keep that as a possibility, but not as an actuality. And, but be for one, for one thing, it does point to the, the limitations of, of retrospection or introspection.

51:33 GP: Mm-hmm.

51:33 RTH: That if there, if it *is* possible to distinguish between the visual characteristics and the semantic characteristics of words, the only way that you could ever see that would be to do something like we're doing right now. And so you wouldn't possibly have had access to that without a beeper that says [snaps his fingers] at this particular moment, what is it?

51:56 GP: Yeah.

52:00 RTH: But I also wanna be totally on re on the record, which I think I have been, as, as saying, I don't really care whether there's a semantic characteristic to the words or a visual characteristic to the word, whether that's primary or not, I don't have a theory about that. What I *do* care about is trying to get Gualtierio's experience as Gualtierio experienced it. And if that's, if that's a in, in (whatever the word is) in an indistinguishable mix between semantic and, and, uh, visual, fine. But if it's not, well, then that's fine, too. We gotta, we're gonna work on it.

52:44 GP: Yeah.

52:48 RTH: *Then* I didn't understand the, *I was singing*. What was I singing? Did you say I was singing "Turn on the Heat"?

52:57 GP: No, I was singing something, but I don't remember what I was singing.

53:00 RTH: Okay. So I was singing a song of some sort or singing a Yeah.

53:03 GP: Yeah. Sometimes I sing made up songs. [RTH: Okay.] That I make up as I go.

53:09 RTH: Okay. So, and, and, and, and singing. This was out loud singing. So if I had been in the room, I would've heard the singing. [GP: Yeah.] Okay. And, and whether that was part of my experience at the moment, *maybe*, I guess I was somewhat or slightly or something aware of it, but not predominantly.

53:29 GP: Yes.

53:30 RTH: And so most predominantly I was, was about the visual display, possibly the semantically visual display or whatever,...

53:39 GP: Mm-hmm.

53:40 RTH: ...of, of the word Heat against the gray thermostat.

53:47 GP: Yes.

53:51 RTH: Then I think I'm good. You happy Lauren? Then we've got one left, I think number 6. Is that right? 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, number 6.

54:09 GP: Yeah. Um, I don't know if we wanna get to that since we're almost out of time. I had an independent question that just popped into my head. Can I ask you that?

54:17 GP: Okay. Yes.

CONVERSATION AFTER THE SAMPLES

54:19 GP: Um, did you get a sense that from your, the interaction with you, Eric Schwitzgebel ended up more persuaded that it's possible to learn something informative about experience from descriptive experience sampling? Or he remained about as skeptical as he was at the beginning? Or, or what was his, uh, journey, y'know, co cognitively with respect to what we can learn from descriptive experience sampling? As best you can...

54:56 RTH: Well, I, if you really wanna know what he thought, you probably ought to ask him, but what I, what I, what I would say about what I *think* about that was, I think he came to think that I was pretty good at asking questions about his inner experience. [GP: Mm-

hmm.] Probably better than anybody else that he had run across. I think that's probably fair to, to say that that's what he thought. And, and I think he came to believe that what I said was reasonable and possibly true.

55:33 GP: Mm-hmm.

55:33 RTH: But I don't know that he came to believe that it was true.

55:38 GP: Hmm.

55:39 RTH: I think maybe it would be fair to say that, that if there was something to be said about inner experience, that I was a pretty good guy to say it. [GP: Mm-hmm.] But maybe there was still wasn't anything good to be said about inner experience.

55:52 GP: Got it. Okay. Yeah.

55:54 RTH: But I'm not, I'm not a hundred percent sure that that's what he thought. And I'm also not sure that I... I think it, I think it, if you had asked him that question immediately after we were done [GP: Mm-hmm.] he might have given you a different, there might have *been* a different answer than if you asked him now.

56:16 GP: Yeah. Did you, did you, did he do any descriptive experience sampling himself? [RTH: Yeah.] Oh he did.

56:24 RTH: But it was, uh, it was,... So the backstory to that is that we met for the first time at, uh, con, uh, uh, Tucson conference, uh, consciousness conference where I gave a paper saying he, that you ought to do something like descriptive experience sampling. And he, and in the same session gave a session, gave a paper that said it was not possible. And, uh, and, and I, and then we had a conversation afterwards and, and in that conversation I said, well, you ought to wear the beeper. I happened to have a beeper with me. Do you wanna wear it? And so he wore the beeper at, in Tucson, took it back, I think, on the plane and maybe wore it for one more day after that. And, and in the course of that decided, well, he was not the ideal subject because he's on the record as a card-carrying skeptic about these kinds of things. And so it was probably a good idea to get somebody else.

57:12 And, and it, and then coincidentally enough that I was being introduced to this woman that we ended up calling Melanie, who's the subject of that book, [GP: Yeah.] who I didn't know, but who was, who had an interest in psychology and was a friend of a friend kind of a deal. And then they said, you ought to go talk to Hurlburt—he has interesting things to say about this kinda stuff. And, and, uh, so she did. And, and I said, well, Eric and I were looking for a subject you wanna be it? See what happens.

57:42 GP: Yeah. So for, yeah, for Lauren's benefit, this is Eric Schwitzgebel that we're talking about. He and Russ wrote a book that came out of this whole collaboration, that I reviewed, by the way. And that's how I kinda started interacting with Russ, I think, or, anyway, we did sort of meet online at that time that I wrote the review, and I wrote a paper on descriptive experience sampling, too.

58:10 RTH: So I, I, y'know, I, I, I think people do things for a lot of different reasons and which is what, which is what part of the diamonds-versus-glass commentary that I was making a little bit ago. [see 35:21]. The one, the one thing that I, I think there is a pretty much a right answer to what was going on in Gualtiero's experience at the moment that beep 3.5 or whatever occurred. [GP: Mm-hmm.] And whether we can, it's, it's not gonna be a *perfect* answer, but it's gonna be *pretty good* answer, I think.

58:46 GP: Yeah, I agree.

58:47 RTH: Maybe even a *very good* answer. I agree. And about and about any other kinda questions, they're shiny and, but they're, but they're hard to, y'know... whether it's what, what Eric thinks about, about the descriptive experience sampling. Well, y'know, that's a complicated deal when you really dig into it and, uh

59:07 GP: Right.

59:07 GP: y'know,

59:08 GP: Well thank you

59:09 RTH: What the Democratic strategy should be to counter Trump. That's a complicated question. And, and there and about which there is vital importance, but no right answer. And, uh, but pristine inner experience is the kind of a thing which I think is interesting and, and comes close to having the right answer, I think. But I'm not trying to, not even trying to talk you into that. I'd be happy to have you demonstrate for me that I'm, that I'm mistaken about that. [GP: I agree with you.] Best, best possible outcome. [GP: Very good.] So, shall we put this on the calendar for, for another time? [GP: Yeah.]