

TRANSCRIPT WITH COMMENTARY
Gabriel H.: A college senior interested in philosophy
Gabriel Sampling Day 6.

Below in black is a word-for-word transcript of Sampling Day 6 from the January 10 interview with Gabriel that is available at <https://youtu.be/Q3Mu18tKS5g>. In green are comments about and explanations of the Descriptive Experience Sampling process. If you have corrections, suggestions, or questions, please post them as YouTube comments.

RTH = Russ Hurlburt

AG = Amber Goto

Gabriel = Gabriel H.

- 0:05 Gabriel: All right. How is everyone doing?
- 0:06 RTH: I'm doing well.
- 0:07 AG: Good. How are you?
- 0:08 Gabriel: Doing well, thank you.
- 0:10 RTH: Hap, happy new year. This, so it seems like you [inaudible].
- 0:14 Gabriel: Thank you. Likewise.
- 0:16 RTH: So this is gonna be something like day 6 or 5 [AG: Six.] or something like that? Day 6?
 [AG: Day 6.]
- 0:22 Gabriel: Okay.
- 0:24 RTH: Anything we should be talking about before we look at beeps?
- 0:29 Gabriel: Um... let's see. I don't, uh, there's nothing from my end.
- 0:35 RTH: Okay [inaudible].
- 0:36 AG: Okay. So when did you wear the beeper?
- 0:38 Gabriel: So, I wore the beeper, um, a bit last night and a bit this morning.
- 0:42 AG: Uh, so like how many did you collect last night? How many this morning?
- 0:46 Gabriel: Uh, I got, let's see, I had two last night. Uh, two full ones last night, and three this morning.

- 0:55 AG: Okay. And when you say full ones, uh, is, was there an issue? Or is it like you missed one or...?
- 1:00 Gabriel: There, there was one where I got the beep, and then, uh, the moment I went to write it down, I, I like couldn't figure it out anymore [inaudible].
- 1:08 AG: Okay. [Gabriel: Okay.] All good. No problem. Um, so no questions, problems?
- 1:14 RTH: So [Gabriel: Uh, no.] I do, I do have a question about that. So when you went to write it down, you couldn't figure it out. What, what exactly does that mean?
- 1:21 Gabriel: Um, that means that, uh, it was like for when I, at the moment of the beep I, I knew what was in my experience, uh, but some combination of like, the beep kind of startling me a little bit, and, uh, the continuation of the beep from the very first note, um, just interfered with it. And then once I wrote it, once I went to write it down, it was, I just didn't remember anymore.
- 1:54 RTH: Okay. So you felt like, you felt like at the, if you, if you could have written it down or whatever immediately without having to find your notebook or whatever, you could have done it, but [Gabriel Yes, yes.] by the time you wrangled the notebook or...?
- 2:06 Gabriel: Yes, there was definitely feelings in my experience and stuff like that. Um, they just disappeared really quickly.
- 2:14 RTH: Okay. All right. Then I'm, I'm ready to go to beep number 1. And Amber, are you first [Gabriel: okay.] or am I first?
- 2:22 AG: Uh, you're first.
- 2:23 RTH: Okay. [Pause]

SAMPLE 6.1 DISCUSSION STARTS HERE

- 2:26 Gabriel: Okay. So beep number 1. [Looks at notes] So in this, uh, in this beep, I was, uh, playing a game of chess. And, uh, I was looking at a, uh, a formation on my opponent's, uh, of my opponent's pieces, which was two pawns and a bishop in a particular pattern. And, uh, the formation was definitely in my experience. Uh, and there was some sensation that there was something kind of weird about it. Um, weird in a, not in a chess way, but in a visual way. Like it looked kind of like a snake or something like that. I wasn't thinking of it as a snake, but I think that's why I thought it, there was something weird about it. And, uh, I was considering if my rook could attack the bishop successfully.
- 3:31 RTH: So I'm looking at the formation; and some sensation of weirdness?
- 3:37 Gabriel: Yes.

3:39 RTH: And how, and, *and* I'm considering whether my rook can attack my bishop. Which, does, which, does one of those seem more present than the other?

3:49 Gabriel: Um, the consideration of whether my rook could attack the bishop.

3:54 RTH: Is more present?

3:56 Gabriel: Yes.

3:56 RTH: 60—40 ish? 90—10 ish?

3:59 Gabriel: Uh, I would say 90—10, uh, is about right. Probably 80—20 is closer though.

4:11 RTH: Okay. And then how did that, how did that considering go?

4:15 Gabriel: Uh, the considering was in the, in that moment, It was just the thought of, *can my rook attack the bishop?*

4:24 RTH: And how does that thought present itself to you?

4:28 Gabriel: Uh, it's, it's the thought of, um, a general direction upward from the bishop, which is where my rook would be if I moved it to attack it. And, um, so it's that general d, sense of direction and sort of like a question, uh, which is, will this be successful? That's not a verbal question, but it *is* in my mind.

4:58 RTH: So does that mean that there's sort of two aspects present about, about this? There's the direction and there's the wondering or considering / thinking about whether this would be successful?

5:09 Gabriel: I suppose there are, but it didn't feel like it. It felt like that was all one thing.

5:13 RTH: That seemed like one thing? Okay. [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] And [pause] so the, the, let's start with the thinking portion. Is the thinking portion directly present to you, or is that a, a way of telling us what this direction meant?

5:35 Gabriel: Um, [pauses] I, it *was* directly present to me.

5:45 RTH: So I am *somehow thinking* about whether this move would be successful?

5:50 Gabriel: Yes. Yes. And actually that, uh, is present to me in a different way, now that I think about it. The way it wa, tha, the way the thinking portion, the way the question was present was, uh, trying to predict the next move of my opponent if I did that. So, um, it, it, I wasn't actively trying to, like, I wasn't actively predicting a move in that moment, but I had the intention to think about what the next move would be.

6:22 RTH: So something like, if I make this move, what would I do next?

6:26 Gabriel: Or if, if something like, if I make this move, what would h, uh, my opponent do next?

6:33 RTH: Okay. [Pause] And, and so that doesn't have anything necessarily about *success*, *successful* in it. Does that [Gabriel: I sup-] mean we're sorta, we're revising and saying, well, it wasn't really about *successful*, it was about what's gonna happen next?

6:49 Gabriel: No, it, there was, it was also about *successful*. Like, um, so that, that was definitely part of it was what the next move would be. But there was like a sense of, uh, okay, so by *successful*, I guess there was a sense of, it wasn't necessarily *success*. I feel like a better way of putting it would be, uh, winning the bishop. [Pause] There was a sense of, can I, will I win the bishop? Will the bishop be, uh, will the bishop be mine?

7:32 RTH: And that's basically transmitted to you by considering the next move. And if the next move doesn't take your rook, then you'd be successful? Is that...?

7:42 Gabriel: Uh, it was, if the next move can't defend the bishop, I would be successful. [Pause] And the vague sense of *does he have some ability to defend the bishop?* was there.

7:57 RTH: Okay. [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] And this I'm gathering is some sort of cognitive analytical process. Is that fair?

8:05 Gabriel: Mm-hmm.

8:07 RTH: But *doesn't* include words or pictures. I don't have pictures of what the next move [Gabriel: Yeah.] will be. It's not like rook is present or bishop would be present or attack or whatever? Defend?

8:16 Gabriel: Not, not in that moment, no. No words or pictures. The only thing, um, that wasn't just like a strictly cognitive, um, would, would, and like maybe slightly sensory, would've been the sense of direction upwards from the bishop. And of course there was, I was looking at this structure and the, the structure was there in my vision.

8:41 RTH: Okay. So there's a sense of directionality from the bishop?

8:46 Gabriel: Mm-hmm.

8:47 RTH: And then there's an analytical, *can he defend it? Will this be successful?* Whatever?

8:55 Gabriel: Yes.

8:58 RTH: Okay. Amber, you have any questions about that? [AG: Shakes head] Okay.

9:04 AG: No, I think I got it.

9:06 RTH: And then th...

9:06 AG: Oh! Actually I do have a question. [Gabriel: Okay.] Um, in the previous sampling day, or is, I don't if this is a previous one, or like a couple days ago. [She is referring to

sample 4.1.] You had had a beep, um... where your sister, you were saying like, *can she do that*, that kind of whole situation with if your sister was able to make the move, she had the card. Is this, [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] is the cognitive portion of this rook and the bishop and all of that, is that similar to that kind of thought? Or is it different? And if it is...?

9:40 Gabriel: I'd say it's the same, actually. It, it's [AG: Okay.] the same kind of thinking. Yeah.

9:40 Russ comments: Both are instances of unsymbolized thinking.

9:44 AG: Okay. Okay. But, that's all.

9:47 Gabriel: Okay.

9:49 RTH: And then there is the seeing of the shape of this display, I guess the rook and two pawns.

9:57 Gabriel: Mm-hmm. Or the *bishop* and two pawns.

10 RTH: Bishop, bishop and two pawns. [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] And, and that it's somehow weird?

10:05 Gabriel: Yes.

10:07 RTH: And this is a minor thing, 10 or 20%?

10:10 Gabriel: Yes.

10:14 RTH: And is the weirdness immediately present in the shape? *I'm seeing this weird shape?* Or is it I'm seeing the shape and I'm somehow thinking/cognizing and I, analyzing to myself, *well, that's sort of weird?*

10:29 Gabriel: Yeah. It, it's definitely not present in the shape. I don't even understand why I thought it was weird in that moment, really. Um, I think maybe it was because I thought it looked like a snake, but that wasn't like in my experience in that moment. Uh, so I don't know why I thought it was weird. It was just, there was just a sense of that's weird.

10:50 RTH: Okay. And is the, is the sense that that's weird of the same ilk as the *will my bishop, can I get the bishop?* Will I keep the bishop? Is there, [Gabriel: Um.] is that the same thinking kind of process?

11:07 Gabriel: No, I don't think so. It was, it was, uh, more like, because the, *that* was an active process that was like, I was purposely, uh, intentionally trying to think through. In this case, the feeling of weird was like, uh, something that just sort of *happened* to me. Yeah, I didn't act, I wasn't like analyzing. It was sort, it just sort of came over me.

11:37 RTH: So I, I'm understanding that one is more active and one is more coming to you receptive, I guess?

11:44 Gabriel: Um, yes.

11:45 RTH: But uh, but is the, is, but given that those differences, does it still seem like the *thought process* is the same, or does it seem like they're different?

11:56 Gabriel: It, it, it, it feels very different to me. [RTH: Okay.] Um, yeah.

12:02 RTH: So I'm somehow apprehending the weirdness of this?

12:05 Gabriel: Mm-hmm.

12:06 RTH: And that apprehension is *different* from thinking about whether I should, whether, whether I would keep the, keep the bishop, is that move safe or whatever?

12:17 Gabriel: I th, I think so, but I'm also not necessarily sure, uh, what kind of distinction you're wondering about.

12:30 RTH: Well, that's good because I don't know what kind of distinction I'm wondering about! I'm, I'm [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] trying to find if there *is* a distinction. [Gabriel: Okay.] The kind distinction *could* be that one of them seems analytical and one of them seems emotional. That would be one possibility, but I'm not [Gabriel: Yeah.] in favor of that.

12:30 Russ comments: RTH could have asked, at 10:50, something like "was one a thinking and the other a feeling?" Not asking that was purposeful, because RTH did not want to suggest the existence of feeling—Gabriel hadn't yet said it was a feeling, and RTH would prefer to have the description arise in Gabriel, rather than arise in RTH and then Gabriel might simply assent. A difficult part of the DES art is to be ambiguous for as long as possible without being (or seeming to be) evasive.
At 12:30, so as not to be evasive, RTH *does* initiate talk about feelings. But when he does so, he is *explicitly* ambiguous six times: I don't know; I'm wondering; I'm trying to find; it could be; one possibility; I'm not in favor. He is doing all he can to encourage Gabriel to describe his own experience rather than simply acquiesce to RTH's suggestion.

12:45 Gabriel: I, I was going to say something like that, um, because I think that captures it somewhat, [pause] but, um, I think the, I think it's more like the receptive versus active thing. I, uh, kind of makes them so different that it doesn't really feel like they could be the same otherwise.

13:07 RTH: Okay. Then that's fair too.

13:10 Gabriel: Okay.

13:13 RTH: *And it's only 10 or 20%, so it's probably not a good idea to try to make too fine a distinction about something that's pretty minor to begin with.*

13:13 Russ comments: Also important is the iterative method: we have a glimpse of this *seems weird* phenomenon; we don't know the details, we haven't pretended to know the details, and we've opened our interest in such things should they arise on future sampling days.

13:22 Gabriel: Sure.

13:24 RTH: So I'm good. Do you have questions about that, Amber?

13:28 AG: Um, I think I'm good as well.

13:30 RTH: Number 2.

SAMPLE 6.2 DISCUSSION STARTS HERE

13:32 Gabriel: Okay. Number 2. So this was... uh, there was a... uh, I was al, I was also playing a chess game while I was doing, this was the last one where I'm playing a chess game. And, um, as I was pl, uh, in, in my head, uh, was just the words "Monday night" in a southern accent. And, uh, this was while I was looking at the chess board and vaguely, vaguely just trying to find some sort of attack I could mount on my opponent. Um, so that's, that's beep number 2.

14:14 AG: So, uh, what, what is in your experience at the moment of the beep?

14:18 Gabriel: It was the, uh, vaguely trying to find an attack I could mount, and it was the southern accent, uh, saying "Monday night."

14:27 AG: Okay. And when you say 'vaguely,' is that, what, what do you mean by vaguely?

14:31 Gabriel: It's, um, it's like my, uh, concentration powers were like really, uh, not there at that moment. And it was, uh, not much was happening in my head. Um, and so basically I was just sort of looking around the chess board without thinking too hard, with the intention of figuring out something I could do. Um, yeah.

14:57 AG: Okay. And I'm getting that there's two, kind of two aspects of this, of this beep here. [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] So is there any that's more salient and if so...?

15:09 Gabriel: In that moment it was, uh, the southern accent saying "Monday night."

15:13 AG: Okay. Like 80—20? 60—40?

15:17 Gabriel: I would say, [Pauses] I would say 60—40.

15:27 AG: Okay. So let's start with the Southern accent. So, um...

15:33 Gabriel: Actually I'll, I'll revise it to 70—30. [AG: Okay.] I, I think it was probably more accurate.

15:37 AG: Okay. No problem. So we'll [RTH: And can, can-] still start with that.

15:40 RTH: Can I ask a preliminary question? Is, [AG: Sure.] Is *Knight* a 'K' word or an 'N' word?

15:46 Gabriel: Oh, an 'N' word.

15:48 RTH: And does it have anything to do with chess?

15:50 Gabriel: No.

15:51 RTH: Okay, then go for it, Amber.

15:53 AG: Okay. So, um, uh, tell me more about that "Monday night" [inaudible].

15:59 Gabriel: Uh, so this was not me actively try, I don't even know like, what this was. This was just like a random voice that was in my head for a moment. I wasn't trying to make it happen. Um, uh, I wasn't, I don't even, I wasn't even imagining anything. It was just, I was a little bit tired and, uh, it just was in my head, the, the word "Monday night" in a southern accent.

16:27 AG: Okay. So, um, is this something that you're saying in, is this like in your [Gabriel: It's not.] voice, is this southern accident in your voice, or is this someone else's voice? It was just, were you *hearing* this? Are you *saying* this [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] or...?

16:42 Gabriel: It's someone else's voice and I'm hearing it.

16:46 AG: Okay.

16:47 Gabriel: And it, it almost, it did feel kind of strange because, uh, usually when I hear stuff in my head, even when I'm like imagining someone else's voice and I'm hearing their voice in my head, it's intentional. But in this circumstance it, there was no intent behind it at all. It was just happening.

17:05 AG: Okay. And when you say this felt strange, is that present to you at the moment of the beep, or is that as I'm describing it to these guys now? I'm [inaudible]?

17:12 Gabriel: As I'm describing it, as [AG: Okay.] I'm describing it right now.

17:14 AG: Okay. So that's more, okay. Um, so, and this [makes air quotes] "someone else's voice," is this, is this, is there a specific someone? Are you just, this is not my typical...? [waves hands]

17:24 Gabriel: Yeah, there's no specific someone that I know of. Um, it was [AG: Okay.] just like a character invented in my head almost.

17:32 AG: Okay. And you said innerly, oh, well, it's like, I'm hearing it in my head, um... [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] So is it like, if I were to be hearing it from a video? Or I'm, you know, no doubt you, I'm producing the words, but it's like somehow I'm hearing it [Gabriel: Right.] as if it were in the environment. Like, could you tell me more about that?

17:55 Gabriel: I, it didn't sound like it was outside of my head, so, uh, I knew it was in my head. Like I knew it wasn't a real voice. [AG: Right.] And it did actually kind of feel, it, it did literally feel like it was in my head. [Pause] Like [AG: But is there, oh, go ahead.] Directionally speaking, like it felt like it was like up here or something. [points to the upper back of his head]

18:17 AG: Oh, there, so there's a physical [Gabriel: Yes.] location? [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] Okay, and where is that again?

18:22 Gabriel: It's, uh, [Places hand on top back of his head] it's like up here. [AG: Okay.] At like the top of my head, basically.

18:28 AG: Okay. And does it feel like, uh, would you say, did, did it feel like, uh, you were like producing these words or...?

18:38 Gabriel: No. [AG: It just...] It does not.

18:39 AG: Okay. [Pause] Okay. [Pause] Okay. Do you have any more questions about that?

18:48 RTH: Male voice, female voice, computer voice, hard to tell?

18:50 Gabriel: Male voice.

18:53 RTH: Deep, deeply male?

18:55 Gabriel: No, it was, uh, it was, it was, uh, slightly higher pitched.

19:02 RTH: Okay. And the southern accent. A deep, [starts speaking in a southern drawl] a deep south southern accent? [stops speaking in a southern drawl] Or, or just a little bit of a hint of a southern accent?

19:10 Gabriel: It was deep. It was a deep south southern accent. And it was also, uh, it was like, uh, "night" was drawn out. So it was like, uh, "Monday niiiiiiiiight" basically. I don't know. It was kind of like the, somebody, uh, announcing, um, it was like somebody was announcing it over uh, eh, I don't... Yeah that, no, it, cut that part out. I don't, [laughs] I don't know how I can explain that, but yeah, it was, it was drawn out.

19:42 RTH: So does it have the characteristics of an announcement? And like, [Gabriel: It had the characteristics...] like a loudspeaker, loudspeaker?

19:48 Gabriel: Yeah. Well, it, it, it felt like a, um, uh, I guess, (Oh, by the way, I, I like the Saturday Night Live video. Uh, I thought that was enjoyable. [\[See sample 5.1, 23 minutes into the interview\]](#)) [RTH: Laughs] Uh, but it was kind of like, you know, when they

announced, uh, “it’s Saturday Night,” uh, [RTH: Right.] “Live, Saturday Night Live,” whatever the announcement is at the beginning. It’s kind of like that kind of feeling where, um, where they’re announcing it, uh, in a sort of fun, lively way.

20:16 RTH: Okay. And is, and is that a, er, an, and are you referring to the characteristics of the voices as opposed to the, the auditory features of the voices? Like if you were in a football stadium and somebody says, you know, “come back for the next game on Saturday night” you, not only would it be drawn up, but it would have echo-y or whatever loudspeaker [inaudible].

20:40 Gabriel: Right. There wasn’t anything echo-y about it. It’s more about just the energy in the voice.

20:44 RTH: Okay. So the energy in the voice is sort of like, and, uh, I ha, uh, high energy, happy-go-lucky-ish... [Gabriel: Yes. Mm-hmm.] voice? Got it. So what I’m gathering from that is that this is a pretty specific hearing. This is not it, it’s random because I don’t know where it’s coming from, but I know exactly what I’m hearing this is...

20:44 Russ comments: Two comments. First, in earlier interviews, such as sample 5.1, Gabriel has not been confident about what he is experiencing, what counts as experience, how he would know whether something is being experienced. Here, by contrast, Gabriel seems very confident that he was indeed experiencing the voice, and about the characteristics of that hearing: not intentional, highish male voice, southern accent, drawn out second word, energetic tone. Is this because this sample is straightforwardly experienced, more so than other samples? Or because he has learned what is and is not experienced? Or because he has given up and is just saying what he thinks we want to hear? We will have to work at figuring all that out.

Second, it is noteworthy that the words Gabriel hears seemed to Gabriel himself to have no referent, were words that he experienced as just randomly appearing. The appearance in directly apprehended experience of words without apparent semantic significance is unusual. Gabriel understands “Monday night” to be words, but he does not understand where they came from, which Monday or which night they refer to, etc. They are words experienced as bereft of the kinds of meaning that such words have. For example, words appeared in four of the five samples on sampling day 5: “like that?” in sample 5.1, “lectures” in 5.2, “cars” in 5.3, and “coffee roll” in 5.4. But in each of those, he understood what the words referred to. By contrast, “Monday night” has no meaning for him, even though he is creating the words.

The notice of such meaningless utterances is rare or nonexistent in cognition or consciousness studies, probably because their discovery requires random sampling of experience in natural environments.

21:06 Gabriel: Yes.

21:07 RTH: Mm-hmm.

21:11 AG: Okay. And the attack, I could mount the, vaguely find the attack. Uh, uh, tell me more about that.

- 21:19 Gabriel: Uh, yes. So I was, uh... [pause] It's in the same way that, uh, like oftentimes, sometimes you're distracted or tired, you're reading a book and you just, uh, read like a paragraph and then you realize you didn't actually understand any of it. [AG: Ok.] You sort of had the intention to read the paragraph in that moment, it was probably there to some small extent. Uh, in the same way I sort of had this vague intent to analyze the board and then find an attack. However, uh, I wasn't doing it very productively. I was just sort of, it, it was just the intent and like my eyes were scanning the board, uh, fruitlessly. But the, that wasn't part of my experience. It was just the vague, uh, search.
- 22:07 AG: So when you say [Gabriel: Or vague intent.] it was, so is this more of an intention? Is this like a searching like, uh, [Gabriel: Yeah.] is this like a, like a cognitive process? I'm thinking of what I'm gonna do, like, uh...?
- 22:21 RTH: Or a visual [inaudible]?
- 22:21 AG: Or something else? Could be a, a, something else?
- 22:23 RTH: Or a visual searching?
- 22:24 AG: Yeah.
- 22:24 Gabriel: Yeah. I, I, it's, honestly, it's more, it's almost more wishful thinking if anything, like, Uh, the, it was, uh, there was an intent behind it, but it was also, uh, there was, there was intent, but also probably most of what I'm describing now was actually more of a hope, like a hope that I would find something.
- 22:49 AG: Okay. And will you say, is this a, is that hope, like a feeling? Or a something [Gabriel: Yes.] else going on?
- 22:58 Gabriel: It's, um... it's like, it's actually, yeah. It's an almost an excitement. Like, uh, ooh, I wonder if I could do this, that kind of thing. So there's an excited hope there. And, uh, it is a feeling. It's not, um, yeah. It, it is definitely, a, and there's, you know, some emotion behind it. Um... uh, there, it's, it's a somewhat enjoyable sensation. So I, I feel like maybe I'm going a little too, I'm analyzing it too much right now.
- 23:47 AG: Yeah. Yeah. It's, it's a 30% deal. So I, uh, [Gabriel: Okay.] It's not too, uh, deep. Uh, uh, so I guess what I'm trying to get at: is this, like, uh, uh, cuz you've used words like intention, wishful thinking, searching [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] So is this like a, I have a, like an intention that has this kind of positive connotation to it? Is this like a...? I, I take you to be saying that that's kind of what's going on here, uh...?
- 24:19 Gabriel: Yes. I had an intention that was supplemented, or I don't know, complemented by... Yeah, I would say I had an intention that was at the same time complemented by this kind of wishful hope.
- 24:32 AG: Okay.

24:34 Gabriel: Um, and the searching part was not part of my conscious experience. [AG: Okay.] I was not, uh, that, I was *doing* it, but it wasn't part of my conscious experience.

24:43 AG: Got it. Okay. Do you have any more questions, Dr. Hurlburt?

24:48 RTH: Nope, I'm good. Number 3.

SAMPLE 6.3 DISCUSSION STARTS HERE

24:51 Gabriel: Okay. So number 3 is, uh, the one that I had a, I lost when, like, when I wrote, when I got to, the notepad out, I just wasn't able to write anything down.

25:05 RTH: Okay.

25:05 Gabriel: So I can move straight to 4?

25:07 RTH: Okay.

SAMPLE 6.4 DISCUSSION STARTS HERE

25:08 Gabriel: Okay. So, uh, that was this morning. And, um, I, it was the words, uh, in, I was watching a video for context. Uh, and I think it, it had something to do with coronavirus. And, uh, so what was in my conscious experience was, uh, were the words "stay home" in a new, in a, in a serious voice, which was a newscaster's voice. And that was part of my experience. It was the experience of a newscaster's, serious voice saying "stay home." That was happening in the real world as well. I was, it was in the video. And, um, it also came with a sense of, um, a recent, dramatic past. And also in my experience was the visual of, uh, a green and blue news anchor's room where, you know, they, they stand and do interviews, that kind of thing. But, but it was just like the, the green and blue newscaster's room that was in my visual experience.

26:16 RTH: And, and is some of this more prominent than others?

26:20 Gabriel: Uh, the words "stay," "stay home" are more prominent.

26:23 RTH: Okay. And, and is stay home both in the real world and in your experience somehow?

26:33 Gabriel: Uh, yes, yes. I'm, uh, when I said it's in the real world, I was just giving context that the, it was actually in the video I was watching, but it was, in my experience, I was attending to it.

26:50 RTH: So am I hearing the announcer say "stay home?" Or am I imagining an announcer saying "stay home" that is somehow in parallel to the real, real-world hearing?

27:08 Gabriel: I am hearing the announcer or the, the newscaster in the video saying "stay home."

27:18 RTH: Okay. So this is a, a perc, a straight, straightforward perception of the real world, not a creation of my own (setting aside the philosophical argument that everything is

always a creation of my own percep; per, perception is created, [Gabriel: Mm-hmm] right? I agree with that. But the, but the *impression*, which, which I *have*, is I'm hearing the announcer say "stay home."

27:45 Gabriel: Yes.

27:47 RTH: Okay. And then there's the, there was something that I couldn't, I didn't, I missed the word of a 'recent dramatic' something. I, but I missed it.

28:01 Gabriel: Uh, right. Uh, it came, uh, the, the, the voice "stay home," uh, that came with a sense of like a recent dramatic, uh, past.

28:15 RTH: And is that, again, a characteristic of the voice? I hear this guy saying "stay home" [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] with the implication that, that something had happened recently, and...?

28:25 Gabriel: It was not a characteristic of the voice. It was, um, uh, it was not. It was a characteristic more of the video I was watching. However, uh, the, yeah, I, I would say it wasn't a characteristic of the voice. It was more something I was, uh, associating with the voice. So like, if you just, if I just heard that voice, I wouldn't say, oh, there's a sense of a recent dramatic past there. It was in the context of the video. [Pause]

29:08 RTH: So I, I, I, I guess I still don't understand exactly what the experience is. [Gabriel: Okay.] So the, by recent dramatic path, I don't, I don't understand...

29:17 Gabriel: Past.

29:18 RTH: What's the word?

29:20 Gabriel: Uh, P A S T.

29:22 RTH: *Past*. Recent dramatic *past*. So, so the, so "stay home" is referring to an e, dramatic event that's happened in, in the recent past,

29:33 Gabriel: Right. Uh, it, or, uh, I mean, it's just referring to coronavirus in general. Um, uh, s, so I wouldn't say it's referring to a sce, Uh, it, it wasn't referring to an event, it had to *do* with an event.

29:49 RTH: Okay. [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] And, and is that event, which particular event present to you? Or is it just...?

30:01 Gabriel: Uh, it, it was.... Um, uh actually I don't think it really was in that moment. It was just the sense of general, general a recent, generally a recent dramatic past.

30:23 RTH: So arising in me at the moment of the beep are sort of *two* things. One is I hear the announcer say, "stay home," *and* I have some sense of a dramatic event in the nearby past?

30:39 RTH: Mm-hmm.

30:40 RTH: Is that right?

30:41 Gabriel: Yes.

30:42 RTH: And that, and that dramatic event was probably re, referred to in the video, came from the video, but what exactly, what we're talking about, I don't really, what, what is, what is that event is not specified to me?

30:57 Gabriel: Not in that moment.

30:59 RTH: Mm-hmm. [Pause] And is, is the recent dramatic past a prominent feature of this? Or is it just a slight flavor of it, or...?

31:15 Gabriel: It's, uh, it's a, uh, I would say it, the, uh, when it comes to... I would say it was, uh, I would say the words "stay home" and the sense of the recent dramatic past, I would say those two are about equal.

31:42 RTH: Okay. And is there anything more to say about how the, how the dramatic past is present to you?

31:54 Gabriel: Um, yeah, probably a little bit. Uh, there, it also had, there was also like the, the drama part. When I say dramatic, it also had a sense of, I guess, *intrigue*. Um, because this was, this was like a documentary that was supposed to be some sort of expose. So there was like a sense of intrigue there as well. Like, uh, did things go wrong, uh, in the government? or something like that.

32:25 RTH: Okay. And, and is that present to you as a picture? I, I see the government screwing up? Or, or as a [Gabriel: It wasn't, really.] cognitive recollection? Or, uh, can't even say?

32:41 Gabriel: I think it was, [RTH: Can't even say?] I think, hmm. Yeah, I would, I would say it was present to me as just a, um, as a feeling. Just as a feeling. And, um, it's hard to say exactly what that feeling is. Uh, but it, it, it's sort of the feeling... I would say it's more than just the feeling of, of intrigue. I would say it's the feeling of like *documentary intrigue* specifically. Uh, because in documentaries that, they have this particular way of making things, uh, sound a little bit scary and, uh,

33:26 RTH: "Stay tuned so that I can tell you about the..."?

33:28 Gabriel: Exactly! That kind of thing. Mm-hmm.

33:34 RTH: And that sense is somehow present to me: that I'm [Gabriel: Yes] like, documentarily intrigued or, or whatever?

33:41 Gabriel: Yes.

33:43 RTH: (It's a feeling that I've come to hate, but, [they laugh] but I know it.)

33:48 Gabriel: Okay. [Laughs].

33:51 RTH: All right. And then there's, uh, green and blue a, news anchor's room.

33:56 Gabriel: Yes. Um, that was just, uh, I don't, I don't know what more to say. It was, uh, the, the, the background of the news anchors room, uh, you know, like the, the, the weird green screen kind of thing that they have? It was this kind of green and blue, uh, colored gradient. And, um, the panel that they were sitting in, uh, had like a green blue thing on the front of it. So, and then there were two people.

34:28 RTH: So I, I see a fully articulated scene, apparently. Is that right?

34:33 Gabriel: Mm-hmm. Uh, yes.

34:35 RTH: Of which the mo, the most prominent aspect was the green, or green and blue screen that's behind the two people?

34:43 Gabriel: Um, I don't know if I can say that was necessarily the most prominent aspect.

34:52 RTH: Okay. So I, I see two people in a newscaster kind of situation?

34:58 Gabriel: Mm-hmm.

34:59 RTH: And, and by two people, do we, are, are these people looking at each other or are they looking at, at the audience, like two side by side newscasters?

35:07 Gabriel: They're, uh, not looking anywhere. Not, not, it, it's like, I don't know where they're looking, in other words.

35:14 RTH: Okay. So what I'm trying, does it make sense to ask whether these are newscast, both of them are newscasters, or is one a newscaster and the other an interviewee?

35:23 Gabriel: I would say they're both newscasters, definitely.

35:26 RTH: Okay. And blue and green is a characteristic of this scene, [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] somehow.

35:36 Gabriel: Mm-hmm.

35:39 RTH: And, and I gather it that it was both in front and in back of them, is that right?

35:44 Gabriel: Yes.

35:45 RTH: And, and can you say more about that?

35:48 Gabriel: Uh, that's because the, there was a background, but also, uh, you know how, uh, in news, in like when you're watching the news, it's often the case that there's some sort of panel in front of their seats or like, uh, I guess just to obscure the, the seats or something like that. I don't know why. Or like a big desk that has eh-

36:07 RTH: A big desk or table or something?

36:09 Gabriel: Yeah. Uh, that had like a, that was blue and green down to the floor.

36:15 RTH: Okay. And, and, and is the 'behind them blue and green' floor to ceiling one sort of uniformly deal?

36:28 Gabriel: Uh, but, what do you mean by that?

36:31 RTH: Well, if, if one sees a green screen, it is a green, same color of green from beginning to, from beginning to end. The object of a green screen is to have no definition at all. Just one [Gabriel: Right.] solid green screen, [Gabriel: Right. Okay.] solid green *area*. [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] And is that what you see is one solid green area? Or is it a gradient from green to blue, which [Inaudible]?

36:58 Gabriel: It's a gradient.

37:00 RTH: And is, and does that mean that green is above and blue is below or vice versa? Or side to side or something?

37:07 Gabriel: Green is in one corner and then blue is in the opposite corner. And when I think about it, I do not know which corner it is.

37:15 RTH: Okay.

37:18 Gabriel: I just know that they're opposite corners.

37:23 RTH: Okay.

37:24 RTH: And, and is, is this anchor, anchor's room more present or less present than the "stay home" and dramatic past? Are they all equal?

37:41 Gabriel: Uh, the visual is le, much less. Uh, uh, so when it comes to the "stay home" and dramatic past, I would say that occupies like, um, I'd say that it's like 90%, as opposed to, uh, the 10% of the visual. [Pause while RTH writes]

38:04 RTH: But the visual has the characteristics of a inner imaginary visualization. I see news anchors and [inaudible] blue and green colors?

38:17 Gabriel: Oh, no, that's actually in the video. That doesn't, that's not, uh, an, not, that's not imaginary to me in that moment. That's something I'm actually seeing. [Pause while RTH writes]

38:36 RTH: So what that means, then, is that this experi, this experience, your experience is pretty much driven by what you're seeing and hearing, with the exception of the dramatic intrigue that is arising in you, [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] but that was the intention of the, of what you're seeing in hearing probably. [Gabriel: Right.] Okay. Then I think I'm good.

39:04 Gabriel: Okay.

39:05 AG: I'm good too.

SAMPLE 6.5 DISCUSSION STARTS HERE

39:06 RTH: Number 5.

39:09 Gabriel: Okay. [pause; looks at notes] Okay. Uh, I was also watching a, um, I was also watching a video here, and, um, for context, it was the video of, uh, it was a video, YouTube video of somebody playing like a, a video game. Uh, so in my conscious experience at that moment was, uh, were the words "trusting him is." Uh, and that was it. The voice, uh, was that of a familiar, comforting voice, uh, of, of a female who's like a character in the video game. And, uh, so I know the video game, so it's, I, like, their associations that I have with the voice because I'm familiar with it. Um, and that voice was actually in the video. Uh, and then also in my experience was part of the visuals of the video. And there were kind of like, they were going in an elevator and, um, there were these, the door was composed of these triangles. So what was in my experience was looking at those triangles on the elevator and, uh, wondering what they are. That was in my visual experience was those triangles. And that came with a sense of wondering what they are.

40:41 AG: Okay. And, um, of these characteristics is what, is there anything that's more salient? Is everything the same?

40:51 Gabriel: Um, the, uh, "trusting him is," the voice, uh, those words, that's the most salient. And I would say that that is similar to the last one where I was mostly focusing on the audio. Uh, so maybe 90—10. So 90% was the, the, the voice, 10% was the triangles combined with this sort of wondering what they are.

41:13 AG: Okay. So "trusting him is." Right? That's what is being said?

41:18 Gabriel: Yes. Mm-hmm.

41:19 AG: Okay. And, um, you're tell, you said that you're hearing this in the voice of the character from the game?

41:28 Gabriel: Yes. [AG: Okay.] And it's sort of a, a comforting voice.

41:32 AG: So is that comforting voice, is that just a, is that a description of the voice, or is there some kind of comforting sensation or aspect of this experience?

- 41:42 Gabriel: I think it's, um, it's a, the, it's, it's not a, it's not necessarily an aspect of the voice itself. It might be, but it's more so the fact that the character is, is like a very, uh, it's like a, a very lovable character. [AG: Okay.] So it's, it's a, it's an association with the voice.
- 42:02 AG: And is that association present at the moment of the beep?
- 42:06 Gabriel: No. I's just a comforting voice in that moment, a comforting, familiar voice.
- 42:13 AG: And so there's some sense of this voice is comforting at that moment.
- 42:13 Russ comments: This question takes an aspect of what Gabriel said and transforms it into a specific thing. Gabriel hasn't done this himself, so AG's comment is a bit off the mark.
- 42:22 Gabriel: It's not that this, I don't know if it's that this voice is comforting. [AG: Okay.] It's that this, I don't, I wouldn't even say that. I would say that, sorry. I wouldn't even say that I'm hearing a voice in my, in experience. It's that I'm hearing a person in my experience. Maybe I should have actually used that vocabulary from the start. [AG: Okay.] Um, I'm hearing, hearing this person, and the person is a comforting, familiar person.
- 42:22 Russ comments: First, Gabriel is not influenced by AG's misleading statement. Good! Second, the distinction that Gabriel is making between hearing the voice and hearing the person is important, and it indicates that Gabriel is a sophisticated co-investigator. Even better!
- 42:49 AG: Okay. And is this person, uh, this, this is a character from a game. Yes? [Gabriel: Yes. Mm-hmm.] And, and is this character a, uh, like a, like an animation, like a, like a fictional character?
- 43:04 Gabriel: It is, yeah.
- 43:05 AG: Mm-hmm. Okay. So this individual, like, I hear this individual and this individual is comforting. I, I take you to be saying that's kind of what's going on.
- 43:15 Gabriel: On. Yes. I, I would say, uh, I, I hear this, uh, I hear this woman, specifically, because there was, like, it was in my experience was the fact that the voice was that as a female.
- 43:28 AG: Okay. And then did she have a name at the time of the experience, or is it just a female. [Gabriel: No.] Okay. Okay.
- 43:39 RTH: So I, I think I have a quite a different sense that you might have, Amber, about what we just said here.
- 43:45 AG: Okay.

43:46 RTH: Because the, I hear Gabriel saying, “I’m hearing the woman say (whatever it is that she says) ‘trusting him is’, and the fact that she’s a cartoon character is immaterial. It’s,

44:01 AG: Yeah.

44:04 RTH: This is a woman in, this is a woman in the, in, in this scenario that I, I’m partaking in.

44:11 AG: Yeah.

44:13 RTH: And I hear him to be saying, “Descriptively, I can say that the voice is, that the person, the woman, is a comforting, friendly, lov, lovable woman. But I’m not thematically making a big deal about, or a deal about that *at all* at the moment of the beep. [AG: Right.] I hear the voice and the voice has those characteristics which I have associated, learned to associate.

44:38 AG: Um hmm.

44:39 RTH: Okay.

44:40 AG: That’s what I got. Okay. Are we good about that?

44:45 RTH: I’m good about that.

44:46 AG: Okay. And, uh, the triangles, uh,

44:52 RTH: Tell me, I guess I did a one, one more question about that. [AG: Okay.] So when you say she’s saying “trusting him is,” does that mean she’s saying a sentence and the beep comes while she’s saying “trusting him is,” and the sentence keep on going, so my experience is I’m hearing a sentence which is interrupted by the beep? Or does it seem like I’m, have somehow pulled out these words “trusting him is,” and that’s what I am hearing. I’m not hearing a flowing sentence; I’m hearing three words.

45:25 Gabriel: Um, I wi, I think I, I *was* hearing three words. Uh, yes. I wa, I was hearing three words, although that I guess that does give, uh, that does give me a question, uh, which is, uh, I, I couldn’t have an, an experience of a sentence that was interrupted by the beep, right? Because...

45:52 RTH: [the audio was not clear] You could or could not?

45:54 Gabriel: Uh, I could not like have a sample. Like, it wouldn’t technically be possible to have a sample of a sentence that was interrupted by a beep, right, because then the beep would have, um, the beep can’t be part of the sample because it’s supposed to be the moment preceding the beep. Right?

45:54 Russ comments: This kind of analytical objection is a challenge for DES, because in a (analytical) manner of speaking, it is true: if the beep interrupts the hearing, then then the hearing couldn’t possibly have been of a sentence—it was, at most, of the

first part of a sentence. But in another (experiential) manner of speaking, it is false: the *experiential* hearing of a sentence is very different from the *experiential* hearing of, say, a string of three-word utterances, even if the *experience* of hearing a sentence does not conform with reality (say, on the possibility that a philosopher has contrived a situation where the speaking suddenly breaks off just after the beep.

For example, hearing (a) “Four score and seven years ago our fathers brought forth, on this continent, a new nation, conceived in Liberty, and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal” might be a very different experience from hearing (b) “Four score and” “seven years ago” “our fathers brought” “forth, on this” “continent, a new” “nation, conceived in” “Liberty, and dedicated” “to the proposition” “that all men” “are created equal.” If a beep occurred just after “new,” it would seem natural for (a)-type hearers to say “I was hearing a sentence” even though they could have no knowledge of whether the speaker was quoting Lincoln accurately or would immediately break off; and it would seem natural for (b)-type hearers to say “I was hearing a speaker say “continent, a new,” regardless of what happened after the beep.

The question for me is what to do about the kind of quibble expressed in Gabriel 45:54. Broadly speaking, there are two alternatives: (1) I can engage in the analysis, which I am likely to find unsatisfying for two reasons: (1a) the analysis *leads away from* the experience (while you were reading Gabriel 45:54 and the previous two paragraphs, you have not cared a whit about what Gabriel had been experiencing at the moment of the beep); and (1b) my analytical interlocutor is likely to be better at analytical quibbling than I am (and by better I mean analytically more adept, stronger, more able to lead us into dead ends). The second alternative is: (2) I can *decline* to engage in the analysis, which I am likely to find unsatisfying for one reason: (2a) Gabriel is a co-investigator with whom I would like to be aligned, and it seems unkind to say, in effect, *I don't care about your interest in possibilities / impossibilities.*

There used to be a second reason for the unsatisfactory feeling that arose when I declined to engage in the analysis: (2b) I worried I was avoiding the analysis because I was afraid my analytical interlocutor's superior analytical prowess would demonstrate my inferiority. But I have outgrown that. I have come to think (rightly or wrongly) that analytical skill is antagonistic to experiential skill, that time spent in honing and/or practicing analytical skills is antagonistic to acquiring skills in exploring experience.

Here, for example, Gabriel might prefer that the analytical (a)-type person would say, “I was hearing a word stream that *might have been* a sentence, but it also *might have been* a few words that *appeared to be* the beginning of a sentence, but that word stream might have been about to end abruptly—how could I possibly have known?” But to the extent that Gabriel had engaged in that kind of analysis, either immediately after the beep or during the interview (as now), he will *not* be trying to carefully describe the experience that had been ongoing, caught in flight by the beep. For example, suppose that immediately after the sample-6.5 beep, Gabriel had started to jot notes about his experience just prior to the beep. His initial jot happened to include the word “sentence.” That excited his analytical interest, so he veers away from contemplating what he had experienced a few seconds earlier to contemplating whether it is possible to have a sentence interrupted by a beep. He decides that that is not possible, and therefore erases his jotted “sentence.” He then

tries to return his contemplation to the beeped experience, but now, because of the intervening considerations, he has lost contact with what had been in his experience at the moment of the beep.

Gabriel (or the reader) might quibble with the foregoing analysis, which would prove my point: I have spent a long time already in my version of analysis, which might provoke Gabriel (or the reader) into another along time pointing out the flaws. Which I, of course, would rebut....

And *none of that* would have advanced the important *experiential* distinction (in fact, all of it would have muddled the experiential waters). The experience to be ascertained is: at the moment of the beep, did Gabriel experience a sentence-like flow, or did he experience a three-arbitrarily-selected-word chunk? “Trusting him is” would seem to be a semantically arbitrary chunk. Is that really what Gabriel experienced at the moment of the beep? Most DES participants do not describe such chunks (although there are exceptions; see my book with Marco Caracciolo). Is Gabriel’s at-the-moment-of-the-beep experience pretty much like that of most other people, and his three-word characterization the result of an extraordinarily careful descriptive process? Or is his experience really chunk – chunk – chunk? I find that question interesting, and I think the last 900 words of analysis has not clarified it in the slightest.

(I should note that I am *not* opposed to analysis. I am opposed to what I think is a misguided faith in the primacy of analysis. I don’t think any amount of analysis will help us discern the characteristics of Gabriel’s experience. Analysis may well contribute to the task, correcting me if I make broader-than-warranted claims for example.)

46:10 RTH: Okay. I’m, I’m I’ll, I’ll agree with that.

46:12 Gabriel: Okay. Uh,

46:14 RTH: But the, the question is whether I hear, what and whether my experience is this woman speaking a, speaking a coherent sentence that had a beginning, a middle, and then it’ll have an end, and, and it is the, when the beep comes, it stops, stops that, so I don’t get to hear what the end is. *Or* does it seem like I’ve heard some words and these words in my experience aren’t part of a sentence? [Gabriel: Uh...] So the, the, the real distinction is that there are some people who (I’m pretty convinced) [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] hear sort of semantic-free words: I hear this word. And then I hear the next word. And now I hear the next word, and now I hear the next word. And I never e, experienced myself as hearing a sentence. I *get* the sentence, people are talking to me in sentence, I *understand* what’s going on in the sentence, but I have, my own experience is not of accumulating the sentence, it’s of hearing this word, and then hearing that word, and then hearing this other word; and the processing that makes a sentence out of that is not in my experience *at all*. It’s, I, I never hear a sentence. I just hear a word. And I’m trying to find out whether your experience is of hearing a *sentence* or hearing a *chunk*.

46:14 Russ comments: RTH is referring, for example, to Chapter 2 of his book with Marco Caracciolo: *A passion for specificity: Confronting inner experience in literature and science*. Columbus: The Ohio State University Press, 2016.

- 47:31 Gabriel: Okay. I don't know how, uh, well, I don't know the answer to that question be, uh, because I, I don't know what it would be like to be the opposite of what I currently have. So like if those are, if, if you're either one or the other, I don't know what the other's, like, that would be hard for me to know.
- 47:31 Russ comments: This seems another example of an analytical quibble. I could counter something like: Well, I could ask, "was your inner hearing of 'Monday niiiight' [sample 6.2] in English or in Chinese?" You could reply that you don't know, because you've never innerly heard anything in Chinese, or that you don't know because you're not adept at distinguishing Mandarin from Cantonese, or.... And I could reply that those distinctions are not necessary.... But such a discussion would lead us away from his experience.
- 47:50 Gabriel: [continues] Um, I, I, I do think this was a chunk that I've heard, but the other thing is this is, uh, I, yeah... I do, I have another question which might help me answer this or at least think about it better the next time, which is: Because, um, you can't, I couldn't have, in my experience the beep interrupting the sentence, uh, presumably that means that the beep could... Hmm. Okay. So let's say I was somebody who heard whole sentences in my experience, right. Uh, that would imply that if the beep went off in the middle of a sentence, then that sentence would not, I would not have any words from that sentence in my experience at the moment of that beep. Um, because the sentence hadn't finished yet, so I wouldn't be able to have the whole sentence in my experience. And as I don't have single words in my experience, uh, those, the, the, the words that it, were interrupted wouldn't be there either. Is that true? Would you agree with that?
- 49:18 RTH: I don't think I would agree with that.
- 49:20 Gabriel: Okay.
- 49:21 RTH: So... [long (25 second) pause] So the, the, the difference is, the difference is some, is, is something like if I'm at a baseball game and I see the pitcher delivering the pitch... I'm watching, I'm watching a baseball game, and the, and the beep comes while the, while the pitcher's delivering the pitch. *I could say* I'm seeing the pitcher deliver the pitch. There's a sense, there is a sense in which that's not true, because the beep happened before the pitch actually got delivered. [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] But what I'm, what I am seeing in a straightforward, descriptive sense is I'm, I'm seeing the pitcher deliver the pitch. And *I could also say*, at the moment of the beep, I was seeing the pitcher wrap his left leg around his right leg, right waist. And that could be true, too, that that could be true, too. And [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] y'know there are some pitchers whose delivery is weird enough that you, that you pay attention to the way that the I, left leg goes. I don't know whether you're a baseball fan or not, I'm not mu mu, much of a baseball fan either. But, but there are, but there are some, there, there are some, some instances where the *mechanics* of the pitch of, of the delivery is as interesting (or more interesting at that, at some particular moment) than the delivery itself. [RTH is referring, for example, to the "upside down" or "submariner" pitching motion.]

51:15 Gabriel: Hmm. Okay.

51:16 RTH: And so the question is, at the moment of the beep (in, in this imaginary situation) am I watching a guy deliver a pitch or am I watching his leg wrap around his waist? And the scene is the same, and the beep is the same, but in one instance, I'm interested in the mechanics of the way this guy, how, how does, how does he move his leg? And the, and the other, I'm interested in the, y'know, the [Gabriel: Okay.] this guy, this guy's in the process of setting up a situation where the guy's either gonna hit it or he's not.

51:48 Gabriel: Okay.

51:49 RTH: And, and the *experience*, I *think*, is, is pretty *different* from the one situation to the next. One is I'm watching the pitch delivery, so as to see the game. And the other is I'm interested in the guy's mechanics.

52:05 Gabriel: Mm hmm, that, that makes sense to me. Um, but I also have another question about it, which is: You said that, um, you could say that you're seeing the pitch be delivered, although in the, in a sense, that might be technically wrong because the pitch hasn't yet been delivered. Um, and I, I would say I think maybe there are two different kinds of... I think the reason... It seems to me that the *reason* there's a, uh, you could say both is because there's two se, different senses of "being delivered." Like, one is the sense of I've seen the, the ball reach its target or destination. And then the other is the sense of I'm observing the process of delivery.

52:57 RTH: So I agree, I totally agree with that! [Gabriel: Okay.] And, and, *and*, I think, it is a rabbit hole that most people, other than philosopher-type kinds of people, people with philosophy interests, don't generally fall into.

53:16 Gabriel: Hmm.

53:17 RTH: Because I think, I think we could break down what de the, the delivery that you, that you were talking about, the word delivery, we, you divided into two. I'll bet I could divide it into *four*, because it has to do with, y'know, whether the ball just leaves my fingertips, or whether it just arrives in the catcher's mitt. *Or* we could break it down into eight, y'know. I'm guessing, I'm guessing we could break that, we could break that down...

53:45 Gabriel: Yeah, I suppose. I suppose so.

53:48 RTH: ...ra rabbit-hole-y infinite or something like that. [Gabriel: Hmm.] And, *but* what I would say is that there are, broadly speaking, sort of, of, *two ways* to, that, the beep can happen in my scenario. One is I'm interested in the mechanics, and the other is I'm interested in the game. And, and in both cases I'm seeing the guy's leg kick. And in the one case, it's just an incidental feature of the progress of the game, and in the other, it's the center of my attention.

54:21 Gabriel: Okay.

54:21 RTH: And if I wanna break that down, I could say, y'know, it's the leg kick isn't really wrapping around, or is it the way my toe goes up before I wrap it around, or whatever. I could break that down too, if I wanted to. But that doesn't change the fact that I, that in, in an important way, the, the, the, these are, these are distinctions that, that *lead away from* the experience rather than *towards* it.

54:53 Gabriel: Right. I feel like that makes sense because otherwise... Yes. [RTH: And so...] I think that makes sense to me.

55:06 RTH: And, and so in our example that we've got going here (and as a general rule, I think), the way you, the way you get out of the rabbit hole is by sticking with the individual experience. And in the, in, so the question is, in this individual experience, is your experience of three words more or less divorced from anything else? *I got these three words. Or* is your experience of the delivery of a sentence that had some words before that and probably have some words after that, but had these three words in it, and those three words were where the beep happened to come?

55:45 Gabriel: Um, I think it, it was three words that were part of the delivery of a sentence. I, I think that's, uh, more the most accurate way I can think of it.

55:58 RTH: Okay.

55:59 Gabriel: But I, I was curious, um, in general (and I know you probably can't, like, y'know, say for sure), but in general, when it comes to those people that are one sentence at a time,...

56:12 RTH: One *word* at a time?

56:12 Gabriel: ... how... What was that?

56:14 RTH: One *word* at a time?

56:16 Gabriel: Or, or not one word at a time, but they, they get whole sentences. [RTH: Alright.] they don't experience like the single... What would generally be in one, uh, their experience if a sentence was interrupted at a beep?

56:28 RTH: Well, there's two, there's two ways that happens in the, in the real world. Somebody, somebody would say, I was hearing, I was hearing this person, th, this person say, "Well, y'know, trusting him is a good, good thing cuz he's a good guy" or something like that. And the beep came sort of in the "trusting him is" portion. That would be sort of an, a natural way.

56:53 Gabriel: Okay.

56:53 RTH: And then, and other, and some other people would say that, that the beep came right at the end of the sentence. There's a lot...

57:01 Gabriel: Really! Even if it didn't!?

57:02 RTH: Even if... Well then we gotta keep track of what the physical beep is and the experiential beep. So for, I think, [Gabriel: Okay.] what, what I think is for quite a few people, that the, that the, the... The beep is not a physical event, *never*, for anybody. The beep is not a physical event. You hear the beep; that's the result of your psychological processing. It starts in the vibration of, well, it starts in the electronics of the beeper and then becomes the vibration of the earphone and then becomes the vi, vibration of your tympanic membrane or whatever the hell. And then the, y'know, the nerve processes and whatever. And eventually as the result of quite a bit of complex, complex neurological processing, you *hear a beep*.

57:43 Gabriel: Hmm.

57:44 RTH: And, and *some people* can process that beep, *do* process that beep, and can say, well, the beep happened in the word *him*. The word just the whole sentence was, "well, y'know, I, you should trust him because he's a good guy." But the beep came under him. Some people would say that.

58:02 Gabriel: Okay.

58:03 RTH: But other people *feel* like, *experience* the beep as coming at the end of a, at the end of a cognitive chunk, like I'm understanding the sentence. [Gabriel: Okay.] And then when, when my processing is done, understanding that sentence, then I hear a beep. And so the beep seems like it comes at the end of the sentence.

58:03 Russ comments: I think (although I have never made a formal study of it), there are more end-of-sentence people than there are mid-sentence people. But that might well be an artifact of the kind of sampling studies and populations that I use.

58:19 Gabriel: Hmm. I guess the, uh, I guess the question there is: Uh, are there, is there, does that happen in two different ways? Because I, that could either occur because they feel the beep came at the end of, um, that that could either be them postponing the beep in their experience. So like they process the whole sentence and then they process the beep even though the beep happened *during* the sentence. Or it could be that they're putting the beep earlier so they hear the beep and then they say it came before the sentence that the beep occurred during.

59:06 RTH: I think, I think, I think either, either one of those possible. I don't *know* the answer to that. I, I think it is in an interesting question. It is by far a more complicated question than I'm, than, than my investigations al, allow me to pursue. [Gabriel: Hmm.] Because, y'know, there's a lot of people think who, who, who for example, think that, well, there's words going on all the time. That's, *that* is pretty manifestly *not true*. But that, that's but then to, to wonder whether the word is coming *here* or two, or two words later, that's a pretty fine point by comparison [Gabriel: Right.] to whether there are words *at all*!

59:47 Gabriel: Okay.

59:49 RTH: But the the whole, the whole, no, the whole notion I think is sort of, of captured in the *Saturday Night Live* video about the headache, y'know. I think we could break, we could, we could analyze this concept of headache up into, up into a million different kinds of things, y'know: do, does do, do my eyes seem to track, does this seem like on the right side or on the left side? We can break that up and we can say, well, y'know, you gotta have 17 of these 25 before you can call it a headache or, or whatever. [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] And we can figure it out by sending a blood sample to a centrifuge and on out the, y'know, Merck Laboratories or whatever the hell it was. And, uh, but the, but the issue is for *most* people, they would say, I have a headache.

59:49 Russ comments: This is a reference to a conversation about a *Saturday Night Live* sketch discussion [see Gabriel's fifth sampling day at 23:00ff]. [In the sketch, the reference is to Lehman Myers, not to Merck.]

1:00:37 Gabriel: Okay.

1:00:38 RTH: And it doesn't, it doesn't require further analysis.

1:00:43 Gabriel: Right. And I do see how like an analyzing it further does, to some extent, seem to like lead away from it. Because I don't know if somebody would say that the experience of like 50 million different elements is the experience of a headache.

1:01:10 RTH: That's right. It's not.

1:01:12 Gabriel: Okay.

1:01:13 RTH: And, and so in, in this, in this situation right now, I could say I'm seeing a black thing in the bottom right hand corner, and then there's a yellow line, and then there's another yellow line, and then there's the letter B, and then there is the, a lowercase u and a lowercase case l, and a out of focus sort of at a two degree angle to the right. I could, we, I could say all those things together and eventually, after several thousand of those, I could say, oh, this guy's, he sees, he sees a Zoom window.

1:01:43 Gabriel: Mm-hmm.

1:01:46 RTH: When actually, experientially, the case is, well I'm seeing the Zoom window, or I'm seeing Gabriel talk in the Zoom window, or I'm, and those, those, those things are, I *think*, for most people, pretty much dramatic, pretty, pretty much *directly* present. [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] But *not* for everybody. And that is, and that is *vitaly interesting* to me. Cuz I don't wanna assume that everybody, everybody has experiential Gestalten in the same way that I do or the same way that I think most people do. I'm, I'm *delighted* to find somebody who, whose inner experience seems to go together in an unusual way. But what I *don't* want to do is to, is to have it be sort of an artifact of a descriptive bent.

- 1:02:38 Gabriel: Right. Okay. Yeah. That, that makes sense. Uh, and, and I do, I definitely, I, I feel like I'm beginning to more fully understand this idea when it comes to visual stuff. Um, uh, I I it's a, I'm still trying to apply it to the understanding to, um, non-visual as well.
- 1:03:23 RTH: [looks at his notes] Well, in the second beep today [sample 6.2] [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.], you said, I was hearing this guy in a southern accent saying "Monday night."
- 1:03:32 Gabriel: Right.
- 1:03:33 RTH: That was not visual, as I understood it. [Gabriel: Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm.] But I also gathered you to be quite confidently apprehending—that's what I was hearing. [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] it would've seemed weird to you, I'm guessing, if I had asked you back in, in, in that beep, "Well, did you hear "Mon" and then hear "day" and then hear "Ni," and then hear "ight." [Gabriel: Mm hmm. Right.] You'd say "No! I heard 'Monday night'!"
- 1:04:02 Gabriel: Yeah, yeah, yeah. That would've definitely been, uh, uh, yeah. Mm-hmm.
- 1:04:07 RTH: And, and it's true, in some sense, that you heard "mmm" and then you heard "Mun" and or "un" and then you heard "d" or whatever. That is true in some sense, but it's not true in the sense of your straightforward experiential [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] apprehension.
- 1:04:22 Gabriel: Right. Right. Okay. Uh, the, the, the implication of this... So the reason that there's a difference between the visual and the, um, uh, the... The reason that my understanding is harder for, uh, the non-visual stuff is because I feel like the implication, uh, has... You explained how the implica (this isn't the implication for visual stuff), but in this case, I feel like the implication is that I didn't actually have a verbal or, or an auditory experience if I didn't also experience *those things*. I just had the *sensa*, or the experience of *thinking* that I was experiencing them. But I remember what you said about the visual stuff, which is, um, uh, if you assume it, it's in... You said generally speaking, I think you said something like, uh, you can't, i, imagine that like visual experience is the same thing as a picture. Uh, and I definitely understand that. Like there will be parts of it that are not defined. Uh, and I guess that's true for auditory as well. So I think I do understand this, uh, I'm getting the hang of this. I'm, I'm, it's solidifying in my brain. So the auditory experience isn't something that you could put on a recording.

1:04:22 Russ comments: Gabriel is right, and the point is important. In the visual realm, the *experience* of seeing X does not require the experienced individual seeings of all the visual details ($x_1, x_2, x_3, \dots, x_n$) that constitute X . In the auditory (same for the speaking) realm, the experience of hearing Y does require the experienced individual hearing of all the auditory details ($y_1, y_2, y_3, \dots, y_n$) that constitute Y .

So, how did we get to Gabriel's saying "I'm getting the hang of this"? Recalling the discussion at 45:54, I think RTH honored Gabriel's role as co-investigator by engaging his analytical interest (2a) and engaging in some analysis. But, in my view, the most important part of this interchange is RTH's leading the conversation *away* from the abstractly analytical (*away* from the general [the way people generally are]),

away from the hypothetical [e.g., the Gettysburg Address example] and *toward* the concretely specific (first, looking at the Zoom screen that was currently ongoing before Gabriel's [and RTH's] eyes; then to the consideration of sample 6.2). It is one thing to say "*People might* do something in such-and-such hypothetical situation," and quite another thing to ask "Well, did you hear "Mon" and then hear "day" and then hear "Ni," and then hear "ight."

1:06:01 RTH: So the, the one of the fundamental, maybe a fundamental interest of interest of mine is whether this is a char, whether the difficulty that you have with this, with this auditory stuff, whether that's a characteristic of your experience, or a characteristic of the description of the experience, or a characteristic of a philosophical point of view that you have about experience. And, and, and, and I don't, I don't know the answer to that. I *would like* to know the answer to that.

1:06:42 Gabriel: What I can tell you, uh, what I can tell you is that, uh, ev even if it is an aspect of like some sort of philosophical quandary, um, that's not what it, it doesn't *feel* like that to me. Uh, it doesn't, in other words, it doesn't feel like I have an experience and I'm just doubting myself, or anything like that. I'm actually trying to, uh, as clearly as I can, report what was going, what was in my head. And it's not like I'm thinking, *oh, well, that can't have been what was in my head*. Um, or at least if that is the case, I don't know that's what I'm doing. So [laughs],

1:07:23 RTH: Whether, and, and that is the qu, that is the quandary. So, so, so are we talking about, and specifically here is the issue, she, whether I should say what was in my experience was "trusting him is," or whether I should say my experience is of a sentence, which included the words "trusting him is"? Is that the, the, where the rubber meets the road about

1:07:49 Gabriel: It is. And I am very tempted to say that I think maybe both of those were in my experience.

1:08:01 RTH: And would it also make sense to say that "tr" was in my experience, and "ust" was in my experience, and "ing" was in my experience, and "him" was, in my experience?

1:08:01 Russ comments: Notice that RTH's question is about a specific experience, not about Gabriel's experience in general or about people's experience in general. The relentless cleaving to specific experience is a feature of DES interviews. (Sometimes we stray, but those are the exceptions that prove the rule.) See the comment at 1:04:22.

1:08:14 Gabriel: It makes less sense, but I'm not sure if that's just because it seems more absurd. Or if it's because it's actually less accurate. But I, if I, if I was, if I was to put my, put money on it, I would say it does not. The, the second one does not make sense. That it does not make sense to say "tru" and "st" was in my experience, but it does make sense to say the word-chunk "trusting him is" was in my experience, and those words were as part of the sentence, were part, it was in my experience.

- 1:08:14 Russ comments: An overarching question in our sampling has been *What is experience?* The present conversation is part of the DES attempt to clarify that question, forcing (or at least encouraging) Gabriel to confront his own personal examples and try to discern what is and what is not experienced.
- 1:08:54 RTH: Okay. And then to make, to be, I, I guess I was a little more extremely absurd than I had to be. So how about just the word “is”?
- 1:09:08 Gabriel: Uh, I, I, *I think so*. I think that was in my experience. Um, I think each of those three words was in my experience.
- 1:09:23 RTH: So in my experience, in the, in the Gestalten of my experiences, I have the *word* “trusting,” and the *word* “him,” and the *word* “is,” and the *three-word chunk* “trusting him is,” and the *sentence* that had included those words (whatever that sentence was, which we’ve forgotten).
- 1:09:46 Gabriel: Uh, well, the sentence that ha, not the, the whole sentence. Because in my experience, uh, of when the *beep* occurred, the beep interrupted the sentence. Or at least that’s how I experienced the beep. [RTH: Okay.] Um, the, when I experienced the beep itself, that it was the beep interrupting a, a sentence. So the whole sentence wasn’t in my experience, uh, uh, it because the, it hadn’t even finished. Um, but I, I do think that e, each word was in my experience and the word-chunk “trusting him is” was in my experience as a, as a part of a sentence.
- 1:10:33 RTH: And then by that logic, is it also the case that in beep number 2, “Monday” was in my experience and “Niiight” was in my experience, and the two words together were in my experience? And, and by in my experience, I mean, I have made a Gestalt of this [inaudible].
- 1:11 Gabriel: Yes, I think so. I think so. I’m not sure if this is because I am, um, I’m not 100% sure that I’m not, uh, tricking myself here, but, uh, as best as I can say, I think they were both in my experience, both the words “Monday” and “night” and “Monday night.”
- 1:11 Russ comments: “Tricking myself here” is Gabriel’s way of saying that, as I would put it, there might be a presupposition operating here. Presuppositions are, in my view, mini or maxi delusions. It is not given to me (or to Gabriel!) to know whether Gabriel has or doesn’t have presuppositions that trick him—I am not a mind reader nor omniscient (and *Gabriel* can’t know, either: the nature of delusion requires not knowing that one is deluded). I have no right to try to talk Gabriel out of what I might suspect is a presupposition/delusion, and even if I tried, I would very likely be unsuccessful—clinicians know that it is a fool’s errand to try to talk someone out of a delusion.
- What I *can* do (and am doing/will do) is to try to encourage, in both Gabriel and me, a genuine interest in the way Gabriel’s experience really is. In my view, the only fair way to abrade any delusion is to give equal opportunities to the possibilities that Gabriel is right about his experience or that he is deluded about it, and to be genuinely interested in discovering which of those (or both or neither) is actually characteristic of his experience, with no *a priori* favoring one over the other. This is

always a going-forward, unfolding (iterative) process: it is too late to ameliorate whatever delusion might have been present in him and/or me at the time of sample 6.5. The best we can do is to encourage both of us to try to be in a more open/accepting/genuinely interested position when we get to sample 7.X or 8.Y.

This is the way I put it to Marco in Caracciolo and Hurlburt (2016, p. 128):

We are all deluded, but there is no omniscient being who can decide in what respects each of us is deluded. And so what? Where do we go from there? I don't know.

Neither did Socrates, as I understand him. What many call "Socratic irony" I think of as Socratic straightforwardness: when he said "I don't know," he meant, very simply and candidly, without a trace of irony, that he didn't know. That is, I think it was not the case, as is often meant by "Socratic irony," that Socrates was pretending ignorance as a means of eliciting some desired thought process from his interlocutor. He was simply ignorant, and he knew it and said it.

My take on where to go from here is to do more or less what (I think) Socrates did: try to figure out, with all the genuineness and sincerity we can muster, how to talk about things that are important, try to learn how to avoid saying things that are misleading or not true, in the hopes that tomorrow we will be better able to figure out what is important and more genuinely able to talk about those things and thus better able to avoid saying misleading or false things, in the hopes that the next day we will be better still. To try in that way, while perhaps difficult, is well within the human range of abilities. I don't know whether it is possible to attain the goal of perfection in knowing what is important and how to talk about it without misleading. As far as I can tell, Socrates didn't know that either, but that didn't stop him from trying. A foundational part of that trying is the recognition that at any given time on any given subject matter, one's view, which seems so obviously true as to be taken for granted, may be false (that is, I think, the heart of delusion). Therefore an important part of that trying probably has to involve enlisting others to attack the same subject matter from a different perspective. Such interlocutor-enlisted procedure provides no guarantees (shared delusion is obviously possible), but it can raise the stakes on particular details, thus providing the opportunity to refine the understanding of those details.

Viewers can decide for themselves the extent to which Gabriel's and my interchange enacts (or falls short of) that ideal.

1:11:28 RTH: [pause] So I, I think that's, I think that is a fundamentally interesting question (whether you're tricking yourself) and I, and, and I'm, I'm not in a position to, I, it's not like I'm pretending not to know the answer, but I really know the answer. [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] If I knew the answer, I would tell you. The [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] , I, I think it's a fundamentally interesting question. *For sure* those words occur auditorially separate in some physical sense. They're, they're not actually as separate as you as you might think, because if you ever really tried to look at the wave forms of words, the, the wave form or the second word is starting before the wave form,

form of the first word is done, if you [Gabriel: Hmm.] get really into the analysis of that. And that's, and that becomes evident if you're trying to learn a foreign language. The hardest part about learning a foreign language is, is figuring out where one word stops in the other words starts. [Gabriel: Hmm.] If somebody else is speaking in German to me (I speak a little German) what, what's hard is to, is to know which word, what, y'know, this sound was part of the last word or part of the next one. [Gabriel: Hmm.]

1:12:50 But *experientially*, like that's really the, that's really the question. [Gabriel: Right.] Do you really hear "Monday," do I hear "Monday" and then hear "night," or do I hear "Monday niight"? And there's a, there's, there's quite a bit of philosophical argument about it. Well, y'know, you, it can't be just one word. You can't just hear one word because, so there's a lot of words that are homophonic or whatever, ambiguous. And you can't, you can't tell what that word meant until you hear the rest of the sentence: *bear* and *bare*. And y'know, until you hear the end of the sentence, you didn't really know what the word *bear* was. But the, but the fact of the matter is if the beep comes on the word *bear*, and you might have had an ex, even an example of this, where the, if the word comes on the word *bear*, you *know* which one it means, even, even though that's not possible at the moment of the beep.

1:12:50 Russ comments: Here is an example of the point RTH is making here. Suppose you are in a conversation. Your interlocutor says, "If I set a trap in the woods, the <*beɪr*>...", where <*beɪr*> is a word that starts with *b* and rhymes with *dare* or *chair*. The sentence continues, but as that sentence unfolds in real time, you don't know whether the grunt <*beɪr*> should be understood as *bear* (as if the sentence would turn out to be "If I set a trap in the woods, the bear will figure out how to avoid it") or *bare* (as if the sentence were "If I set a trap in the woods, the bare minimum is that I will catch something."). Most people never have any quizzical presentiment such as *I wonder whether this sentence will go on with bare or bear?*

It might be an interesting experiment to contrive laboratory DES experiments which deliver beeps at such points of ambiguity. Those experiments have not been performed. My guess: for most people the beep would seem like it came at the end of the sentence; but for those whose beep seemed to come immediately after the word, the word would still not have any perceived ambiguity. That is, the processing of the beep really takes place over the course of a few fractions of a second, during which the ambiguity gets resolved.

1:13:40 Gabriel: Mm-hmm. Right.

1:13:43 RTH: And, and so the, the, the question, the question that, that I would like us to try to answer is: what does it, what is present in my experience? and, and divorce that away from what has to have be, ha, *has to be* the case because of the logic of the situation.

1:14:06 Gabriel: I am doing my best to do that. And I, I think that I, I do think that I am. Uh, it, like, again, if I had to put money on it, I would say I am divorcing it from what I think logically makes sense. Uh, especially since I think I am pretty convinced at this point of the idea of this being the case with visual stuff, because we, we had, I think it was

the meeting that got erased, um, but we did talk about this for, uh, a little bit and, uh, discussed how there could be like sort of undefined characteristics and visual experience. Um, and so I, I think I can accept that, um, and I think I can accept it for auditory stuff as well. So I don't think this is coming from a logical conclusion, like a, a logical deduction or something like that.

1:14:06 Comments: RE: "the meeting that got erased": This refers to Gabriel's sampling day 4, where I failed to press the *Record* button.

RE: "I would say I am divorcing it from what I think logically makes sense." That sentiment may be true, but it may be the manifestation of a delusion—an essential feature of delusion is that one believes it to be true. Because I'm not a mind reader or omniscient, I have to have a skeptical stance toward such claims, where I mean "skeptical" in its "suspended judgment" sense. (Skeptical is often taken to mean disbelieving; that is not how I intend it.) I hope/intend to create/maintain/foster a situation where, going forward, we take a credulous, unfoldingly more grounded stance toward Gabriel's experience.

1:15:10 RTH: [pause] So what I'm, I'm not a linguist, but what, what I, what I think is, is that people don't speak in words. It's, it's actually not true that people speak in words. [Gabriel: Hmm.] Because to say, well, people speak in words makes it seem like, well, there's one word and then there's another word, and then there's another one. And I don't think that's actually really true. And part of the reason I don't think that is from what I was just talking about, foreign languages are really one word running into the next. And it's not that there's one word and then another's another word. There's a, this grunt followed by that grunt, and this grunt is tapering off, and that grunt is, is beginning. And, and it's not the case that this is a word and that's a word. It's a, I'm in the process of communicating and I'm grunting at you. And, and the grunts are in *one* manner of speaking words, but in another manner of speaking, some, something more, more and something less, something less, less discretely definable.

1:16:18 Gabriel: Mm-hmm. [pause] That makes, I mean, that does make sense to me.

1:16:28 RTH: Um, and you, and, and one way to tell the difference is, is to listen to somebody who's acquired the language as, as an adult. Y'know, listen to a Chinese speaker who came to the United States and encountered English for the first time at, at age 15 or something like that. Their · words · are · very, they · definitely · do · speak · in · words [he articulates each word separately].

1:16:50 Gabriel: Mm-hmm.

1:16:52 RTH: Because they learn to speak in words. And I don't think, I don't think developmentally a native speaker doesn't learn to speak in words. I think they learn to grunt.

1:17:04 Gabriel: Hmm. Okay. And how does, and I'm not sure how this applies to, uh, I'm not sure what, how this applies to the discussion we're having about, um, I... How does this apply to the discussion we were just having? I'm having difficulty seeing the connection, but I, I can tell that it's there.

1:17:36 RTH: So I don't think the beep happens as a discrete thing. [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] I think the beep happens. It sounds, it *sounds* discrete, but it, but it, it really is smeared over some amount of time, maybe *quite a lot* of time for some people. I think actually for some people it's actually on the order of seconds, y'know, the, the process of hearing the, [snaps fingers] what seems like the rapid onset of the beep actually happens—if you could chart the neurology through their nervous system [inaudible] [Gabriel: Hmm.] at second or two to, for that to happen, I think. [Gabriel: Okay.] And, and I think the same thing is true in speaking. So when, when I'm speaking, I'm not just speaking this word, but I'm also *anticipating* speaking the next word. And not only am I anticipating speaking the next word, but I'm also anticipating speaking the word *after that*. [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] And so, and so the process of...

1:18:33 [continues] And, and what I'm *hearing* (when I'm listening to you speak, for example) I'm doing the same thing. I'm, I'm hearing the word that you're speaking now that is what *seems like* the word that you're speaking now, but that's colored by the words that's coming next. And I don't actually hear the word that you're speaking now, because in in the real world, I, I *never* have, I wonder whether he means *bear* or *bare*? But I never actually have that experience. I [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] *always* seems to me like I know exactly which word he means. [Gabriel: Right.] And that, and that *has* to mean that I'm folding my experience back, back in time, and I'm, I'm hearing things that are whose processing took place seconds, seconds later. [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] And, and so the, the, so when, when, when DES asks, *well, what was going on at the moment of the beep?* it might seem like a beep that's, there's a microsecond before the beep and a microsecond after the beep and the beep happens at this exact time. Well, I don't think that's actually true. It *seems* like that's true for many people (most people probably). *And* the *speaking* seems like it's this word, and then this word, and then this one; and that's not probably even true either. So the question is, what's happening in your *experience*?

1:19:50 [continues] And the experience is, well, I heard a beep and it was at the end of the sentence, or it was after this word. *Or* it was, or my, my experience could be one word, and then another word, and then another word, and then another word. And it may never seem to me like, I hear a whole sentence. But for somebody else, it's well, I, I hear a whole sentence and the beep came in the middle of the sentence, and obviously it wasn't in the middle of the sentence because there wasn't anything after the beep, *logically* speaking. [Gabriel: Right.] But, but actually it's a, it's a complicated [Gabriel: Yes.] construction. Every, everything is a constructed deal here. [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] There's a construction applying, applying the beep to the, to the other aspects of my experience is a construction. And, and, and we don't fully understand what that's, what that's about. But the, and I think the, the one of the primary reasons that we don't know it is that people haven't, haven't tried to at least find out, well, what, what, what, what does it *seem* like? What, let's carefully, carefully examine what does it, what, what *does* seem to be happening at the moment of the beep? We can start there. And if we knew the answer to that question, well then we would be in, in a position to say, well, y'know, the beep isn't really where you thought it was. The beep is before that or after that, or whatever. Those would be totally interesting questions to digest [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] and chew on.

1:21:24 Gabriel: Okay. Uh, yeah. Uh, so I mean, I, I accept it, I accept what you're saying. I, I think, uh, it does make, it does make sense to me. And, um, so I don't think I'm running into a logical problem when it comes to reporting here. Uh, uh, it's still possible that I am, and that like, somehow philosophically I'm getting myself into a quandary. But I *do*, I do feel like I get, uh, each word and I feel like I get the, uh, the, the whole sentence or, or the whole chunk in this case.

1:22:08 RTH: Well, as, as to whether you're getting stuff in a quandary, that, that, that is the notion of what I generally refer to as presuppositions. And I think that presuppositions are *wily* adversaries, [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] and they make you believe things that are, that are not true about yourself.

1:22:27 Gabriel: Okay.

1:22:28 RTH: And, and I also *think* sincerely that I'm not in a position to judge whether you have presuppositions or not.

1:22:28 Russ comments: See the comments at 1:11:00 and 1:14:06. The viewer/reader is now in a position to judge whether or to what extent RTH has lived up the ideals expressed there.

1:22:39 Gabriel: Mm-hmm. But I, I'm also, I do accept that I [laughs] they, I may have hiding presuppositions that are messing with my, uh, messing with my ability to figure this out here. And I do think that, uh, I, I, even though I *think* that I did each word and that's what I put my money on, um, I do think that I probably need to do maybe a few more, a few more beeps to figure it out for sure.

1:22:39 Russ comments: In my view, "*hiding* presuppositions" is absolutely redundant: all presuppositions are hiding. That's what makes them delusions. I'm not quibbling about words here; I am emphasizing that in the effort to abrade or bracket your presuppositions, you have to assume that they are invisible to you.

1:23:08 RTH: And, and I totally agree with that. And, and what I would say is that part of the reason that DES works in the way that it does (which is to say, multiple sessions across multiple times) is that I think, I think we need to have these conversations, [Gabriel: Hmm.] and there's no way to have these conversations except when, when they're of import. Gabriel: Hmm.] And so the conversation that we're having right now about "trusting him is," I think that's water over the dam—we're never gonna figure out what that experience was like. But it might help us next week. [Gabriel: Okay.] Whenever. And, and that's not a weakness of yours, and it's not a weakness of mine. It is that this is the way the process has to go. And very few people, if, if anybody other than us (well, maybe in in Eastern cultures, maybe), but, but in the, in western scientific cultures, there are very few people who are, who are engaged in this kind of task, which I think is the necessary task to answer the kind of questions we've got.

- 1:24:12 Gabriel: Okay. I, I'm curious if you ever, uh, is there, have you tried measuring how long the, uh, the beep is for people? Like how spread out it is?
- 1:24:24 RTH: I've never tried to measure it. [Gabriel: Okay.]I think that's, those are very complicated. I have written (in my early work about schizophrenia) that I think that individuals with schizophrenia might have several seconds of a delay [Gabriel: Hmm.] in how long it takes them to process some kind of visual processing. And I've, and I've got some, in that book, I think I have some examples of why I think that, y'know. But it, but if you stop and think about, uh, sort of the common delusions of, uh, the, that people who are del, deluded have, it's that like the, that they control the world, y'know. The, that kind of world-controlling delusion could come from just a timing deal. [Gabriel: Mm! Okay.] If I think about turning on the light switch and then I turn on the light switch, but the light seems to come on before I reach for the switch, and that's just a processing deal that my, my processor of, of the physical world is slower than my processing of the visual world, [Gabriel: Right!] it seems like I can thought-control the, [Gabriel: Okay.] the light. [Gabriel: Mm-hmm. And that can be, that could be, y'know, much of that could be a timing issue.
- 1:25:43 Gabriel: Okay. I, I, I, I remember an experiment that's somewhat similar to that where, um, every time, uh, like you click uh, a screen turns, uh, orange with a slight delay or something like that, and then you, you, you have somebody continuously do that and then eventually you take away the delay and then they start feeling like the orange happens *before* they click. Where, so it seems it's kind of like timing getting messed up.
- 1:26:13 RTH: I, I do think, I do think timing can get messed up. [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] And I think, I think that's a totally interesting kind of a thing. So for example, I, when I make transcripts of the, of the interviews like we're doing here, which I do [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] a lot, I, I will very often play those transcripts at, at not normal speed. I'll play them at 1.3 times as fast or whatever, cuz it takes, y'know, 70% less time to do it or whatever. [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] And sometimes I play them at a slow speed if I wanna try to get the words right or whatever, I play 'em at 70% speed. And if I do that long enough, eventually it seems like that a normal speed. [Gabriel: Hmm.] So timing, I, I, and... And then I go back to 100% speed and it seems really weird. [Gabriel: Hmm.] But if, y'know, if you were to walk in on me while I'm listening to it, while I'm listening to an interview or what, at 130%, you'd say, well, how can he possibly be paying attention to that? [Gabriel: (laughs)] Seems like, seems like normal.
- 1:27:22 [continues] And I would say, and we're sort of on an aside, on an aside here, but the, and I, I have created a series of what I call lectlets, miniature lectures for my statistics class. And so people tune in into those. And I've given them control over how, how fast they can listen to my voice, basically, talking to them. [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] The reason that I did that was that a guy, back, a student said to me, "Y'know, if, if you could, if, if you talked faster, I could, it would be easier for me. I'm a little hyper kind of a guy and talk fa, if you could talk faster, I would comprehend better." [Gabriel: Hmm.] And I said, "Well, I don't know whether that's true or not, but I can make myself talk faster." [Gabriel: (laughs)] So I put a control on, on, on the playback deal so people can make me talk faster, make me talk slower, and whatever works for

them, I don't really know or care actually, but whatever works. (I do care), but, but, but I don't need to figure out for you whether it works. You, you can play around with it and [Gabriel: Right.] see what works for you for whatever reason.

1:28:39 [continues] But the, the bottom, the, the bottom line is the *Saturday Night, Saturday Night Live* sketch is, is: Is it the case that there is a Gestalt about a headache? Or a Gestalt about a visual experience? Or a Gestalt about a about a verbal exchange? And if so, what is it? And do we, do we get it? Do we, do I end up having that Gestalt or do I have to break it down? And do I break it down and, and somehow compute the Gestalt later on? [Gabriel: Right.] And, and I definitely *don't* wanna talk you into it and have you, y'know, "well, I guess I'll try to make him happy. I'll, I'll report that I hear a whole sentence—that seems what he wants to hear me say. So I'll just say that." That would be the worst possible outcome [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] for me.

1:29:39 [continues] I am interested. So I, I've sampled with, with a fair number of professional philosopher types. And it's quite frustrating for me to do that because they seem to claim that they got no experience, or they don't know what the hell I'm asking or, or they're off on some kind of a tangent and I can't bring 'em back to what I think experience is. And I would like to know why that is, in a... I would *genuinely* like to know why that is. [Gabriel: Hmm.] Y'know, so I'm, I'm too dense to be able to follow a really good philosopher. A lot of 'em seem to think that, and that might be true. And... Or do, or do they not have inner experience of the kind that I imagine most people have? I don't know. And, and, um, I think that...

1:30:34 Gabriel: ...that philosophy just melted their brains [laughs].

1:30:38 RTH: Well, I, I think it's, I think it's possible that, uh, that their philosophical position is more important to them than the, the actualities of their own phenomena. [Gabriel: Um hmm.] And if that's the case, then paying attention to the actua.... And, and if the actualities of their own phenomenon contradict their philosophical position, well then something's gotta give. And it's either the philoso, philosophical position or the actualities of their experience. [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] And, uh, and to the extent that the philosophical position is important to them, then experience goes out the window. [Gabriel: Hmm.] I think that's *possible*. And I also think it's possible that their experience is substantially different from [pause] something, or their experience.... I shouldn't say *different from*, I should say their experience is in such a way that it, it informs the substrate of whatever their philosophical position is.

1:31:39 Gabriel: Um hmm. Yeah, that's definitely possible as well. Uh, do you think it's possible that, uh, I don't know. I mean, I guess it's probably possible, but I would imagine it's unlikely. But what if, uh, what if like being exposed to certain philosophical [laughs] idea eventually molds your experience to fit it?

1:32:05 RTH: I, I *do* think that's true.

1:32:07 Gabriel: What was that?

1:32:08 RTH: I think that's true.

1:32:09 Gabriel: Okay.

1:32:15 RTH: And not just any philosophical position, but any, any, anything. I think, I think your experience is altered.

1:32:23 Gabriel: Okay. Well this, this has definitely given me a lot to think about. Um, is it, is it possible that, uh, like I could get a, uh, the recording of this by any chance? Because I might want to go over it again.

1:32:38 RTH: Sure.

1:32:40 Gabriel: Okay. Thank you.

1:32:42 RTH: And you want all the recordings or just this one?

1:32:44 Gabriel: Uh, just this one for now.

1:32:49 RTH: Okay.

1:32:50 Gabriel: Thank you.

1:32:51 RTH: It's takes me an hour, probably, to do it. It takes, it takes Zoom about an hour to make a video.

1:32:57 Gabriel: Ah, okay. No worries.

1:32:59 RTH: So I will, I will send it to you.