

TRANSCRIPT WITH COMMENTARY
Gabriel H.: A college senior interested in philosophy
Gabriel Interview 5

Below in black is a word-for-word transcript of the January 3 interview with Gabriel that is available on YouTube at <https://youtu.be/MRxK9MRWgco>. In green are comments about and explanations of the Descriptive Experience Sampling process. If you have corrections, suggestions, or questions, please post them as YouTube comments.

RTH = Russ Hurlburt

AG = Amber Goto

Gabriel = Gabriel H.

0:02 RTH: So this is going to be your fourth try?

0:08 AG: I think today's number 5.

0:09 RTH: Is it?

0:11 AG: Yes.

0:12 Gabriel: Okay. I guess is what, yeah. Five sounds right to me.

0:14 RTH: I think that's right. It's number 4 that I screwed up in the recording. So it's, so as far as recordings go, this will be number 5.

0:23 Gabriel: Okay.

0:24 RTH: And anything we should be talking about before we, before we launch into it?

0:32 Gabriel: Um, I don't have anything, uh, any questions specifically.

0:37 AG: Okay. And when did you wear the beeper?

0:41 Gabriel: Uh, so I wore the beep, uh, the beeper for three beeps last night and three beeps this morning.

0:49 AG: Okay.

0:54 RTH: Okay. Amber, you wanna do it? You, me, you, me? Or me, you, me, you? How would you...".

0:59 AG: Like me? Um, I think you should start.

1:01 RTH: Okay then.

1:04 Gabriel: Okay.

1:05 RTH: Beep number 1.

SAMPLE 5.1 DISCUSSION STARTS HERE

1:06 Gabriel: Beep number 1. Alright. So for context, I was listening to a video on my phone. Uh, and what was in my experience at that moment were the words “like that?” in like a question, like a sarcastic question, um, which was a voice from that I was listening to in the video. And I also heard the, the sound of fire or flames, um, because that was in the video, that was also in my experience. And, uh, visually, uh, I was sort of attending to some wooden crates that were in the video.

1:46 [continues] Um, so tho, those were basically the three main things that were in my experience at that moment. And also, uh, the voice was, uh, the voice of a resistance fighter. So basically the video was of a video game where you’re fighting against an evil empire. And, uh, so the voice to me was, I was familiar with the voice. So the voice was, when I was hearing it, the voice of a resistance fighter. It wasn’t the voice of, it wasn’t just a random voice, it was specifically the voice of sort of a resistance fighter. And in this instance, it was sort of a, there is sort of a righteousness and folksiness to it.

2:30 RTH: So sarcastic *and* righteous.

2:33 Gabriel: Mm-hmm.

2:35 RTH: And virtuous? Is that, is that what you said?

2:38 Gabriel: Uh, righteous and folksy. Yeah.

2:41 RTH: Folksy!

2:42 Gabriel: Yeah. And also it was sort of, there was like sort of a sense of, uh, sha like, *shame on you* in the voice as well. And the, that was all part of my experience of the voice.

2:57 RTH: Okay. Well, let’s start there. So the, are you describing the characteristic of the voice? That is to say the voice was sarcastic and righteous and folksy and shame on you? Or are you describing, I’m noticing the sarcastic-ness, righteousness, folksi-ness, shame-on-you-ness characteristics of the voice?

3:18 Gabriel: The, uh, oh, what, what’s the distinction there? Uh,

3:22 RTH: The distinction. The distinction is whether you, so, so for example, in the third part of the, the last part of this beep, you, you said you were visually attending to the wooden crate. [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] And I have presumed that there’s other stuff on the screen other than the crate. But for whatever reason, you’re sort of zoomed in on the crate.

3:38 Gabriel: Right?

- 3:40 RTH: So my question about the *first* part of the beep is, so I hear the voice, and am I focused in on the sarcastic, righteous, folksy shame-on-you characteristic of the voice? Or am I just hearing the voice? And now you guys ask for its characteristics? [Gabriel: Right, Okay.] It's characteristics are, it's sarcastic and...
- 3:59 Gabriel: So, um, I wasn't focusing on that specifically. That was something that came with the voice without me having to think about it. Um, the sarcastic part of the voice, by the way, was actually part of the way he was speaking. Whereas most of those other aspects were things that I associate with the voice because I'm familiar with the character.
- 4:26 RTH: So the righteousness, folksiness, shame-on-you characteristic is the way he *usually* is. And sarcastic is the way he was at this particular time.
- 4:37 Gabriel: The, the shame-on-you was also part of this particular time. But, uh, yes. The, the folksiness and righteousness, those were the way it usually is.
- 4:47 RTH: Okay. So just to make sure I'm understanding, *none* of those were *thematically* present to you, like I'm noticing particularly the sarcasm or the folksiness or whatever. I'm just,
- 5:00 Gabriel: Do you mean like I wasn't particularly attending to it?
- 5:09 RTH: I mean, I am not, I don't know how to say it other than I'm, I'm not making a, I'm not making a thing out of this, out of this aspect. I'm not,
- 5:09 Russ comments: I don't like the word "attending" because it implies a Cartesian-type duality—that the sarcasm and the folksiness are strands of reality that can be attended to (or not). I don't think that is the way the world is; I think it is better to acknowledge the sarcasm and folksiness are at least partially a creation of Gabriel imposed on his world. But here, it might have been better for RTH just to answer "Yes."
- 5:24 Gabriel: I would, yeah, I would say I, I wasn't like specifically zooming in on those things or, um, reflecting on them.
- 5:35 RTH: The difference is like if you're, if you're looking at me, I presume you, you, you're seeing me and, and the, and as fact in the universe, I'm wearing a blue shirt. [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] But, and it's *possible* for you to be interested (for whatever reason) in the blueness of my shirt. Or it's a fact of the universe that my shirt is blue, and it's falling on your retina (the blueness is falling on your retina), [Gabriel: Right.] but you, you haven't made a theme or a thing or whatever of the blueness of my shirt. Either you have or you haven't.
- 6:02 Gabriel: Right. Yeah.

- 6:03 RTH: And so that's the distinction that I'm trying to get at with, with respect to the sarcasm and the righteousness.
- 6:03 Russ comments: It may seem that for the next 34 minutes, RTH continues to ask questions about the past—about Gabriel's experience at last-night's beep. However, from RTH's point of view, the questioning has transitioned away from being about the *past* to being about the *future*: his object will be to have discussions that may be useful in some future day's sampling and interviews thereon. This is the iterative process at work: making distinctions that are directly grounded in Gabriel's own experience, clarifying how we communicate with each other on Gabriel's own terms.
- 6:10 Gabriel: Okay. Uh, yeah. That's a good, that's a good question. Um, I suppose I'm not sure. Because, um, I think it's possible, uh, even if I'm not like, actively reflecting on something, uh, for it to be in my conscious experience, like I don't have to be necessarily thinking or reasoning about something for it to be in my conscious experience. Would, would, uh, would you agree with that?
- 6:45 RTH: Ab, Absolutely.
- 6:46 Gabriel: Okay. But the other thing is, um,
- 6:54 RTH: So let, let me withdraw my *Absolutely*, and explain what I mean by that. [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] So what, what I think is the inner experience is a skill. Attending to things in the environment is a skill. And, and I think that you as an organism are attending to a, a huge number of things in some manner, in some manner. So when, when you're looking at me, you're taken into, you're taking into account in some way that my shirt is blue. I'm not wearing *no* shirt, for example. [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] He's, he's wearing *a* shirt, he's not naked! And, and there's, y'know, a gold thing in the background, which maybe you were looking at, or maybe you're not, and Indian blanket and whatever. You, all those things are somehow impacting you.
- 7:35 Gabriel: Right.
- 7:36 RTH: The, and so I'm, I'm accepting those as being part of your conscious experience in some broad manner of speaking.
- 7:44 Gabriel: Okay.
- 7:45 RTH: The question is whether you, well, you, you, it *could be* that your experience is: I'm actually seeing all those things. I am focused equally on the *blueness* of your shirt and on the *goldness* of the, the, the thing up, up, up here and on, on the picture that's behind me.
- 8:04 Gabriel: Okay.
- 8:05 RTH: But that most people aren't like that. *You* might *be*, but most, most people, when they're thinking of... when I'm speaking, you're thinking about what I'm saying,

rather than the color of my shirt or the color of the screen. [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] It's impacting you in some way.

8:19 Gabriel: Right. Okay. That makes, that does make sense. Uh, and I, I definitely like, agree with that. However, I do struggle when it comes to determining which of the, like what level or, or I guess how many dimensions of conscious experience something is taking up, uh, when I think back on it.

And I think, I do have a question, uh, (and this might help me understand, uh, or at least get to the bottom of this, I'd be able to answer it more efficiently), which is, um, when we determine, when we like at the beep write down what was in our conscious experience. Since it was, it's at the moment of the beep, uh, and we're, we're talking about what was exactly preceding the beep, by definition we're *recalling* what was in our conscious experience, even if it was just like a short amount of time afterwards. Right?

9:11 RTH: Absolutely.

9:12 Gabriel: Okay. So I think then there are two options that I can tell for what it means to then recall what was in our conscious experience: either (1) somehow memory, somehow the elements that were in our conscious experience are like tagged in memory as *this was conscious* and *this wasn't*. Or [(2)] we have to somehow use cues to infer what was in our conscious experience. Which one of those do you think is correct? Or maybe I, there's other options that I'm missing.

9:12 Russ comments: I think this kind of analysis—the comparison of one abstraction to another abstraction—is not likely to be productive, because it leads *away* from directly apprehended experience rather than *towards* it. Here at sample 5.1, for example, at sample 5.1, Gabriel's directly apprehended experience involves (in part) hearing "like that." His directly apprehended experience does *not* include constructs such as *memory*, *tags* or *cues*. Any time we spend discussing memory, tags, or cues will at best distract us from investigating and describing aspects such as hearing "like that," and (worse) might provoke a confusion between what is conceptual and what is directly apprehended.

RTH's task is to help Gabriel keep oriented toward his own directly apprehended experience—to describe (among other aspects) with fidelity how hearing "like that" presented itself (including keeping open the possibility that hearing "like that" was *not* directly apprehended at the moment of the beep).

Memory or *tags* or *cues* and other abstract, inferred constructs may well be useful in some situations, but they have nothing to do with sample 5.1's directly apprehended experience.

9:53 RTH: So I'm, I'm, I don't think I'm willing to endorse either one of those.

9:57 Gabriel: Okay.

9:58 RTH: What, what I would say is that *many* people, I would say probably *most* people (but y'know, I haven't, I don't have a random sample of everybody. So I, I, I would say a lot, most of the people that I've sampled with, let's put this way), know the

difference between what was directly in the experience. It's a *recollection*, right after the beep, they're *recalling* it. [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] So the beep happens, and they're looking back a half a second to what was, to what was going on with them. Most of, most people are (after the second or third day), they're pretty confident in saying, well, this, this aspect of my experience, out of the welter of things which were *possibly* there, I was, I was involved with *these* and not with *those*.

10:45 Gabriel: Okay.

10:46 RTH: But that doesn't necessarily mean that's the case for *you* [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] and it, and it doesn't even mean that it's the case for them. It means that they're, they, they seem compelling to them. [Gabriel: Right.] And, and I haven't been able to figure out a reason, not, not to credit those reports. [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] So I don't think it's, I don't think it's the fact that there's something that's *tagged*, this is consciousness—tagged; this is *not* consciousness. So I don't, I don't think that's probably true.

11:11 Gabriel: Okay.

11:12 RTH: And *yet*, mo, mo, most people know the difference between what is in consciousness and what is not.

11:22 Gabriel: Okay.

11:23 RTH: And so, and so in, in my example, mo mostly if the beep came while they were looking at me, they would be able to say, well, for whatever reason I was interested in the blue of your shirt. I don't know why that was, maybe. Maybe, maybe it was because I liked the particular stripe pattern and it reminds me of a shirt. I could make up a story about why I'm interested in that. But most people would say, for whatever reason, (you don't care about the reason, so I won't tell you about the reason), but for whatever reason I was interested in the blueness of your shirt. And I *wasn't* particularly at that particular moment interested in the gold of the picture behind you, or even in what you were saying, because I was more interested in your shirt. [Gabriel: Hmm.] A lot of people talk like that.

11:23 Russ comments: The viewers can decide for themselves whether RTH is being too demanding.

12:02 Gabriel: Right. Okay. And that, I guess what I'm wondering is where they get that information. Assuming they're correct, where would they be? Like, how do they get that information?

12:20 RTH: So (A) that's a fundamentally important question. (B) I have no idea the *answer* to that question.

12:26 Gabriel: Okay.

12:27 RTH: (C) I think I'm, I'm, I'm not dismissing that question as being unimportant by any means. [Gabriel: Right.] But the, the question that I would have for *you* is *whether*

you have that information, regardless of *why* you have it or *how* you have it, which requires some theory of consciousness, I think, [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] that says, well, this is how consciousness works. The question, regardless of, regardless of whether there is a good theory of consciousness (which I'm not taking a position on that), the question is whether for *you*, when there is a beep, I am more involved in Hurlburt's shirt than I am in the fact that he's wearing black glasses or whatever other, he's got a red spot on his upper lip, or whatever. You could be, you could be zoomed on that. [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] You could be, and the question is whether you, whether this process makes that happen for you.

- 12:27 Russ comments: Broadly speaking, when interrupted by the beep, I want Gabriel to apprehend what had been directly present to him when interrupted by the beep. I *don't* want Gabriel, immediately after the beep, to engage in some analytical / theoretical consideration about what constitutes consciousness, how consciousness works, and so on. Such analyses have their place, and I don't particularly want to discourage Gabriel from such considerations in general. But if Gabriel engages in them *immediately after the beep*, I fear he will distract himself from apprehending what had been present immediately before the beep. There is only one best opportunity to grasp what had been ongoing at the moment interrupted by the beep, and that is immediately when interrupted by the beep.
- 13:29 Gabriel: Okay. Okay. Okay. Uh, yeah, uh, that makes sense. Ba, basically, I would say, like, I just, I, I feel like the conclusion of this is I just have to, y'know, uh, do my best to, to, uh, which I'll, yeah, I'll, I will attempt to do. Um, and my best for this particular beep is that those, the sound of the fire and like the, the aspects of the voice, um, okay. Sorry. The aspects of the voice we were talking about, I wasn't particularly reflecting on them, but they were still like, happening to me in my conscious experience. Like they, they were there to some extent, it feels like maybe to a, in a small way, I was reflecting on all of them. Um, but yeah, that, that's, I, I feel like that's the best I can say about that particular beep.
- 14:35 RTH: So lemme see if I understand what you're saying. [Gabriel: Okay.] About the, about the voice: I am attending to the voice. It's more or less central to my experience. [Gabriel: Mm hmm.] And the voice has these characteristics: righteousness, folksiness, or whatever.
- 14:49 Gabriel: Right.
- 14:50 RTH: And whereas I'm not *particularly* noticing, *well, that's folksy* or *that's conscientious*, [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] *that's, that's righteous*, whatever, that it's no doubt influencing me in some way. And, and it *is in fact* the characteristic of the voice that I hear.
- 15:08 Gabriel: Right.
- 15:09 RTH: Except...
- 15:09 Gabriel: The whole is the voice, then. That, that's what's what is like the main aspect. It's the, the, the voice. [RTH: Okay.] But those are like *parts* of the voice.

- 15:27 RTH: Um, another way of looking at this is, I'm, I'm guessing if we were linguists, we could identify some characteristics of the voice. Well, there's a glottal stop and there's a whatever. [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] Sure. But was no doubt taking place in that voice. [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] And so you could have listed those off, too. These are voices. This is, this is voices that has, y'know, three glottal stops, two, whatever. I don't, I'm not a linguist. But, and you didn't do that. And so I would say that it's likely that that, that, those aspects of the voice [Gabriel: Right.] presentation were not as prominent to you as (A) that there was, I was hearing the voice [Gabriel: Yeah.] and (B) well, it had these characteristics.
- 16:08 Gabriel: Right. Well, also, when it comes to the characteristics, uh, I suppose what I maybe say, calling them characteristics isn't the best way of putting it. I feel like they were more emotions that I was feeling as a result of the voice, but those emotions were, in my experience, a part of the voice. So I, I wouldn't say that they were sort of characteristics of the voice, but they were definitely like, like feelings that were present. And I suppose it's, it's possible that they weren't part of my conscious experience, uh, in like, uh, but they were rather just like parts that are lesser than the whole, um, if that's a good way of putting it. But if that was the case, I don't know how to know that, right now. This is one of the things that I've struggled with a few times in these samples, and I feel like I am getting better at it. But this one, I don't know.
- 17:37 RTH: [pause] So, if it was a feeling that was present to you, it wouldn't nec, necessarily, or even *likely* be a feeling that was present in the voice. So, for example, you said that the voice was righteous. It's more likely, it would seem, that if the voice was righteous, the feeling that would arise with you would be something along that, *that that guy's an asshole*, rather than a feeling of righteousness.
- 18:01 Gabriel: Mm-hmm. Right. Well, I suppose so. I, I think that actually probably *is* accurate. Like, I, I pro I think I, I felt like the guy was a jerk. Um, and I'm calling that righteousness, because that's what it, well, that's what it came from.
- 18:33 RTH: So I, if you had said "I was watching this show and arising in me was a sense of *what a jerk!*" [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] I would've been happy with that, that that would've been fine with me. That isn't what you said. And, and I'm not, and I don't wanna hold you to what you said, because I think people, I, I think these, these things are all like drafts. What, what you said first is like a first draft, and then we're gonna either discard that, or revise it, or improve it, or throw it out, [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] whatever we're gonna do with, with whenever we write a first draft. And it could be that, it could be that it would be better to have said about your experience at the moment of the beep, "Well, I was feeling like this guy was a jerk." And actually the words that he was saying, which were "like what?" or "like that," or whatever it was, [Gabriel: Right.] that wasn't really a part of my experience at all. What was in my experience was *this guy's a jerk*.
- 19:30 Gabriel: Hmm. I think the words *were* a part of my experience, though.

19:40 RTH: So I, I, I think we've probably, one, one of the, one of the characteristics is the, the more we talk about it, the, the diff the more difficult it gets to be. And, [Gabriel: Right.] and the, and the problem with that is, is about retrospection, so, [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] so the more we talk about it in retrospection, the less likely we are to be able to get at it [inaudible]. [Gabriel: Right.] So I'm, I'm willing to, I'm willing to give up on that, this beep (shouldn't say that), move on from this beep, except the, except to say one thing: you, uh, the, the *main* characteristics of the beep seems to have been auditory. What I was *hearing*. I was *hearing* the words, I was *hearing* the flames, I was *hearing* the characteristics of the voice.

20:26 Gabriel: Um hmm.

20:27 RTH: And *then* you said, well, I was visually seeing the crate. And I was worried at the time that you were saying that, that, that you felt some kind of a need to be complete in my description: and my eyes were opened and this was what... [Gabriel: Okay.] And, and so the question is, if you were zoomed in on the crate, if, if you were visually more interested in the crate than in whatever else was on the screen, then that would be part of your experience. But, but the, but it's possible that you, your eyes can be open and aimed at something and seeing it or whatever, and just not experiencing it at all.

20:27 Russ comments: Recalling that this entire conversation is more about *tomorrow* than about *yesterday* (that is, is more iterative training than data collection; see the comment at 6:03), RTH's 19:40—20:27 turns (actually, the entire conversation) illustrate the complexity of the iterative method: RTH is trying to convey that there is a frequent presupposition (if my eyes are open, I must be seeing) in the vicinity; that to the extent that presuppositions was operating, Gabriel may have been mistaken about aspects of his original account (but that presupposition may *not* have been operating, in which case Gabriel may have been correct); that RTH doesn't really care about whether he was mistaken or correct—that the object is to become more efficient *when we sample in the future*; and to convey all that without a hint of disapproval.

21:01 Gabriel: Okay. Uh, I understand that concern because, y'know, I worry about that myself when I'm writing these things down. I do think that was in my vi, uh, visual experience. And, uh, there, I mean, I guess there are a few cues that tell me that, like, as well, uh, which like reinforces, uh, for me, which is particularly that, um, I remember before that instance wondering what the thing he was standing on was. That wasn't in my experience at the time of the beep, uh, but what he was standing on was a crate. So there is some evidence there that I *would be* focusing on the crate visually anyway. Um, of course that has not, I can't, y'know, I'm not supposed to be drawing *inferences* of what was in my experience. I'm just saying that I, I trust that that was in my visual experience, and I'm not just tricking myself. I think I really was. And, um, that was sort of an action for me. Like I was actively kind of looking at the crate. Um, whereas these other sounds and stuff, I was sort of perceiving them and feeling them without actively *trying* to, if that makes sense. Uh, but they were, they were sort of happening to me.

- 21:01 Russ comments: Gabriel is right, he's not supposed to draw inferences. Any tendency to draw inferences works against the ability to apprehend, and we will have to sort through that.
- 22:28 RTH: [pause] So the task is to report what is ongoing in your experience. [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] And maybe that's may, maybe this, maybe the process doesn't work for you, for whatever reason. And I, I, there's no judgment in involved this, y'know. Maybe the beeper is, doesn't solve your, this issue for you, or, or whatever. So I'm, I'm more interested in, in the difficulty.
- 22:28 Russ comments: RTH emphasizes that he is interested in the genuine outcome of the process without making assumptions or coercing Gabriel into pretending something about the outcome. If there is something about Gabriel's experience that makes responding to the beep difficult, then RTH would like to explore that.
- 22:57 Gabriel: Okay.
- 23:00 RTH: But the, the question is basically what's in your experience. There, there was a, a *Saturday Night Live* skit, sketch, some number of years ago about a... Are you a *Saturday Night Live* fan?
- 23:13 Gabriel: I've, I've watched it a few times. I wouldn't say I'm necessarily a big fan, but I've liked some of it.
- 23:17 RTH: Okay. And I'm not a big fan either, but I watch it from time to time. But there was a sketch a while back about a, a headache meter, and the couple is on the screen and a and the, and the woman is saying, "well, y'know, I, I, I feel like a headache." And [her partner says,] "well, let's, let's, well, let's take a blood sample and we'll run it through a centrifuge and whatever, and we'll find out whether you have a headache." And, and they do that. And then it comes back, no, you don't have a headache. "Oh, what a relief! I don't have a headache!" The, the joke of that is that the difference, it's the difference between experience and some objective [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] explanation of, of experience. And that's basically I think what we're, what we're, what we're trying to figure out here. So whether, whether you need a headache meter or whatever, whether, whether everybody needs a headache meter to decide whether they have headache. And...
- 23:17 Russ comments: Later that day, RTH sent Gabriel this email:
Here's the *Saturday Night Live* sketch I mentioned as a partial answer to your "How do you know what is in inner experience?" question.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9bKgsR_9qa4
It is an important question, which makes it worthy of both serious consideration and humor.
- 24:14 Gabriel: Yeah. I, okay. That's kind of funny. That's a funny, uh, [inaudible]. I, I see what you're saying. I, I *think* I see what you're saying. Uh, I is it, is that mostly in response to this idea of like I was using as evidence of visual, the visual experience, the fact that I had this reasoning going on beforehand?

24:35 RTH: [tentatively] No. [Gabriel: Okay.] I would say it was, it's about sort of the whole difficulty. [Gabriel: Okay.] You're, you are asking, I, I understand you to be asking *how am I to know what's in my experience?* And there's a philosophical answer to that question. Well, there's a philosophical, uh, theory of consciousness that says things are tagged, or higher order, or whatever. [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] And those are perfectly fine explanations. But the, but the question is whether you *need* such an explanation in order to immediately in, in your experience, be able to say, I'm [inaudible].

25:10 Gabriel: Right. Well, I, okay. I would rephrase it slightly, for me, at least. My difficulty is not, how am I supposed to know what *is in* my conscious experience. My difficulty is how am I supposed to know what *was in* my conscious experience? Um, I feel like that's a different question.

25:10 Russ comments: I am not eager to answer this question, because any attempt to answer such analytical questions inevitably leads *away* from directly apprehended experience.

25:38 RTH: [pause] Well, I, I'm, I'm, I'd be happy to debate that with you too, cuz I've, I've wondered about that myself because it seems like every, there is *nothing* that's *in* your experience that *wasn't* in your experience. If it *is* in my experience n, n, n, now and, and one microsecond from now, it certainly *was* in my experience (or it wasn't). But if I can't be sure about it one microsecond later, then how am I ever gonna be sure of it, even in the moment? I don't know.

26:07 Gabriel: Right. Exactly.

26:11 RTH: And so the, so that, that seems like a sort of an artificial distinction, because I think short-term memory and, and our whole nervous system is designed to sort of smear o, over the moment. We know there isn't really such a thing as a moment. There's, y'know, there's shorter times and longer times. And...

26:29 Gabriel: That's a good point. I think if experience, like conscious experience, did what didn't exist like in the instant as well though, uh, then it, and it was spread over time, then that would sort of, I, I, uh, my instinct is that it would render it epiphenomenal. Because how could it be causal if it was spread over multiple moments to, and to exist, to add, to exist in multiple moments at once. At that point, it exists sort of outside of time rather than inside of it.

26:29 Russ comments: Whether consciousness is epiphenomenal is an abstract analytical question, not an aspect of directly apprehended experience. Therefore DES does *not* inquire about whether something is epiphenomenal or causal. It asks only whether it is apprehended.

Perhaps if or when science appreciates well what are and are not directly apprehended phenomena, it will be appropriate to ask (and theorize) about whether or in what way inner experience is causal. But that is some years down the road.

- 27:13 RTH: So I think, I think you're pointing out, uh, a char, a fundamental characteristic of the DES method that we're, that we're using. And I, I write about the DES method as if I was interested in what was in your experience *caught in flight* by the beep. [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] I say that frequently. But, uh, that's not actually really true. What I really care about is what is... Well, I really, I *do* really care about what is caught in flight by the moment of the beep, if that exists, but I don't know whether it exists. [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] But I think it, I think it exists, but I, but that's a theory; I don't really know. What I'm *really* asking about is what ineluctably or uncontrovertibly or whatever *seems like* it was in your experience at the moment of the beep when you reflect back, a tenth of a second later.
- 28:08 Gabriel: Right.
- 28:10 RTH: And I recognize that you, that that it could very well be that you, that you make up the whole thing. That there was absolutely nothing in my experience at the moment of the beep. I hear the beep and I have to quickly manufacture something. And so I say, well, I was interested in the blue, blueness of the shirt.
- 28:27 Gabriel: Mm-hmm.
- 28:31 RTH: Now most people would say that isn't the way it is. I was interested in the blueness of the shirt before, before the beep happened and that that was caught in flight by it. And I recognize that they might very well be deluded about that, because there's no way that, there's no way that you can determine that delusion, I think, whether you can decide whether that was really true or not. Maybe you did make it up. The question is, I think the best we can do is to get at *what it seems like we're not making up*. It seems like this is what was going on at the moment of the beep.
- 29:06 Gabriel: Right.
- 29:08 RTH: And *seems* not by *inference* and not by *theory*, but by the difference between a headache and a headache meter. [Gabriel: Hmm.] I, I had a headache, I felt pain in my head and I don't think I made it up just because I got this beep. Oh, all of a sudden I got a pain in my head that I didn't know it was there before. That's... So I think, I think that's what we're really looking for.
- 29:35 Gabriel: Okay.
- 29:37 RTH: And, and that sidesteps most of the important questions of the philosophy of consciousness, I think. [Gabriel: Okay.] Cuz I, and I think the reason for that is I don't know how to answer those questions. I don't think anybody else knows how to answer the question.
- 29:53 Gabriel: Okay.
- 29:53 RTH: And I, and I don't think you can *possibly* answer the questions before you try to answer the questions that I'm asking, which is basically what, what does it *seem like* [Gabriel: Right.] was right at the moment would be. Let's, let's find out what that

landscape is like, setting aside, suspending what the nature of consciousness is or the theories that we have about that or whatever. Because, because we, we've gotta try to do the, the exploration first. And then we'll try to explain it.

30:21 Gabriel: Okay. I have one more question and you might, uh, the question might is just to clarify things. And if you take issue with the question, then I think I will un, I understand. Um, which is: you said what *seems like* it was in your conscious experience, *not* by *inference*. And, um, there's the idea that like what's, what's in your conscious experience at a given moment is metaphysically obvious. So you don't have to *infer* it because it's just, it's what's present to you. Um, and it's like the only metaphysically, um, like tautological or obvious thing. Uh, however, once it's in your, in, *in the past* and you're, um, trying to recall, then by definition, like now you have, now it's not metaphysically obvious to you what *was* in your conscious experience, uh, because at that point you're not that person anymore. So I would say it seems like you, in order to see, say what seems like it was in your conscious experience, you sort of by definition have to do some sort of inference because of the fact that it's not, uh, metaphysically present or obvious.

31:49 RTH: [pause] So I, I think that makes the problem harder than it actually is. [Gabriel: Okay.] And it's... So, maybe rather than a headache meter, the, so if you stub your toe, you're, you are going, if, if you, you're likely to say, well that is *going to* hurt. [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] And, and the reason for that is that the, the nervous system that transmits pain is slower than the nervous system that transmits motion. And so you, you recognize that you stubbed your toe before the pain arrives, cuz your leg is long and the nerves takes some time and whatever. So the myelinated nerves get your motion there faster than the pain nerves. So do y'know the experience that I'm talking about?

32:34 Gabriel: Right? Yeah.

32:37 RTH: So there's some non, non-retrospection of pain. There's the pain is *going to* happen.

32:43 Gabriel: Right?

32:44 RTH: And the pain happens, and then you recall that the pain happens a microsecond later, or a tenth of a second later, or a few seconds later. And, and the reason that you can recall that *I think* is that the, the pain was not only expected, but then it, but then the pain is in your short-term processing, which keeps all the, keeps all those things alive, because your neurons take, take time to process all this stuff.

33:10 Gabriel: Mm-hmm.

33:12 RTH: And, and so the problem of retrospection is not quite so clean-cut as you make it out to be. It's not like things either are, either *are* or they're *not* retrospective. I think, I think the notion of time is, is in the, in the, the notion of the human, uh, the human interactions of time is a pretty complicated thing. So you got all, there's really all different kinds of time measures out there. You got short-term memory, long-term memory.

- 33:48 Gabriel: Yeah.
- 33:48 RTH: Short-term memory of vision, short-term memory of tactile stuff. These, they're all different. They're all somewhat different. And, and yet we coordinate them together somehow. And, and that's, that's really what I'm asking. So the, so if the beep happens, if the beep happens in that time between the stubbing of the toe and the pain arrival, then it, I think it's an empirical question whether the beep can happen, right the? Is it possible for the beep to happen? And you could say, well, I, at the moment of the beep, I was, I, I had recognized I stubbed my toe, but I hadn't yet felt the pain and I was waiting for the pain to arrive. Well, I think that's possible. I think, [Gabriel: Okay.] I think the beep can do that. [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] And if the beep had come a half a second *later*, then you could say, well, my toe hurts.
- 34:35 Gabriel: Mm-hmm.
- 34:36 RTH: My toe *hurts* now. It hurt then I seems like it had been constantly over the last tenth of a second since I got the beep.
- 34:46 Gabriel: That Yeah. Uh, I, it's, it's hard to know like on what level to look at all this stuff as, but I, I'm, yeah. Uh, I have to, like, every time we have one of these conversations, I, I, I have to let it like sift in my brain a bit afterwards because it's a little hard to, to think about it all at once. [RTH: I agree with...] Like a, another thing is at the point at which you say, uh, my toe hurts now, it's still recall a recollection, right? Because at that point it's your mouth recollecting because whatever nerve signals that were caused by *pain* nerve signals, um, went to your mouth, it was still different pain nerve signals that triggered this, y'know, set of events in your brain to eventually cause your mouth to say those words. So maybe you're still in pain at that moment, but it's not the same pain that caused your mouth to say that.
- 35:47 RTH: So I think there's some truth to that, but I, but I also think that, that, that, uh, it's a rabbit hole because...
- 35:54 Gabriel: Yeah, it's a rabbit hole.
- 35:55 RTH: I think you can then say, well, y'know, we're having a conversation about this and the conversation about this was about what actually happened back then. [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] And actually we're not really having a conversation about this. We're having the *second phase* of the conversation about this because the first phase of the conversation is really in recollection. But we're not really doing that. And I don't think there's any, there's any escape from that. I think.
- 36:17 Gabriel: You're, Yeah, I agree. It seems like if you just keep going that way, everything will just disappear lo in some weird, logical mess.
- 36:26 RTH: And, and I, and I fully accept that *Gabriel* is so committed to that way of looking at things that nothing is in his, in his, in his inner experience, because it's gone down some rabbit hole or whatever. That would be fine with me *if that's the way it is*. I'm,

I'm, I'm not trying to say, well, Gabriel *has to have* easily available, directly apprehendable, whatever, inner experience. Maybe he does, and maybe he doesn't. Maybe he's, y'know, light years more, more enlightened than I am and [Gabriel laughs] and, and, uh, and know when I catch up to him, then I'll, I'll realize that there wasn't really anything. I, I, I don't... I bracket all that stuff, that stuff away. [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] But what, what I want to get at is as simple a question as I know how to state, which is: to the extent that Gabriel is trying to be genuinely honest with us and himself, and not get caught up by some theory or other, unless he's sort of gen, unless he is in fact genuinely caught up by that theory (if that's and if, which he is, that's fine). But if, y'know, if he does have a pain in his toe, I would like him to tell us about that. If that's what's, if that's what's in his experience— [Gabriel: Okay.] it seems to have been an experience *as best he can tell* at the time of the beep without subjecting it to one or ten or a billion layers of analysis.

38:09 Gabriel: Mm hmm. That makes sense. Uh, I'm giving it my best shot. [they laugh]

38:14 RTH: And, and that that's all we're asking for. And, and, and, and, and what I, what I mostly *don't* wanna do is to talk into, talk you into saying, "well, shit! I'll just do, I'll just give him what he wants. And I think what he wants for me is to tell him, tell him something's e, easy." That's *not* what I want. I would *much rather* have these conversations with Gabriel saying, "well, I'm not really sure what's in my experience."

38:38 Gabriel: Okay.

38:40 RTH: And *then* we're gonna have to... If, if he *says* that, then we're gonna have to hammer out well, what does he mean by that? What is that? Because he doesn't have anything in, in his experience, by *my* definition of *in his experience*? Or does it mean that he's, he feels the need to talk about ontological characteristics or whatever? I'm, I don't, I don't want to presume that one answer to that or the other.

39:05 Gabriel: Okay.

39:06 RTH: So I'm not trying to, I'm *definitely not* trying to say *make it easy on me!*

39:10 Gabriel: Yeah, of course.

39:12 RTH: I'm, I'm, I'm trying to get at whether there's something in his experience. Which, and, and I would say in my recollection (which is now a retrospection over a week or so), there, this process was easier for you on the fourth sampling day than it is on the fifth or the third.

39:39 Gabriel: And yeah, I think so.

39:39 Russ comments: The DES question is straightforwardly simple: *What, if anything, was in your experience at the moment of the beep?* We have spent nearly 40 minutes trying to decide how to answer that question about one particular beeped moment. That the question is simple does not necessarily imply that answering it is easy!

RTH here observes that Gabriel's answers seemed much more straightforwardly confident on sampling day 4 than they do here on day 5 (unfortunately, due to RTH's failure to launch the recorder on day 4, there is no recording and therefore no transcript of day 4).

My sense (based on 50 years of sampling) is that there is no amount of analysis that can help Gabriel grasp what if anything is in his experience. Either his experience is (or will be) directly apprehended, or it isn't. We will have to see, as sampling goes forward, whether the process becomes easier.

DES views its participants as co-investigators. Gabriel is the only person on the planet who can have anything relevant to say about whether he directly apprehends something at the moments of the beeps. The last 40 minutes of conversation is aimed at trying to ensure that Gabriel and RTH have similar understandings of what "directly apprehended" might mean, and at aligning their methodological concerns. Trying to work out shared procedural understandings is what good co-investigators should do; viewers of these interviews can judge for themselves the extent to which we are accomplishing that.

I would like to be clear that I am *not* trying to talk Gabriel into reporting the existence of directly apprehended experience. I would be just as happy (probably happier) if, after we have become confident that we understand each other and are not talking past each other, to ascertain that Gabriel really *does not* have directly apprehended experiences when beeped. That would be genuinely interesting. What would *not* be interesting would be to reach something that sounds like a conclusion but is really the result of confusion, unresolved ambiguity, or other kinds of talking-pasts.

Spoiler alert: It will turn out that our discussion of Gabriel's experience in the upcoming sample 5.2 is markedly different from what has been discussed here in 5.1. [See the comment at 52:18.]

39:40 RTH: And, and the tragedy is we don't have that on tape, so we can't come back and look at it then. [Gabriel: Hmm.] But, but, but, but maybe this is, maybe it's even better, y'know, maybe, so maybe we have to do it several times to figure out what, what the deal is.

39:55 Gabriel: Okay.

39:57 RTH: So the minor tragedy might actually turn into be a, a positive good, a good thing. Cuz it won't, it won't, it won't allow us to go back. We have to go forward.

40:12 Gabriel: All right. Ready to give it a shot

40:15 RTH: On the beep number two.

SAMPLE 5.2 DISCUSSION STARTS HERE

40:17 Gabriel: All right. Yep.

40:18 AG: Beep 2.

40:18 Gabriel: Okay. So this was, um, I'm gimme a second to try and remember what this was.

40:33 Gabriel: Okay. Right. This was, um, there was, it was just the word. Uh, I was listening to a video again, um, this time while I was brushing my teeth. And, uh, I heard the word, uh, "lectures." This was in my conscious experience. And, um, there was a, a feeling of wet on my knuckle cuz of the water droplet just went on my knuckle. But at that moment, it was just like a little feeling of something wet on my knuckle. And there was also the sound of water. And there was the smell of mint (from the toothpaste).

41:17 AG: Okay. And would you say these are four separate components of your experience? Or would you say otherwise?

41:32 Gabriel: I would, would say these are four separate, uh, components. [AG: Okay.] I don't think any of them were lumped together.

41:38 AG: Okay. And is there anything of these four that are more salient to you?

41:44 Gabriel: Uh, that would've been the word and then the feeling of wet on my knuckle. Those would, were the most salient.

41:50 AG: Are those, are they the same salience or is one more present?

41:55 Gabriel: Um, they're the same.

41:57 AG: Okay. So let's start with I um, "lectures." Um, so how, how was that present to you?

42:06 Gabriel: Uh, that was present to me auditorially because I was listening to it, but also the meaning of it was present to me. Um, so, and it was, uh, sort of "lectures" in the sense of, um, like a, like a professor giving a lecture.

42:21 AG: And that's the meaning I take you to be saying that what you're saying there. That's the meaning of "lectures."

42:26 Gabriel: Yeah. That was the meaning of that word, "lectures." It wasn't like, oh, somebody yelling at somebody, he's lecturing him. It was, it was "lecture" as in academic setting.

42:36 AG: Okay. [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] So you said that you heard it through a... How, how did you hear it?

42:44 Gabriel: I had headphones, earbuds in. Yeah.

42:46 AG: Okay. And is there anything about, um, I guess the call, uh, is there anything about how that's heard? Like this was said in a woman's voice? In a man's voice? I just heard the word? Something else?

43:03 Gabriel: Um, not that I, I think it was just basically the word.

- 43:08 AG: Okay. Okay. And then so, um, this meaning...
- 43:17 RTH: So can I, can I back up before we go down that road? [AG: Okay.] So when you, when you say the word, does it seem to you like I'm hearing a single word "lectures"? Or does it seem like I'm hearing a sentence that includes the word "lectures" and the beep happens to get it?
- 43:32 Gabriel: Right? Uh, it was just a single word. Uh, I wasn't really paying too much attention to the video and this one word happened to just pop out at me. Um, so I wasn't really even aware of the previous sentence.
- 43:53 RTH: So for whatever reason in my experience is the word "lectures" as a single existing word with the meaning academic and not pugilistic or whatever, right?
- 44:08 Gabriel: Mm-hmm.
- 44:08 Russ comments: We have found that this distinction between (a) the experience of the beep coming *somewhere in midsentence* (happening to be at the word "lectures") and (b) the beep catching a single word ("lectures") in experience is quite experientially robust—some people frequently report (a)-type (sentence-interrupted) experiences, whereas others report (b)-type (word-by-word) experiences. I don't know the cognitive significance of this distinction—as far as I know, the distinction is not made in the cognitive literature. Perhaps it is merely epiphenomenal; perhaps it is an artifact of the DES procedure. (There is a long discussion of this in my 2016 [book](#) with Marco Caracciolo.)
- 44:08 RTH: Okay. Okay.
- 44:15 AG: Okay. And the meaning portion. Um, so how is that present to you?
- 44:22 Gabriel: Um, that's, I can't, I don't, I can't really say. I mean, it wasn't visual or anything like that. Um, it was just sort of, that's what the word meant. Y'know, that's, that it was lectures as in that, uh, I wouldn't say that it was present to me in any other way.
- 44:43 AG: Okay. So is there some, so, uh, so is this, I'm hearing the word "lectures" and I'm somehow cognizing about what that means? Or is this somehow I hear the word "lectures" and I associate that with something else? Or is that, is there something else going on there?
- 45:00 Gabriel: Uh, I don't know if it was like, I don't think I was, there was any mental effort, um, that is, and it didn't feel like an association. It just felt like the word "lectures" was that meaning.
- 45:19 AG: So is this, I'm hearing the word "lectures" and I understand it to mean, y'know, the, the meaning of it, and that's all in my experience? Or something else. Or,
- 45:32 Gabriel: Um, when you say, okay, I would say that does sound accurate, but *the fact that I'm understanding it to mean that* wasn't in my experience.

45:32 Russ comments: AG has leaned pretty hard on Gabriel, and he has stuck to his guns. Good for him! It indicates that he is not merely trying to please the interviewers.

45:40 AG: Okay.

45:41 Gabriel: Okay.

45:47 AG: Okay. Do you have any more questions about that? [RTH: Nope.] Okay. And then the feeling of wetness. [Gabriel: Um-hmm.] Could you tell me more about that?

45:57 Gabriel: Uh, yeah, that was just the feeling of, um, I mean, in, in, in reality it was just the feeling of something colder on my knuckle. But it was experienced as the feeling of, uh, something wet. It was, it was probably specifically the feeling of a *drop* of something wet.

46:23 AG: Okay. And I take you to be saying this is a physical feeling. [Gabriel: Yeah.] Like I feel it on my knuckle. Um, and is this, uh, like, does, does which knuckle, what hand does, which finger does any of that matter? Or is that just, would that be more context?

46:41 Gabriel: It was, it was specifically on my knuckle. It wasn't just it, I'm not just saying that's where it happened to be. It was specifically in my experience on my knuckle. [AG: Mm-hmm.] And it was on, uh, this knuckle, the, uh, the, the middle finger knuckle of my left hand, if that's important.

46:57 AG: But was anything about it being the middle finger, my left hand, [Gabriel: No.] was any of that a part of your experience?

47:03 Gabriel: No.

47:04 AG: Okay. I'm good about that. [RTH: Me too.] Um, and, uh, okay. So now the less salient portion, so the sound of water. [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] Uh, uh, tell me more about that.

47:24 Gabriel: Uh, that was just, y'know, the sound of like the faucet water, kind of, y'know, rushing down.

47:30 AG: Okay. So this is like a, a fact that the universe: This faucet is on and the water's coming out is making a noise. And I am also hearing it. And in my *experience*, excuse me. And in my experience, I'm just, I am hearing that sound.

47:44 Gabriel: Yeah. In my experience I'm hearing it, but I'm not thinking about what it, what, where it's coming from or anything like that. It's just momentarily the, the sound of the water.

47:55 AG: Okay. And then in my experience, is it the sound of water? Or is it a sound?

48:01 Gabriel: It's, um, it's the sound of water. Okay.

- 48:07 AG: And is it the sound of, um,
- 48:10 RTH: So can I ask, can, can I ask a question? Because I'm guessing it's not really the sound of water, I'm guessing it's...
- 48:14 AG: Yeah, I was, yeah. I
- 48:15 RTH: ...I hear, I hear water.
- 48:17 AG: Yeah. [inaudible that. Yeah.
- 48:19 Gabriel: Oh, okay. Um, yeah, uh, yeah, it's, it's not the sound of water, it's that I hear water. I, yeah.
- 48:37 AG: And is it even I hear water? Or I hear like my faucet, or I hear, or is it just I, I, I don't wanna talk you into anything. I'm just wondering if it's that specific. [Gabriel: Yeah.] Or if it's, or I hear water, like
- 48:52 Gabriel: It probably is *I hear my faucet*. Um, I, I don't think I can really recall that, that, that meant much detail, though.
- 48:52 Russ comments: Exercise for the reader: There have been three descriptions of Gabriel's experience:
(a) I hear the sound of water
(b) I hear water
(c) I hear my faucet
What is the difference? Does it matter from the standpoint of faithfully describing Gabriel's experience? Is there a better characterization of Gabriel's experience at this particular moment? I give my answer below, so that you have the opportunity to think about this on your own before you peek.
- 49:04 AG: Okay. No problem. Um, any more questions about that? [RTH: Nope.] Okay. So then the smell of mint. [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] Um, tell, uh, tell me more about that?
- 49:23 Gabriel: Okay. So yeah, that was the smell of, um, it was the smell of my toothpaste specifically, but that wasn't in my experience. It was just the smell of, um, it was the smell of mint. And it, in my experience, it wasn't sort of the smell of natural, uh, y'know, mint leaf or anything. It was the smell of a kind of, uh, I, I guess a kind of fake mint or a kind, a kind of unpleasant-ish mint, like a, a mint that isn't like candy. It's kind of like a chemical mint. So it's more like some, like a dentist's mint. That's how it was experienced.
- 50:01 AG: And is all of that present at the moment of the beep? Or is that just how, like I have to explain to these guys? So now I'm saying it's not natural, it's a, but to me it's mint.

- 50:11 Gabriel: The, it wasn't to me mint, it was to me, a, it, it was to me a unpleasant mint. I wouldn't say that the, the unnatural part was necessarily in my experience, but the unpleasantness of it was.
- 50:30 RTH: So is it the case that I smell unpleasant mint? Or is it the case that I smell my toothpaste, which is in fact unpleasant mint?
- 50:40 Gabriel: Uh, I was not thinking of it as my toothpaste in that moment.
- 50:44 RTH: Okay.
- 50:48 AG: Okay. Sorry, could you say that again? Um, you were smell, sorry, could you just say that again.
- 50:55 Gabriel: Again? I was *not* thinking of it as my toothpaste in that moment.
- 50:58 AG: Got it. And then, is this a similar deal to the water in the sense that it's not that it's the smell of mint, but I smell mint the same way? It's not the sound of water, but I hear water. Is it like a similar thing like that?
- 51:14 Gabriel: Uh, it was the smell. It was the smell of mint, not that I smell mint.

51:14 Russ comments: Here's my answer to the 48:52 exercise for the reader:

(a) *I hear the sound of water* is an abstraction that separates a feature (the sound) from the object (the water). It says, in effect, "I don't hear actual water. I hear *something that auditorially resembles water*." The question is, did Gabriel experience, at the moment of the beep, an abstraction that separates feature from object? Gabriel's answers suggest not.

(b) *I hear water* is an abstraction that separates a particular (*this water*) from the general (*water in general*). "I hear water" is the kind of thing a hiker might say in the forest (followed up by, "no, it is just the wind in the trees"). The question is, did Gabriel, at the moment of the beep, hear an abstract water or a particular water? Gabriel's answers suggest that his experience was of a particular.

(c) *I hear my faucet* suggests a sense of ownership (*my faucet*, instead of your faucet in the other bathroom, for example). Gabriel's answers do not suggest any ownership. And *faucet* rather than *water* suggests the source of the water rather than the action of it; that was not suggested by Gabriel's answers.

So I think a better option would be:

(d) *I hear the water*. *The* implies *actual* water, thus avoiding the (a)-type mistake; *the* implies *the particular water*, thus avoiding the (b)-type mistake; *the* does not specify ownership, and *water* is what Gabriel's experience was aimed at, thus avoiding the (c)-type mistakes.

Is this just quibbling about words? I think not. Those distinctions are (or at least might be) important, so a description that aspires to fidelity has to come down on the right side of all such distinctions.

What difference does it make? I think a lot. I think AG was not adequately clear about the (a) distinction when she said (at 47:30) about the water, "in my experience, I'm just, I am hearing that sound." That led to a discussion about *sound*

rather than about *water*, and that is on the wrong track. And the requirement to be clear about (c) compelled Gabriel to correct the record (at 51:14 about the mint) “It was the smell of mint, not that I smell mint.” The more the conversation can be kept in alignment with the experience, the fewer the distractions and the fewer such corrections are required, and therefore the more faithful the description can be.

- 51:18 AG: Okay. Um, and do you have any more questions about that?
- 51:34 RTH: No.
- 51:35 AG: Okay. And then just for, I don’t know, for salient purposes, um, you said that the lectures and the wetness were more than the mint and the water. Um, 60—40? 70—30? We can lump those things all together. Or I can’t give you numbers?
- 51:59 Gabriel: Let me think about that. I’d say the mint and the water were a combined like 30%. So I’d say like 70—30.
- 52:08 AG: Okay.
- 52:16 AG: Then I am good.
- 52:18 Gabriel: Okay.

SAMPLE 5.1 AND 5.2 COMPARATIVE DISCUSSION

- 52:18 Russ comments: [See the discussion at 39:39.] The upcoming discussion will compare and contrast Gabriel’s experience in samples 5.1 and 5.2.
- 52:19 RTH: So before we move on to number 3, what I, I would like us to comment in, in regards to the conversation that we were already, that we had on the first about the first beep. [Gabriel: Okay.] So in this beep, in the second beep, you seem pretty confident about the first part of it. When we were talking about the lectures, that this, I was hearing *one word*, “lectures,” and I *wasn’t* hearing the whole sentence.
- 52:41 Gabriel: Right.
- 52:44 RTH: My guess is that there was a whole sentence to be had in the, in the actual *world*, [Gabriel nods affirmatively] in the, in the real universe. That is, there was an actual sentence, but, but that was *not* a part of your experience at the moment. Your experience at the moment, for whatever reason, had abstracted out this word.
- 53:03 Gabriel: Yes.
- 53:04 RTH: So that’s the difference that we were talking about in the, in, in the first beep. [Gabriel: Okay.] You seem *confident* in saying it was about this *word*, *not* about the *sentence*. The sentence fell on my eardrums, no doubt, [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] but my experience was not of the sentence. It was of the word.

- 53:27 Gabriel: Okay.
- 53:29 RTH: And, and we could, I think, develop a theory as to why that would or would not happen. [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] But that's not the point. The point, the point is that it *does* happen that Gabriel, at least *sometimes*, can say: it's, it's *this* aspect of the universe, which is present to me. It seems present to me at the moment of the beep. (It doesn't seem like I'm making this up after the beep. But who knows? Really?) But...
- 53:58 Gabriel: I, I do feel like it's especially sometimes easier to say that certain things were *not*. Like I, I feel like there are some things that I can very confidently say were *not* in my experience. There are some things where I can *somewhat* confidently say *were*, and I feel like there are *a lot* of things where I *cannot confidently* say *were*, but they *may have been* or *may not have been*. I, I feel like there are three camps.
- 53:58 Russ comments: In my opinion, a main disadvantage of being intelligent is that it is easy to advance speculative theoretical arguments that sound reasonable or true.
- 54:26 RTH: So I, I think that's, that's a great observation. It's probably true. And the, *and* I think that the only way to, to answer that question, interestingly, interesting enough question as it is, is to go beep by beep. This one, we could do it. That one (the first one), we had trouble doing it, this one [inaudible]. If we do that often enough, *eventually* we might be able to get some kind of a closure or information or whatever about what's easy and what's not, what we can do [inaudible]. And that would be totally interesting.
- 54:58 Gabriel: Okay.
- 54:58 RTH: To *speculate* about it is *not* very interesting to me because, because I don't think... I think we need the *data* before we do the *speculation*.
- 55:05 Gabriel: Right.
- 55:08 RTH: Which is not to say that the question's not important or that, or even that you don't have any information. I don't really know how much information about that you've got. [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] But the, but the, the *data* is, is the kind of conversations that we're having.
- 55:26 Gabriel: Yeah, that makes sense.
- 55:26 Russ comments: This discussion illustrates the heart of the iterative procedure. We try to get Gabriel's experience in high fidelity. We fall short, for reasons that are partially evident, partially opaque. So we try again, each time from a new perspective, as we try to roll back the opacity. How successful we will be remains to be seen.
- 55:30 RTH: On to the number 3?

55:31 Gabriel: Okay. So let's see. And I do understand why speculation is really hard to trust on this. Um, it, I can tell, just in my own thought patterns, it's very easy to, like, confuse myself.

55:31 Russ comments: Gabriel's "it's very easy to, like, confuse myself" is perhaps a very astute observation about his process: that when, for whatever reason, he begins the analytic examination and reconsideration of his own experience, he heads down a rabbit hole and loses contact with his own directly apprehended experience. But the alternative is also possible: that the reason for the analysis is that he understands that what seemed to be his original experience was really a chimera. Sorting out those options is perhaps the fundamental question of consciousness science and experiential science.

SAMPLE 5.3 DISCUSSION STARTS HERE

55:50 Gabriel: [continues] But, uh, okay, number, for number 3, um, there was the word "cars" auditorially in my experience. (And, uh, this was also, I was also listening to something, uh, with headphones.) Um, and there was the, um... The meaning of the sentence *was* in my experience. So the whole sentence was "known for my cars," and the meaning of that sentence was in my experience, but only the word "cars" I think was in my experience auditorially. And, uh, then there was also, at that moment, the sight of, uh, I, I had just like, uh, gotten out, uh, like an, an allergy shot that I inject myself with. And, um, there was the site of some medicine at the top of the needle, like a little droplet. So that was also in my experience.

56:59 RTH: So I'm hearing the word "cars" as part of a sentence, [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] and I'm seeing the drop of medicine on the end of the needle. [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] Equally so? One more than the other?

56:59 Russ comments: RTH is not quite right here. Gabriel does *not* hear "cars" *as part of a sentence*, but rather hears the word "cars," period. The word itself happens to be part of a sentence, but that is not his experience. [See the comment at 44:08.]

57:12 Gabriel: Um, I think, uh, I think it was equal.

57:16 RTH: Okay. And, and let's start with the drop then. [Gabriel: Okay.] The, so th, this is in reality, I'm seeing the actual needle that I had just used?

57:28 Gabriel: Uh, yes. Yeah.

57:29 RTH: And what do you see?

57:32 Gabriel: Uh, I just see a little drop at the end of it. And it, it's like, uh, yeah, I just see the drop at the end of it. I'm not focusing on really anything else. I just see the drop.

57:42 RTH: And does it seem like I'm seeing this in reality? Like the, the needle's over there sitting on the table or the desk or whatever and I'm, I'm, I'm particularly interested in the drop for whatever reason. And...

- 57:53 Gabriel: Yeah, I was particularly interested in the drop, um, for whatever reason. Uh, it was, it was in my hand, the needle was in my hand. But yeah, I was particularly interested in the drop. Uh, the drop was sort of golden because it was sort of, uh, it was dimly lit by this lamp here and was at night. So, uh, yeah.
- 58:12 RTH: Okay. And is the golden-ness of the drop of particular interest to me?
- 58:18 Gabriel: Like I'm, it's *not* of particular interest.
- 58:20 RTH: It's a fact of the universe that the drop is gold, but I'm interested more in the drop-ness of it than the golden-ness of it?
- 58:25 Gabriel: Yes.
- 58:27 RTH: Okay. Okay. And, and I'm gathering that I see this more or less as it actually is. I'm just interested in the tip of the needle and the drop.
- 58:42 Gabriel: Yes.
- 58:44 RTH: Okay. Then I'm also hearing "cars."
- 58:49 Gabriel: Yes. The word "cars."
- 58:59 Russ comments: This is a simple micro-example of how interviewer skill (or lack thereof) contributes to the ability of the interview to produce high fidelity descriptions. When Gabriel says "*the word cars*," it is likely that his saying "*the word*" as a correction aimed at RTH's mistaken summary at 56:59 (see the comment there). If so, then that implies that Gabriel has somehow filed away RTH's mistake and has been somehow keeping that alive, ready for use when appropriate (as now). I have no theory about how he does that keeping-alive, but it does imply that the conversation for the last two minutes has not been 100% focused on the issues at hand but has at least been partially distracted by the keeping-alive necessity to correct the record. Is that a big deal in the present interview? Perhaps not. But I think it does suggest that infelicities on the part of an interviewer contribute to lessening the fidelity of upcoming discussions.
- 58:55 RTH: And what, and what do I hear? What, what...
- 58:59 Gabriel: So the sentence was, "I'm known for my cars." And, um, I audit, uh, in my experience was really just the word "cars," but the meaning of the sentence was still there in the form of when I heard when the car, "cars" was present in my experience as the thing this guy was known for. So "cars," and "cars," that was auditorially in my experience. And it takes the meaning as *the thing this guy is known for*.
- 59:38 RTH: Okay. And so does "cars" seem like it's the only auditory thing in your experience? Or do you sort of have a penumbra of the rest of the sentence?

59:50 Gabriel: I, I think it's the only thing. I don't, I don't have, um, I, I did not feel at the moment of the beep and, uh, as if that the rest of it was in my experience.

1:00:02 RTH: Okay. And, and, and in the previous beep, "lectures" was in your experience [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] as a single word,...

1:00:14 Gabriel: [they speak over each other] Yes, in the previous...

1:00:16 RTH: ...but I don't... In the previous beep, right.

1:00:18 Gabriel: Right.

1:00:19 RTH: And so what I'm asking is, is "lectures" and "cars" present to you in the same or different ways?

1:00:28 Gabriel: I would not say they're really in the same way, because cars had like, um, the meaning of, of a sentence behind it, and the meaning of that sentence was part of my experience of the word "cars." "Lectures" was just sort of like a random isolated word that didn't come with any, uh, baggage of like a previous sentence or anything like that.

1:00:50 RTH: So "cars" has the accumulation of the sentence or the context of the sentence in it [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] as a feature of the hearing of "cars."

1:00:59 Gabriel: Mm-hmm.

1:01:01 RTH: And "lectures" doesn't have that. There was [Gabriel: Right.] [inaudible], but, but I'm, but I'm not sentence-izing the word [Gabriel: Yeah.] or contextualizing the word. Alright, then I think I'm good.

1:01:01 Russ comments: I think that is not quite right. "Lectures" *did* come with something like the contextualization of the word: Gabriel immediately understood "lectures" as a classroom activity rather than as a scolding or reproof. That doubtless came from something like the baggage of the previous sentence. (That would be more an interpretation than an apprehension.) Either way, the apprehension was of the word, not the word as surrounded by or embedded in the sentence.

1:01:12 Gabriel: Okay.

1:01:15 AG: Me as well.

1:01:15 Russ comments: The specificity of Gabriel's recall here is noteworthy in the context of our long discussions over the first 40 minutes of this day, where Gabriel said he was entirely unconfident about what was and was not experienced. Here, he is confident and consistent in the fine distinction between only a word ("cars") and a sentence interrupted at a word.

This confidence comes from good-faith iterative attempts at apprehending and describing sample after sample. It does not come from analysis of theoretical

possibilities. Analysis (in my view) leads to a *loss* of confidence in their apprehensions of their own experience (“it’s very easy to like confuse myself” in Gabriel’s words at 55:31).

1:01:22 RTH: Number 4.

1:01:23 AG: Are we going on to 4?

1:01:24 Gabriel: Okay. Uh, by the way, this is where it’s in the morning. Uh, so this is where things transitioned to just a few hours ago. So, um,

1:01:36 RTH: So before we do that, I guess I, as in my role as timekeeper, it’s 1:03, which it means we’ve been at this for an hour. Do we have time to do another beep or two?

1:01:44 Gabriel: I do.

1:01:45 RTH: I’m good.

1:01:46 AG: Yeah, that’s fine. Okay. That’s why I was asking if we’re gonna go onto it because...

1:01:50 RTH: Uh huh

1:01:50 Gabriel: Okay. Okay.

SAMPLE 5.4 DISCUSSION STARTS HERE

1:01:52 Gabriel: Yes. So this was, um, I had spoken the word “coffee roll.” Uh, I was having one for breakfast. I had spoken the word “coffee roll.” Um, and it was auditorially in my experience. And, um, oh, actually my bad, I’m sorry. I had *read* the word “coffee roll” and, uh, I, when I read words, I have the voice I was talking about the last time I was telling you about reading something. So I, I had read the word “coffee roll” and in sort of my imagination, not outwardly, but uh, was the auditory experience of reading it, um, and, or of speaking it. And, um, at the same time there was the, I I had just searched it in a Google search and uh, I had misspelled it. So there was, uh, in visually I was sort of looking at the thing where it says, *did you mean to type “coffee roll”*? correct, and correctly spelled. So visually that was in my experience, that little button.

1:03:07 AG: Okay. So are you, are either of these more salient to you?

1:03:13 Gabriel: I would say, I would say no. I would say they’re equal.

1:03:18 AG: [inaudible] Okay. Um, so I’ll start with, uh, the reading “coffee roll.” So, um, could you tell me more about that?

1:03:28 Gabriel: Okay, so the, the, the auditory experience of like my voice, so I, it is the act of re, of saying. The auditor, auditory experience of like that inner voice is, um, it, it’s just sort of, um, it’s, it’s my voice, uh, y’know, in my head, but it’s also like, it doesn’t sound

like a normal voice, which we've discussed before. It's sort of like a, a sort of like a, it's a human voice and uh, it's like a kind of whispery, but also not really whispery, but that's sort of the best way of describing it. It's kind of like a transparent voice.

1:04:10 AG: Okay. And so is the reading of this word more of a fact of the universe, but I'm really innerly speaking it somehow? Or is it, is the reading component part of the experience at the moment of the beep?

1:04:32 Gabriel: Hmm. I would say it was part of the experience.

1:04:36 AG: Okay. And so is this somehow: I'm innerly hearing myself or, well, *I'm hear innerly hearing this voice speaking?* Or *I'm innerly speaking* and it's, I'm innerly speaking or reading, or this is what I read, this is how it's present, or...?

1:04:59 Gabriel: Mm-hmm. I think I'm innerly speaking and at the same time innerly reading. So innerly reading is more of, um, I would say that like the innerly reading part and the innerly speaking part are not the same thing in my experience, but they always happen together.

1:05:20 AG: And in what way are they not the same?

1:05:23 Gabriel: Um, it's like, I can, it's, it's, it's kind of like the innerly speaking happens involuntarily whenever I innerly read. So it's not like, um, it's not like I try to innerly speak, but I do try to innerly read, or just to read, I guess.

1:05:46 AG: So reading, is this like a, like when you say innerly reading, do you mean like not reading out loud? Or do you mean...

1:05:53 Gabriel: Yeah, yeah, I just meant not reading out loud.

1:05:55 AG: Okay. Mm-hmm. Okay.

1:06:04 RTH: So I'm not sure I heard you. Did you say that reading is effortful? That I, that I, I'm explicitly *trying* to read? Or something like that?

1:06:15 Gabriel: Yes, I was, I was pur, I was trying to read, like, that was, uh, that was voluntary action. It wasn't sort of something I was just doing on autopilot. Um, yeah.

1:06:28 RTH: And the innerly *speaking* happens alongside that. [Gabriel: Yeah.] So if I set, so if I set myself, myself, the task to read and, and then, and then read; what I get is innerly speaking the words.

1:06:42 Gabriel: Right.

1:06:43 RTH: And yet it's not just is my experience, not just speaking the words, it's, I'm reading *and* I'm speaking the words.

1:06:52 Gabriel: Yeah.

1:07:08 AG: Okay. Um, and this is, and, and it's, this is not just, I'm innerly reading and innerly speaking something. It's specifically the "coffee roll."

1:07:20 Gabriel: Yes.

1:07:24 AG: Okay. And is there anything about, is it just the word, the, I guess that's a phrase or the, the phrase "coffee roll," there's nothing else? There's not like, no, like in a previous beep you had meaning attached to some of these words, but...

1:07:43 Gabriel: This is, yeah. In this, in this instance, uh, the reason it was in my experience was because I had typed it. Uh, so, uh, yeah, the, the actual meaning wasn't there. [AG: Okay.] Because I, I wasn't, and the reason was because I wasn't reflecting on it, I was more focused on the action, or I *had been* more focused on the action of typing it. So there's no meaning or image or anything like that. It was just the word "coffee roll."

1:08:08 AG: Then I take that typing and all, that, that's just context. Like, that's something that I type.

1:08:11 Gabriel: That's context, yeah. Mm-hmm.

1:08:12 AG: Okay. Okay. And I am good on the reading.

1:08:16 RTH: Um, I've got one more question about that. [AG: Okay.] So, so we've been talking about this as innerly speaking in a whispery or transparent-y kind of a voice. [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] And I would like to know whether this is more the experience of *speaking* or more of the experience of *hearing* using our talking-into-a-tape-recorder or hearing-your-voice-come-back as the way of distinguishing between that. Or maybe the question doesn't make sense.

1:08:43 Gabriel: Okay. So I remember the whole tape-recorder thing. Let me think about that for a second. So, if I'm listening to like myself on a tape recorder, um, it doesn't feel like my will is directing the words. Um, and it feels like it's happening without my will. But if I'm speaking into a tape recorder, it feels like my will is directing the words. Um, so in this case, it, I would say that it feels more like innerly speaking because it does feel like my will is directing the words, even though it doesn't really sound like my voice. I think of it as my voice, just because I hear it whenever I, y'know, inwardly speak, but it doesn't actually sound like my voice.

1:09:45 RTH: Okay. Then I think I'm good.

1:09:47 Gabriel: Okay.

1:09:49 RTH: I guess before, before I say I'm good. So do you experience the will as being a separate kind of a deal, or is that just a way of saying, I feel like I'm driving the words that I'm...

1:09:59 Gabriel: Uh, it just means I'm feel like I'm driving the words.

1:10:02 RTH: Okay. Then I'm good.

1:10:05 AG: Okay. And is that all, like, that's all like metaphorically, right? Like how that

1:10:13 Gabriel: What, specifically?

1:10:15 AG: Um, the driving the words. Sorry, I didn't really understand the question that Dr. Hurlburt was asking.

1:10:24 RTH: What I understood the question was that, that his experience was of creating the words rather than hearing them coming from the outside, [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] [AG: Yes] but *not* that there was a separate, I experienced myself as *planning to say* this and then *saying* that. [Gabriel: Right.] [AG: Right.] That I'm in, I feel myself as in command or in...

1:10:45 AG: Oh, I understand. Okay.

1:10:46 RTH: ...in the production, in the production mode rather than the receptive mode.

1:10:46 Russ comments: There are those (many, in fact) who think of the *will* as an actually existing entity, with its own experienced characteristics, causal significance, and so on. That is not, apparently, how Gabriel understands it.

Because (a) the concept of *will* did *not* arise in the direct apprehension of the beeped experience (but only arose in the service of our distinction between speaking and hearing); (b) the beeped-experience question seems pretty well answered (it is speaking, not hearing); and (c) sorting through the difference between will-as-experienced and will-as-theoretical-construct may lead to a rabbit hole, I choose not to explore it further.

1:10:49 AG: Yes. Okay. That makes sense. Okay. And okay, so at the, looking at the, did you mean coffee roll, uh, part. [laughs] Could you [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] tell me more about that?

1:11:05 Gabriel: Right, so this was, um, I was looking at that little thing where it says, y'know, "did you mean to type blah blah, blah," or "did you mean to say blah, blah, blah?" And, um, I was looking at it and it *was* part of my experience, but it wasn't like present, it wasn't present in my experience *as a correction* or *as like a correction of a typo*. It was present in my experience just as a button, just as like, y'know, uh, something I could tap like a button. Um, I wasn't thinking of it as the correction box, in other words.

1:11:41 AG: But you were thinking of it as a button; is that what I take it to mean?

1:11:41 Russ comments: Gabriel has *not* said he was thinking of this as a button. So this and what follows is a red herring which finally gets resolved in the 1:12:17 turn.

1:11:45 Gabriel: Yeah. Just as a button. Yeah.

1:11:48 AG: And when you say you were, you were looking at it, is it a, is it that my eyeballs are pointed at it and I'm thinking that this is a button I can click on it or whatever? Or is this I'm seeing, I'm

1:12:04 Gabriel: Seeing, I would say it's the first one.

1:12:07 AG: My eyeballs are aimed at it, but I'm thinking this is a button. Or is it, or is it, is this a button or is this I can click on it, or is it more, is it less, is it more vague than that? Is it...?

1:12:17 Gabriel: I'm, I'm not thinking *this is a button*. I'm, I'm, I'm, I'm looking at it. My eyes are pointed at it; and I see it as a button.

1:12:28 AG: Okay. And this "seeing it as a button." Uh, what do you mean by that?

1:12:36 Gabriel: I mean that, um, I'm, I'm looking at it more as it's function, which is something you tap, [AG: Okay.] As opposed to like what the words are. Um, yeah.

1:12:51 AG: Okay. So I'm seeing this as more something I can, I can press rather than [Gabriel: Right.] Did you mean blah, blah, and then it's correcting me or anything. Like,

1:13:01 Gabriel: I'm not even really seeing any of its text or anything like that, because it has text in it, obviously, but that's not part of my experience either.

1:13:12 AG: Okay. It's a, and it's, and like a fact of the universe says all these things, they're there, whatever. But I'm not really attending to it. I'm more... Okay. [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] Uh, Dr. Hurlburt, do you have any questions about...?

1:13:26 RTH: I'm good.

1:13:27 AG: Okay. I am good as well.

1:13:30 RTH: Do we have time for one more?

1:13:32 Gabriel: I do.

1:13:33 AG: Okay. Sure.

1:13:33 RTH: One more.

SAMPLE 5.5 DISCUSSION STARS HERE

1:13:34 Gabriel: Okay. Uh, this one was, uh, I was playing a chess puzzle, like a tactic puzzle. And, um, what was in my experience was imagining, uh, advancing a pawn forward. And so I was imagining that pawn in the position of having advanced forward. Um, and I was seeing that it would be on the, on a diagonal that my bishop could protect it from. So in other words, it would land on a square that my bishop could protect. And the way that that was in my experience was sort of this vague, um, sense of downward and to

the right from the pawn's imagined new position. That was a little complicatedly put. My bad.

1:14:36 RTH: And so is my experience primarily of an imaginary seeing of the, of the board with the pawn advanced?

1:14:44 Gabriel: Um, so it, it's not really an imaginary seeing. Um, I'm just looking at the square ahead of the pawn where it would move to. I'm looking at that square and it, I'm not imagining that there's like visually a pawn there, but I'm thinking of that square as having a pawn on it.

1:15:05 RTH: So what I, I, what I see is the screen as the, as it is in the real world. [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] And I am imagining that that would as if I, that I'm seeing as if it had a pawn on it. [Gabriel: Yes.] And that it would then be protected by the downward to the right diagonal.

1:15:24 Gabriel: Yes. And that is sort of visually present as like uh two squares downward and to the right of that, um, that square, um, sort of popping out, um, more than the other squares. They have some sort of sensation of like *depth* to them, like they're really actually sort of closer to me than the others.

1:15:52 RTH: And, and that seems that's, that's a visual phenomenon? That I see these things as popping out or closer to me or something like that? [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] And does, does that seem at the moment of the beep, like an imaginary deal? Or does it seem like the, the phone screen had popped out these squares?

1:16:12 Gabriel: Um, so I *know* that they're not actually coming out of the screen. Um, so I guess in that sense, an imaginary phenomena. But I also wasn't thinking of it actively as imaginary in that moment. I'm, so I'm not sure if that answers your question.

1:16:31 RTH: So I guess what I hear that as saying is I'm, I'm, I'm in my imagination seeing the screen with the pop, squares popped out, but I'm not, I don't really care whether it's imaginary or whether it's the real screen. I see the squares,

1:16:31 Russ comments: That mis-states (or at least may mis-state) Gabriel's experience somewhat. He has *not* said he sees the screen in his imagination. At 1:15:24 he implied that he is seeing the *real* screen with squares popped out. RTH's summary has blurred the distinction between seeing an image and distorting part of an actual seeing.

1:16:47 Gabriel: Right? Yes. And this wasn't like a secondary image somewhere else. It was right there in front of me.

1:16:47 Russ comments: This is likely Gabriel's attempt to clear up RTH's mis-statement and to say that it was more like a distortion of an actual seeing. But we don't know for sure—we probably could have figured it out with better questioning. But we are not thorough in our discussion of this sample—we are already 15 minutes past an hour.

1:16:57 RTH: And the two squares. Are the two squares, do those two squares include the pawn and the bishop?

1:17:07 Gabriel: Uh, no, actually.

1:17:09 RTH: So the two squares between the pawn and the bishop?

1:17:12 Gabriel: Uh, yes. There are other squares between the pawn and the bishop, but it didn't go out that far. Not with this depth.

1:17:19 RTH: So there might be three or four squares between the pawn and the bishop along that diagonal, [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] but I'm only popping out the first two. [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] And is it the first two, the two that are closest to the pawn?

1:17:28 Gabriel: It's the two that are closest to the pawn.

1:17:47 RTH: And, and are you, is this a game that you're playing? Like a, an online chess game? Or is this a, some kind of a quiz deal that has been manufactured?

1:17:56 Gabriel: Yeah, this is like a manufactured puzzle that you have to solve. [RTH: Okay.] So it's not a game. In other words, it's not like a game I'm playing against someone else.

1:18:10 RTH: Right. And is the puzzle present to you at the moment of the beep? Or is it just the, the experience of if I move my pawn there and then that's protected by the bishop here?

1:18:21 Gabriel: Yeah. It's just that experience of the pawn.

1:18:27 RTH: No, I think I'm good.

1:18:30 Gabriel: Alright.

1:18:31 AG: Um, I just say wanted to check really quickly. So, um, in the portion that you said that you were imagining the pawn moving forward or that part, so were you seeing, what were you seeing?

1:18:48 Gabriel: Um, so the visual, uh, there was just, was just that square that the pawn would move to. Um, it would be a white square. [AG: Mm-hmm.] and then those two other squares downward and to the right. Um, and those two are slightly elevated.

1:19:11 AG: Okay. So you were just, see you were seeing the square, not the pawn on the square.

1:19:17 Gabriel: Right. And there wasn't in the real world a pawn on that square either, and I wasn't imagining a pawn on it.

1:19:23 AG: Got it. Okay. Okay. And I'm good.

1:19:25 Gabriel: Okay.

1:19:28 RTH: So I've got, I've got other things that I need to get done here, so I think we should call this a day. Shall we plan on, [Gabriel: Okay.] Shall we do it again?

1:19:38 Gabriel: I would love to.

1:19:39 RTH: I'm in favor.

1:19:40 Gabriel: Okay.