

TRANSCRIPT WITH COMMENTARY
Gabriel H.: A college senior interested in philosophy
Gabriel Interview 3

Below in black is a word-for-word transcript of the December 20 interview with Gabriel that is available on YouTube at https://youtu.be/_qeBdSOWXgU. In green are comments about and explanations of the Descriptive Experience Sampling process. If you have corrections, suggestions, or questions, please post them as YouTube comments.

RTH = Russ Hurlburt

AG = Amber Goto

Gabriel = Gabriel H.

- 0:02 AG: Okay. I'm ready if everyone else is ready.
- 0:05 RTH: I'm ready, too, but, but, but we were having a conversation which I didn't quite grasp the detail of cuz I was distracted by what was happening on the screen, so
- 0:14 AG: I'm so sorry about that.
- 0:15 RTH: So Gabriel, so, so Gabriel had a thought about the sample, the blotchy-image sample of last time. So, well, let's start that conversation over again, Gabriel. [Gabriel: Okay.] On the, on the probability that I didn't really grasp what you were saying.
- 0:29 Gabriel: Okay. Got it.
- 0:30 RTH: And Amber wasn't here, so...
- 0:32 Gabriel: Okay. So last time, uh, I had this, uh, sample, which involved me imagining an image of a person [AG: Mm-hmm.] And, uh, when I told you guys about the sample, I mentioned that it was a blotchy image. [AG: Mm-hmm.] Uh, and then the question was, was I thinking of it as a blotchy image when it was occurring? And, uh, the answer to that is *no*, I wasn't like actively thinking about the blotchiness of the image. [AG: Okay.] So that leads to another question. It, it, was the blotchiness actually part of my conscious experience in that moment? Was it like part of the directly apprehensible, um, experience?
- And I was thinking about that. I realized if the answer to that question is *no*, the blotchiness was *not* part of my experience, and that indicates two possibilities. The first one is that I'm wrong, and there was actually a *clear* image in my head, in my conscious experience at least. So, uh, maybe that means there was a *second* clear image, um, in my conscious experience. Or, uh, or it means that the blotchy image just wasn't part of it at all. Uh, the other option is that there was no visual image in my conscious experience, uh, which means that I was wrong about there being an image at all.

Uh, and this, uh, so those are the two possibilities if I was wrong about the blotchiness being in my conscious experience, because I couldn't have had an image in my head that was both blotchy and non-blotchy.

- 0:32 Russ comments: Gabriel is referring to the Magnus Carlsen image of sample 2.1. Here's an outline of what he says here in his 0:32 turn, so we can refer back to it: There are three possibilities:
- 1) There was blotchiness in my conscious experience, even if I wasn't actively thinking about the blotchiness;
 - 2a) There was no blotchiness: There was actually a *clear* image (and I was mistaken about its clarity);
 - 2b) There was no blotchiness: There was no image *at all* (and I was mistaken about its existence.
- There is one impossibility:
- 0) It is not possible to have an image that is both blotchy and non-blotchy.
- For the record, I think Gabriel is mistaken when he says "I couldn't have had an image in my head that was both blotchy and non-blotchy." In the real world, it is impossible for an image to be both blotchy and non-blotchy. But Gabriel's mistake is assuming that his inner experience is of *seeing an image* of Magnus Carlsen. His experience is of *innerly seeing* Magnus Carlsen (no *image* involved), and *seeing* can be nonspecific about blotchiness, or ambiguous about blotchiness, or blotchy in one manner of speaking and non-blotchy in another manner of speaking. We will return to this issue at 3:13.
- 2:05 RTH: So I'm not sure that's true. I think it is possible, maybe, to have an image that was blotchy.
- 2:10 Gabriel: Okay.
- 2:10 RTH: And it depends on what you mean by "in my conscious experience."
- 2:15 Gabriel: Right.
- 2:16 RTH: So if, if, by "in my conscious experience" you mean I'm thematically thinking, "well, look here, the, this image is blotchy."
- 2:22 Gabriel: Mm-hmm.
- 2:24 RTH: If that's what you mean by "in your conscious experience," I think the image can be blotchy, but you don't have to be *thinking about* it. You don't have to be centralizing the blotchiness...
- 2:34 Gabriel: Right. Okay.
- 2:35 RTH: ...but the image can nonetheless be blotchy, and you're just not paying attention to that.

- 2:41 Gabriel: Okay. So, so you would say that even if I'm not paying attention to the blotchiness of the image, and I am thinking of the image as an image of this particular person, the image that is in my experience, uh, can still be blotchy. Is that what you're saying?
- 2:59 RTH: Yeah, I think that's right.
- 2:59 Russ comments: We have agreed that RTH thinks that what we called in the comment at 0:32 "option 1)" is possible.
We are being sloppy (in RTH's view) in referring to the experience as having an image (see the comment at 0:32). As at 0:32, RTH does not make the distinction between having an image of Magnus Carlsen and innerly seeing Magnus Carlsen, because he does not want to get us distracted into debates about terminology or theory. If subsequent samples make that distinction salient, we will talk about it there.
- 3:01 Gabriel: Okay, good. I, I think I agree with that then. And I think that was the case, uh, with that, that sample.
- 3:13 RTH: So let's take a, let's take a similar example, but it might be easier to figure it out. Let's say [Gabriel: Okay.] That you have an image of the American flag [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] You are seeing at the moment of the beep, the American flag, [Gabriel: Right.] and the, and the seeing that you have is a black and white seeing, [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] but you're not interested particularly in the black and whiteness of it. You're interested in the flag-ness of it.
- 3:13 Russ comments: Note that RTH starts out where Gabriel is (talking about *having an image*), but then moves to talking about *seeing*. But RTH does *not* make it an analysis of the words or a consciousness theory; he keeps it as a descriptive effort.
- 3:43 Gabriel: Right.
- 3:44 RTH: And so the question is, can the flag be both red and black at the same time? And I think the answer to that is yes, you can be seeing a black and white flag, but understanding it as being a red, white, and blue flag.
- 3:56 Gabriel: Right. Okay.
- 3:58 RTH: And, and, and the fact that you're not commenting on, aha. "Look here, I'm having a black and white image," but I'm, my interest is entirely in the flag. [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] It happens, it happens as sort of a minor detail, clearly a visual detail to be black and white.
- 4:18 Gabriel: Okay. Yeah.
- 4:19 RTH: But, but that's not thematic to you.
- 4:22 Gabriel: Okay.

- 4:23 RTH: The question. So I guess you would, you would say, I'm, I'm, you *wouldn't* say "I'm having a black and white image of the flag." You'd say, "I'm seeing the flag." [Gabriel: Right.] And, and one aspect of the flag is, well, this seeing happens to be black and white, [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] and yet it's *not* the case that I'm seeing a black and white flag. [Gabriel: Okay.] I'm seeing, I'm seeing the American flag, [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] and the black and whiteness is not of particular import.
- 4:54 Gabriel: Okay. I would, uh, I would, so in the way I would think about that, I would agree, I would think about that in the following way. I would say, uh, like sort of semantically, it's a black and white flag, um, that's sort of stored in a factual knowledge, but the direct perceptual experience of imagining it is a black and white flag. So there are two aspects of the experience, the semantic experience of the flag, and then the perceptual experience to the flag. I think they can co, they can coexist.
- 5:45 RTH: [pause] So say that, start that, that portion again. Tell me, tell me what you mean by that.
- 5:45 Russ comments: This is a dilemma for RTH. Gabriel at 4:54 has sketched a theory of semantic/factual knowledge and perception. RTH thinks that to understand what Gabriel means, we would have to work, perhaps for hours or much more, at defining each of the terms, their relationships, their limitations, and the like. And all of that will lead *directly away from* what he experienced at the moment of the beep. But (a) this kind of thing seems important to Gabriel, so it would be would be unkind to ignore it; and (b) it is possible that Gabriel's perspective will be helpful to RTH's understanding Gabriel's participation in DES or perhaps DES in general. So RTH asks for a clarification.
- 5:51 Gabriel: Okay. So in my, in my mind, like when I think what, the way I would like think of what you're saying is I would, I would say like, um, there would be like the semantic factual understanding of the flag. Uh, and then also the sort of ima, imagined, uh, or imagined simulation of the perception of the flag. So there would be the imagined facts of the flag, or the facts of the flag, the semantic knowledge of the flag, would be, this is a red and blue flag. The perceptual experience of the imagina, imagining would be of a black and white flag.
- 6:39 RTH: [pause] So I, I think that's probably true, but I wouldn't break, I wouldn't slice the pie in that way.
- 6:47 Gabriel: Okay. Sure.
- 6:49 RTH: I would slice the pie as saying: my experience is of the flag. [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] And the black and whiteness, or the red-white-blueness is not of import to me.
- 7:03 Gabriel: Okay. Is it still part of the experience?
- 7:14 RTH: [pause] I think one could, I think one can break that down in several different ways. We can ask your, my experience is of the flag. We'd have, I guess we'd have to be concrete about what the flag is. And so we're gonna get some examples. So maybe

we should leave this conversation and go for... [Gabriel: Sure.] But the, but assuming that the color of flag wasn't, wasn't of, of particular interest to me. So let's, let's, let's say my uncle has just died and, and he's got a flag draped over his casket. And, uh, and I see this picture. And, uh, whether this picture is presented in black and white or red, white, blue, it has nothing to do; that is of immaterial to me. I'm [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] I am imaginarily seeing my experiences of seeing the casket with my, my uncle's casket with the flag on it.

8:00 Gabriel: [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.]

8:01 RTH: And then if you ask about the perceptual details of that, you can say, well, the, the whole thing was in black and white. I didn't really see any color.

8:12 Gabriel: Okay. And, uh, are we talking about a *real* flag that you're actually observing? Or are we talking about one that you're imagining?

8:20 RTH: Well, I think it's the same. I *think* it's the same thing in this situation.

8:24 Gabriel: Okay.

8:24 RTH: If I see a black and white photograph of my uncle's casket, or in my imagination, I see my uncle's casket [Gabriel: Okay.] and, and the seeing happens to be in black and white (which some, some seeings are)...

8:37 Gabriel: Sure. I think there's a slight difference, which is that like if you, if you were seeing a black and white photograph, um, it's possible, I think, that the, that the visual experience of the flag is not in your consciousness at all. It's just the, um, it's just the, um, the, the meaning that you're reflecting on or something like that. Um, but if you're imagining the flag, then there has to be some visual component in your experience, presumably, uh, because you're sort of actively bringing it into your experience. Uh, that's the point of imagining. So if you're imagining it, then there has to be some visual thing going on.

9:25 RTH: [pause] So I don't... I doubt that that's true.

9:27 Gabriel: Okay.

9:28 RTH: And, and what, what I think, I think, I think the trap that you're falling into is to, is to believe that, that there's some kind of a single stream of consciousness. [Gabriel: Okay.] Either it's in it or it's not. And I just don't think that's true. I think you're, I think experience, consciousness, or whatever is parallel processing of a whole lot of different kinds [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] of stuff. [Gabriel: Okay.] And some of it's more central. Some of it's less central. Some of it's 50% central, some of it's 70% central, some is 19% central. It's not, it's not *there or not*, it's in this manner are speaking, it's there; in that manner of speaking...

10:06 Gabriel: Okay.

10:08 RTH: But what I would say is we should, we should not take this conversation as being *closed*, but we should look at individual beeps. And the individual beeps *might very well* make this conversation, might, might contribute in a salutary way to this conversation.


10:28 Gabriel: Okay. Sure.

10:31 RTH: And the, and the reason that I say that is in my, in my experience in, in most DES things (in most of life in general), the specific instances are fundamentally important.

10:44 Gabriel: Okay. Got it.

10:44 RTH: It seems in sort of a philosophical analysis, as we've been going here, an analytical analysis, whatever you wanna call it, that we can talk in, we can talk in general without, without looking at, at individual specific instances, but I don't think that's possible, really. It seems like it's possible, but I don't think it is.


10:44 Russ comments: It seems to me that there are, broadly speaking, two ways to go about considering inner experience. The first, in which we have been engaged for the last 11 minutes, I might call the philosophical or the analytical method, as schematized here:



We start with an apprehended phenomenon—here, an image of Magnus Carlsen—and then apply some theoretical perspective to it (step 1). Then we have an

analytical discussion where we disambiguate some aspect of that theory (schematized by the straightening out of the bottom of the red theory in steps 2 and 3). Then, if we were to continue the analytical discussion, we would disambiguate (straighten out) other aspects, until by step 9 we have an unambiguous theoretical understanding. However, as we have proceeded, we have at each step lost touch with most of any directly apprehended phenomena.

The DES descriptive approach can be schematized this way, illustrating the iterative procedure:



At each step (beep), the procedure encounters a new-at-each-step directly apprehended phenomenon and describes it. Each new encounter highlights its own particular aspect(s) of apprehended phenomena, and (to the extent that the participants are paying attention) morphs their existing understanding to conform more closely to the new aspect. Note that at each step, the participants are directly confronting both the new apprehended phenomena and the currently understood description.

The difference between these two approaches is that the philosophical / analytical approach may start with a phenomenon but then never again makes contact with actual phenomena, and may be confused about what is or is not an actual phenomenon. A made-up example (e.g., the imagined uncle with the flag) is *not* really an example and *not* a phenomenon: it is a figment of RTH's imagination, perhaps presumed (with no warrant) to be the same in Gabriel's imagination. But it is not a phenomenon for either RTH or Gabriel. By contrast, the DES procedure focuses on one actual phenomenon (one random sample of Gabriel's experience)

after another. It tries to apprehend each of those phenomena with fidelity. To some extent, it will fall short (the red description never lies perfectly on the green phenomenon). By contrast, the philosophical / analytical procedure doesn't try to conform to phenomena.

It is easy to distinguish between a philosophical / analytical discussion and a DES description: count the number of actual phenomena carefully apprehended and described. Hypothetical situations (e.g., the uncle's flag) do *not* count.

So from RTH's perspective, the conversation of the last 11 minutes has *not* contributed much to our grasp of Gabriel's inner experience. Perhaps those minutes have been useful in advancing the procedure in some other way—establishing a level of communicative trust between the participants, for example.

11:03 Gabriel: Okay.

11:04 RTH: But I'm not, I'm not trying to be dogmatic about that. I'm saying, well, let's go look at some beeps, [Gabriel: Got it.] and maybe we can figure out something about that.

11:04 Russ comments: It is likely that upcoming interviews will be something of a battle between philosophical/analytical arguments and descriptions of phenomena. We will see how that plays out.

11:11 Gabriel: Okay. Alright. I, should I begin with, uh, my first beep, then?

11:17 RTH: Yes. And Amber will be the primary interviewer here.

11:21 Gabriel: Okay.

SAMPLE 3.1 DISCUSSION BEGINS HERE

11:21 AG: So when you're ready, what, if anything, was in your experience at the moment of beep 1?

11:25 Gabriel: Okay, so,

11:26 AG: Oh! I'm sorry. Really quick. Did, when, when did you wear the beeper?

11:30 Gabriel: So this was, uh, the beep 1 was at 5:23 yesterday. I didn't take the times on all the others, but they were shortly after.

11:39 AG: But you wore them all like last, the evening of yesterday.

11:42 Gabriel: Yes. It was all continuous, so it was, yes.

11:45 AG: Okay. And then, um, sorry, any questions other than the discussion previously had any questions about this sampling or problems with the beeper at all?

11:53 Gabriel: I don't, Nope. No problems with the beeper. I don't think I have any questions.

11:56 AG: Okay, perfect. And, [Gabriel: Okay.] so go ahead with beep 1.

12:00 Gabriel: Alright. So, uh, in my experience at that moment was, uh, the words, “they do have crème brûlée,” and also I was looking at an image of a crème brûlée on my phone. So the, the image of the crème brûlée was also in my experience. And also just the idea of there being a crème brûlée in the pastry area of, uh, of a Whole Foods grocery store.

12:33 AG: I’m sorry, what was the last part about the grocery store?

12:36 Gabriel: Oh, uh, the, i, the idea of a crème brûlée being in the pastry area at a Whole Foods grocery store.

12:45 AG: Okay. And of those things, is there anything that is the most salient to you?

13:00 Gabriel: I would say it was the image.

13:05 AG: And that’s, uh, okay. So let’s start there. So, um, what do you see?

13:18 Gabriel: Uh, it was just, uh, y’know, a yellow, uh, pastry. Kind of looked like, a little bit like a pie. Uh, and, uh, this was something that I was actively looking at on my phone. So I wasn’t imagining this, this is right there. And, uh, I was looking at the crème brûlée.

13:37 AG: So do you see a crème brûlée? Or do I see a yellow pastry that I understand to be crème brûlée.

13:43 Gabriel: I saw, I saw a pie-like object. At the moment, I was kind of thinking, this looks a little bit like a pumpkin pie.

14:00 AG: Is, but is that part of your experience? Or is that something that, that,

14:04 Gabriel: That *was* a very, uh, slight aspect of my experience was thinking, *this looks a little bit like a pumpkin pie*. Uh, it was a very, very minimal.

14:26 AG: Okay. [pause] Um, and is the, the seeing, does this have any borders to it? Any background?

14:44 Gabriel: Um, I think, uh, I was just looking at the, uh, crème brûlée and then like everything else was, everything else except for basically the top of the crème brûlée was not really in my experience at all. It was basically everything else was a blur around it.

15:02 AG: Okay. And, um, are you seeing this crème brûlée ? From what perspective are you seeing it? Like, are you seeing it from the top? Are you seeing it,

15:11 Gabriel: Like I, I was

15:13 RTH: Looking at the, can I interrupt here? Cause Amber, it seems like you’re asking questions that would be more relevant if this was an inner seeing rather than an

outer seeing. And the difference, the difference there is that in this situation, there is something physical (or electronic or whatever) that's being seen external from Gabriel [AG: Mm-hmm.] Whereas in an *inner* seeing, then, then, then there's not something that we can say is separate from Gabriel or.... [AG: Yeah.] And so the question about perspective, what, which direction are you looking for? Well, I'm looking at it in the *real* world. I'm looking at it in the way that it's presented. So what I'm, what I'm recommending here is that you keep very clearly in mind the distinction between what is there to be seen on the phone and what is in Gabriel's experience.

15:13 Russ comments: Suppose a DES participant, let's call her Anna, says "I'm seeing my friend Billie." Suppose further that we have established that this is an imaginary process—Billie is not present either in person or in photograph. Now we would like to know what it is about Anna's experience that leads her to say "I am seeing Billie:-- sometimes people mean that they were innerly seeing, and sometimes they mean that they were somehow imagining without any experience of seeing at all. What to do?

One line of questioning might be, "By *seeing* do you mean that you were innerly seeing Billie? Or do you mean that they were somehow imagining Billie without any experience of seeing at all?" But there are three problems with that line of questioning: First, it asks about the word usage, and DES doesn't really care about word usage. Second, if Anna has an unusual form of experience, asking her to clarify the words that she uses about it is not likely to be fruitful. And third, it doesn't allow for some other alternative.

I have found it useful to ask something like, "From what perspective do you see? Or doesn't *perspective* make sense here?" People whose experience is actually inner seeing can answer that question easily, saying something like: "I see her from the waist up, looking not directly at me but a little to the right." Such an answer is as good evidence there is that the experience actually involved a seeing. And it has the further virtue of encouraging a focus directly on Anna's experience, which is the ultimate goal of DES.

If the "from what perspective" question is difficult to answer, then I will want to know what is it about her experience that makes that question difficult.

Note that I don't necessarily care what the perspective is—whether it is from the front or the side, or so on. My primary interest is whether the experience is of inner seeing. That is why the question of perspective is important for inner seeing but not as important for external seeing.

16:14 AG: Okay. Okay. So what should I do? Like, cuz I'm, I'm, okay.

16:23 RTH: So what's your, what's the question? [inaudible]

16:27 AG: What is he seeing? Like the top or like the front, because I don't know how the image looks on the...

16:35 Gabriel: Right. Yeah. That it was, uh, it was, it was like, uh, a, a like a view of it was like the top, it was like from an angle. So like you could see a little, if you looked at the image, you could see a little bit of the bottom and a bit of the top. But the bottom part wasn't part of my experience. It's just the top and some of the white, some of the

white background of the image was also in my experience, uh, at, at all as well. I forgot to mention that, but,

17:00 AG: Okay. And is the phone or the, the fact that it's on my phone, the phone, any part of that in your experience? It's no doubt I'm seeing it on my phone, but is that part of your experience at the moment?

17:15 Gabriel: I don't think so.

17:16 AG: Okay.

17:18 Gabriel: Not that I can recall.

17:25 AG: Okay. Do you have any other questions?

17:27 RTH: Yeah, I do. So I'm.... So on your phone. Tell me, tell me again exactly what's on the phone.

17:40 Gabriel: Uh, exactly what's on my phone or in the experience of my phone. So like, do you wanna know what was actually there?

17:48 RTH: I wanna know both, but you can start, start either way of what I was gonna the ask the other one, too.

17:54 Gabriel: Okay. So in reality it was, um, uh, a picture of a crème brûlée on like the Whole Foods website, uh, below the picture was some text, uh, that labeled it and then also explained some nutrition information. [RTH: Okay.] Um, and then in my experience was just the, uh, the picture of the crème brûlée, the top of it, um, the kind of yellowish, uh, like the differences between the browns and the, the yellows of like the, the, the caramelized portion, um, and a bit of the white background. And that was basically, uh, all of the visual aspects that were in my experience, or at least I was attending to.

18:40 RTH: And by and by the top of *it*, what's the *it* there,

18:45 Gabriel: The crème brûlée.

18:46 RTH: So the, so the photograph that is being displayed shows the crème brûlée in its crockery or whatever you, whatever you call that thing. But you weren't looking at that, you were looking at just the...

19:01 Gabriel: Yeah, I was just looking at the top of it. The, the caramelized thing.

19:06 RTH: Okay. And, and do you see that... As far as your experience is concerned, we've been talking about it as if it was a crème brûlée. [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] Do you see it as a crème brûlée? Or do you see it as a, as a, uh, [pause] I forget what you called it.

19:31 Gabriel: A pie-like object.

- 19:32 RTH: A pie-like object.
- 19:34 Gabriel: Yeah. Yeah. I, I think I saw it as both a crème brûlée and a, a pie-like object.
- 19:38 RTH: And what does that mean, that you saw it as both?
- 19:40 Gabriel: Well? Like I, I knew it was a crème brûlée, uh, but I knew it was a crème brûlée because of the fact that it was there on the front page of the crème brûlée section of, of the Whole Foods website or whatever. Um, but I at, but it was also like, at the same time I was trying to figure out what the picture was a picture of, uh, and I was thinking it was a pie-like object. I was just thinking this is a pie-like object. I, I feel, uh, it, it does, it does, it does feel like both of those were occurring at once.
- 20:21 RTH: So at the moment of the beep, I both see a crème brûlée, *and* I'm trying to figure out whether this pie-like object is a crème brûlée?
- 20:32 Gabriel: Uh, yes, I think so. I, I think so. Maybe. I mean, maybe, yeah, maybe, maybe what it is is that part of me was wondering if it was the wrong picture, but I don't remember wondering that. I could be, and also like, I could be wrong. Maybe I wasn't thinking both of those at the same time, but that is, uh, what I remember and that's what I wrote down.
- 20:32 Russ comments: Gabriel's 20:32 turn is, to my ear, a good example of a person struggling with his presuppositions. Recall that at 0:32, Gabriel had stated "because I couldn't have had an image in my head that was both blotchy and non-blotchy," as if that impossibility was so obvious as not to require consideration. Here, he is faced with a similar dilemma: it doesn't seem possible that he could both know it is crème brûlée and yet *not know* it is crème brûlée. That he is struggling is a good sign, from my point of view. It means he is taking the process seriously.
- 21:07 RTH: So I'm not in a position to judge what was actually in your experience, that's [Gabriel: Yeah.] that's not, that's not my job. Well, my job is, is to (and Amber's job too) is to develop in *us* a way of talking about Gabriel's experience so that *next time* we might not be as confused about these things as we are at this time. [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] So this, this time we're, *this time* I hear Gabriel to be saying, "well, maybe I saw it as a crème brûlée, and maybe I saw it as a pie-like object that I was trying to figure out whether this was a crème brûlée, and maybe I was trying to figure out whether this was, I was on the wrong page or whatever. [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] And maybe all that stuff is in his experience, and *maybe* it's, uh, sort of a presupposition of his way of looking at the world that, that he's reluctant to own up to what's actually in his experience or whatever and say, well, it could be this, and for sure it could be, it could be that, it could be this other.
- 22:16 Gabriel: I don't, I think the, the ma, the only *maybe* that there is for me is, um, maybe I was wondering if it was the wrong image. That I feel like that's a good way of reconciling the two things that were in my experience there. But that is just a, maybe, I think as,

as I remember it, I was thinking of it as a crème brûlée, but I was also thinking of it as a pie-like object.

22:43 RTH: And are those the same way of thinking?

22:47 Gabriel: Um, um, no. Be, and, and there was like a little bit of confusion at that moment. It was like, this is a crème brûlée, uh, but why is it a pie-like object? [laughs] So those tho, I, there was like...

23:08 RTH: A, that's, that's going the other way around. Why is it a pie-like object? That's starting with crème brûlée and going to pie-like. Up until now we've been talking about pie-like, and wondering whether it was crème brûlée.

23:18 Gabriel: Well, I knew it was crème brûlée. Uh, I, I don't, if I said that I miss, I misspoke. I knew it was crème brûlée the whole time, but I was also thinking of it as a pie-like object.

23:18 Russ comments: This can give us some insight into the DES procedure. It is *not* the aim of DES to try to discern / interpret / deduce / speculate whether Gabriel's directly apprehended at-the-moment-of-the-beep experience is better described as seeing a crème brûlée that resembled a pie-like object, or as seeing a pie-like object that he could infer was a crème brûlée, or neither, or both, or whether there is an even better third alternative. DES accepts that when describing experience, Gabriel (like most people in their early practice in DES) is engaged in an activity for which he has relatively little practice or skill. It accepts that Gabriel's descriptions are likely some admixture of Gabriel's actual experience, some (perhaps many) presuppositions, and some other influences that are hard to specify. It accepts that presuppositions are delusions, and all veteran clinicians know there is no gain in trying to talk someone out of a delusion. DES therefore happily accepts that *we don't know* about this important aspect of Gabriel's experience.

What we have done here is *not* to answer that question, but (perhaps) to put us in a better position to answer similar questions *if they arise in the future*. We have established that it is (or at least might be) possible to think two contradictory things at the same time, and that RTH will not find that crazy or stupid—that he will be interested in such anomalies if they actually exist. That is the iterative procedure at work: accepting our present shortcomings in favor of the possibility of future fidelity.

23:40 RTH: [pause] Okay. And then there was a part of this conversation where you described it as being yellow and brown and against white or something like that.

23:47 Gabriel: Mm-hmm. Yes. Uh, exactly.

23:51 RTH: And was that, were, was that in your experience as well?

23:57 Gabriel: Uh, I was thinking about the brown part on top of it because, uh, that was part of like, what made me think it was like a pie like object because it reminded me of cinnamon on top of pumpkin pie.

24:18 RTH: And is that in your experience? *Oh, that looks like cinnamon, pumpkin pie.*

- 24:24 Gabriel: Uh, it, I wasn't re reflecting on it specifically that it looked like cinnamon, but it was sort of like, um, I was, I was sort of recognizing it as a pattern of pumpkin pie, that I would see on pumpkin pie. I wasn't thinking of it as cinnamon though.
- 24:54 RTH: So I am in some way thinking of it as a visual characteristic of pumpkin pie. Something that you see on pumpkin pie.
- 25:04 Gabriel: Yes. [pause] Does that answer the question?
- 25:30 RTH: [pause] So it seems like we've given sort of three answers to the question of what is it that you see? I see crème brûlée, I see a pie like object. [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] I notice the brownness, which reminds me of pumpkin pie. [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] And are, and so the question is, are all three of those present to me at the moment of the beep?
- 25:59 Gabriel: I believe so, yes.
- 26:05 RTH: Equally?
- 26:05 Russ comments: Note that RTH is not likely to believe Gabriel's answer—this conversation has been going on too long, so there is too much opportunity for confabulation or drift. The question is more a calisthenic aimed at strengthening the ability (on future sampling days) to aim at experience.
- 26:07 Gabriel: Um,
- 26:08 RTH: Or doesn't that question makes sense?
- 26:16 Gabriel: I think the, uh, pumpkin pie and the, the pie like object part and the, uh, pumpkin pie thing, I think those two are like split because they're basically, uh, they're, they're very closely related. Um, so it, it's like, it's like 50% is the, um, crème brûlée, 25% is the pumpkin, uh, pattern, and then 25% is the pie-like object.
- 26:51 RTH: So actually, we'll leaving out another, another part of this process, which is, is this the wrong picture? Did the, does the screen put up the wrong picture?
- 27:00 Gabriel: Uh, I don't, like I said, I don't actually remember that being part of my experience. I was just saying that that's like maybe some way of reconciling the two, but I don't remember that being part of my experience. [RTH: Okay.]
- 27:00 Russ comments: RTH files this response away as *Good! He doesn't just acquiesce to my pressure.*
- 27:25 AG: And you had some other portions of your experience as well, is that correct? Okay. Um, so is there anything that, that was the next salient or are they about the same at that point?

27:38 Gabriel: Oh, uh, the, the, the other part of my experience was the words, uh, “they do have crème brûlée.” [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] uh, I would say the, the image, uh, those words. What, which was the most salient here? I’m, I’m, I’m actually having trouble knowing which was the most salient. Um,

28:02 AG: Okay. That’s okay.

28:05 RTH: Let him work at it.

28:05 Russ comments: Part of the calisthenic described in the comment at 26:05.

28:06 Gabriel: Okay. Yeah, I will, I’ll think about that for a second. Yeah. The, the words were not, uh, were, were a limited part of my experience. It was sort of something I was saying on autopilot. Um, they *were* still part of my experience, but it was a small part. It was not as big as the, uh, imagery I was just describing.

28:29 AG: And those words are... How are those words present?

28:35 Gabriel: Uh, they’re, that’s something I’m literally saying to, uh, to somebody who was on the phone. Um, so just audio, auditorially.

28:46 AG: So are you hearing these words or are you, I’m speaking these words.

28:52 Gabriel: Can you? Yeah. Uh, I, I remember when we discussed this last time, uh, yeah, I was speaking them.

28:57 AG: Okay. And out loud.

28:59 Gabriel: Yes. Okay.

29:09 AG: And is there any inflection in this, uh, statement? Uh, like they *do* have crème brûlée, or they do have *crème brûlée*, or some, something like that?

29:17 Gabriel: I think, I think it was the first one, but that’s an inference based on, um, uh, based on the conversation. So I don’t actually, I can’t actually like tell you that that was part of my experience.

29:17 Russ comments: Good! He’s discriminating between recollection and inference.

29:30 AG: That’s okay. Um, and is there anything more to say about that portion of experience?

29:42 Gabriel: Uh, no, I don’t think so.

29:45 AG: And Dr. Hurlburt, do you have any questions?

29:47 RTH: There’s another part of his experience, I think.

- 29:49 AG: I mean, I'm not this portion. Do you have anything else about this portion? [RTH: Nope.] Okay. Okay. And then, yeah, you have one more thing about this idea of the crème brûlée being in the grocery store. So, uh, could you tell me more about that?
- 30:03 Gabriel: Yes. So this, this wasn't visual, this was just the idea, like of the fact of, um, this crème brûlée being in the pastry section of Whole Foods, like the, the fact that it might be there.
- 30:25 AG: And when you say like, the fact, the idea that it might be there, like is this some kind of like thought process? I see it on the website, therefore it must be in the pastry. I wasn't, is pastry section part of the experience? Is Whole Foods part of the experience?
- 30:45 Gabriel: Uh, pastry section? It is. Like what, what what I said was essentially all part of the experience. It was the, the fact of it being in the pastry section. It wasn't the fact of it being in Whole Foods [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] it was the fact of it being in the pastry section. Um, uh, but, and that didn't, that didn't represent itself in any particular way, aside from just like, acknowledgement of a fact in my head. And it didn't, uh, the way it came about wasn't part of my experience either. It was just there.
- 31:27 AG: And when you say "acknowledgement" [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] how, how, what, what, um, how, how is this present to you? You said that it's just there. Um, what, what do you mean by that?
- 31:39 Gabriel: Um, that's, uh, that's really hard for me to answer because [AG: Okay.] it's basically like, um, it's basically just floating somewhere in my head, y'know? It's just a fact that that is, uh, that's, uh, in my experience. And it's not anywhere specific. It's not like visual or sensory, it's just a fact. So I, I don't know how to describe it really, because it's just a fact.
- 32:14 AG: Okay.
- 32:19 AG: So I guess the question I, I'll try and ask the question a different way. So, [Gabriel: Okay.] uh, what I'm wondering is, is this something like, I I have, like, all of this is happening at the moment of the beep, right? So I, I'm seeing this image, I am saying they do have crème brûlée, and I am understanding that this would be in a pastry section? [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] Or is this something different? Something else? Like a, like an I, like is this more of like a cognitive process? Like, because I, I'm seeing it, I'm, I'm saying it, I'm understanding what's going on. I, I understand it to be that it'd be in the pastry section, or is this fact somehow present in a different way? I don't know if that question made sense.
- 33:00 Gabriel: I think, uh, I think it is present cognitively. Like I feel like that's the best way of putting it. Okay.
- 33:11 RTH: So let me comment on the process here. [AG: Yeah.] Well, part of, part of what's making this conversation a little bit complicated is that "fact" is being used in two different ways. [AG: Yeah.] It is a fact (or it's not) that Whole Foods has crème brûlée

on its pastry, whatever. And, and that fact is independent of Gabriel or Amber or me or anybody else. That's, but I don't think that's what, and, but I don't think that's part of what's in Gabriel's experience. Gabriel's ex... The question is whether Gabriel has, as part of his *experience*, this whatever it is, [Gabriel: Right.] thought about the, the crème brûlée being on the pastry aisle.

- 33:57 Gabriel: Maybe I should have said it's the *idea*, the *idea* of crème brûlée being the pastry section.
- 34:04 RTH: So even, even *idea* is a little bit state of the universe rather than Gabriel's experience. The question is whether at the moment of this beep, the fact that, or the idea of that, is *present* to Gabriel, that *Yeah. crème brûlée is on, on the pastry aisle*. There is crème brûlée on the pastry aisle.
- 34:28 Gabriel: Is that a question to me?
- 34:30 RTH: Well, uh, we're, we're thinking about how to, how to do this. So there's lots of facts or ideas out there [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] <affirmative> that, that are *true*. Y'know, Trump was indicted or they're referred to whatever. That's true. There's a war in, in, uh, between Russia and whoever. And that's true. And you could call that a fact, or you could call that an idea. I, but I, there's the idea that this war is going on, all that stuff is happening. [Gabriel: Okay.] But that doesn't mean that at any particular *moment*, Gabriel, at *this*, at *this* particular moment, the moment of this particular beep, that that was in your experience. It was no less a fact and no less an idea. But *one* of those was maybe in your experience and the rest of them...
- 35:12 Gabriel: Right. Um, it was this fact, uh, of the pastry thing: that *was* in my experience. [RTH: Okay.] Oh, and actually, I, I should say it also, uh, it wasn't, it was, it was a more of a, it was the fact that it's *possible*, not the fact that it *is*, but the fact that it's *possible*.
- 35:32 RTH: So somehow present to me in my direct experience at the moment of this beep (and no other beep, or we're not talking about any other beep, we're talking about this one), there is, it's possible that crème brûlée is in, in the pastry aisle.
- 35:47 Gabriel: Yes.
- 35:48 RTH: And that's *not* spoken. There's no words involved here. [Gabriel: No.] Even the word crème brûlée?
- 35:55 Gabriel: Uh, no, that was not... I mean, crème brûlée was in my experience because I was saying it, but that wasn't part of this thing. [RTH: Okay.] That wasn't part of this, part of my experience.
- 36:08 RTH: Okay.
- 36:09 Gabriel: So I suppose that, I suppose this was, uh, one of those unsymbolized facts or, or thoughts.

- 36:16 RTH: Sounds like it. But I've, I've, I'm reluctant to use that word until, until we figured out what the characteristic are. [Gabriel: Okay. Mm-hmm.] So I don't want, I don't want the word to be ahead of the experience. I'd rather have the word sort of lag behind the, the experience.
- 36:30 Gabriel: Okay. Got it.
- 36:32 RTH: And, and how prominent is this particular, y'know,
- 36:37 Gabriel: The fact?
- 36:39 RTH: This experience of crème brûlée on the pastry aisle, is that, um, 1%? 10%? 50%? Of your experience...
- 36:47 Gabriel: Of your I'd say, uh, I'd say it's like, it, it's like, um, 5% or maybe something around there. It's not a very big percentage. Uh, but it, it did, uh, it, it *was* there and it made the, it **was** there. Um, and the, the re uh, yeah, it wa it was, it was, it was kind of small, but it was there. It was small, but it was still like significant in a way, in the, in the sense that it did make me kind of pleased. Uh, it was a, a pleasing fact.
- 37:28 RTH: And is that part of your experience at the moment of the, the pleasing, pleasing part?
- 37:32 Gabriel: Yes. Yeah, that was part of, that was part of my experience. And I, I, I have, I did have that written, I have that written down right here, slightly pleased.
- 37:48 RTH: So when I've got is something like: Ongoing in my experience, caught in flight by the moment of the beep, by the leading edge of this beep [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] *is*: I see something which I take to be crème brûlée. [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] I see something that's a pie shape thing. [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] I see some brown stuff that reminds me of pumpkin pie. I say aloud, "they do have crème brûlée," and I have an idea, thought experience somehow of well, it might be on the pastry aisle.
- 38:36 Gabriel: Yes.
- 38:37 RTH: And all those things are ongoing. That's five pretty separate things.
- 38:41 Gabriel: Yeah. Those are five pretty separate things. And the, and slightly pleased as well. [RTH: And slight pleased. I forgot about that.] Uh, uh, so yeah, all those things, a as I remember them, uh, were in my, um, experience at the moment of the beep. Uh, now I, y'know, or at least whatever my temporal resolution is of, um, assessing my own experience.
- 39:15 RTH: Okay. I'm good about that one. [AG: Mm-hmm.] [Gabriel: Okay.] Shall I ask about number 2? [AG: Sure.] Number 2.
- 39:15 Russ comments: I invite the reader to reflect on the comment at 10:44. Today, we have had both a longish conversation that could be understood as philosophical / analytical (the first 11 minutes), and a longish conversation that could be understood

as descriptive. We have accepted that this particular sample (3.1) contains much (or all) that should be accepted as being of questionable fidelity about this particular experience. The question is, if the long-term goal is, eventually, to grasp Gabriel's experience with fidelity, should we do more philosophical / analytical conversation or more descriptive conversation (more beeped experiences)?

My answer: I think that descriptive conversations such as we just completed are vitally important if the object is to grasp his experience with fidelity. We could have had *a lot* of philosophical / analytical conversations and not advanced the real possibility of multiple experience, of contradictory experience.

There will come a time when philosophical / analytical conversations are important, but (in my view) that will be *after* we have become well grounded in Gabriel's actual experiences.

SAMPLE 3.2 DISCUSSION STARTS HERE

- 39:27 Gabriel: Okay. Uh, so in number two, uh, the word "Sistine," uh, the idea of, um, Italian brothers, oh, I should give a, I should give an explanation for what I was doing. I was looking at a, uh, like a cartoon that my mom had sent me. And it was about, uh, some Italian brothers who, uh, had built the floors of the Sistine Chapel. And it said something like, uh, unfortunately they were not, uh, remembered as well as, uh, the guy who, who made the ceilings, but these, these, the Lombardo brothers, uh, built the floors. So, uh, the word "Sistine" was in my conscious experience, because I had just read it, it was the, uh, the idea of Italian brothers. Um, and there was a slight discomfort over realizing that the joke was not very good or very logical since they would have credit. So it's not like surprising, like there, there's probably some record somewhere of the people who built the floors of the Sistine Chapel. So there's that slight discomfort. And, uh, then there was, there was also the word "pristine," um, uh, floating, uh, in the back of my, my head or, uh, not auditorially, but I just read the word Sistine and I was thinking of it. Part of me was thinking of the word "Sistine" as the word "pristine." Um,
- 41:03 Gabriel: So that, that was what was in my experience.
- 41:09 RTH: So you sort of broke up a little bit. So there's one word is "Sistine," as in the chapel. [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] And then there is another word that I couldn't tell whether you were saying "Sistine" again or "cysteem"?
- 41:22 Gabriel: Uh, "*pristine*."
- 41:23 RTH: Pristine.
- 41:24 Gabriel: [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.]
- 41:28 RTH: So two separate words present at the moment of the beep. [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] One is "Pristine," like the chapel, and one is "pristine," like "pristine experience" or whatever.
- 41:37 Gabriel: Right. And "Sistine" was auditory. Uh, but "pristine" was not.

41:53 RTH: And, and by auditory, what do you mean?

41:58 Gabriel: Uh, I mean it was, uh, inner speaking, um, or inner reading, just like the last time we talked about inner, the first time we talked about, uh, the inner speaking. And I talked about that sort of, um, whispery, uh, kind of non-human voice. Uh, that that's what the voice was. So it was the auditory experience of the word "Sistine."

42:33 RTH: So this is more about the *hearing* of this whispery voice. [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] not so much. Uh,

42:46 Gabriel: Go ahead. Sorry.

42:47 RTH: Not so much about the *speaking* of it. Is that right or is it *speaking* in this, wh, whispery voice, is it more about speaking?

42:56 Gabriel: Um, it is, it is the, it's inner speaking. So it was the, the, the experience of the word Sistine was, uh, speaking, an inner speaking that I'm also hearing.

43:15 RTH: Okay. And "pristine" is a different thing.

43:25 Gabriel: "Pristine," uh, is, is not auditory. "Pristine" is just an idea. It's like the idea of pristine, because I, I was for a second, my brain was like, wondering if "Sistine" meant "pristine." It hadn't, like, at that moment of the beep, it hadn't 100% chosen how to interpret "Sistine." So the possibility of the chapel and the possibility of pristine were in my head.

43:56 RTH: And when you say your brain was trying to decide that, d does, is this something that you experienced?

44:04 Gabriel: Uh, I experienced it as the word "pristine," uh, being in my head, but I, I wasn't like actively noticing or trying to determine how to interpret the word "Sistine."
"

44:21 RTH: And how, how, how is the word "pristine" present to you?

44:28 Gabriel: It's present to me just as, um, as the meaning of the word. Uh, and I don't know if there was any visual associated with that. It's possible there was, uh, but I don't know for sure.

44:45 RTH: And as, but when you say, as present to me as the meaning of the word, do you mean just the meaning, *just* the meaning of it? Or do you mean the word as a semantic unit? Semantic, I, I semantically understand this word, the word's there, and I understand what it means.

45:01 Gabriel: Um, I mean, uh, it's the, just the *meaning* of the word "pristine" was floating in my head, uh, sort of semi attached to "Sistine," which I had just read. It was like, um, yeah.

45:20 RTH: So the *word* “pristine” is *not* present to you?

45:25 Gabriel: Not the auditory experience of the word. Just the meaning of the word.

45:31 RTH: And by just the meaning of the word. Do you mean just the meaning of the word *without* the word itself, whether spoken, heard, seen, whatever.

45:39 Gabriel: I don’t, I think it, yes, without the word itself.

45:43 RTH: Okay. So the *meaning* of the word “pristine” is present. [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] And the spoken and heard version of the word “Sistine” is present?

46:03 Gabriel: Yes.

46:06 RTH: And those are those are somehow experientially connected, or are you inferring that those are connected because of this thought process?

46:13 Gabriel: Which two things?

46:15 RTH: “Pristine” and “Sistine.”

46:17 Gabriel: Uh, the, I’m inferring that they’re connected. Uh, I, the connection between the two wasn’t, uh, in my experience. Okay. Uh,

46:32 RTH: So

46:32 Gabriel: Just to be so glad I got that outta the way.

46:35 RTH: Okay. So our, our task is just to describe what’s in *experience*.

46:39 Gabriel: Yes. Okay.

46:40 RTH: Well, they, they may very well be connected by some thought process, [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] but that goes beyond, beyond our task here.

46:48 Gabriel: Yes. Okay.

46:50 RTH: So as far as your *experience* is concerned, it seems so far, see if I got this right, that the word “Sistine” is present as if spoken in the whispery kind of a voice, [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] and the *idea* or the *meaning* of pristine is present, but not spoken in the, even the word itself is not actually present. But those two things are in my experience, [Gabriel: Yes.] and I don’t, I don’t experience that as being in some way connected.

47:18 Gabriel: I do not.

47:20 RTH: Okay. And then, um,

47:23 AG: I have a question about that really quickly. [RTH: Go for it.] Um, so you, you were saying that it's floating in the back of your head, is that a meta, is that, do you mean that metaphorically,

47:33 Gabriel: Or do you I mean that metaphorically. Okay.

47:35 AG: Just wanted to double check. Okay. And I'm good.

47:40 RTH: And then there's some idea of Italian brothers, and that the joke wasn't very good.

47:49 Gabriel: Uh, yes. [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.]

47:50 RTH: is that two, two separate things?

47:53 Gabriel: Uh, yeah. Those are two separate things as the idea of Italian brothers. Um, yes. And, uh, uh, and the idea that the, uh, slight discomfort over the joke not being very good.

48:09 RTH: So which one of those should we talk about first? Doesn't matter to me.

48:15 Gabriel: Is that, who's that question for?

48:16 RTH: For you.

48:18 Gabriel: Oh, okay. Uh, yeah, it doesn't matter to me. I could talk about either of them first.

48:21 RTH: Oh, let's talk about the brothers then.

48:23 Gabriel: Okay.

48:24 RTH: So somehow there's an idea of Italian brothers present to me. What is, what do you mean?

48:30 Gabriel: So, the, uh, idea of Italian brothers, uh, in this, in this particular instance, it was sort of the idea of, um, somehow overweight Italian brothers. Because in the cartoon, there's like a picture of like some kind of overweight guys. Uh, but it wasn't, I w, there was no visual image. I'm what caused the idea of overweight Italian brothers was the overweight people in the cartoon. Um, so that, that's what it was. It was, um, there was, yes. Yeah. And, um, I, this is kind of strange, but there was pro, there was like some, uh, slight old fact like smell of, uh, of sweat as, uh, that was associated with the idea. And that was partially in my, uh, experience.

49:28 RTH: Okay. So by, by *brothers*, do you mean people with the same parents or by brothers do you mean like, uh, religious sect kind of a deal?

49:39 Gabriel: Oh, I mean, uh, people with the same parents.

49:42 RTH: Okay. And are you, and by brothers, do you mean sort of an abstract thing? Like, I've got a brother, you've got a brother, or the whole world's got brothers, whatever, or do you mean these particular two guys?

49:58 Gabriel: Uh, it was actually, it was either three or four.

50:02 RTH: Three or four guys, whatever.

50:03 Gabriel: Yes. [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.]

50:04 RTH: But, but you, you don't mean brothers in the general, you mean these, the Lombardi, Lombardo brothers, or Lombardo.

50:10 Gabriel: Yes.

50:13 RTH: Okay. And so when we say the idea of the Italian, overweight Italian brothers, does that mean I'm somehow thinking of the Lombardo brothers and I'm of them as being overweight, and at the same time I smell sweat?

50:32 Gabriel: Uh, I was, it was that, it was more like the smell of sweat combined with, um, the, uh, idea of like overweightness, uh, was itself a part of the idea of the Italian brothers. So the Italian brothers was like a, a part, uh, was made up of those two things and the concept of brothers and Italian.

51:14 RTH: So I could understand that in a, any variety of different kinds of ways. [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] I, in my experience, it could be I'm smelling sweat and thinking about overweightness or something. [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] And then when I have to tell these guys about it, I say, well, y'know, that's somehow that means that the Lombardo brothers,

51:36 Gabriel: Yes.

51:37 RTH: *Or* I could be thinking about the Lombardo brothers. The Lombardo brothers are sort of central to my experience. And when I tell these guys about it, I can say, well, there's a smell of sweat involved. [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] and Overweightness. *Or...*

51:54 Gabriel: Right. The sweat and overweightness was *itself* like part of the *identity* of the idea of the brothers. It wasn't something that the id, the brothers idea was causing. It was *itself*, uh, central to the idea of the Lombardo brothers.

52:26 RTH: And, and is the smell, I, do I actually smell it?

52:30 Gabriel: Yeah. There is a, a sight smell.

52:33 RTH: Okay. So it's not just the idea. *These guys, these brothers are smelly.* It's, I *smell* them.

52:38 Gabriel: [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.]

52:41 RTH: And [pause] so I, I smell something which I understand to be the brothers, and I'm thinking about the brothers, thinking about the *Lombardo* brothers, and I somehow know that, them to be overweight. [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] And all that stuff seems like one package. I'm [Gabriel: Yes.] thinking about the overweight Lom. Overweight, smelly, I'm, I'm thinking about and smelling the overweight Lombardo brothers.

53:22 Gabriel: Yeah. None of it is incidental. It's all, all wrapped up together into like one thing, which is the Lombardo brothers.

53:34 RTH: Who smell like this and who are, and that's part of the essential deal of it.

53:40 Gabriel: [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.]

53:57 RTH: Okay. And then there's the joke.

53:59 Gabriel: Yes. Uh, sorry, what, what was

54:04 RTH: That? Unless Amber had additional questions about the Lombardo,

54:07 AG: Um, I just wanted to be clear that, that this idea of the brothers, is this an idea of, of broadly Italian brothers, or specifically the *Lombardo* brothers? Because we had kinda said both things in the description.

54:23 Gabriel: Oh, okay.

54:26 AG: Hmm. Does that question make sense what I'm saying?

54:28 Gabriel: I

54:31 AG: So are all these ideas somehow in my experience, in my experience, the Lombardo brothers are in my experience? Or is my experience this be a little more, I don't wanna say that. Um, is my experience about the *Lombardo* brothers or my ex, is my experience about *Italian* brothers.

54:49 Gabriel: It's okay. Yes. Like, um, the name Lombardo Brothers was not in my experience. [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] that was something that I had passed over. Um, it was about specific *brothers* who had done the floors of the Sistine Chapel, but the name was not there.

55:10 AG: Okay.

55:12 Gabriel: Yeah. In that moment, if you asked me what their name was, I wouldn't even remember.

55:17 AG: Okay. But it, it's about, uh, *brothers who built the floor*, the [Gabriel: Yes.] is is even the idea of *Italian* brothers.

55:26 Gabriel: Yes. Italian was there.

55:28 AG: Okay.

55:30 RTH: And is floor builders there as well?

55:33 Gabriel: Uh, that is, that is there, but that is there in the, uh, con, in the part of being disappointed with the joke that is not there, uh, being part of the, uh, brothers.

55:48 RTH: So in, and this is, this thought is about a particular band of brothers, particular group of actually genetically related people...

56:00 Gabriel: [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.]

56:01 RTH: ...who smell this way and are overweight.

56:06 AG: And happen to be Italian.

56:07 Gabriel: Yes. And okay. There is also, and, and, uh, have a company together, a family company.

56:17 RTH: Okay. Okay. And then there's the discomfort with the joke.

56:30 Gabriel: Yes. So, um, there wa there was, um, uh, there was discomfort with the joke because it wasn't as good as I thought it would be. Uh, now the, because (let me think about whether or not, uh, the, because it was good, not as good was in my experience, or if it was just the discomfort and that was caused by that). [pause] Okay. Uh, there was discomfort, and there was, this joke is not very good, but the not as good as I thought it could be *wasn't* part of it. That was, uh, a cause of the feeling that it wasn't very good because I had higher expectations of the joke. Um, but that *wasn't* in my experience, it was just this joke is not very good and discomfort or displeasure.

57:40 RTH: And is the, this joke is not very good. How is that present to you?

57:48 Gabriel: Um, that is present to me, that is present to me in the knowledge that the joke isn't actually pointing out a truth, uh, which is, y'know, the idea of the joke was sort of like, oh, nobody thought, nobody thinks about the, the people who built the floor of the Sistine Chapel. And I, I, when I got to that, that word Sistine, I realized, okay, I, I'm, I, I bet you there probably is documentation as to who built that floor. Um, so it's not a, so *to me*, the joke because of the fact that there actually is documentation, the joke wasn't as good. Uh, so the, the, the, *this joke isn't very good*, is present in the recognition that *there is documentation*.

58:44 RTH: And, and so is the, is the realization that there's probably documentation, is that part of the *context* of this, or is that part of the *actual experience*?

58:53 Gabriel: Well, the, that is part of the actual experience.

58:55 RTH: So the actual experience is that this, this joke rests on faulty principle, basically.

59:02 Gabriel: Yes.

59:05 RTH: And I, I would, would, would, I would, should I call that sort of an analytical thing? Or cognitive?

59:11 Gabriel: It was an analytical, uh, it was analytical. There was the actual feeling of disappointment as well. Uh, and the, the feeling of disappointment in, in my experience was sort of one and the same with the analysis.

59:26 RTH: So I experience myself as having engaged or currently engaging in an analysis project, and also feeling a slight discomfort.

59:37 Gabriel: Yes. That's what was going on.

59:39 RTH: Okay. And does the analysis seem like it's going, still going on? Or is it, is the analysis over and now I just have the result of it?

59:47 Gabriel: Oh, um, the analysis is over. I just have the result of it.

59:56 RTH: And the, and the result of it is this joke's not very good.

59:59 Gabriel: Yes.

1:00:00 RTH: And I know what *not very good* means, cuz I went through the analytical process. It means that its truth values don't add up or

1:00:06 Gabriel: Whatever. Yes.

1:00:08 RTH: Okay. And then at the same time, I feel discomfort.

1:00:13 Gabriel: Mm-hmm.

1:00:13 RTH: And what does that mean?

1:00:16 Gabriel: Uh, the discomfort is basically one in, one in the same with the end result of the analysis. Uh, like it is technically a different thing logically, but it's, in my experience, it's basically the same thing. Um, and, um, I can't describe the discomfort. It's just discomfort. It's not like physical or anything like that. It's just discomfort.

1:00:47 RTH: And if it's the same thing as *this isn't a very good joke*, why don't we just leave it as *it isn't a very good joke*. And I'm not, I'm not trying to say we should or shouldn't [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] do that. And I don't really care about the words involved. Well, what I wanna know is, it seems like you've been saying pretty convincingly that there's sort of two aspects of this. One is the analytical—it's not a very good joke—and the other is discomfort as [Gabriel: Right.] if it's two separable (related obviously) things,

1:01:19 Gabriel: But Yes,

1:01:21 RTH: And

1:01:21 Gabriel: I, it's like, okay, let me think about it because that's a hard question. Um. [pause] I, I almost wanna say that, um, I recognize the discomfort or displeasure is a result of the ana, analysis, and I realized it in that moment, but I don't think that's accurate. Um, it's, it's, it's more like, it's more like the analysis was like, the result of the analysis that this wasn't a very good joke, I like that that fact, this isn't a very good joke, um, it's like that was made of displeasure, in a, in a sense. Uh, it, it, it, they're really, uh, they're really kind of one and the same. Um, yeah. They're really, they, they really do feel like one and the same. [pause] Like the fact *is* the displeasure.

1:03:11 RTH: So the, the fact that these, that *these truths don't add up* and *displeasure* are the same thing.

1:03:22 Gabriel: Yeah. That's how I experience it. At least

1:03:29 RTH: That's what we're shooting for!

1:03:32 Gabriel: Okay.

1:03:40 RTH: So we're 10 minutes past where we're supposed to be here, and I've got, we got another meeting coming up pretty, pretty soon, so we're gonna have to, we're gonna have to bring this, this one to a close.

1:03:49 Gabriel: Okay.

1:03:50 RTH: But I would, I would say, I think these are totally interesting. I hope we can do some more of 'em. We have to figure out when we're gonna do it. [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.]

1:03:58 Gabriel: All right. I'd be happy to do more.