

TRANSCRIPT WITH COMMENTARY
Gabriel H.: A college senior interested in philosophy
Gabriel Interview 2

Below in black is a word-for-word transcript of the December 13 interview with Gabriel that is available on YouTube at <https://youtu.be/ZQvDit1tLLA>. In green are comments about and explanations of the Descriptive Experience Sampling process. If you have corrections, suggestions, or questions, please post them as YouTube comments.

RTH = Russ Hurlburt
AG = Amber Goto
CK = Cody Kaneshiro
Gabriel = Gabriel H.

0:00 AG: Um, so day two. Um, do you have any questions? Any issues with the beeper? Anything at all?

0:06 Gabriel: [Looks through notepad] I don't think so. I don't think so.

0:10 AG: Okay. And then when, when did you wear the beeper?

0:14 Gabriel: Uh, I wore the beeper, um, on a plane yesterday. Uh, I got a few beeps in and, uh, when I got back, uh, to the apartment. So that was late at night, around two.

0:30 AG: So yesterday, was this all continuous or did you...?

0:34 Gabriel: Uh, I took a pause after, uh, the f, uh, like when we landed, and I think I actually only got one beep in on that flight. It was a short flight. [AG: Okay.] Um, yeah, so I got, I, I took it out when we landed and then I did the rest at the apartment.

0:46 AG: Okay, [inaudible]. [Pause]

0:53 RTH: I'm ready.

0:54 AG: Okay. I am ready as well. Uh, beep 1.

SAMPLE 2.1 DISCUSSION STARTS HERE

0:56 Gabriel: Okay, [looks through notepad] so... beep one... Alright. So beep one was, uh, I was zipping the sound, uh, or sorry, I was zipping my backpack closed. And, uh, what was in my experience at that moment was the sound of my backpack zipper, um, the feel of it in my, uh, between my two fingers, which was just a slight, like cold sensation cuz it was metallic. And at the same time I was also thinking about, um, um, I was thinking, uh, uh, about Magnus Carlsen. So I had the image of that guy in my head. Uh, and, uh, I'll, I'll describe that image. So that was not like in front of me or anything like

that. That was like a second image. So I could, I could see my backpack very vaguely. Um, at that moment. It was in my awareness, but, uh, mo, more in my awareness visually was this image which wasn't in front of me spatially, it was just an image in my head. Uh, and it was an image of him, uh, in a, like streaming cuz he does streaming sometimes. And, uh, I saw some, I saw a decent amount of detail. His head was tilted down and, uh, but also there was sort of a vague sense of a white outline around the whole image. [Pause]

2:23 AG: Okay.

2:23 Gabriel: Am I going too fast?

2:24 AG: No, no, no!

2:25 Gabriel: Okay.

2:26 AG: Um, so [clears throat] it sounds like you have a few things going on here, [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] like three things in your experience?

2:35 Gabriel: Yeah, there were like three things: the zipper, the image of the guy, and, uh, a, a slight image of my backpack right in front of me. Like, I was slightly aware of that. [Pause]

2:49 AG: So... so would that be four things that you, uh, the sound of the zipper, the feel between your fingers?

2:58 Gabriel: Oh yeah, I guess so. I was thinking of the feel and the sound as the same, but yeah, you're right. I guess that would be four things.

3:03 AG: Okay. So which of, of all of these things, which is the most salient in your experience? Or is there anything that is more salient?

3:10 RTH: So, can I, can I have, let's, let me ask this, a couple of questions [AG: Okay.] and then we'll have a con, conversation about that. [Holds up a notepad such that the long side is flat against the table]

3:16 AG: Okay. Yeah.

3:17 RTH: So in our, in our model [begins to slide a pen on the table towards the edge of the up-turned notepad] of time marching forward [the pen meets the edge of the notepad] and the beep [slides pen up the edge of the notepad, as an illustration of the beep, then continues to slide the pen across the top of the notepad] occurring, and then you push [slides the pen down the further edge of the notepad] the button to stop the beep and time keeps on going [continues to slide pen across the remainder of the tables width]. The in, the moment that we, we're interested in is the one that's right here, right, one microsecond just before the beep occurs. [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] And we want to know what's directly present to you *then*. [Gabriel: Yes.] And so what we *don't* want you to do is to, while, while the beep is going, or shortly thereafter, [uses pen to generally motion to the top edge of the notepad] make sort of a catalog: *well*,

what was I seeing? What was I feeling? What was I hearing? What was I, whatever?
[Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] That would be sort of here, [uses pen to point to a specific spot on the top edge of the notepad] looking back at this, [uses pen to point to just before the bottom corner of the notepad, where the pen first contacted it] what we really want to know is what's going on here [continuing to point to the aforementioned bottom corner of the notepad] as best we can. So that, my question, after that lecture, is: were all those things present to you ongoing here? [continuing to point to just before the bottom corner of the notepad] Or does it seem like there's some kind of *well, I gotta make, I gotta give a complete report?*

- 4:08 Gabriel: Okay. I think they were all in my e, experience at that moment. Um, I, there were a number of things that *weren't* in my experience, for example, that were, I could probably still feel like my feet on the ground and stuff like that. Um, also I was kind of hungry at the time, but I wasn't noticing that. Uh, those things I think *were* in my experience at that moment. [RTH: Okay.] Does it seem like it was a lot to have in an experience? Is that why you asked?
- 4:38 RTH: I, I didn't, I, I didn't mean to be asking in a way that was accusing you of, [Gabriel: Oh no.] making a mistake or whatever.
- 4:45 Gabriel: I didn't think you were accusing me.
- 4:46 RTH: What I wanted, what I wanted to recognize, and I wanted Amber to recognize is that when somebody lists something I, I, a lot like that, [AG: Mm-hmm] there's the *possibility* [Gabriel: Okay.] that they're cataloging, [AG: Mm-hmm] and we don't want them to catalog. [Gabriel: Right.] And we're early in sampling, [AG: Mm-hmm.] and so we want to figure [AG: (Clears throat)] out whether they're cam, whether they're cataloging, and if they are, then we can talk about it, that early on. What we don't want to do is to give 'em the impression that they *should be* cataloging, [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] [AG: Mm-hmm] or allow them to continue to think they should be cataloging [AG: Makes sense] if we're...
- 5:19 AG: Yeah.
- 5:20 Gabriel: Yeah, that does, okay, that makes sense. Yeah. Uh, I don't, I don't, I don't think I was cataloging there [RTH: Okay.] I think that was what was, in my experience, [RTH: Mm-hmm.] uh, that's my best guess at least. Um, [AG: Okay.] I'm not 100% sure I could be wrong about those things, but...
- 5:35 RTH: And then the *other* thing that I would say is that you doing the counting might, might be somewhat problematic. [AG: Okay.] And it seems like three things *to him*, then it's three things. [AG: Got it.] And one of those things was a sight and a sound together. If that's the way it is, is his, in his experience, you don't want to rip those apart, so to speak, and make 'em, make 'em *have to be* two different things
- 5:58 AG: Okay. [Pause] Okay. So, uh, can I go back to salience? [RTH: (Nods)] Okay, so which of these things were more salient?

6:09 Gabriel: Okay, right. Um [pause] I thi, I think [pause] uh [pause] the sound of the zipper was the least salient thing, but everything else was about equal.

6:43 AG: Okay. So let's start with...

6:48 RTH: And tell, would you tell me again what is the everything else?

6:51 Gabriel: Oh, that was, uh, the backpack in front of me visually. Um, the, the cold feeling of the zipper, and, um, the image of Magnus Carlsen, uh, in his little streaming setup.

7:08 RTH: Mm-hmm. So here, here's an example of why it, it seems like sort of three and a half things, [AG: Mm-hmm.] rather than four things [inaudible].

7:20 AG: Yeah. Okay. [Pause] So let's start with the image of Magnus Carlsen. [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] Um, how do you spell Magnus Carlsen? Just so that I know. [Laughs]

7:34 Gabriel: M A G N U S, uh, [AG: Carlsen.] Yeah.

7:41 AG: Um-

7:41 Gabriel: I don't know if there's an 'E' in Carlsen but [inaudible]

7:42 AG: That's okay. I, just, just so that I know [Gabriel: Okay.] for my own, uh, knowledge. Um, so, what, what do you see?

7:50 Gabriel: Um, so I see this, this guy. He's sitting down, uh, in front of a desk. I don't see the desk, but that's where he is. And his head is tilted down kind of like this, [tilts head down and to the left] um, because he's looking at what's on the desk. Uh, so that's sort of what I see. He's wearing a white shirt. Um, I see his hair. And, and basically all of this is kind of vague blotches of color. Um, it's not detailed. Um, it's just kind of abstract, uh, kind of impressionistic. And that, yeah, that's what I see. And then there's sort of, um, a, a vague outl, or like a hint of an outline, like this feeling of a white outline around the image. And I think that's because I had been watching this on YouTube and the, the, like, the outskirts of the YouTube video are white.

8:55 AG: Okay. And when you say blotches of color [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] What do you, what do you mean by that?

9:09 Gabriel: Okay, so what I mean by that is, if I actually think about the face of the guy, um, in my experience at that moment, it's not detailed at all. It's really just like, kind of a blob, but it's a blob, which feels like his face, and it probably feels like his face more than it actually looks like his face. Like, that's just a feeling I attached to it. But, um, yeah. And that's sort of, everything else is kind of like that too. Everything's sort of blotchy. It's not very well, not very detailed. [Pause]

9:56 AG: [Looks to RTH] Can you-?

9:56: RTH: What, what do you wanna know?

9:57 AG: Um, can I just ask what I'm thinking?

10:02 RTH: That's a, [AG: Laughs] per, perfect thing to ask [inaudible].

10:05 AG: Okay. So am I seeing Magnus Carlsen, or am I seeing these blotchy sh, like blotchiness that I understand to be Magnus Carlsen?

10:21 Gabriel: Wh, what do you mean by that?

10:23 AG: So in my experience, do I see this, these, these blotches that I understand to be Magnus Carlsen when I'm describing it to you? Or I just, I just understand this, what I, my vision to be Magnus Carlsen [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] or am I seeing Magnus Carlsen?

10:23 Russ comments: The question AG is asking is: what is immediately present in Gabriel's experience at the moment of the beep? Does Gabriel directly experience Magnus Carlsen (and then later can describe the blotchiness), or does Gabriel directly experience blotchiness (and then later can describe Magnus Carlsen)? It is a difficult question to ask, because inner seeing is *not* the same as external seeing. In *external* seeing there is the external thing seen and (separately) the experience of it. About *external* seeing it makes sense to ask about the thing seen and (separately) about the experience. In *inner* seeing, there is no separation between the seer and the thing seen (or at least such a separation should not be taken for granted). So about *inner* seeing, the question has to be only about experience: does it come immediately as Magnus Carlsen or does it come as blotchiness?

10:42 Gabriel: So when I, when I'm s, I, when I'm seeing the blotches, they f, uh, it is not in my awareness that they don't s, look like him, if that's what you mean. I, I, it is, I, I feel like this looks like him, uh, like I, it's not in my awareness that this is sort of an abstract blotchy thing. I'm not thinking about that. Um, but it *is* an [AG: Mm-hmm.] abstract blotchy thing. Is that what you mean? Is that, does that answer your question?

10:42 Russ comments: To my ear, Gabriel answers the question by saying it comes immediately as Magnus Carlsen—it is *not* in his immediate experience that he is seeing abstract blotches.

11:14 AG: Yeah, I'll, I'll try and ask it in a different way. So, [Gabriel: Okay.] in my experience, at the moment of the beep, in my experience, do I see Magnus Carlsen? And when I'm trying to explain it to these people, I'm saying that it's blotchy and it's, it's all of these things. *Or* in my experience at the moment of the beep, I see these blotches, [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] these, that's what you said, blotches or these whatever, [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] and I understand that to be Magnus Carlsen?

11:14 Russ comments: (See the comment at 10:23). This is an example of the difficulty of the DES interview (and all other interviews, carefully considered). Here, considering just the 11:14 turn, AG does a better job of asking the is-it-immediately-Magnus-or-is-it-immediately-the-blotches question...

11:39 Gabriel: It's more the second thing that I understand it to be Magnus Carlsen. [Pause]

11:39 Russ comments: ...but I think Gabriel's answer suggests that the interview has gone awry: he says it is the *second* thing (immediately the blotches) but that he understands it to be Magnus (which is the *first* thing). My understanding of what has happened here is this:

10:23 AG asks: Is your immediate experience of (1) Magnus or of (2) blotches?
(However, the question is asked with difficulty.)

10:42 Gabriel replies: (1) Magnus.

11:14 AG re-asks: Is your immediate experience of Magnus or of blotches?
(This time the question is phrased better, *but the fact that AG is asking the same question again implies to Gabriel that he gave, the first time, the wrong answer.*)

11:39 Gabriel replies: (2) Magnus. (That is, he has given a self-contradictory answer.)

11:52 AG: Okay.

11:52 RTH: [To AG] So I, I think [AG: Laughs] that your fir, that he understood your first question differently from the way he understood your second question. [AG: Okay.] [To Gabriel] So in your, in your experience is your experience of seeing, is your experience of seeing Magnus Carlsen, and if there was a parallel universe with not any discussion or s, whatever like that you would remember "well, I saw, at that moment I saw Magnus Carlsen." And-

12:18 Gabriel: As opposed to what exactly? I think it's that, I think it's that I saw Magnus Carlsen, but I'm not 100% sure what, uh, the, what the o, other option is.

12:18 Russ comments: Gabriel seems to be settling in on (1) Magnus.

12:33 RTH: The other option is, "I see some blotches. And, and rather than tell you I see a blotch of red here and yellow here and bigger, I'm gonna say, well, y'know, they, they sort of resemble Magnus Carlsen."

12:50 Gabriel: I th, I real, I don't know how to answer that question. I'm sorry. [AG: No.] I don't understand. Uh, I'm not sure I understand. Uh, because I, I mean, they're, they are, it was the blotches. And in my, in my mind, I wasn't thinking about the fact that it was blotches. Uh, it, it felt, it felt like a detailed image, if that's what we're, if that's what you mean? It felt like a detailed image, but it wasn't.

13:22 RTH: So let me, let me try a different, a different [Gabriel: Okay.] tack here. If you, i, i, i, if you're looking in this direction, you could say, "well, I see a blue shirt with some, with some green stripes to it, and I see a hairy wrist or, and I, and I see some so, gold glasses and I-" and all that would be true [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] Or you could say, "well, I see Hurlburt."

13:52 Gabriel: Right. Okay.

13:54 RTH: And the question is, in your experience is, is at some particular time, is your experience of seeing Hurlburt or of seeing all these things together, which of course are the Hurlburt visual, visualization?

14:06 Gabriel: So you mean like being individually aware of each of those things as opposed to just being aware of the whole?

14:17 RTH: Not necessarily *individually* aware, but aware of the, aware of the details rather than the whole.

14:25 Gabriel: Okay. Um, I was aware of the whole. [Pause]

14:25 Russ comments: I take Gabriel as selecting (1) Magnus.

14:36 [Gabriel continues] That said, I feel like I was aware of the detail, I feel like I *had* to have been aware of the details, because I was imagining it and I don't see how something [RTH's phone rings] me, [RTH: Sorry] Oh, no worries. I don't see how, um, maybe I'm wrong, but I, I don't see how something I was imagining could not have been in my experience.

15:02 RTH: So let's accept the possibility that you are wrong.

15:02 Gabriel comments: This conversation is largely what propelled my thinking that reporting on one's past inner experience must rely on either inference or some presumed memory 'tag' that differentiates consciously experienced details from details that were unconsciously stored in memory. At 14:25, I was making an inference based on the presupposition that imagined visuals, unlike real world visuals, are entirely composed of constituents with which we are directly aware. Since I hadn't yet considered the 'tagging' hypothesis, on being asked to discard my presupposition, I felt as though I would simply be forced into using another presupposition or being unable to say anything at all.

15:02 Russ comments: DES asks for descriptions of what is directly apprehended, and nothing else. That is, DES does *not* want to discuss what is inferred or hypothesized. DES is alert to the possibility that this distinction between what is directly apprehended and all else might not be easy or possible for some individuals, so DES does not want merely to presume that that distinction exists.

With Gabriel, I would note that the distinction did not become problematic until about 11 minutes into the discussion of the present sample—that is, on his first sampling day, as well as at the outset of his description of the present sample, Gabriel seemed confident in distinguishing between what was directly apprehended and all else. So something about the last four minutes of this interview apparently caused Gabriel to lose his nerve about what he experienced.

[Note that we return to a discussion of this image at the beginning of interview 3.]

15:04 Gabriel: Okay.

15:05 RTH: Which I think you are actually, [Gabriel: Okay.] But, so I think [Gabriel: (Laughs) Okay.] the world, I think the world's a complicated place. [Gabriel: Okay.] And I think that your, that your... disposition or thinking about that is a very common kind of thing [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] particularly for somebody with a philosopher, philosophical bent to [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] which would appear [Gabriel: (Laughs)] that you have. And, [pause] and, and so part of, part of what we're, part of what we're trying to do here is to, is to discover whether that's true. [Gabriel: Okay.] So I don't, I, I, I was a little strong when I said I doubt that it's true. What I, what I really want to do is to say, I, I, I want us to be skeptical about that. [Gabriel: Okay.] I want us to say, "well, maybe it's that way, or maybe it's not." So [Gabriel: Okay.] lemme give you, let me give you another example. So I just said, "let me give you another example." And we could ask, "well, did you understand Hurlburt to be ask, saying he was gonna give you another example? Or did you hear Hurlburt say the word 'let,' followed by the word 'me,' [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] followed by the word 'give,' followed by the word 'another,' followed by the word 'example.'" And I'm guessing that you understood that as Hurlburt saying he was gonna give you another example. That was the heart of your understanding. There are people who get one word at a time. Maybe that's *you*. Those are fairly rare, which is why I said "I doubt." [Gabriel: Okay.] But, but they're, but most, most people get the meaning, y'know, they, they hear the sort of the meaning coming with the words rather than a word, and then another word, and then another word, and then another word, and then another word, and then a later on the meaning.

16:54 Gabriel: Okay. Hmm.

16:56 RTH: And it's, this is the exactly the same phenomenon that you were asking about before.

17:00 Gabriel: Yeah. It's kind of funny.

17:01 RTH: B, before, [Gabriel: Mm-hmm] because you actually don't know what any [AG: (Clears throat)] word that I utter means until I get to the end of the sentence, because there are ambiguities in the words, and you have to figure out which homophonic ambiguity I'm, I'm [Gabriel: Right.] [inaudible]. And, and, and most people feel like they got that at, at the beginning of the sentence. [Gabriel: Yes.] But they couldn't possibly have had it until the end of the sentence.

17:22 Gabriel: Yeah. It's, it's very rare that I'm wondering what a word means, which means that, yeah. Okay. Um, okay. I mean, I'm, I'm beginning to understand the question a little better now. Um, but I also think that, I think that I, that, uh, I do hear, I feel like I do hear all the words at once, like all the words, uh, are part of my experience one at a time. Um, even though maybe af, even though maybe I also have the sensation that the meaning is there too, if that makes sense.

18:09 RTH: Well, what I think about that is that, that it might not have been a well-chosen example on my part. That's one thing. And the second thing is, sooner or later we may get a beep where that, when there are words happening, and that's when we're gonna be t, talking about it. [Gabriel: Okay.] Because I think what, what you're trying to do now is sort of armchair introspect about, well, what's it like to get words

[Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] And I think armchair introspection is very difficult, if not impossible. [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] If we get a beep, then I'll, I'll, we'll probably recall [Gabriel: Okay.] this conversation and we'll want to know whether it was one word at a time or whether it was, I, *I was hearing the guy say the whole sentence*.

18:46 Gabriel: Okay. Got it. I di, there was a, there was one where I was thinking of words, uh, which, which will be upcoming.

18:55 RTH: Okay. Well wh, when we get there. We'll, [Gabriel: Okay] we'll see what that, what that said.

18:59 Gabriel: Said. But when it comes to the blotches, uh, I, I don't, I, I don't think at the moment I can explain it better than I have, but I'll con, I'll consider this next time imagining something at the moment of the beep. Um, and hopefully I'll be able to grasp a little better what was in my direct experience in, in relation to this question. [pause]

19:31 RTH: [pause] So what I would, what I would say about that, and then we should move on, probably, is that when Gabriel first said this sentence, he said something, *I think*, something like, "well, I saw by Magnus Carlsen... and I saw him with his head down and whatever." [Pause] And then, then later on refined that about the blotches. And the, and so if I had to guess, I would guess that it would, the gestalt was *Magnus Carlsen*. [AG: Mm-hmm.] The gestalt wasn't this blotch and that blotch [AG: Mm-hmm.] separately in that blotch, separately in [inaudible]. And Gabriel has the philosopher's gene and, and people with the philosopher gene [Gabriel: (Laughs)] have, have difficulty with DES [AG: Mm-hmm.] and, uh, for, for exactly the reasons that we're, that we're going through now. And we're gonna see what happens about that [AG: Mm-hmm] And, and I don't mean that in a, in a critical way *at all*. It's [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] just an observational way. [Inaudible]

20:45 Gabriel: No, no, I understand. Makes it fun, I think [AG: (Inaudible) The name of the game.] for me at least.

20:50 RTH: [to AG] And I thought your question was a good question. [AG: Okay.] The, so I didn't...

20:54 AG: I didn't know how to word it honestly.

20:55 RTH: I thought your very first question about that was a perfectly adequate question, [AG: Okay.] and his answer, his answer to that question was, "I don't know what you mean" [AG: Yeah.] was a good answer. [AG: Yeah.] And, uh, and the, and it's a difficult, it's a difficult thing for, [AG: Yeah.] for some people. More difficult for some people [AG: Yeah.] than others.

21:17 AG: Yeah. Okay. So next thing? [RTH: Yeah.] Okay. Um, so the next, or, well, let's move to the next thing going on. Um, how about, okay, so then you mentioned the *feeling* of the zipper. Could you explain to me [Gabriel: Okay.] what you, what's going on there?

21:37 Gabriel: That was just, um, a feeling of cold between my fingers. Um, I don't know how to, I don't know if I can break it down more than that, [AG: Inaudible] but just right, right

here between my fingers... [AG: Between-?] These, these two fingers, my, my thumb and, uh, my pointer finger. [Pinches together the thumb and pointer finger of his right hand]

21:58 AG: And is there any place on your finger that you feel it... [Gabriel: Uh...] specifically?

22:04 Gabriel: No. I wouldn't say so, because if that was the case, uh, then I probably feel it on both of my fingers, but it was just one sensation. Um, I didn't feel as though it was on my finger, it felt like I was, it felt like, um, it was the thing there. Kind of like, um, I don't feel like, uh, the, the image of that [Points to a marker near Amber] marker is on my eye.

22:33 AG: Oh, I s, okay. [Gabriel: Yeah.] So do you feel it between, "I feel it between my fingertips?," "I feel it through my whole finger?," "I feel it...?," [Gabriel: I f, I] "I feel my hand?"

22:41 RTH: [to AG] So, I think, I think he was trying to tell you that that's not the right question to ask. [AG: Okay.] I think he was trying to tell you that he feels the cold zipper. [AG: Okay.] He doesn't feel his, he doesn't feel his, [AG: Yeah.] [Gabriel: Right.] *this finger cold and that finger cold.*

22:53 AG: Okay.

22:57 RTH: I think. Is that what you were tryna' say?

22:57 Gabriel: Yes, that was what I was saying.

22:59 AG: Yeah. Okay. And then...

23:00 RTH: And so your question was gonna be a mis, [AG: Yeah.] That was very likely to lead him in the wrong direction.

23:04 AG: Okay. And then-

23:06 RTH: But, but going back to the previous conversation we had, obviously you felt it on this finger and you felt it on your thumb... [AG: Mm-hmm.] [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] and you integrated that together in whatever n, however your [Gabriel: Right.] neurons do that, and it comes out to, [Gabriel: That's true.] [AG: Right.] in your experience, to be of a cold zipper. [Gabriel: Yes.] *Not* of something on this finger. *Not* of something on that finger. [Gabriel: Yes.] And you got no problem talking about that.

23:29 Gabriel: My, my, the, the thing that confused me about the imagination example though, is like, I can't, what does it mean to imagine something if it's not in your direct experience? [Pause] Like is that even-

23:43 RTH: So I don't understand that question.

- 23:46 Gabriel: Um, I, I, I think I understand it with like the fingers because, um, um, that, that makes, that's easier for me to understand. It's hard for me to understand with breaking down what I, was in my imagination, because, um, the components of what was in my imagination, I feel like they have to be in my direct experience because I thought, I kind of feel like def, definitionally, that's what imagination is. It's something that you are putting sort of actively into your direct experience.
- 24:22 RTH: So the finger deal is different because there's a real zipper, and only a, and is that, is that what makes a difference? That there's a, that the
- 24:34 Gabriel: Well, I think the difference there is that, yeah, there, there's a real zipper and it's like my, my, my brain and, uh... yeah, exactly. So there's a real zipper. So that can be interpreted. Uh, the information from the zipper can be interpreted, but I, like the information in my imagination can also be interpreted, but it also, I feel like has to be directly there as well, because it is in my imagination.
- 25:03 RTH: So that's the part that I would like us to bracket (what I, what I would call bracket).
- 25:07 Gabriel: Okay.
- 25:08 RTH: And what bracket means, it means let's not take a position about whether that's true or false or not. [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] Let's set it aside and, and operate as if it *might* be possible. Whether it is or not, we can w, maybe we'll c, figure that out, but th, as if it, it *might* be possible or impossible. Either way, we're gonna bracket that. We're gonna set that [Gabriel: Okay.] issue aside and say, "well, y'know, maybe I have to, maybe if I have inner knowledge about something, well then I have to imagine it, or something like that. Or maybe not." But the question *is* trying to set that aside, what is, what is your experience of? In *this* one, [stumbles over words] the, the reason that this is an, an important example is that *everything's* in your imagination. I mean, the zipper is in your imagination, I suppose it's out there in the real world too, but it's, but the fact that it's a zipper or whatever, everything, everything is inner experience. And *yet* in that situation, you're willing to bracket that, or you're willing to set that aside and "say, well, I feel the zipper."
- 26:13 Gabriel: Okay. I mean, that, that is true. Um, I don't think the two sides of, uh, my fingers were being cold was in my imagination though, like when I was feeling the zipper. Does that, does that make sense? Do you see what I'm saying?
- 26:36 RTH: Well, I think that, that hinges on very fine definitions of "what is in my imagination."
- 26:43 Gabriel: Okay. I agree.
- 26:44 RTH: Certainly there are, there's neuron transmission that's beginning here [points to pointer finger of right hand] and beginning here [points to right thumb] [Gabriel: Mm-hmm] and going this way, [motions up right arm] and it goes through the LGN or wherever the hell it goes up there. [Motions upward] And that's inner in some way, and, and, and, and, and what *I'm* saying is I don't think that necessarily that's a different kind than the inner experience which would be entirely in imagination.

- 27:15 Gabriel: Hmm. Okay. Okay. That might, that might be true. Uh, let think about this for a second. [Pause]
- 27:26 RTH: But, but most of all, what I would like us to do is to *not* try to figure it out. [AG: Mm-hmm.] what I would like [Gabriel: Okay.] us to do is to set aside to, to set aside that “this one has to be that way, and this one has to be that way.” Maybe it does, maybe it doesn’t. The question is about, about your direct experience. [Gabriel: Okay.] And, and we’re, so we’re gonna, we’re trying to define what direct experience means. And in, in the *zipper* example, we have a pretty clear notion of what the direct experience is. It was, it was of the *zipper*, [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] not of my cold [Gabriel: Right.] finger. And the question is, when we think of how that feels, what a direct experience is of that, and we try to, “well, what was the direct experience of Magnus?” [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] Well, was it th, th, the direct experience of, was my ex, was that more, did that seem more like the zipper or more like the fingers? [Gabriel: Right.] More like, more like Magnus or more like the blotch and the blotch and the blotch?
- 28:19 Gabriel: Okay. And is [RTH: And,] there, oh, oh go ahead.
- 28:21 RTH: And, and I don’t think we need to, or can, or *should* try to answer that question about [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] this sample.
- 28:26 Gabriel: Right. Okay. That makes sense.
- 28:28 RTH: We muddled, we muddled these water [Gabriel: Laughs] *dramatically*.
- 28:30 Gabriel: Okay. And, and I’m guessing you don’t want me like making an, [AG: (Shakes head)] like, inferring [AG: No.] what was in my experience based on this sort of logical reasoning.
- 28:39 RTH: [Pounds table with a ‘thumbs-up’] Exactly.
- 28:41 Gabriel: Okay.
- 28:41 AG: That’s exactly it.
- 28:41 Gabriel: Got it. [AG: Mm-hmm.]
- 28:42 RTH: And, and that is the challenge of bracketing. [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] [AG: Mm-hmm.]
- 28:49 Gabriel: Right. That does make sense. [RTH: Yeah.] I’m gonna have to think about this. Uh, but I, I’m gonna have to think about this just so that I can, because I’m slightly confused. But [laughs]
- 28:49 Gabriel comments: Here, I began to very much feel like I had lost my moorings (hence the confusion). I was willing to try discarding my presupposition that imagination is entirely composed of constituents with which we are directly aware. However once I did that, I felt I had no further basis to say anything at all about what was in my experience, no way to ‘sort’ the consciously experienced aspects from the

unconscious aspects of my recollection of the moment of the beep. I thought I would either be forced to say nothing, or forced to say things that I had no real reason to believe. This thinking largely solidified after this meeting, but it was mostly this idea of 'bracketing' that started it. Right after the meeting I wrote much of my concerns down in my personal notes. Some of my questions in those notes were answered in subsequent meetings, specifically one in which we discussed visual imagery.

- 28:49 Russ comments: Bracketing presuppositions, in my view, is a fight to the death, and losing one's moorings is a part of that struggle. A presupposition is something that is believed to be absolutely true, and so obviously true as to be accepted without need for consideration. To take seriously the possibility that something that is unfailingly, unerringly believed is possibly an untrue presupposition does indeed require losing one's moorings without any guarantee that they can be regained.
- 29:01 RTH: Well, good. [AG: Yeah] So I'm, [AG: Laughs] because I, I, I didn't think I said the things that I said entirely adequately or whatever. So there, there's reasons to, reasons to be confused. But the, but the bottom line is, what we're trying to get at is how your experience presents itself to you *before* we start the analytical process. [AG: Mm-hmm.]
- 29:22 Gabriel: Okay. Right. That does, that does make, okay, that makes sense. I see, I see what the, I, I understand what the goal is.
- 29:34 AG: And we are asking very refined questions. [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] Like these are, we're getting, we're getting into the, the heart of it, the details. [Gabriel: Right.] Small details.
- 29:44 Gabriel: Okay. All right. That makes sense. Okay. Yeah. I, uh, the, the, the idea is like, the question is solidifying in my mind now a little bit. So I, I think I'll have a good understanding of it at, um, at some point before the next sampling at least. [Pause]
- 30:07 RTH: So I, I guess I want to say a couple more things. [AG: (Inaudible)] One is, I, my goal is not to try to talk you into one way of looking at it. [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] My, our goal, our, our goal, I think is to try to, if we could get inside you and do it your way, that, we would do that. But we can't. So we gotta go through, through this language stuff. [Gabriel: Right.] [AG: (Laughs)] [Pause] I'll, I'll resist giving another example. I think we should go on here.
- 30:50 AG: Oh, okay. Um, so can I ask [RTH: (Nods)] more about cold? Okay. So when you say you, you are feeling cold, [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] are you feeling coldness or are you feeling cold zipper-ness, or coldness of the zipper?
- 31:05 Gabriel: I think I was just, uh, I think I was, I was feeling coldness of something. It, not necessarily of the zipper, it was just, uh, coldness of something.
- 31:16 AG: So I'm feeling coldness and it happens to be a zipper.

- 31:18 Gabriel: Yeah. And I would say it, I would say it was coldness of *metal*. I would say it wasn't like uh, of, it wasn't just coldness in general. Uh, it was coldness, specifically metallic coldness.
- 31:33 AG: So there's something about this coldness that's different than plastic coldness, or [inaudible]?
- 31:40 Gabriel: Yes. Yeah. [Pause]
- 31:52 AG: Uh, do you have any more questions about that?
- 31:53 RTH: I think we oughta go on to number 2.
- 31:55 AG: Oh, just move on?
- 31:56 RTH: Yeah, [AG: Okay.] (inaudible). We probably made this as problematic as we possibly can. [Gabriel: Laughs]
- 32:01 AG: Okay. Okay. Number 2.

SAMPLE 2.2 DISCUSSION STARTS HERE

- 32:03 Gabriel: Okay. Number 2. This was, um, this was, this was from a chess game. Uh, so, uh, I had just moved my king to E2. Uh, oh, this was a, it was actually not a chess game, it was just rearranging the pieces on a board. But I had just moved the king to E2 and, uh, cuz I was trying to like, move them on a computer board to, back to the starting position. But I realized after doing that, that having moved the king to E2, I removed its, uh, castling rights. So, m, what was in my direct experience was, at that moment, uh, a frustration that I had removed the castling rights of the king. And also at that moment was the crinkle of a bottle, uh, near me that somebody was drinking.
- 33:01 RTH: So there's two things [Gabriel: Two things.] in your experience here? [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] And equally? Or one more than the other?
- 33:06 Gabriel: Uh, the frustration was more so than the crinkle of the bottle.
- 33:13 RTH: 60—40 more so? 90—10 more so?
- 33:15 Gabriel: I would, it was, uh, probably 60—40 more so it was closer than 90—10, but...
- 33:22 RTH: Mm-hmm. And, and so, so is this more about the feeling of frustration or more about the cause of the frustration? [Gabriel: It was, um...] Or both?
- 33:36 Gabriel: It was a feeling of frustration. That was mostly what it was.
- 33:40 RTH: And how, how does that frustration, how do you apprehend it?

- 33:45 Gabriel: I don't know. I don't know. Uh, I, when I went to write this down, I was thinking about how that feeling of frustration manifested and, uh, I just, I couldn't figure it out. Um, maybe it's, maybe it's not, may, maybe that indicates that it was just, um, uh, just, uh, the, I, may, just the belief that I was frustrated, but I don't, I don't know how it was manifested.
- 34:13 RTH: So let me ask some questions about that and see whether we can get, can make, make some progress. Maybe we can, maybe we can't. So how, are you confident that you were feeling frustrated? That-
- 34:24 Gabriel: Yes, very mild fleeting frustration.
- 34:27 RTH: Okay. And so the, the question is not about doubt whether "I was feeling frustrated," but how it man, how I, how it manifested itself to me [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] And is the, does the frustration seem to be bodily? Somewhere, do I feel this in my body somewhere? Or mentally? Or doesn't that question make sense?
- 34:48 Gabriel: I don't think it was bodily. So I think it was mentally.
- 34:54 RTH: [RTH: Mm-hmm.] And by mentally, do we mean somehow I feel frustrated that I can't put it into word, or I can't describe eh, other than that. And so must have been mental?
- 35:05 Gabriel: Yes. That's what I would, that's how I would say it.
- 35:08 RTH: Okay. And, and the, the fact of the, well, the *cause* of the frustration is that the king is lost its right to castle. [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] And is that present to you at, right at the moment of the beep, or does, or is that out here [turns his notepad on its side] before the beep, [begins to slide a pen on the table towards the edge of the up-turned notepad] where I realize-?
- 35:31 Gabriel: I think it's before the beep.
- 35:33 RTH: So I realized that the king has lost its right. I feel frustration. Beep!
- 35:36 Gabriel: Yes.
- 35:40 RTH: So in *this* aspect of my experience, it's pretty purely frustration. [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] as opposed to frustration and cognitive analysis of the just-
- 35:50 Gabriel: Yeah. It's pretty purely fr, I don't even think visually I was thinking about the board. I don't think I was looking at it, or I was looking at it. I don't think the vision, the visual of the board was in my experience really at that moment.
- 36:02 RTH: So my eyeballs are aimed at the board. [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] Which is on my computer really. [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] and computer or phone [inaudible]?
- 36:09 Gabriel: It was my phone.

36:11 RTH: So my eyeballs are aimed at my phone, but I'm not really seeing it. I'm feeling frustrated. [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] Okay. [Pause] And is there anything more to say about frustration at this particular moment, or is that as good as we're gonna do on this one?

36:26 Gabriel: That is, a, as good as I can do with frustration.

36:30 RTH: Okay. [to AG] You got any questions that you want to try to help us out with that? [AG: Shakes head.] I, I think this, I think this kind of experience is difficult [AG: Mm-hmm.] and it could very well be, this is good as one ever can get. [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] And then at the same time, I hear the crinkle of something, but I can't remember what it was.

36:45 Gabriel: It was a water bottle.

36:51 RTH: And is there more to say about that experience?

36:55 Gabriel: Um, well, what, in my experience, it *was* the crinkle of water bottle, it wasn't just a crinkle. It was, uh, very distinctively the crinkle of a water bottle.

37:08 RTH: And by that do you mean that a water bottle has a specific crinkle, and I was hearing that, but my experience was entirely auditory? My, my experience was entirely auditory *or* that it would, (which would be to say I hear a crinkle, and then later on I can say, "well, there's, [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] there's only one thing that can make that crinkle; it's a water bottle; therefore it was crinkle." [Gabriel: Right.]) *Or* is my experience at the moment of the beep, *I hear a water bottle crinkling*?

37:38 Gabriel: It was, uh, I hear, it was that I hear a water bottle crinkle.

37:41 RTH: Okay. [Pause] And is that, is that something that's happening in, in real life? I'm holding a water bottle or somebody else is holding a water bottle?

37:56 Gabriel: It was somebody next to me. Yeah. Somebody in real life, uh, like opened a water bottle and squeezed it a little bit or something.

38:03 RTH: Okay. And I hear that, for whatever reason that I'm, I'm not particularly interested in that or whatever, [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] but it, it has made its way before the footlights of my consciousness?

38:14 Gabriel: Yes.

38:16 RTH: And, uh, and I'm gathering this as the sound of the water bottle rather than the person crinkling the water bottle. It's not him or her or whoever.

38:27 Gabriel: Yeah. It was the sound, and also the, uh, there, there was the experience of, um, there wa, it was the, the experience of it being to my left as well. I, I forgot to mention that, but...

38:46 RTH: So the sign of the water bottle *over there* [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] not *in her hand* or *his hand* or whoever it was. [Gabriel: No.] But, but...

38:59 Gabriel: Yeah, just *over there* [RTH: Mm-hmm].

38:55 RTH: And I think I'm good about that.

39:00 AG: Yeah. I'm good too. That was my question.

39:03 RTH: Well, what I would, what I would say about that is that in *this* beep, your experience seems quite, your seem quite confident about aspects, aspects [Gabriel: Mm-hmm] that are divorced from the, from reality [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] And it's, it's, it's this and not that. It's the, it's the sound and not the holder, and it's the, *over here* and not *over there*.

39:26 Gabriel: Right.

39:28 RTH: And it's the, it's the *feeling* and not the *cause of the feeling*. [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] And it seems that, that there's not a difficulty in this experience about that.

39:40 Gabriel: No, I don't think so. That do, it doesn't seem difficult to me.

39:44 RTH: Okay. So, so what we have to do, I think, is to develop what a, a shared understanding of what it means to be before the footlights consciousness. [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] [AG: Mm-hmm] That the sound was before the footlights consciousness, but the girl, or the guy, or whoever it was, wasn't [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] before the footlights of consciousness. He, she was there and my ex, and, and in *some* manner speaking, my experience knows that cuz I'm not running into her or whatever, I'm, I'm keeping track. If she got up, I know that she got up and [Gabriel: Right.] whatever. So I'm a, I'm adjusting in a skillful way to all the things that are present in my environment, [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] even though they're not directly before the footlights of my consciousness.

40:27 Gabriel: Mm-hmm. [Pause] Okay.

40:35 RTH: Number 3?

40:36 AG: Yep.

40:37 Gabriel: All right.

40:38 RTH: And, uh, and I would say, you're doing great [AG: Mm-hmm.] [Gabriel: Okay.] So the, the, we don't want to paper over any difficulties that we've got. We want to, we want to bring those difficulties out onto the table so that we can talk about it. [Gabriel: Okay.] And, and it *could* very well be that those difficulties are what is sort of the fundamentally interesting-est part of the, um, the process.

41:00 Gabriel: Mm-hmm. Right. Okay.

41:01 RTH: Or not.

41:03 Gabriel: I find it interesting. I think, uh, I feel like I, I have new ideas to think about, which is good.

41:10 RTH: Number 3.

41:10 AG: Number 3.

SAMPLE 2.3 DISCUSSION STARTS HERE

41:10 Gabriel: All right. Uh, let's see. So, I was writing an essay at this moment, and, um, uh, I was writing about, uh, the prompt of the essay was to, uh, convince somebody that, uh, government operatives are not using memory-erasure techniques on people by explaining, uh, the science of memory. So at that moment, the word, in my experience, the words "we know" were in my, uh, conscious experience because I had just, um, I had just written them on a, uh, on the essay. Uh, it was the words "we know." And the *reason* I wrote the words, this was *not* in my experience, but the reason I wrote the words was because I was going to say, um, "we know consolidation occurs due to retrograde amnesia being localized to-" uh, or "due to retrograde amnesia occurring from lesions to the, uh, hippocampus." That's why I was going to write those words, that's why I wrote those words. However, I had forgotten, I had sort of lost my train of thought. And at that moment, in my experience was the intention to write, um, "and we know this is possible" instead of the sentence that I just described. So in my intention, and I was aware of that, my intention, was to write "this is possible" directly after writing those words. Um, but I also, also in my experience was the knowledge that that was wrong. Like, it didn't quite make sense because it didn't make sense with what I was going for. So there was a frustration *there*. Uh, it was actually, it was a confusion. I was slightly confused. Uh, I, I, yeah, I was, I could tell that I was temporarily kind of forgetting what my original train of thought was, and that's why I wh, why I had that intention, uh, and I was, I was kind, slightly confused and frustrated. [Pause]

43:26 AG: Okay. [Gabriel: Okay.] Um...

43:28 Gabriel: That, that was a kind of confusing one to describe. So I know you might need clarification.

43:33 AG: Okay. So could you tell me again, what was [Gabriel: Okay.] in, what was directly present in your experience?

43:37 Gabriel: Okay. It was the words "we know," uh, the intention to write "this is possible," the knowledge that that was wrong, and a con, confusion and frustration.

43:54 AG: And that's all happening at our moment, [Flips a notepad on its side and points to the bottom left corner (from Gabriel's perspective)] [Gabriel: Yes.] right before the beep?

43:58 Gabriel: Yes.

43:59 AG: Okay. Um, so of all those things, is there anything that's more salient?

44:08 Gabriel: "We know" was the most salient.

44:10 AG: Okay. Like that's the most, everything else is the same? Or [inaudible]?

44:17 Gabriel: That's the most salient and everything else is the same. Everything else is slightly less salient, but about, about equal to each other.

44:30 AG: Okay. So let's start with "we know," [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] um, how is that present?

44:36 Gabriel: Um, so that is, um, it's uh, it's a voice in my head, uh, saying "we know." Um, it's not my voice or anyone else's really. It's sort of like, uh, a, a voice that, uh, doesn't sound like, it doesn't really have, uh, the sound of a normal person's voice, but it is sort of an auditory experience of voice.

45:21 AG: So, am I hearing this voice, whatever voice it may be? Or am I, no doubt I, no. Hold on. [Gabriel: Okay.] [laughs]. So am I *hearing* this or am I *speaking* it? This voice? Is it...?

45:44 Gabriel: Could you, uh, just explain the difference between those two?

45:49 AG: So, okay, I'm trying, sorry, I'm trying to be careful. [laughs]. Um, so like, I'm hearing like, sorry, I'm just trying, I'm trying to be careful. I'm sorry. Um, so I, I take you to be saying that this, "we know," those are words of my own creation. [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] I, I have created these words, they're not [Gabriel: Right.] I'm not reading them. I, I've created these, [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] right. So, and, and this voice, am I *hearing* it like auditorially as, or like as if I'm hearing it from a speaker or from something, or am I speaking it, like, am I speaking it. And, and or is it none of those? [Gabriel: Okay.] It something else? It could be anything.

46:48 Gabriel: I think it's that I'm speaking it. Um, what, uh, I, when I think, uh, when, when I think back on it, um, I knew at that, at that moment I know, um, I don't know if it was in my experience, but I do know that I was, um, moving my mouth and my tongue slightly. Um, and, um, and the voice is like my brain's interpretation of the air moving through my nose, uh, and my like internal throat cavity, uh, [laughs] what I, my, my, my throat, uh, and like how it's changing based on the slight ways I'm moving my, my tongue, or at least how my, how I would imagine it would change. So it's not really, it, it's, I, there is an auditory component that is sort of really hard to grasp, I think. Um, but the, the voice is actually, um, I think it's, um, uh, I, yeah. Uh, well, I don't, I lost my train of thought. Sorry. 48:05 RTH: So can I ask you a question that I think is what Amber was asking? [AG: Yes.] [Gabriel: Okay.] In a different, different way. [AG: Please.] [Coughs] It's possible to speak into a tape recorder [Gabriel: Hmm.] and to hear your voice play back out of a tape recorder. [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] And when you do that, it's the same words going in, same voice going in and coming out. [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] It's my voice going in, it's my voice coming out. But while in the first part of those, you

would say, “well, I was speaking.” And in, when you’re playing back, you would say, “I was hearing.” So that’s the distinction that I think Amber was [AG: Mm-hmm.] trying to get at. [AG: Yeah.] Is this a, is this the, the inner equivalent of *speaking* [Gabriel: Okay]. Or is it the inner equivalent of *hearing*?

48:45 Gabriel: I would say it’s the inner equivalent of *speaking*.

48:49 RTH: Okay. It’s more productive-y than it is receptive-y?

48:53 Gabriel: Yes, I think so. [RTH: Okay.]

49:02 RTH: But not in your voice?

49:04 Gabriel: No, it’s, uh, I, the, it, it’s, it’s almost more like the, yeah. It’s not really in my voice or the voice of anyone. It’s not really even like a human sounding voice. It’s kind of an airy, um, almost non-existent voice.

49:27 RTH: But a voice nonetheless? [Gabriel: Yes.] So you can’t even say whether it’s a masculine kind of voice or a feminine kind of voice?

49:34 Gabriel: No, I can’t say that.

49:35 RTH: Or a computer kind of voice?

49:36 Gabriel: No.

49:38 RTH: And yet it seems to be a voice?

49:41 Gabriel: Yes. The best I can do is describe it as a whisper, but it, that doesn’t really explain it.

49:57 RTH: And it’s a whisper in the sense that there’s no timbre or whatever, there’s air motion. [Gabriel: Right.] But no...?

50:08 Gabriel: Yes. Yeah.

50:09 RTH: No really too many auditory characteristics? [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] And so does it actually feel to me like I’m speaking and I feel air moving in and out? Whether it actually is or not?

50:19 Gabriel: I don’t think that was in my experience. Uh, but that is the case. Like if I think back on it there, that is going on a little bit, but I, that wasn’t in my experience.

50:37 RTH: And I’m good about that part. Yeah.

50:38 AG: Yeah, I’m good about that part, too.

50:38 Gabriel: Okay.

50:40 AG: Um, so... these other parts of your experience, could you, this intention portion?
[Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] Could you tell me more about that?

50:54 Gabriel: Right. So [Pause] um, I had the plan, intention to write the words, "this is possible,"
um, right after "we know." So it would've been, "we know this is possible." Um, and I
wasn't thinking about the words. They weren't in a voice themselves. Um, the words
weren't like in my direct experience in a verbal way at all. It was just the intention to
write them.

51:43 AG: So when you say inten, uh, all right. Uh, so is this about this intention or is this about
the words?

51:51 Gabriel: Um, it's mo, moreso about the intention to write those words.

52:01 AG: And how does that present itself to you?

52:05 Gabriel: It's just like a plan, basically.

52:12 RTH: So you seem to be saying that I have the intention to write that "this is possible"
unquote, even though the words "that this is possible" is not present to me.

52:25 Gabriel: Yes.

52:26 RTH: Okay. So somehow this intention is specifically about words without the words
themselves being present?

52:35 Gabriel: Yeah. I, I think so. Yeah.

52:28 RTH: Mm-hmm. So I think that's quite possible. [AG: Yeah.] [Gabriel: Okay.] That it's a
common, that's actually a common thing [Gabriel: Hmm.] for people to be thinking
about something, which is it, which is specifically tied to particular words, even
though the words are not present.

52:57 Gabriel: Hmm. Okay. It's an odd thing. Uh...

53:05 RTH: It's part of the bracketing process that... [Gabriel: Hmm.] You don't have to worry
about whether that's possible. The question is what your, what's your experience.

53:13 Gabriel: Right. [AG: Mm-hmm.] Okay.

53:14 RTH: And, and so we're, we want to, we're, our *goal* is to try to build your willingness,
interest, in, in trying to describe what's in your experience, regardless of whether that
seems weird, or strange, or impossible.

53:32 Gabriel: Mm-hmm. Okay. Alright.

53:35 AG: Got anything, any more questions about that?

- 53:37 RTH: I think I'm good with that.
- 53:38 AG: I think I'm good too. And then, um, you said, so now we have this wrong confusion, [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] so tell [Gabriel: Right.] me more about those.
- 53:47 Gabriel: Um, I was, so, [Pause] so there was the knowledge that the intention was wrong. Like it wasn't what I was planning originally. So there, there was the knowledge that it was, um, pointless to write it. That's the, what I would say. There was the knowledge that, that the intention was pointless. Um, because it wasn't going to help me finish writing what I was writing. Uh, so that, that it was like a, it was basically like a, just a fact that was i, in my awareness and, uh, from the fact what, or due to the fact the fact caused, um, um, a sense of confusion and um, uh.... I would say actually there wasn't really a sense of frustration. I, I will, I'll take out the frustration thing. It was just a sense of confusion [Pause] because I, and the reason I was confused cause I was like," wait, what was I gonna write?" Um... [Pause]
- 55:11 AG: Okay, so this knowledge, the intention was, how does that present itself to you?
- 55:19 Gabriel: Uh, that, it's the, the knowledge that the intention was pointless. Um, it just presents itself as like a conclusion. It's just a, just a fact that I was aware of that I, um, so I don't think that I can explain that in any other way. [AG: Mm-hmm.] I don't think there's like a physical manifestation of it or anything like that. [Pause] Just a fact.
- 55:59 RTH: [to AG] So what I would ask of that would be, [AG: I-] so-
- 56:02 AG: I have another question, but I don't know if I want to use the word that I'm [inaudible], [RTH: G, go for it.] Okay. So is this like a, ana, like a cognitive, analytical kind of like a thing? Like I'm somehow *thinking* that this is wrong based off of, well, maybe not all that, but like, if there's some kind of know, like this process, I keep using the wrong words. [Laughs] Like this processing, understanding, thinking, conclusion, I've, , whatever word we wanna use for it [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] And that's come from, I had this intention, the, I, I was gonna write this, the intention was this, and now I've kind of come to that conclusion like this, this, there's like a thought process going on?
- 56:54 Gabriel: There, there was a thought process going on. I don't think the thought process was in my *experience*. [AG: Mm-hmm.] It was just the, the mental fact that was in my experience.
- 57:03 AG: Okay. You can go and ask your question. Probably a bad question. [Laughs]
- 57:08 RTH: And is the, I, I thought the question was okay. Is the mental fact and the confusion both present, or is it just that the confusion is present?
- 57:21 Gabriel: Oh, um, they're both in my experience. Um, I, I don't, the confusion and the mental fact are separate things though. They didn't feel like one thing.
- 57:33 RTH: Mm-hmm. That was my question.

57:36 Gabriel: Okay.

57:39 AG: Do you have anything else about us mental [RTH: No (inaudible)] and then confusion? [RTH: (Nods.)] [inaudible] Okay. So this confusion, [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] what, what's going on there?

57:49 Gabriel: So, uh, I thought about that after I wrote it down, uh, because, uh, I was trying to figure out what it was like, and I, I thought for, I thought maybe when I, when, when I was thinking about it, that it was like a physical sensation. Um, and I was, and, and I thought about it and I was like, oh, kind of like the physical sensation of being dizzy. Um, but I realized, uh, so I would say that that sense, that confusion, it kind of was like the physical sensation of being dizzy. Like it, just like a brief instant of dizziness, but it, it's not really dizzy in the, like, when I actually get physically dizzy. That is, um, it feels like a physical process. This felt like a mental process even though it was basically the same sensation.

58:48 AG: Um, and is this dizziness portion present to you at the moment of the beep, or is this "well, I was confused. I felt something that I would describe as confusing to these guys. And when I retrospect on that it is dizzy?

59:01 Gabriel: Right, um...

59:05 AG: Like, or when I retrospect to even write it down [AG: Mm-hmm.] not even that far [inaudible].

59:08 Gabriel: Sure. [Pause] Now, I think that depends on that earlier discussion we were having for me. Because like, uh, I didn't think of it as dizziness at that moment. I thought of it as confusion. Uh, but I just realized that the two are com, were comparable feelings when I think back on it. Uh, so I would say, it was, I actually, maybe it doesn't have to depend on the previous conversation we had. I, that, I'm just saying that that's how, uh, it wa, it felt like confusion to me, but maybe it just so happens that confusion and dizziness are similar feelings. [Pause]

1:00:06 RTH: So in the previous beep there was, we had a, there was a frustration [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] and we decided what to call that mental. [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] Is the confusion *mental* in the same way? Or does this, does the, this seem like there's a bodily aspect? [Gabriel: Okay.] And, and I would say an imaginary bodily aspect is a bodily aspect. [AG: Mm-hmm.]

1:00:06 Russ comments: RTH seems to have overlooked the fact that Gabriel has said (in 59:08) that the confusion involved dizziness. That is, Gabriel has said that the confusion feeling has a bodily aspect. By not stating that, RTH has implied to Gabriel that dizziness does not count as bodily, which will make Gabriel's responses impossible to interpret.

1:00:26 Gabriel: Okay. Okay. That's, um, okay, let me think about that.

1:00:37 RTH: And by, and by that what I mean is some people would say, “I feel a knot in my chest” [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] but that doesn’t necessarily mean there is a knot in their chest [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] but there’s the *experience* of a knot in the chest. [Gabriel: Right.] And, and they would say that’s a *physical* thing. It feels like a physical knot. This is not metaphorical [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] I’m saying there’s something in there [Gabriel: That] so-

1:00:55 Gabriel: That does make sense. Uh, I, it depends on, I guess that depends. So I, I was having trouble deciding how to answer that question when I was writing this down because I realized like if, um, like di, the, the feeling of dizziness, um, I feel like we thi, we, we call it a physical sensation just because it is, it happens in response to physical action of like getting twirled around and everything like that. But if you were just dizzy, I don’t think you feel that in a particular part of your body. I, it’s, it’s, it’s, um, maybe dizziness is sort of a confusion because it’s like a confusion of, “oh, I think I’m moving,” but I’m not. So there’s like a, um, a contradiction between your perception and then, um, what your prediction of where you’re going to be is.

1:01:57 RTH: So what I would, what I would say about that is, I would say that most people would say, “I feel dizzy” rather than “my perception can’t figure out whether I’m moving or I’m not.” [Gabriel: Right.] The experience is of feeling dizzy [Gabriel: Right.] might very well come from my neurons in some manner speaking, [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] not being to decide whether I’m moving or not. But that’s not the experience.

1:02:22 Gabriel: Right. I agree. And my, my point is just that the feeling of dizziness is not localized anywhere in the body for me.

1:02:22 Russ comments: Gabriel’s difficulty has been increased by RTH’s implied ruling out of dizziness as being bodily. See the comment at 1:00:06.

1:02:33 RTH: So the good news about DES is that we don’t have to answer these questions in general. We only have to answer them about this particular beep. [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] And we, and, and later on we might be able to, y’know, if we got a bunch of beeps where he is dizzy, then we’ll figure out what dizziness [Gabriel: Right.] is in the, in general. [Gabriel: Right.] But, uh, so the question about this beep is, is this some confusion? “I can’t decide whether I’m moving or not,” or is there some feeling of dizziness or whether that whole thing is sort of a red herring and really what’s present to me is “I’m confused and I don’t know any better way to talk about it”?

1:03:14 Gabriel: I think, um, [laughs] Yeah. So I’m, I, I’m having trouble deciding between those options as well. [RTH: Okay.] Um-

1:03:22 RTH: And, and so what I would, what I would say about that is I think we’ve, I think we’ve gone as far as we ought to go on that beep and as far as we ought to go on, on today’s sampling. [Gabriel: Okay.] And, and the reason for that is that we’re past an hour and, and everybody gets tired, including me [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] and probably you, cuz we’ve been grilling you pretty good. But [AG: (laughs)] the, and but even more important, even more important than the hour, (well the hour’s pretty important actually), but the, but I think we have been working at this distinction between what is

present and what is theoretical and, and whatever. [Gabriel: Hmm.] And that's gonna sink in over the, and the next time we sample then, things are gonna be different. [Gabriel: Yes.] Whether they're gonna be better or different or worse or stronger or [Gabriel: Okay.] weaker or whatever. I don't know. We'll find out, we'll find out about that.

1:03:23 And uh, and, and so what I would say about that is I would recommend that you just sort of let this conversation happen when that not, don't try to figure it out specific for this task. [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] Do whatever it is that you want to do with it on your own, y'know, that's your business. You can do whatever you want. But I think this, this task, the beeper task, is gonna unfold the way it is gonna unfold. [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] And, and you can't, there's nothing you can do about that. You can't speed it up. You can't, y'know, you're obviously working at it, we're obviously working at it, what sooner or later we're gonna evolve in some way. And, and, uh, and it'll be interesting to see what, what that way is.

1:04:59 And I would say you're doing a great job at it. [AG: Mm-hmm.] So if it, [Gabriel: Thank you.] if it sounded somewhere along the line that I was being critical of you or whatever, that's not true. I, I want to understand what you're saying. I've been around enough philosophers to recognize different ways of getting themselves confused, [Gabriel: (Laughs) Okay.] getting them confused and whatever. And, and it then, and even that's interesting to me. So it's what, it's like one beep at a time and we'll, we'll, we'll step through these beeps and maybe we'll get something interesting [Gabriel: Alright.] out. Maybe not.

1:05:36 Gabriel: Okay, sounds good.