

Gabriel H.: A university student with philosophy interests
Gabriel Interview 12

Below in black is a word-for-word transcript of the February 20 interview with Gabriel that is available on YouTube at <https://youtu.be/Jl-2jyWBGs4>. In green are comments about and explanations of the Descriptive Experience Sampling process. If you have corrections, suggestions, or questions, please post them as YouTube comments.

RTH = Russ Hurlburt

AG = Amber Goto

CK = Cody Kaneshiro

Gabriel = Gabriel H.

0:00 RTH: So this is gonna be day... I have no idea. [CK: 12?] Day 12? [AG: Nods] Anybody have anything to say before we go on to beeps? [pauses] Me neither.

0:18 Gabriel: Okay.

0:18 AG: Okay. So when did you wear the beeper?

0:21 Gabriel: So I wore the beeper, uh, last night and this morning.

0:24 AG: Okay. Um, how many last night and how many this morning?

0:27 Gabriel: Uh, lemme check that. [Consults notes] So this morning I had one, two, three, four. Last night I did two.

0:39 AG: Okay.

0:41 RTH: Well, shall we do the freshes, fresher ones first? Or, or is there different situation you prefer the situation from yesterday?

0:49 Gabriel: Uh, I think the freshest ones are probably the ones that I'll be able to report the best, so let's [RTH: Alright.] go with those.

0:53 RTH: Let's do that.

0:55 Gabriel: Okay. So I'll, I'll go backwards. Um,

0:58 RTH: So [Gabriel: So] beep, this will beep number 4?

1:00 Gabriel: Yeah, beep,

1:02 RTH: 6, [Gabriel: beep 4 of] no, beep number 6. This would [Gabriel: Yes.] be 6. [Gabriel: Yes.] 6 total. 12.6.

1:05 CK: Fourth [Gabriel: Yeah, this'll be] of today, and six total. Yeah.

SAMPLE 12.6 DISCUSSION STARTS HERE (starting with the most recent sample)

1:07 Gabriel: Exactly. So this will be number 6. [RTH: Got it.] And, um, so, uh, for context, I was watching a video, uh, on my phone and, um, it was a video about Forrest Gump. Uh, so what was in my experience at the moment of the beep was the word "cigarette," uh, spoken in the voice of Forrest Gump. So it was, this was Forrest Gump saying "cigarette." That was the experience. And additionally, there was the *thought* of how Tom Hanks imitated, uh, a southern, a young southern boy to make, uh, to imitate or, or as his inspiration for the voice.

1:56 RTH: So I'm hearing Forrest Gump say "cigarette."

2:01 Gabriel: In a very particular way, in h, in his, like this accent, drawly accent that he was using.

2:07 RTH: Okay. And is that a, a part of a sentence or just that word "cigarette"?

2:12 Gabriel: Um, [RTH: And I'm really asking,] it was part of a sentence. It was part of a sentence, but, uh, it was just the word "cigarette" that was in that moment that was sticking out to me because I was making particular note of the way it sounded.

2:26 RTH: Okay. So the, there, so *Forrest* is speaking a sentence, but *Gabriel* is focused on the word, on, on a single word "cigarette" and the way it is spoken?

2:37 Gabriel: Yes. Mm-hmm.

2:37 RTH: Ok. And, and at the same time, I am in some way reflecting on how, for, how Tom Hanks imitates a southern guy to...?

2:52 Gabriel: Yes.

2:53 RTH: Is that right?

2:54 Gabriel: Yes. It, [RTH: And,] it's specifically thinking about how Tom Hank imitated this young southern boy that, um, that he knew, uh, to make the accent of Forrest Gump.

3:10 RTH: And that's, from what y'know about Tom Hanks, basically? My, I'm, I'm reflecting on a fact that I know about Tom Hanks. That he [Gabriel: Yes.] that he imitated a particular southern boy.

3:23 Gabriel: Yes.

3:24 RTH: Okay. And is that thought that reflection, a verbal thing or pictorial thing, or...?

3:32 Gabriel: It is, it is *not* a verbal thing. Um, I think there *is* something, there *was* something visual about it, which was like an image of, um, Tom Hanks on a phone call with, uh,

with like this young boy. So, uh, but there was a, but that was like a, a, a small portion of it. [RTH: And..] And also, I, I can't be 100% sure that that was actually there, but I think it was.

4:12 RTH: So I'm *definitely* reflecting on that Tom Hanks imitates a particular southern boy to make this, and I *may* have been in a sort of a low grade or second, secondary or minorly way, seeing an image of Tom Hanks on the phone with this kid.

4:35 Gabriel: Yes.

4:37 RTH: Okay. And is, and, and is the uncertainty about the visual bec, because I can't remember whether I'm making it up now, or I, whether it was there. Is that the...?

4:50 Gabriel: Uh, yes. I'm not sure if I'm making up now or if it was there. Uh, if I, let me think about it for second. [pauses] Actually. Okay. If there was a visual image, it would've been the boy in a room, uh, talking into a microphone. And I don't think Tom Hank, there, I, there wouldn't be a picture of Tom Hanks in there. Tom Hanks wouldn't be visually present. Um, and, and I, I do feel like it, that picture was there. I think, I made, I think I did make up the Tom Hanks being part of the picture when we were just talking. [RTH: Mm-hmm.] I do think, I do, if I, y'know, if I had to bet on it, I would say that picture was there. Um, but it was also a very fleeting thought. So it's hard for me to say for sure.

5:52 RTH: So what I, what I would say is that, is that our method is not aimed at perfection. We understand that recollection is going to be clouded by reconstruction. And so the, the process here starts out, starting out to be a thinking. Then Russ says, *is there something visual?* And, and Gabriel says, *well, yeah, there probably was, it was Tom Hanks*. And then Russ asked for some more details. And then Gabriel says, *well, it wasn't really Tom Hanks, it was the kid*. That's less straightforward than a rec, than, than the recollection of the thinking. The *thinking* seems pretty straightforwardly recalled. [Gabriel: Hmm.] I was, I was somehow thinking about Tom Hanks and the kid. But the visuals, the visual stuff seems more circuitous or unsure or something. [Gabriel: Yes.] And I'm, I'm willing to leave it at that, and, and with no im, im, no criticism meant or implied or, or whatever. I think that, I think the process is not perfect.

5:52 Russ comments: The DES object is to describe with fidelity *what is recalled* to have been directly apprehended at the moment of the beep. That is a different thing from describing with fidelity what had been directly apprehended at the moment of the beep. The aim of the iterative training is to improve, across time, Gabriel's ability to apprehend (immediately following the beep) and recall (while note-jotting and interviewing) what had been ongoing at the moment of the beeps. The aim is *not* to infer, and even to infer correctly, what had been directly apprehended at the moment of the beep; the iterative training tries to *diminish* such inferences, even if the inferences are correct, and to cleave to direct recollections of the beeped experience.

That is, the object of DES is *not* to describe an instance of pristine inner experience with fidelity (that would allow or invite inferences). The object is to

cultivate the skills of recollection so that on future occasions, (a) the distinction between recollection and inference is immediately apparent; and (b) the recollection becomes more and more adequate. That is, of course, the heart of the iterative method. That cultivation takes practice and repetition.

The problem with inference is that inference is not grounded in any particular directly apprehended phenomenon. Inference is an extrapolation from some generality to a particularity. Generality: *I always talk to myself when I'm worried.* Inference: *I was worried, so I must have been talking to myself;* particularity: *at the moment of this particular beep.* On some occasions the inferential extrapolation may well be correct, may well contribute to the accuracy of a description of a phenomenon. But on other occasions, the inferential extrapolation may be incorrect and make a description less accurate: many people have strongly held but nonetheless incorrect generalizations about their experience (DES calls these *faux* generalizations). People (including or perhaps especially psychologists and philosophers) are not good at distinguishing between true and faux generalizations about experience.

Because inference is not tightly grounded, there is no way to know whether any particular inference is accurate, and people (including or perhaps especially psychologists and philosophers) can make repeated inferential particularizations about their pristine experience, leading them ever farther from the experience itself.

The DES object is to get better and better at recollecting what was directly apprehended—which is to say, get better and better and suppressing inference—and to get better and better at describing that recollection. All that is grounded on a series of apprehensions of specific particular phenomena—the pristine experience that was ongoing at the moments of a series of beep beeps

7:01 Gabriel: Okay. Got it.

7:01 RTH: And, and sometimes we can have a, per, a clear recollection of a visual thing, in which case I think we oughtta analyze that or describe that in detail. [Gabriel: Hmm.] And sometimes we have what I guess I would say is a fraught or a, not, not, not meaning put any particular emphasis on that word, but, uh, in some ways unsure [Gabriel: Yes, yeah.] And I would say, well, let's, let's, let's not speculate anymore about it than we already have.

7:30 Gabriel: Y, y'know what, I can also say there, another reason for the uncertainty here is because I *do* know I've had that image, uh, when thinking about this *in the past*. So it's like the same image that I had when thinking about this in the past. And I know I can say with confidence that I've had this image in the past. So part of my uncertainty here is also just wondering if maybe like *that* memory is, I guess, interfering with my recollection right now, which, uh, I don't know if that's useful information, but I, I find it interesting. So I thought I'd bring it up.

7:30 Russ comments: Gabriel is raising an important issue: *am I recalling what was happening at the moment of the beep, or am I recalling some related thing that happened at some other times?* (a) There is no way that that can be sorted out about this beep—that distinction for this beep is water over the dam. (b) There is no way that RTH can help Gabriel solve his difficulty, either about this beep or in general,

other than to maintain a sincere interest in Gabriel's experience at the moment of the beep and to convey that interest to Gabriel. (c) That sounds hopeless for DES and for introspection in general. (d) But it is not hopeless. It simply is evidence for the necessity of a principled iterative method and recognition that DES is a first-person-*plural* method. To the extent that RTH is sincere in his interest in fidelity, Gabriel can develop whatever skills he requires to *become* able, immediately after *future beeps*, to recognize that in the upcoming interview he will want to discriminate between what was happening at the moment of this (now still in short-term memory) beep and other experiences that he knows might be similar; that can alter his note jotting, and so on.

This is Gabriel's 12th sampling day, and he is (we are) still discovering what needs to be mastered to become a faithful describer of his experience. That is not at all a criticism of Gabriel—the iterative process takes time, repetition, support, and so on.

8:04 RTH: And by "that image" you mean the, the kid with the microphone image, not the, for, not the Tom Hanks with the phone?

8:11 Gabriel: Yeah, the kid with the microphone image.

8:13 RTH: Mm-hmm. Well, I'm, I've, I, I, I think memory is interesting. Memory interference is interesting. I don't know anything about it. And, and I try not to know anything about it, actually. So the, [Gabriel: Okay.] what I'm be, because I think, I think if we go down the path of trying to *explain* things, we are going to depart from the path of trying to *describe* things.

8:13 Russ comments: See (b) in the 7:30 comment.

8:41 Gabriel: Okay. Got it.

8:41 RTH: And there's, and there's plenty of room in the world for explanation, and there aren't very many people out there trying to describe. And so, [Gabriel: Hmm.] I try to stick to descriptions and try to get that right as best I can. [Gabriel: Okay.] So I'm happy with that, I think. Well, let me say what I got and, and you tell me whether this is right. So, so a good share of my experience. Maybe the prominent..., I don't really know, a good share of my experience has to do with I'm listening in a partict, particular drawly characteristics of "cigarette" that I have abstracted away or contracted away, or explicitized away from a sentence that included that word. And I'm thinking that Tom, I'm *recalling* in a sort of an analytical way, that Tom Hanks copied a particular southern kid. And that I *may* (or may not) have had a visual and, visualization in some way of the kid.

9:43 Gabriel: Yes.

9:45 RTH: Then I think I'm pretty good.

9:47 AG: Um, I have one more question, uh. Gabriel, is there a way, I don't know if this even makes sense, but which is more salient? Or is there a way that you could say that any is more salient? I dunno why I,

10:00 Gabriel: Um, uh, in this instant, what was more [AG: Yeah.] salient was the, I can say, I *can* say that the thought of, um, Tom Hanks imitating the boy was more salient.

10:11 AG: Okay. And, uh, by how much?

10:15 Gabriel: Uh, maybe like, uh, 60, 60%.

10:19 AG: Okay.

10:26 CK: So lemme make sure I'm, I'm understanding that correctly. That means the, so the, I'm hearing Tom Hanks say "cigarette" or saying I'm hearing Forrest Gump, say "cigarette" is like 40%...

10:36 Gabriel: Mm-hmm.

10:36 CK: ...and the stuff about the, Tom Hanks imitating a young southern boy is like 60%.

10:43 Gabriel: Yes.

10:44 CK: Is that correct? Okay.

10:45 AG: And then also wrapped into that thinking, ana, cognitive process or whatever is this image of the young boy...

10:56 Gabriel: Uh, [AG: Possibly.] maya, maybe. Yeah. [AG: Yeah.] Possible. Yeah. Uh, and Cody, I'll, I'll say, just in case this is important, um, it wasn't Tom Hanks saying "cigarette," it was Forrest Gump saying [CK: Forrest Gump.] it, it. Yeah.

11:11 CK: I had misspoken earlier and [Gabriel: Okay, no worries.] is that, is that a, is that an, a hearing of the video, meaning like, Tom Hanks is playing and I'm hearing him say that? Or is this an inner hearing? Like I've create, I've made this up.

11:24 Gabriel: It's a hearing of the video.

11:25 CK: Okay. And I'm good.

11:30 RTH: And I, I, and I would observe that Cody corrected himself, which I thought was good. He, he started, he started saying that Tom Hanks was saying, and he corrected himself to foreign, "Forrest Gump was saying," if [Gabriel: Oh.] my recollection is correct. [His recollection is correct; see 10:26.] And, [Gabriel: Oh, my bad. I missed that.] and I think so, we can replay the tape or whatever. But, but I, I thought that was a, a pretty smart change that he recognizes. I thought he recognizes a mistake and, and corrected it in the, at, at the moment, which I thought was pretty good. [Gabriel: Hmm.] Number 2?

11:30 Russ comments: At its heart, pristine inner experience is generally *directed at* or *aimed at* something, and a huge aspect of the DES skill is being clear about what that something is. Here it is noteworthy that both CK (in his 10:26 turn) and Gabriel (in his 10:56 turn) are distinguishing between the aim of Gabriel's beeped experience as being either *Forrest Gump* or *Tom Hanks* saying "cigarette." Good on both sides! In the real world, that's a very difficult distinction to make—Tom Hanks *is* Forrest Gump in a very important real way. But in the *experiential* world, the two are very different. Both CK and Gabriel are in touch with that, which means that both are paying attention to the experiential world, which is the object of DES.

12:02 Gabriel: Okay. [AG: Inaudible] All right. So number 2,

12:05 RTH: Or number 5 I guess it would be.

12:07 CK: Okay, yeah. [Gabriel: Right.] And I, Amber, you're taking this, am I taking it or,

12:11 AG: Uh, [RTH: Amber,] I'm usually second, I think. sure.

12:13 RTH: Yep, [CK: Sure.] a, Amber's second.

12:14 CK: Yep, okay.

SAMPLE 12.5 DISCUSSION STARTS HERE (working backwards from the most recent samples)

12:15 Gabriel: Okay. All right. So, uh, number, beep number 2 [really 5]. So, uh, for context, I was sitting down and I was eating breakfast. And, uh, so in my experience at the moment of the beep, uh, I had spoken the words "you're getting", or sorry, "you're going," no, yeah, "you're getting," "you're getting late." I had like whispered them out loud. And, and I had whispered them out loud in real life. So it wasn't that this wasn't an inner speaking, this was like, I was out, I was actually speaking. And, um, and uh, at the same time, there was the image of my girlfriend, uh, imagined—this was in my head—uh, walking to a building.

13:04 AG: And is either more salient?

13:17 Gabriel: [pauses] Um, I don't know, I, they're kind of the same. They're like, they're [AG: Okay.] kind of experienced as kind of the same thing, so it's pretty hard to remove them from each other.

13:32 AG: And when you say "the same thing," what do you mean by, [Gabriel: Um,] like, it, [Inaudible] all one experience? These are not two separate things or...?

13:44 Gabriel: I mean, they are obviously two separate things technically, but it's kind of like they're the same experience. Um,

13:54 AG: Okay. [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] So this is like all part of one, like two characteristics of one experience is, is how you would,

14:00 Gabriel: I think, I think that's a safe way of putting it, yes.

14:04 AG: Okay. [pause] Sorry, I'll just write that down. So, um, I'll start with the seeing. Tell me what you see.

14:16 Gabriel: Okay. So I see my girlfriend, uh, and y'know, she, she's, uh, walking to a building. It's sort of, she's in a, she's in a dress, like some sort of blue and green dress. Uh, she's white, black hair. And, um, I, I, she has some sort of pocketbook in the, as well. Um, and the building in the background is, uh, it's, it's, uh, very, it's very, it's, the building, it's, has some brown, maybe it's made out of bricks. I think there's some sort of like metal, um, beams of like, steel that's painted blue. Uh, but the building itself is very undefined. And, um, I also, I, I, I, she's walking, I believe on the sidewalk and there is a blue sky in the background, and that's probably about it.

15:26 AG: Okay. And, um, you said that she was walking to a building. So are there two buildings or are there, is there something,

15:35 Gabriel: There's, uh, only one building, so she's like, there's only one building. She's almost there. She's like right at the door, basically.

15:42 AG: I see. Okay. And is this building anything specific or is this just a building?

15:48 Gabriel: It's a school building, but it's not any, it's not anything specific aside from that.

15:56 AG: So like, you wouldn't say it's like,

15:57 Gabriel: It's not even a UNLV building. [AG: Right.] It's just a school building.

16:00 AG: Okay. [Gabriel: Yeah.] And is there anything more to be said about that?

16:11 Gabriel: Um, I guess one thing is like, the way that she's walking kind of indicates, um, that she's going quickly. Like her stride is a little big. So...

16:27 AG: Is, and is this, um, are you seeing her from the, like a profile from the back, from the front?

16:35 Gabriel: This is a profile view.

16:38 AG: Okay. Left profile, right profile?

16:41 Gabriel: Uh, it would, I'm looking at her left.

16:45 AG: Okay.

16:53 RTH: And do you see her in motion? Or is this a, like a still picture of a person in motion?

16:58 Gabriel: It's a still picture of a person in motion.

17:01 RTH: Okay.

17:14 AG: Um, yeah. Is there anything more to be said about this?

17:18 Gabriel: Uh, I don't think so. I think that about covers it.

17:18 Russ comments: Gabriel's inner seeing is quite skillful in what it is aiming at. It is specifically about his girlfriend, and specifically about her hurrying, but it is *not* specifically about any particular building—it is seen to be a *school* building but not any specific building that he has ever seen. Thus, this seeing conveys that his girlfriend is late for school, but does not convey what exactly she is late for (perhaps because Gabriel doesn't know, or because lateness is an ongoing issue).

12:22 AG: Okay.

17:24 CK: Uh, just one more question. Is there, are there borders to this? Like I'm seeing a, y'know, [outlines a rectangle] like a picture [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] or is it sort of like a real scene, or y'know, there's no border just kind of bleeds out into the...

17:45 Gabriel: The second I try to answer that question, I feel like I'm definitely, no matter what I choose, I'm gonna be like, sort of making that up. I, I don't think I know.

17:57 CK: Fair enough. That's fine.

17:59 Gabriel: Okay.

17:59 RTH: So I would say about that is that there, there is a third choice between there being a border and there not being a border. And that is, I wasn't really paying attention to whether there was a border or not.

18:08 Gabriel: Okay. I suppose that's true, but I also wasn't paying attention to the sky in the background, but I know there was a sky.

18:15 RTH: As you, as in I saw the sky at the moment of the beep, or as I presume there must have been a sky? Cuz,

18:21 Gabriel: Oh, as in I, I *saw* it, [RTH: Mm-hmm.] it was definitely there. [RTH: Okay.]

18:25 CK: There, [RTH: So,] but not central to my experience, right? In the same way, [Gabriel: Right.] Okay.

18:31 RTH: So what, what I would say about all of that is that there, there are gradations of being present to you. There's the sky that isn't as present as the girlfriend, and there's the borders that aren't as present as the sky.

18:41 Gabriel: Okay.

18:43 RTH: All that stuff is, there's no reason why it has to be either there or not. Either / or, either / maybe / or, or either two different kind of maybes or, or whatever.

18:52 Gabriel: Okay. Got it. [Pause] Yeah, that, [AG: Um, I'm,] that, that helps me think about it. Oh so, what was that?

19:01 AG: [Inaudible] uh, if you have anything say. I was just gonna say I'm good on that portion. If there's any more questions.

19:05 RTH: And well, let me make one more comment. And that's also true about my question about *in motion*. There's, you answered that fairly con, cons, confidently that it was not in motion. But, but there's, there are gradations there. Well, it's, it's like, as in, well, I didn't really see her progressing, but it didn't seem like a skill, still picture either. That would've been,

19:25 Gabriel: Hmm. Oh, okay. Yeah. That, that makes sense to me. Probably because, yeah, that makes sense to me. Kind of like, y'know, when you're dizzy and you're, you're looking out and, uh, even if you keep your eyes fixed on a point, it still feels like it's moving. [RTH: Right.] Vi, it visually feels like it's moving, but it's just not.

19:51 RTH: And, and I think, I think that's true in the, in the inner, inner experience, the, [Gabriel: Hmm.] In the *real* world, there of course, there's a difference between a video and a picture, and there's not much in between. [Gabriel: Mm-hmm. Yeah.] But that's not, that's not necessarily true in the experiential world. [Gabriel: Right. Okay.] I, I see her, I understand that this is a seeing of, of a motion. Yeah. I don't really see the motion, so that doesn't mean I see a still picture either.

20:16 Gabriel: Mm-hmm. There are definitely some visual illusions like that too, where, where you, where it's not, it's not technically moving visually, but there's like the sensation that it's moving visually. [RTH: Right.] Okay.

20:33 RTH: Number 3, which really is number 3.

20:36 AG: Um,

20:36 Gabriel: Oh, [RTH: No, it's number 4.] [AG: Inaudible] there was another aspect.

20:38 AG: There was another part, yeah.

20:39 RTH: Oh, sorry about that.

20:40 AG: I just wanted to double check on that. So you, you were whispering, I take you to be saying that you're whispering out loud? "You're getting late"?

20:47 Gabriel: Yes, yes. I actively whispered that out loud, uh, in the real world. I whispered it. It was also present to me. Yeah.

20:57 AG: Okay. And is there anything more to be said about that?

21:02 Gabriel: No, I don't think so.

12:03 AG: Okay.

21:06 RTH: I've got a couple questions about that. Should I go for em'?

21:09 AG: Yeah, go ahead.

21:11 RTH: W, w, was this whispering *to* anyone? Yourself or to your girlfriend? Or,

21:16 Gabriel: Uh, it was, it was, um, it was to, it was sort of to, it was to my girlfriend, but she wasn't there, so it was like I was imagining saying it to my girlfriend.

21:29 RTH: So the, "you" in "you're getting late," is your girlfriend? Not, [Gabriel: Yes.] not Gabriel. Okay. [Gabriel: Yes.] And, [pause] and we have, we have talked in the past about an inner voice being sort of whispery. [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] Is this, is this whispery the same or different from that?

21:52 Gabriel: Uh, it's different from that.

21:54 RTH: So this is a true whisper?

21:56 Gabriel: Yes. This is a true whisper.

21:59 RTH: And I hear it more or less as it really is?

22:03 Gabriel: Mm-hmm.

22:03 RTH: Okay. And I think I'm good.

22:09 Gabriel: Okay.

22:12 AG: Number 4?

SAMPLE 12.4 DISCUSSION STARTS HERE

22:15 Gabriel: Okay. [Clears throat.] So for context, I was, uh, texting with someone at the moment of beep and, uh, I had just texted the message "That's," or I just finished typing the message: "That's so coooooool." Uh, so in my experience at the moment of the beep, um, was the reading, or was the typing/reading of "That's so coooooool." Uh, with many zeros, or sorry, with many "coooooool" was extended. So there were many o's instead of just two. Um, so in my experience was the typing and reading of "That's so coooooool." Um, and that was spoken in my internal voice. That *was* spoken in the whispery kind of, uh, voice that we've talked about before. And, uh, additionally there was an image of, uh, this character, uh, from an anime. It was Misa from Death Note.

- 23:22 CK: Either, any aspect of my experience that's more prominent?
- 23:36 Gabriel: I would say, um, I'm not sure because this thought process I was going through, at one point the "That that's so coooooool" was more prominent. Then later on, the picture of Misa was more prominent, and I don't know when during the thought process that beep happened.
- 23:56 CK: Okay. And that's to say, just to understand what you're saying here: These things are ongoing, they've been going on for some time prior to the beep, and the beep [RTH: Coughs] interrupts that thought process though, that [Gabriel: Yeah. And it,] includes the Misa [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] and the typing, reading of "That's so cool."
- 24:16 Gabriel: Yes. Yes. And it went on for a little bit after the beep started, so I, so I don't remember exactly when during that process the beep was, so I don't know which was more prominent.
- 24:31 CK: Okay, fair enough. So I guess just starting with the, the, the typing or what, whatever, but the, "That's so cool" part, not, not the Misa part. But so how is that present to you at the moment?
- 24:50 Gabriel: I'm sorry, which part?
- 24:51 CK: The, the typing, reading "That's so cool."
- 24:54 Gabriel: Okay. Yeah. So, um, that's present to me as, uh, I mean it's the, there is something experientially different from typing the text as opposed to reading it. And, um, so I, I, I guess whatever that, I don't know how to explain it, but it's that So it was the experience of having typed the text. And, but also in, in addition to that is the experience of reading it. Uh, because y'know, I, at this, at least at this moment, when I was typing it, I was also reading it. So, well actually, I don't know if I was reading it or if I was *saying* it and then typing it. Um, I don't know which of those two it was. Uh, and there have been a few times where I was typing something out and we've had a sample, and it's been hard for me to tell whether or not the experience, the auditory experience was the act of me reading it or if it was the act of me saying it and then typing it.
- 26:05 RTH: So I, I [Gabriel: That was a mouthful.] I don't have the timing straight, [Gabriel: Okay.] I don't think. So is, has the typing concluded and now I am reading it? Or is the typing ongoing and the reading is in sync with the typing and the beep catches me somewhere in there? Or is the typing ongoing and the reading is ongoing, but they're not synchronous?
- 26:33 Gabriel: Okay. Uh, y'know. Okay.
- 26:36 RTH: Or *I don't know* is,

- 26:36 Gabriel: Logically speaking, I had finished writing the message, um, uh, like I had typed the I in "coooooool." So logically speaking to typing is done. But the act of typing i, is still part of my experience.
- 26:56 RTH: And by logically speaking, you mean in the real world of, of [Gabriel: Yes. Real world.] keys, keystrokes or thumb, thumb strokes or, or, or whatever. So the [Gabriel: Yes.] beep, the beep comes after the typing is concluded. But the *experience* is that the, the typing is still ongoing.
- 27:14 Gabriel: Yes. The experience is that I'm in the act of typing a message.
- 27:18 RTH: Okay.
- 27:23 CK: And by typing a message, how did, how exactly does that go?
- 27:33 Gabriel: Um, well. It's, it's the act of, uh, typing something to someone, I guess. Like, this isn't something I'm writing in my own notes or something [CK: Sure.] like that. Uh.
- 27:48 CK: I guess my question [Gabriel: Uh,] here is I, I can imagine as a, there's a number of options here, right? Like, I could imagine this is like a bodily sensation sort of a thing, right? Like, I'm feeling my fingers doing this. Like I'm, it feels like my fingers are moving and typing, do doing this [Gabriel: Hmm.] act of typing. It could be, I'm in the writing frame of mind, right? So this is really nothing to do physically, this is that, but, y'know, somehow I'm, I'm formulating the words to put [Gabriel: Okay.] together as a message. Or could be, could be those things could be something else. But that, that's, I guess [Gabriel: Okay.] my question is by typing, like how, how is that present to you at the moment?
- 28:25 Gabriel: Okay. That would, that would be a frame of mind. It wouldn't be a physical thing. I think frame of mind's a pretty good way of putting it. I'm in the frame of mind of, I'm in the text-messaging frame of mind. That seems very accurate to me, I... Because it's definitely different from like an email frame of mind, for example. So I think, uh, I think that makes sense.
- 28:56 CK: And is that, does that text message frame of mine, which I, I'm not, I, I don't know if I fully have grasped that yet, but does that, i, [Gabriel: Hmm.] is that, does that include like the, the inner speaking of "That's so cool"? Like i, is that kind of, is that inner part of it, that innerly spoken part, kind of what I mean by "I'm in this frame of mind"? Or is that somehow different, y'know, is this one thing that has multiple aspects? Again, both of those, neither of those...
- 29:27 Gabriel: Um, well, the inner speaking of "That's so cool" i, i, is not unique to the text-message frame of mind, I suppose. Uh, what is unique to the text-message frame of mind, uh, that we're talking about.... That, the text message frame of mind is almost like just, y'know, the text message frame of mind might be one of those cases of, of, technically the fact that I'm texting has an experience, experiential effect. Because if I was doing something else, it would feel different, um, in the same way that like an arm re, like this armrest has an effect on me because if it wasn't there, my arm would

be falling through the chair. So I, I'm going to say, uh, I might sort of retract the text-message frame of mind thing. Uh, there, I mean, there's a typing. All right, I'm confused.

30:35 RTH: So lemme, lemme see whether I can, unconfuse this. [Gabriel: Okay.] So at the moment of the beep, regardless of whether I am physically typing or not, does, do I apprehend myself as typing "That's so cool"? that's, as [Gabriel: Yes.] an ongoing thing.

30:54 Gabriel: Yes.

30:55 RTH: And I think that's what we've been calling the fr, frame of mind, but that got us confused, so. [Gabriel: Okay.] Because I, I apprehend myself as typing, even though I recognize in, on *retrospection*, that the typing is over.

31:09 Gabriel: Yes.

31:10 RTH: Mm-hmm. And then I'm also saying "That's so cool." [Gabriel: Yes.] And is that, is that in sync with the, with the experiential typing, or is that seem like its own separate sorta strand?


31:28 Gabriel: That, uh, um, okay. That is what I have the difficulty separating because well, it's a pos, okay. Lemme think about that. [pause] Okay. No, it i, it is part of the experience of typing. Yes. I was get, I, I was interpreting the question wrong.

32:06 RTH: Okay. [pause]

32:05 CK: Okay. And I guess both for Gabriel and for everyone else is there, is there anything, any, anyone have anything more to say about this part, this aspect of the beep, experience of the beep?

32:20 RTH: So lemme see whether I've got, [Holds up hand-drawn diagram. See comment 32:20 for a recreation.] whether I got this schematized right. Is that, I guess I gotta somehow un, gotta change my background.

32:20 Russ comments: Here is a recreation of the diagram RTH sketched:



- 32:34 Gabriel: Let me change my view so that I can zoom you in a little bit.
- 32:37 RTH: Yeah. And I gotta change [RTH: There we go.] my view, so I'm not backwards. How the heck could I do that?
- 32:40 CK: Oh, that, that, no, that was, it was coming, correct.
- 32:42 RTH: It was coming correct?
- 32:43 Gabriel: Oh, yeah. [CK: Yep. Yeah.] [RTH: Oh.] It's just backwards for you so that it's [RTH: Inaudible] like you're looking in a mirror. Okay.
- 32:47 CK: But it, it was coming. We could read it.
- 32:48 RTH: So you could read it?
- 32:50 CK: Yeah. Yeah. [Gabriel: Okay.]
- 32:51 RTH: So time. So if time is going, whichever way, time is going, what, what's happening in the real world, [uses pencil to point at the time axis] (this is harder to look, than it looks.) what's happening in the real world started and, and then it ended. [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] An, and what's happening in experience [Uses pencil to point at the curve labeled 'experience of typing'] started after the real world typing, and it ends somewhere after. [Points in the general area of the right hand side of the curve labeled 'experience of typing'] And the beep comes, the beep comes in here [Points to the general area between the curve labeled "real world" and the one labeled "experience of typing"] [laughs], the beep comes in here somewhere, I guess.
- 33:20 Gabriel: Yes, right.

33:21 RTH: [Inaudible] turn it around and look at it like this. [RTH moves such that he is out of frame, but able to look at his diagram while angling it toward the camera] The beep, the beep happens in here? [Points, this time more precisely, to the area on the time-axis between the curve labeled “real world” and the one labeled “experience of typing”]

33:26 Gabriel: Yes. It happens somewhere after the real world one ends and before the, the experiential ends.

33:33 RTH: Okay. And the *speaking* of it, the experience of speaking it seems sort of in sync with the experience of typing it?

33:41 Gabriel: Um, yes.

33:43 RTH: Okay. That’s the way I understood it. [CK: Yeah.] [Gabriel: Okay.] Can’t draw it, but I can understand it.

33:52 CK: And [RTH: Wonder how I,] so, and then there’s, [RTH: Go ahead.] I’m not, but yep, that was good. So then there’s the inner s, the inner seeing of Misa. [Gabriel: Yes.] And what do you see?

34:05 Gabriel: Uh, I see, I see a blonde-haired anime-style girl sitting back in a bed, and she’s wearing kind of like goth clothing and has a bunch of, um, unusual stuffed animals. [pause]

34:46 CK: And so is this the case that I’m... Is this that I’m seeing Misa, this I I’m seeing her as, y’know, accurately? Or is it that I’m seeing a blonde-haired anime-style person and

35:06 Gabriel: I am seeing Misa. That was the, I was giving a visual. Yeah. I’m seeing,

35:10 CK: Right? No, I, I I, I appreciate that, but I wanted to make sure those can be two slightly very different, or they can be slight differences, but very different experientially. So I wanted to make sure that [Gabriel: Right.] we were talking about

35:19 Gabriel: This. I am, I am seeing Misa. Uh, yeah, exactly. I’m seeing Misa in her room.

35:30 CK: Clear? In color? In motion?

35:35 Gabriel: It’s not in motion. Um, it is in color. Uh, and when it comes to whether or not it’s clear, it, it, I i, it wasn’t, I wasn’t experiencing it as unclear. I wasn’t experiencing it as clear either, which I guess maybe clear as the default than that case, it was clear. But, uh, I, I don’t know if I can say whether or not it was clear or unclear.

36:02 RTH: Had a lot of details.

36:05 Gabriel: Yes. Uh, well, uh, I don’t, uh, okay. I, yeah, I suppose it had a lot of details. If we look at the image, y’know, if we, if we dissect the image, um, though I, I feel like I didn’t

experience it as a detailed image. I just experienced it as this is an image of Misa or this is not an *image*. This is *Misa*.

- 36:34 RTH: I understood you to say in originally, this is Misa, she's wearing a goth dress, she's on her bed, she's got a, about a bunch of weird, crazy stuffed animals around her on the bed.
- 36:45 Gabriel: Well, that is true. Um, but at the moment, oh, hey, I wasn't making a thematic thing out of those details. Those are just details that are in, in this ima imagined picture, but it's in that...
- 37:02 RTH: So I, yeah, I didn't, I didn't mean to say that you were making a thematic detail in, in the sense of, I'm analyzing and, and somehow conveying to myself, well, there are stuffed animals and oh, there's goth dress, dress or whatever. But more in the sense of, y'know, when I'm looking at Gabriel on the, on, on the screen, I'm, I'm seeing Gabriel, I'm not just seeing his left eye. Although that might be where I'm fixated at the moment, but [Gabriel: Right.] I'm, I'm seeing him wearing a pink shirt and whatever.
- 37:32 Gabriel: Okay. Yeah. And that I agree then.
- 37:36 RTH: Okay. And I, and I would say that if you asked me whether Gabriel is clear, I would say yes, even though that was not thematically, but I can make it thematically, like Gabriel is one sense of clarity in the background is another sense of clarity. [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] And regardless of whether I'm looking at his hand that's on his chin or whether I'm looking at his left eye, I'm, I'm thinking that I'm seeing Gabriel clearly, even though when I'm looking at his left eye, his hand isn't as clear, and vice versa.
- 38:03 Gabriel: Right. Well, in that case, um, okay, so we've had discussions like this before. Um, when it comes to clarity, the image is ob, objective, I mean, if I, I don't know if object, if the word *objective* makes sense here, but it seems like the image, objectively speaking, if I were to like draw as best I could, uh, y'know, and then, y'know, undefined elements we disregard or something like that, I think it would be a pretty *unclear* image. But we've also said that even clear visual experiences have a lot of undefined elements and less of it is clear than we usually think. Um, so I, the, that, that is a, that's a hard question for me to answer. I don't know if I understand how to answer the question of whether or not it's clear. [pause]
- 39:15 RTH: So I, I agree with all of that, including its difficulty. The, but what I would say, I think, is [pause] something like: if, if when I'm looking at Misa, I have the sense of seeing Misa, [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] and I don't have the sense of seeing a blurred Misa, then I think I would say, well, I must have been seeing Misa clearly.
- 39:48 Gabriel: Okay. All right. In that case, in that, in that case, I would say I, it was clearly Misa.
- 39:56 RTH: And the, and it's the same sense as, if I'm looking at Gabriel, I don't have a sense of him being clear one way or another. But if I look at Gabriel's *background*, then I would say, well, that, I'm looking at a blurred background. [Gabriel: Okay. Okay.] And


that would be, and that would be the, the blurriness would be a, y'know, fairly salient portion of my looking at, at Gabriel's *background*. [Gabriel: Okay.] And I wouldn't have that when I'm looking at Gabriel, even though Gabriel does, y'know, come and come and go, his left ear disappears sometimes because of the clarity of the background, the software that makes that [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] makes the background happen, sometimes just subtracts his ear and sometimes it doesn't. And, and uh, [Gabriel: Right.] but, but I wouldn't say that was an essential part of my seeing of Gabriel unless I was choosing to make it part of it.

40:47 Gabriel: Okay.

40:48 CK: Or I guess [Gabriel: Uh,] what I would say that is, is sort of like, I'm looking at Gabriel in the same way, and sometimes I see the lines on Gabriel's shirt and sometimes I don't. Right? It's, but I'm not unclearly seeing it. I'm still, I'm looking at Gabriel and that's, [Gabriel: Okay.] seeing Gabriel is pres, is very salient to me.

41:06 Gabriel: Okay. I, I th, I can agree with, I agree that it was clear then, the image. The reason that I have trouble with the word *clear* is because I feel like *usually* the word clear, it's sort of, I guess more, is not really a reflective of experience because it's usually more of a description of, um, I guess like computer screens or like pictures. Like this *picture* is clear. Um, and what that means is there isn't... Well, yeah. I think, I think clear in the sense that we're using it now is not a visual characteristic, but a, um, I, y'know, I guess it, it's, it's not a visual characteristic. It's an, it's a, it's more of a cognitive thing, whereas *clear*, the sense that people usually use it, is sort of a visual characteristic. Um, and I maybe this will help explain my confusion, like the background there, my blurry background, I feel like that blurry background could be experienced, like if I was imagining my bedroom, I feel like I *could* have that as my imagined image and in some cases I would still experience that as a clear image of my bedroom, if that makes sense.

41:06 Russ comments: The issue is *not* cognitive. In the real world of vision, there are two meanings of *clear*. One, as Gabriel says, has to do with the clarity of the *thing seen*:



"I clearly see Gabriel; and I clearly see his blurry bedroom." Part of the thing seen is clear, part is blurry.

The other sense of *clear* has to do with the seeing itself: the patient with cataracts complains to her ophthalmologist that her *seeing* is unclear. Her experience of the same computer screen is like this:



She would say, “I don’t see clearly.” Her complaint is not about Gabriel or his bedroom, but about the clarity of her seeing in general.

Inner seeing is understood to be metaphorical in the sense that the eyeballs and the real exterior world are not involved, and yet the *experience* is of *seeing*. At the moment of this beep, Gabriel (innerly) *sees* Misa, *not* merely *cognitively knows* her characteristics. So the question is: does Gabriel (innerly) see Misa clearly (like the Gabriel of the upper picture), or does he clearly (innerly) see a blurry Misa (like the bedroom of the upper picture), or does he (innerly) see Misa but nothing including Misa is clear in that seeing (like the bottom picture)? Or does that question simply not make sense—does the inner seeing metaphor break down? (This discussion will continue in the comment at 45:30.)

- 42:48 RTH: So I, I think it’s difficult, because I do think that *clarity* has a variety of different kind of meanings. [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] What I would say, that some people sometimes, and maybe even *you* sometimes, I can’t, can’t remember, would say: I had a visual, I had a visual imagery, and it was just not clear to me. I did not see any features. I did not... That I would, I would say would that image, the, this inner seeing was not clear. [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] I don’t hear you saying that here. I hear you saying, “I saw Misa” and, and [Gabriel: Right.] it wouldn’t, wouldn’t make sense to me to say, well, but Misa was blurry. I, I was, I was seeing Misa in all of her real anime life. And that’s what I hear you saying, basically. And so I would say, [Gabriel: Yes.] well that’s a, that’s a clear seeing of. And, and every, everything is a little bit I, analogical or whatever. I mean, you’re not really seeing, it’s, [Gabriel: Okay.] it’s a visual, visual experience and she’s not really clear—it’s a apprehensional experience.
- 43:53 Gabriel: Okay. So in that case, in order for something to be like blurry, in order for a vi, an imagined experience to be blurry, does the blurriness have to be thematic? Like do, do we have to be making a point of it?
- 44:19 RTH: [Pause] I think the answer to that is no.
- 44:22 Gabriel: No. Okay.
- 44:22 RTH: Oh, so I, [pause] I think it’s, I think it’s complicated. [Gabriel: Okay.] Because I think, I think blurry can be, can be, *I saw visual blurriness* as it is when I look at your background now, I see your doorframe and whatever. *I see visual blurriness*. And I’m, and I’m sure cap, people are capable of imagining that. But it, it’s also the case that most of the time, even though my eyeballs are aimed in the same direction, like right now I’m seeing the visual blurriness that’s behind Gabriel. But most of the time when

I'm looking at Gabriel, I'm just not paying attention to the background, cuz it's not very [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] interesting. I'm interested in what Gabriel looks like. And, and so I think there is a, there is an interplay between what is *seen to be blurry* and what is just *not paid attention to*. [Gabriel: Okay.] But what is not paid attention to is *sometimes* central. [Gabriel: Okay. Right.]

45:30

So the, the, the example that's coming to mind is one that I've written about where (I don't, I don't actually remember where I've written about it), but the, but the s, per, the subject in the research thought her roommate was sort of loose-moraled, or whatever you wanna say. And, and at the moment that, that she had that, she had a, a, she had a visual image of her roommate sitting on a couch with, wearing just a bra as her top at, attire. And next to her was a guy who was blurry or not featured. And the, and the point of the, the point of the seeing was that she's with a lot of guys who are sitting next to her where, and, and so the blurriness, she was... She wasn't really attending to the blurriness particularly, [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] but it was a feature of the, of the *seeing* and the, the center of the scene was the, whenever you call nowadays a girl who has a lot of boyfriends. But, uh, but, but [Gabriel: Okay.] but, but the seeing was specifically *not clear* about who the guy was. [Gabriel: Okay. Hmm.] Even though that was not the center of the visual, the center of the visual thing was, [Gabriel: Okay.] was the girl, was the girl. [Gabriel: Okay.] So I think, I think these are, these, these things are complicated and we, we just have to [Gabriel: Yeah.] Have to worry, worry 'em through one beep at a time, basically.

45:30

Russ comments: Let's keep in mind the question that RTH is trying to answer: at 43:53 Gabriel asked, "In order for ... an imagined experience to be blurry, does the blurriness have to be thematic? Like do, do we have to be making a point of it?" The answer is *No*. To avoid confusion, let's give some names to the people in the 45:30 example. Let's call "Anna" the person who innerly sees and "Betty" the roommate who is innerly seen. Anna sees Betty clearly, sees Betty's bra clearly, sees the couch clearly. But Anna sees the guy *unclearly*—he has no particular features, presumably because the unclear guy conveys that Betty sits in her bra next to lots of guys. It is *not* the case that Anna is making a *special point* of the guy's unclarity (*Aha! The guy is unclear!*) any more than she is making a *special point* of the bra's clarity (*Aha! The bra is clear!*). Both the guy-unclearity and the bra-clarity are essential features of Anna's inner seeing—the point is that Anna is seeing a specific Betty and an unspecific guy. But neither of those aspects was made a central theme of her experience.

It's approximately the same sense as the raspiness of Gabriel's inner voice (e.g., in this sample as well as in 10.5, 9.6, 8.7 etc.). The raspiness was evident to Gabriel, was a feature of the inner speaking at the moment of the beep, but was *not* a central theme of Gabriel's experience. Gabriel immediately apprehended his voice as being raspy even though there was no *Aha! The voice is raspy!* aspect of the inner-speaking experience.

So the question about the Misa sample is: Did Gabriel innerly see Misa clearly, as a characteristic of the seeing, even though there was no *Aha! Misa is clear!* aspect of the inner-seeing? It seems to me that the answer is *Yes*, and it seems to me that, as a result of this discussion, Gabriel will be in a better position to answer that kind of question on later sampling days.

- 47:03 Gabriel: It might, I, I, I think maybe it'd be useful to... So I'm, I would like it if you guys could send me this recording after, um, [RTH: Okay.] because I'd like to go over this again. And I'm wondering if, if maybe, um, uh, I'm wondering if maybe it would be useful to come up with words, uh, for different meanings of clear. Uh, but, but in this case, I'll agree that the i, the, the picture of, or the, the imagined image of Misa was, uh, definitely clear in the, in the way that we've described it here.
- 47:42 RTH: Okay. So number one, I'll send you the, I'll send you the video. And number two, what I, what I would say about whether we should come up with words, I think we should, and I think we should do that as slowly as possible, [Gabriel: Okay.] which puts me in sort of the backwards way from the philosophical camp, I think. But, but what a, what, what, what I *think* is that the *longer* we wait before we come up with a set of words, the more likely that those words are going to have, have a full understanding for us.
- 48:19 Gabriel: Okay. That makes sense.
- 48:20 RTH: Whereas if we, if we say, well, let's, let's just now after as the result of one conversation or maybe a couple of conversations, but [unclear] let's let's define clear in this regard and clear in that regard and call that this clear clear and that clear blurry or whatever, whatever [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] we make our,... *then* I think that we will be forced into the *word* discriminations rather than the *phenomenon* discrimination. [Gabriel: Right. Okay.] And I would prefer (so that the, the whole method basically, I think is has this as a central feature) to keep the, the, the desirability of figuring out exactly what words we should use as the *last* thing that one would do, rather than the *first*.
- 49:05 Gabriel: Okay. Okay. That makes sense.
- 49:08 RTH: Which I think makes me fairly unusual in the, in the scientific or philosophical world or whatever.
- 49:16 Gabriel: You wanna let the, you wanna let the phenomenal discriminations *force* word dis, word discriminations. You *don't* want *word* discriminations to force *phenomenal* discrimination.
- 49:29 RTH: Exactly. The word force might be a little strong, but [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] but, but pretty good actually, I think, [Gabriel: Okay.] I think. When it, when we have gotten to the place where we know what we're, what, how we're discriminating phenomenologically, I think it will be quite logical for us, quite easy for us to say, well, this, let's call this word that, [corrects himself] this phenomenon that and this phenomenon that other.
- 49:29 Russ comments: The discussion we are having here is an important reason for being slow to define terminology. But there is another important reason: once terminology has been codified, there is an inexorable push for future investigators to classify according to that terminology. That works *against* the fidelity of the process. Most DES participants (by far the majority, I think) are not confused by the definitions of

clear—they naturally use the understanding of *clear* that leads to Gabriel's 41:06 understanding.

To suggest to *those* participants that there are alternative understandings of *clear* is to lead then down a path that is not relevant to them, and will likely be hugely distracting to their mastery of whatever discriminations *are* important for them.

So the DES investigator has to be open to understanding what a particular participant means by *clear* (and by every other word that they use), and not single out any one particular word as worthy of particular emphasis.

49:53 Gabriel: Okay. Got it.

49:55 RTH: And that's, and that's j, that's sort of an empirical observation of what I, what I think we have done. [Gabriel: Okay] That, uh... And I think it's a, I think it's of fun, of fundamental importance.

50:11 Gabriel: Okay. Makes sense to me.

50:13 RTH: The longer, the longer you can keep the commitment to a description *at bay*—until you, until it's no longer a problem—then, [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] then you can make a description.

50:13 Russ comments: Many observers are impatient with DES, but I think the definitional slowness that we have been talking about is of fundamental importance.

50:28 Gabriel: Okay.

50:30 RTH: But I'll send you the tape.

50:32 Gabriel: Okay. Thank you.

50:33 CK: For what it's worth, I actually thought, Gabriel, that was, I think your distinction of, or the, the fear of letting the words force the experience into certain tracks that may not necessarily be experientially faithful. I think that is actually, that, that is the main tenet of DES, about bracketing those presuppositions, right? Or why we, why it's difficult, why it makes it difficult, right? Because we have to use these words to talk about it. I have to use the something like the word *clear*, which is dirty. It has a lot of different varied [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] connotations. Bbut, [Gabriel: Okay.] that's what we're trying to work, I guess, not *against* per se, but we have to muck through it, right? Be, [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] because we need to avoid that. We need to recognize that's possible, when *really* what we're trying to do is to let the phenomena be phenomena, right? And then have the phenomena first and foremost, and try to describe that.

51:23 Gabriel: Okay. Got it. Thank you.

51:28 RTH: So I'm guessing we've screwed this beep up about, about as far as we're gonna get to that. We should go onto the next beep.

51:34 Gabriel: Okay.

51:35 RTH: Number 3?

SAMPLE 12.3 DISCUSSION STARTS HERE

51:37 Gabriel: All right. Beep, uh, beep number 3. So, uh, for context, I was watching a video, uh, and, uh, yeah, I was watching a video. I was just sitting in my bed watching a video. And, uh, auditorially present to me at the moment of the beep, uh, were the words “each and every time.” And this was actually spoken in the video and I was experiencing it; uh, it was part of my experience. That was part of a sentence, uh, which was, the whole sentence was, “he dies each and every time.” But auditorially all that was present to me was “each and every time”; um, however, the meaning of the whole sentence was still present to me at that moment. And additionally, and, and that was the, in the voice of the YouTuber. I don’t know the guy’s name, but it was in the voice of the YouTuber. Let’s see, what’s, and what else? [pause, looks at notes] Um, right. Okay. Um, and that was about it. Uh, there wasn’t really anything visual there. Uh, this was it, earlier in the morning, so it was a little bit more difficult for me to be engaged in this beep, um, than, like, eh, eh, it felt a little more difficult to be accurate. But that’s all I... Usually, there’s something visual. But in this case, I, I don’t really feel like there was.

53:29 RTH: Okay. And so I understand you to be saying that the guy is saying “he dies each and every time,” but somehow you are hearing only the “each and every time” portion of it.

53:40 Gabriel: Yes.

53:41 RTH: And that, that is distinct from saying, he was saying “he dies each and every time,” and the beep just came at the end of the sentence. Er that somehow I have chunkified out that “each and every time” [Gabriel: Yes.] experientially piece.

54:01 Gabriel: Yes. And specifically, I, I chunked out the *auditory* “each and every time” bit, but the *meaning* of the whole thing was still present to me. [RTH: Okay.] It was just when it came to the sound in my ears, y’know, “each and every time” was chunked out.

54:18 RTH: Okay. And is there anything more to say about how, what, what, what chunked out? How, how that [inaudible]?

54:25 Gabriel: Um, uh, no, it was just like, at the moment of the beep, it just felt like the sound of “each and every time” in this guy’s voice was there, and the rest of the sentence wasn’t.

54:43 RTH: And did it seem like the *sound* was there? Or did it seem like *the portion of the guy speaking* was there?

54:52 Gabriel: Um, well, could you elaborate on that?

54:56 RTH: Well, I could say, if I focus on just the *sound*, I would, I would say I was focusing on the timbre of his voice or his accent, [Gabriel: Mm, hmm. Okay.] or his quality of his voice or whatever. Whereas if I was speaking, I was, I was hearing this guy speaking, and I got the...

55:11 Gabriel: Yes, I was hearing this guy. [interrupts himself] Well, so that's a good question. Because the, uh, so if I were to say that it was just, if it was, if I were to say it was the second option, so I was hearing this guy speaking, and only this end of the speaking was there, then I'm worried that the reason I'm saying that is because the semantic meaning of the *whole* sentence was there. And therefore, *maybe* all I did get was the sound. But because the sound in this moment was combined with the semantic meaning of the whole sentence, which *wasn't* chunked, I feel like this chunked out part was the guy speaking, uh, only, or *was* the guy speaking. But it's possible that the chunked-out part was just the audio. However, it feels like the guy speaking, because I also have the whole semantic meaning there. But in reality, the whole semantic meaning wasn't chunked, but just the audio. Does, uh, does that make sense at all?

56:21 RTH: So, in, it, it an in, if you were asking me about my experience, that, that, it's an interesting thing. So yes, it entirely makes sense. (A), (A): yes, it does entirely make sense. And (B): it's a philosophical distinction that I just can't track. [Gabriel: Okay. (laughs)] It's uh, it, it's, it's, uh... What, what I'm asking is a simple, phenomenal question that doesn't have anything to do with the, with what, what I think is correct, what I think your analysis is, is correct. But my, my question is a si, much simpler question, which is: were you paying attention to the voice qualities? Was the center of this the auditory qualities?

56:21 Russ comments: Regarding option (B): Gabriel's (in 55:11) "If I were to say that.... But it's possible that...." puts his talk into the subjunctive mood that my DES experience leads me to tune out. As a general DES principle, I want to hear what Gabriel's experience *was*, not what it *might have been* under certain assumptions. Perhaps Gabriel didn't apprehend the aspect of his experience that I'm inquiring about, or perhaps he apprehended it but can't remember it—either would be fine with me. But what I *don't* want in DES is for Gabriel to apply some theoretical or logical analysis and then tell me the result of that analysis.

I've been doing DES for long enough (or perhaps it is a personality quirk of mine) that when my theory-detectors sense that an analytical (rather than a descriptive) process is being talked about, I simply tune out, as conveyed by "I just can't track" it.

All that is *not* to say that all analytical or theoretical processes are bad or undesirable. It is to say that analytical or theoretical processes impede the apprehending and describing of experience in DES.

57:10 Gabriel: Right. No, that was not the center of this.

57:13 RTH: Okay. Like, I, I gathered, for example, in the Forrest Gump beep [he refers to sample 12.6, the first sample from today], that you were paying attention to the auditory qualities of "cigarette."

57:26 Gabriel: Yes.

57:27 RTH: And in this beep, it was more the whole deal rather than just the auditory quality.

57:37 Gabriel: Yes.

57:38 RTH: Mm-hmm. [pause] And the, the an, the analytical thing that you, that you said, I think, I think those words were all true, but it just, it's from, in my experience, it's sails past the phenomenon, which is what I'm interested in. But, [Gabriel: Right. Yeah.] but those, but those, those, those words, no matter how accurate are those, or how, how accurate, *regardless* of how accurate those words are, they're not gonna be able to answer the question, [Gabriel: Yes.] was I paying attention to the...?

58:11 Gabriel: I agree. Because either way it would be the same, it would be the same experience, I think. It would, it would feel the same way. [RTH: Mm-hmm.] I think. So, yeah. That, that makes sense.

58:11 Russ comments: Gabriel is exactly right. And it is the experience that DES is interested in.

58:29 RTH: All right. So it is 12, 1:31. Do we have time for one more or are we gonna call it a day here?

58:39 Gabriel: Uh, let's see. Uh, I do have time. Yeah, I have time for one more.

58:48 RTH: I'd say let's do one more.

58:50 Gabriel: Okay. Sounds good.

58:54 RTH: Which is Amber, Amber's beep.

58:59 AG: Go ahead, beep 2.

SAMPLE 12.2 DISCUSSION STARTS HERE

59:00 Gabriel: Okay. Okay. So at the moment of the beep, uh, just for context, I was, this was last night, and, uh, I was at the gym, a, and also at the same time I was listening to some video about *Breaking Bad*. Uh, and so at the moment of the beep, in my experience, uh, were the words in Walter White's voice, so Walter White was speaking, "I am the danger." Um, and, uh, there was a, an imagined image of Walter White, um, y'know, speaking those words angrily. Uh, and additionally at the moment of the beep, there was, uh, in my experience was pain in my bicep as I was finishing, um, a set.

59:56 AG: And any, uh, of those more salient than the others?

1:00:01 Gabriel: Um, it would be the auditory bit.

1:00:06 AG: The “I am the danger”?

1:00:08 Gabriel: Yes.

1:00:09 AG: And how much more,

1:00:11 Gabriel: Uh, that would be, [pause] that would be, [pause] uh, that would [pause], okay. So the, the auditory combined with the image would be like set, uh, 80%, and then the pain would be maybe 20%.

1:00:39 AG: Okay. So I’m gonna s, I’ll start with, uh, “I am the danger.” Uh, is there anything more to be said about that?

1:00:48 Gabriel: So there *was* something about the characteristics of the voice, which was actually present to me, which was the *anger* in, in the voice. It was said very angrily, uh, and that, that that wa, that, so that was present to me. Um, uh, so yeah. I think, I think that covers it. I mean, the, the anger was part, was a combination of a few things, like the gravely-ness and like, [AG: Mm-hmm.] but I, I don’t know if I would say those were present to me, uh, a as opposed to just part of what makes the voice angry. So yeah, I, I think I’ll just say the voice was very angry.

1:01:31 AG: Okay. And, um, you’re saying you’re, you were hearing this right? Like so it came from the video, [Gabriel: Yes.] the real [Gabriel: Yes.] world and I’m hearing. Okay. [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] And, um, just to make sure, you said in Walter White’s voice, and Walter White is a character, right? [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] So this is, this is [cuts out momentarily] his voice, not the actor.

1:01:50 Gabriel: Yes. This is Walter White’s [AG: Okay.] voice.

1:01:52 AG: Okay. And, um, just make sure that he, uh, I said, I asked you this already, I think, but I’m just gonna ask again cuz I might have missed it. But, so you’re hearing it as if, let me make sure I’m getting my question straightened out. Like I’m hearing it as it’s normally being said, like, I’m not hearing any emphasis on one word. I’m not anything like that, or...?

1:02:18 Gabriel: Yeah, no emphasis on one word. It’s the whole phrase.

1:02:22 AG: Okay. Got it. Um, and,

1:02:26 RTH: And are you, are you attending to the anger in this? Or are is, so is the anger sort of thematic or is it just the whole thing happens to be angry?

1:02:37 Gabriel: Uh, I would say that the darkness is thematic, and the anger is part of what makes it dark. So I was thinking like in that moment about how, I guess sort of, uh, monstrous, like it was. Because it was, it was a very dark scene. Uh, so, uh, so the darkness was thematic. The anger was a part of the darkness.

- 1:03:10 AG: And when you say you're thinking about it, is that, is that to say that you're attending to that in some way? Or that's present? Or is there something more to it?
- 1:03:21 RTH: Or less, to it.
- 1:03:23 AG: Yeah, or less.
- 1:03:25 Gabriel: I would say, [pause] uh, it was thematic in the sense, okay, so I'll, I'll stop using the word thematic right now. The, the, the sentence or the, the phrase what it, it made me, uh, uncomfortable, like when I was hearing it, because it was because of the darkness. It, it was so like, so grim. Um, and...[pause] It, it part, i, it wasn't in words necessarily, but it wa, I was thinking, I was thinking something like, *that's horrible*, kind of. Uh, it, and it was sort of an active, it was an active thought. Like I, it was, I was thinking actively *that's horrible*. Um, and, uh, yeah. That, that, and that *wasn't* in words. Um, so I, yeah, I think that would be an unsymbolized thought.
- 1:05:06 AG: Okay. So is that active thinking, I guess... That's, that's part of your experience at the moment of the beep, right?
- 1:05:16 RTH: So can I, can I back us away from that for, for a little bit? [AG: Okay.] Because I'm, I'm noticing that, that his description did not include the thought until pretty late in this discussion and, [AG: Right. Yeah.] and, and so I would, I would like to give him op, the opportunity to make that a first draft and [Gabriel: Okay.] the second draft and turn it into a third draft. So it seems to me that it's possible that, that there was a dark implication of these words [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] and it was, im, it was impacting y, Gabriel, impacting you.
- 1:05:47 Gabriel: Yeah.
- 1:05:48 RTH: And whether that impact... The question, I guess is whether we think that impact was thematically for a better, for lack of a better word, or, or cognitively, or affectively, or, just,
- 1:06:01 Gabriel: Okay. Yeah. So, um, I think I was getting, I *was* getting a little confused because there was like an uncomfortable feeling that the words caused like an emotional thing. Um, and I was getting confused about the, that in particular, the emotional aspect of it, uh, and how it was present to me. But I, I *can* confidently say that I, there was sort of a thought of *that's horrible*. Now, I don't know if that's the words, *that's horrible*. The words *that's horrible* were not present to me. But, and I also don't know if that's the best way of describing, uh, the thought, because there was almost like some sort of guilt mixed into it. Um, but I, I don't know what a better way of putting it than thinking that, y'know, than *that's horrible*. [pause] And, um, look, okay, I am, I'm definitely having a harder time explaining this one.
- 1:07:31 RTH: So, Amber, do you wanna continue on this or you want me to continue on this one?
- 1:07:35 AG: Uh, well, I was gonna say that I know what you're talking about, like contextually, just I know what scene you're talking about. I know, like the [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] show.

So I was wondering if, I don't really, like, we, you've mentioned earlier that you, you *heard* things from videos, right? So I'm just trying to understand where there this additional component, *if* this additional component is part of your experience, is that, is, is it to, is this to say like, I'm *hearing* this and there's *something*, and I'm *not* just hearing it, there's a little bit of something going on in addition to just hearing it? Does that make sense? Like,

1:08:16 Gabriel: Yes, [AG: Okay.] there *is* something going on in addition to just hearing it, which is like an emotional reaction? Uh, and uh, yeah. An emotion. Yeah, an emotional reaction. Maybe. I mean, may, I guess maybe there isn't a thought, maybe it's just an emotional reaction. Uh, but I feel like the emotional reaction *is a thought*, um, about the video. But, uh, I also might be just too confused.

1:08:52 AG: Okay.

1:08:57 RTH: So lemme see whether I got it. The Walter White, Wright, has said, "I am the danger," and you are impacted by that somehow. And the question is whether that impact is just as a affective feeling, I feel the darkness or whatever, [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] or whether the, whether I am in some analytical kind of way saying, well, *that's horrible*.

1:09:28 Gabriel: Oh, right. Okay. Um, yeah, that's, that's the question. And I think maybe when I use the word active thought, uh, I think that was a poor choice of words because I think the word active in that case was interpreted, might have been interpreted to mean that I was sort of actively, intentionally voluntarily *producing* the thought. Uh, what I meant to say, what I meant by the word active was, I meant that the thought is actually there, it's going on.

1:09:56 RTH: Okay. [Gabriel: Um,] That, that's sort, that's sort of how I understood it. I don't think, [AG: Mm-hmm.] I don't think I had that part of it wrong. [Gabriel: Okay.] So the, the que, the, the question for me is mostly about, to the degree, the degree to which this was a, an, uh, cognitive analytic-y kind of a *thought* or an affective feeling-y, kind of a feeling, or whether that distinction doesn't make sense for you at this moment, in this [inaudible].

1:10:22 Gabriel: The distinction. I, uh, I understand the distinction. Um, and I would like to say it makes sense. However, I, I, I don't think it makes sense to me right now, um, because it kind, it, it feels, it feels like both.

1:10:44 RTH: Could be!

1:10:46 Gabriel: Okay.

1:10:49 RTH: So the, this is, this is, goes back to the, y'know, not, let's not try to pin ourselves down early. The longer, the longer we can keep something going and the more likelihood that we're gonna get to be able to sort it through. [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] So I, I think we should leave as a open question: well, we don't know exactly at the moment of this beep, or in Gabriel's experience in general, whether we should call

this a cognitively analytic thing or a effectively thing, or some of each or both, or some other thing that we haven't yet figured out how to talk about. [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] What I would notice in, in the, in the world, *I think*, there are some people who would be clearly analytical, *oh, this is horrible*. And, and they would be saying that to themselves in words or an unsymbolized thinking clearly that would be clearly translatable into words. [Gabriel: Hmm.] That's a possibility. And there are other people who would just feel horrible and they might feel it mentally or they might feel it in [Gabriel: Yeah.] their heart felt heavy or whatever. And then there's some [Gabriel: Okay.] who, who, who don't make that distinction that clearly and that these things are wrapped up in each other.

1:12:01 Gabriel: If I were to describe it as best I could now, after hearing that, I would say if there was, it was an affective feeling of, *that's horrible*. I don't think it was physical. I think it was mental. Uh, and yet the, the affective feeling, uh, of, y'know, discomfort contained within it, the, I don't know, proposition, statement, fact that, um, this particular thing was horrible. It wasn't that I'm deducing from the feeling that this thing is horrible because it made me feel nasty. It's that that was actually sort of there.

1:12:52 RTH: And, and I, I don't, I don't doubt that. And what I would say is that, that we're probably never gonna know about this particular beep because there's too much water over the dam. We've had to, [Gabriel: Okay.] we've had to work at this, at this beep too hard. But now we've, we have clarified a distinction or two, and maybe the next time, if we're in a similar situation, then it'll be, we, we'll, we'll have, we'll have an easier time getting to the heart of the matter.

1:12:52 Russ comments: This is the heart of the iterative process. Gabriel's account at 1:12:01 sounds plausible, *is* plausible, and perhaps is a faithful account of his experience at the moment of beep 12.2. But RTH would rather have us end the discussion of this aspect inconclusively, so that *next time* a similar experience occurs, we will be more efficient in describing the characteristics without having to backtrack about any aspect of the sample 12.2 description.

1:13:22 Gabriel: Okay.

1:13:23 RTH: It's all the same deal, same conversation that we had earlier on. [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] longer, the longer we wait to commit ourselves to things, the better off I think we're gonna be.

1:13:32 Gabriel: Right. Okay.

1:13:36 RTH: Because if, if we were to, so, so we've arrived at this where I think the, I think it's heart of the matter, and if we were to, if were, whether, what we've arrived at is that there was, there *was* an unsymbolized thought in the middle of this mix. Let's say we had arrived at that, which, which I wouldn't say we probably shouldn't arrive at, but let's say we did. [Gabriel: Okay.] Then that would color all the future things. Well, I gotta go looking for this unsymbolized thinking that's in the middle of the, any affective of kind of deal. [Gabriel: Right.] And I would say, *let's not do that*. Let's,

[Gabriel: Okay.] leave as an open question whether there's some analytic-y kind of a thing in the, maybe there is, maybe there's not.

1:14:15 Gabriel: Okay.

1:14:16 RTH: And, and we might, if we sample long enough, answer that question for Gabriel. Or maybe we won't. Either one, the, I'm *not* saying we should make that as an aim. We're gonna try to, we're gonna try to figure that out. [Gabriel: Mm-hmm.] Maybe we're g, maybe we will have the opportunity, y'know, God will grant us the opportunity. I don't know how you feel about all those kinds of things, but, uh, but some omniscient being will provide us with a beep at the right time to sort these kinds of things out. Or, or, or maybe he won't. And, and, uh, I, I wasn't trying to invoke a particular deity. I'm just trying to say it's not me. I'm, I'm not the, omniscient being, and I don't know whether, whether it's gonna happen or not.

1:14:59 Gabriel: Okay.

1:15:02 AG: Um, [RTH: Inaudible]

1:15:03 RTH: Go ahead.

1:15:04 AG: Well, there's some other characteristics of this that are separate or that are not part of this. Should we keep going or...?

1:15:13 RTH: I'm guessing we've probably worn ourselves out here and we should call this a day and... But [Gabriel: Inaudible] I'm, I'm, I'm, I'm, I'm happy. Well, let me take it back. Go ahead and look ahead and do it. I got, I'm gonna listen to what's happening here, but I'm gonna listen, I'm gonna turn myself off cuz I gotta, my dog is scratching at the door so, [AG: [laugh] Okay.] so go, go for it.

1:15:40 AG: Okay. Um, I just, so the thing you had mentioned is there's an image of Walter White speaking? I just wanted to clarify that initially, um, you had said that that, and the "I am the danger" was 80%. Are those similar to previously? Is that all one experience or is that two separate things? Or does that distinction not make any sense or...

1:16:03 Gabriel: Uh, I think it's, uh, all the same. Uh, the, the, the auditory thing of [AG: Mm-hmm.] hearing "I am the danger" and the image are basically the same thing. [AG: Got it.] They're basically one, one experience.

1:16:15 AG: Okay. So could you tell me about what you see?

1:16:19 Gabriel: Okay, that's just, um, uh, that's just Walter White, uh, black, black T-shirt, uh, bald [laugh], angry, uh, goatee. Um, and then there's a blurry background and the camera is slightly below or I guess the, the, it's slightly, yeah. So he's sort of in a position, a high position. He's like kind of raised up in the, in this image.

1:16:53 AG: And is this an image? Or is this like, I see Walter White with a blurry background?

1:16:58 Gabriel: Yeah this, this is, I see Walter White with a blurry background. Well, I, [AG: Okay.] I wasn't making a thing of the blurry background, but, um, oh boy. Here we go with blurriness again... [AG: Laugh] I wasn't making a thing of the blurry background, um, upon analyzing the, the image or the, this seeing, I can say that the background was not in focus. Uh, that, so I, I hope that that explains what I meant by *blurry* there.

1:17:42 RTH: And by not in focus, you mean I'm just not paying attention to it? Or do you mean that it's out of,

1:17:47 Gabriel: I mean that it, I mean that it is out of focus. So I'm not paying attention to his shirt, really. Like, uh, uh, however, like, however that *is* in focus, But the background is out of focus. [RTH: Okay.]

1:18:09 AG: Okay. And is there anything more to be said about that?

1:18:14 Gabriel: Uh, I don't think so.

1:18:17 AG: Okay. Um, any more questions about that?

1:18:21 RTH: I'm good.

1:18:22 AG: Okay. And then the last 20% is this pain your bicep. [Gabriel: Right.] Right. Which does, does the side, like arm,

1:18:34 Gabriel: Yeah, it does. It was, it was my right, uh, right bicep. [AG: Okay.] And, uh, it was, uh, yeah, it was a pain. It was like, uh, it felt like, uh, yeah, it was, uh, it was just, yeah, it was a, it was pain in my bicep. It was kind of like the size of, uh, a golf ball maybe. Uh, so it was, it was localized to a specific part of my bicep, which was the front. And uh, it felt like, it felt like a kind of golf-ball-sized volume of pain.

1:19:21 AG: And is that, that, to say that, is, that's just the area? Like when you say golf ball, that's just like the area that you feel it? [Gabriel: Yes.] Or is there something else that...?

1:19:36 Gabriel: It's just the area. It's not like I'm, it's not like I feel like the pain takes the shape of us, of a ball or anything. That's just sort of how it, it's, it's spread out-ness, how spread out it is.

1:19:51 AG: Okay. Um, is there anything more to be said about that?

1:19:59 Gabriel: Um, I'll say that it's a burning, a burning pain. It's not like a stabbing pain or anything like that.

1:20:12 AG: Okay. Um, any more questions about that?

1:20:16 RTH: I'm good.

1:20:17 AG: Good there too?

1:20:17 CK: Yeah, I'm good as well. Okay.

1:20:22 RTH: So shall we do this again?

1:20:26 Gabriel: I would be happy to.

1:20:27 CK: Sure.